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THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 


AT  THE  BALLANTYNE  PRESS 

PRINTED  BY  SPOTTISWOODE,  BALLANTYNE  AND  CO.  LTB. 

COLCHESTER.  LONDON  AND  ETON,  ENGLAND 


1 


'THE 

FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 


A   DOCUMENTAKY   ACCOUNT 

REVEALING  THE  CAUSES  OF  HER  STRENGTH, 

WEALTH  AND  EFFICIENCY 


BY 

J.  ELLIS  BARKER 

» ■ 

AUTHOR  OF  *  MODERN  GERMANY,'  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  BUTTON  &  COMPANY 

681   FIFTH  AVENUE 

1916 


/h 


h 


M 


(X 


PREFACE 

Innumerable  books  in  the  English  language  deal  with 
German  history  and  German  poUtical  and  economic  affairs, 
but  practically  not  one  of  these  has  touched  the  heart  of 
things.  None  has  revealed  to  us  the  mainsprings  and  hidden 
causes  of  Germany's  power,  Germany's  efficiency,  and 
Germany's  economic  success.  None  has  displayed  to  us 
the  principles  of  German  statesmanship  and  diplomacy, 
and  the  factors  which  have  shaped  the  national  character 
and  the  national  conscience  of  the  people.  An  adequate 
account  of  the  foundations  of  modern  Germany  does  not 
exist  in  any  language,  not  even  in  German.  In  the  present 
volume  such  an  account  will  be  given  for  the  first  time. 
For  its  composition  the  writings,  speeches,  and  state  papers 
of  Prusso-Germany's  leading  men  from  the  time  of  the 
Great  Elector  to  the  present,  have  been  ransacked. 
Hundreds  of  volumes  which  are  to  be  found  only  in  a  few 
of  the  greatest  libraries  outside  Germany  have  been  drawn 
upon.  Into  a  brief  space  all  the  most  important  pronounce- 
ments of  Prusso-Germany's  leading  men  on  the  greatest 
political  questions  have  been  compressed.  The  book  con- 
tains within  a  few  hundred  pages  the  quintessence  of  German 
statesmanship  in  all  its  branches,  and  in  the  words  of  its 
most  celebrated  and  most  authoritative  exponents. 

Nations  are  what  they  are  owing  Jo  their  past.  Modern 
Germany  has  been  created  by  a  few  very  eminent  men  such 
as  the  Great  Elector,  Frederick  Wilham  the  First,  Frederick 

▼ 


vi  PREFACE 

the  Great,  Bismarck,  Moltke ;  and  Frederick  was  by  far  the 
greatest  of  these.  As  the  action  of  modern  Germany  is 
based  on  the  tradition  which  these  men  have  created,  we 
can  fully  understand  Germany  only  by  studying  their 
teachings  in  word  and  deed.  Not  Bismarck,  but  Frederick 
the  Great,  was  the  maker  of  the  German  Empire  and  of  the 
German  nation.  Frederick  anticipated  Bismarck's  unifica- 
tion of  the  Empire  under  Prussian  leadership  by  the  creation 
of  the  Fiirstenbund.  He  ruled  Prussia  during  no  less  than 
forty-six  years.  He  created  during  his  long  reign  the 
traditions  of  modern  Germany  by  his  example  and  by  his 
teachings.  He  left  for  the  guidance  of  his  successors  a 
number  of  most  important  state  papers.  They  are 
practically  unknown  to  the  EngHsh-speaking  peoples,  and 
they  have  hitherto  not  been  reprinted  in  this  country. 
Carlyle  scarcely  mentions  them  in  his  bulky  historical 
volumes.  They  are  Httle  known  even  to  the  German  public, 
but  they  are,  and  have  been,  the  Bible  of  all  Prusso-German 
statesmen.  These  most  important  papers  are  reproduced 
in  full  at  the  end  of  this  volume.  They  are  given  in  the 
original  French — Frederick  could  scarcely  write  German — and 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  they  will  be  read  and  carefully  studied 
not  only  by  statesmen  and  pubUcists,  but  also  by  the  general 
pubhc  and  by  the  rising  generation.  It  seems  desirable 
that  the  present  volume  should  serve  as  a  text-book  at  schools 
and  universities.  Young  men  and  women  may  learn  French 
as  well  from  the  writings  of  Frederick  the  Great  as  from 
those  of  La  Fontaine  and  Bossuet,  of  Moh^re  and  Fenelon. 
Besides,  it  is  important  that  the  citizens  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
democracies,  who,  after  all,  direct  the  policy  of  their  country, 
should  know  something  of  the  real  Germany.  It  is 
important  that  they  should  not  merely  be  acquainted  with 
dry  historical  facts  and  dates,  but  that  they  should  know 
something  of  real  history  and  of  real  statesmanship. 

Incidentally  the  book  reveals  the  failings  of  Democracy, 
the  defects  of  democratic  organisation  and  administration. 


PREFACE  vii 

It  is  no  doubt  possible  to  combine  the  advantages  of 
democratic  with  those  of  autocratic  government,  Hberty 
with  eflQciency,  order,  and  economy.  Democracy  need  not, 
and  should  not,  be  synonymous  with  disorganisation, 
instability,  amateurishness,  drift,  muddle,  waste,  improvi- 
dence, and  unpreparedness  for  war.  The  present  war  has 
revealed  the  weakness  of  Democracy.  The  views  of  the 
greatest  German  rulers  and  statesmen  collected  in  this 
volume  may  indicate  the  cure.  The  experience  of  the 
present  war  may  cause  Germany  to  become  more  democratic 
and  may  cause  the  Anglo-Saxon  democracies  to  become 
better  organised.  The  views  of  Frederick  the  Great  on 
the  defects  of  democracy  and  of  Cabinet  Government  should 
be  particularly  interesting  at  the  present  moment. 

The  first  three  chapters  have  previously  been  published 
in  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After.  The  fourth  chap- 
ter has  appeared  in  The  Contemporary  Beview.  Chapters 
VI,  VII,  and  VIII  have  appeared  in  The  Fortnightly  Beview. 
Chapters  V,  IX,  X,  XI,  XII,  and  XIII  are  entirely  new.  I 
would  herewith  sincerely  thank  the  Editors  of  the  periodicals 
named  for  their  permission  to  reprint  these  articles.  They 
have  been  very  widely  commented  upon,  and  have  been 
repubhshed  not  only  in  the  British  Dominions,  in  the 
United  States,  France,  Russia,  and  Roumania,  but  even 
in  China.  I  would,  however,  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
that  these  articles  have  not  merely  been  reprinted,  but  that 
they  have  been  very  greatly  expanded,  and  that  they  have 
provided  only  the  nuclei  of  the  chapters  indicated. 

The  present  volume  is  totally  distinct  from,  and  is 
complementary  to,  my  book,  '  Modern  Germany '  (Smith, 
Elder  &  Co.,  7s.  &d.  net),  of  which  a  fifth  and  very  greatly 
enlarged  edition  was  published  in  1915.  That  book  deals 
in  nearly  900  pages  exclusively  with  modern  affairs,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  sub-title,  *  Her  Political  and  Economic 
Problems,  her  Policy,  her  Ambitions,  and  the  Causes  of  her 
Successes  and  of  her  Failures.'     *  Modern  Germany  '  has 


viii  PKEFACE 

been  widely  read  throughout  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.  The 
fourth  edition  has  been  pirated  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  book  has  been  translated  even  into  Japanese.  It  is 
widely  used  as  a  book  of  reference,  and  I  venture  to  hope 
that  its  successor  will  prove  as  popular  and  as  useful  to 
statesmen,  pohticians,  educationaUsts,  journalists,  and  pubhc 
speakers. 

J.   ELLIS  BARKER. 
Apnl  1916. 


CONTENTS 


I.      ThB  FOTJITDATIONS  OF  GbRMAKY'S  StEENOTH,  WbALTH, 

AND  EinciBiroY 1 

II.    The  Foundations  of  Germany's  Diplomacy     .         .      59 

ni.    The  Policy  of  Bismarck  aitd  op  William  II     .         .    108 

IV.    The  Foundations  of  German  Education,  and  of  the 

National  Character 150 

V.  The  German  Army  and  the  General  Staff    .         .168 

VI.  The  Causes  of  the  War 174 

VII.  Germany  and  Turkey 197 

VIII.  The  German  Colonlal  Empire  ....    212 

THE  MOST  IMPORTANT  PRUSSIAN  STATE  PAPERS 

IX.    Frederick  the  Great's  Political  Testament  of  1776. 

(Exposii  Du  GouvERNEMENT  Prussien,  &c.)    .         .     229 

X.  Introductory  Chapter  of  Frederick  the  Great's 
Posthumous  Memoirs  (Histoirb  de  mon  Temps), 
written  for  the  guidance  of  his  successors        .     238 

XI.    Frederick  the  Great's  Memoir  on  Government  and 
ON  THE  Duties  of  Sovereigns  (Essai  sur  les  Formes 

DE   GOUVERNBMENT,  &C.) 248 

Xn.    Frederick  the  Great'  s  Directions  for  the  Education 

OF  Princes  (Instruction  au  Major  Borcke)  .     266 

XIII.    Frederick  the  Great's  Instructions  in  case  of  his 

Death  in  Battle,  Defeat,  or  Capture         .         .     271 

INDEX 273 

iz 


THE 

FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

CHAPTEE  I 

THE   FOUNDATIONS    OF   GERMANY'S   STRENGTH,   WEALTH 
AND    EFFICIENCY^ 

Before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  many  very  eminent, 
but  very  ill-informed,  people  publicly  expressed  the  belief 
that  Germany  would  not  dare  to  go  to  war  because  the 
Powers  ranged  against  her  were  too  strong,  because  she  was 
too  poor,  because  her  finances  were  in  disorder.  Immediately 
after  its  outbreak  they  proclaimed  equally  loudly  that 
Germany  would  rapidly  be  defeated,  that  the  combination 
of  Franco-British  wealth  and  of  Eussian  numbers,  of  the 
greatest  industrial  and  the  greatest  agricultural  nation, 
of  the  largest  army  and  the  strongest  fleet,  would  inevitably 
prove  fatal  to  Germany,  that  before  long  the  armies  of  the 
Allies  would  sweep  all  over  Germany  and  enter  Berhn. 
Since  then  many  months  have  elapsed.  The  AlHes  have 
not  yet  succeeded  in  seizing  firmly  upon  German  soil. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  are  still  in  possession  of 
nearly  all  Belgium,  and  of  Serbia,  and  they  hold  besides 
large  and  exceedingly  valuable  districts  of  North-eastern 
France  and  of  Western  Eussia  which  contain  some  of  the 
most  important  manufacturing  centres. 

^  From  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  July  1915. 

B 


2  .TOE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Belgiui?!,.'  Poland,  and  -North-eastern  France  have 
become  German  strongholds  and  German  arsenals.  Germany- 
controls  territories  filled  with  fortresses  and  with  machinery 
of  every  kind.  Nor  is  this  all.  She  has  not  only  success- 
fully defended  her  own  country  and  invaded  her  neighbour 
States  ;  she  has  in  addition  carefully  organised  the  vast 
territories  occupied  by  her  troops  and  has  thoroughly 
organised  the  defence  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey  as  well.  Lastly,  she  is  providing  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  not  only  with  an  abundance  of  officers 
and  soldiers,  but  also  with  money,  arms,  ammunition,  and 
suppHes  of  every  kind.  She  is  governing  and  administering 
three  great  States.  Without  Germany's  help  Turkey  and 
Austria-Hungary  would  probably  have  been  lost .  Germany's 
great  mihtary  achievements,  her  vast  industrial  and  financial 
strength,  the  foresight  and  abihty  of  her  military  and 
industrial  leaders  and  of  her  administrators,  and  the  unity 
and  the  unflinching  devotion  of  her  people  in  field  and 
factory  have  amazed  even  the  best  informed. 

At  the  moment  the  cry  of  national  organisation  is  on 
everybody's  hps.  We  are  told  that  the  British  nation, 
that  the  whole  British  Empire,  must  be  organised  for  war, 
that  a  perfectly  organised  nation  such  as  Germany  can  be 
overcome  only  if  all  the  human  and  material  resources 
of  the  Empire  are  brought  to  bear  upon  the  struggle. 
Unfortunately,  most  Enghshmen  have  only  a  vague  idea 
what  national  organisation  means  and  involves.  Since 
statesmanship,  the  science  of  the  vital  interests  of  the 
State,  as  Prince  Metternich  described  it,  is  absolutely 
ignored  by  the  British  and  American  universities,  Germany's 
national  organisation  and  administration  are  practically 
unknown  to  the  English-speaking  peoples.  Industrious 
investigators  have  described  to  us  in  detail  the  outside 
of  certain  German  institutions  and  organisations,  but 
they  have  failed  to  show  us  their  mainsprings  and  spirit, 
and  to  reveal  to  us  the  true  sources  of  Germany's  strength, 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STKENGTH      3 

wealth,  and  efficiency.  In  the  following  pages  I  will  en- 
deavour to  describe  the  causes  of  Germany's  marvellous 
mihtary  and  economic  achievements,  and  will  show  that 
the  chief  cause  of  Germany's  strength  is  discipline.  In 
doing  this  I  shall  give  a  large  number  of  most  important 
documents,  nearly  all  of  which  have  not  previously  been 
pubhshed  in  the  English  language. 

German  efficiency  and  thoroughness  have  been  plants 
of  slow  growth.  Germany's  administrative  poHcy  was 
not  created  by  Bismarck,  nor  was  her  mihtary  pohcy 
initiated  by  Moltke.  If  we  wish  to  discover  the  sources 
of  Germany's  power,  we  must  acquaint  ourselves  with 
the  views  and  teachings  of  those  great  men  who  created 
Germany's  administrative,  mihtary,  financial,  and  economic 
policy,  who  created  her  traditions,  who  made  modern 
Germany.  We  must  look  into  the  past  to  understand 
the  present. 

Three  centuries  ago  Brandenburg-Prussia,  which  be- 
came a  kingdom  only  in  1701,  occupied  probably  a  far 
lower  position  in  Europe  than  that  held  by  one  of  the  Balkan 
States  at  present.  The  country  had  neither  a  national 
organisation  nor  an  army.  The  people  were  poor,  rude, 
uncultured,  ignorant,  and  were  devoid  of  a  sense  of  unity 
and  of  patriotism.  The  Germans,  as  a  race,  are  not  par- 
ticularly gifted.  Man  for  man,  Enghshmen  and  French- 
men are  probably  their  superiors.  However,  a  Govern- 
ment can  make  or  unmake  the  character  of  a  nation.  The 
Germans  have  been  made  what  they  are  by  their  masterful 
rulers,  especially  by  Frederick  Wilham,  the  Great  Elector, 
by  King  Frederick  WilUam  the  First,  and  by  Frederick 
the  Great.  Phable  materials  are  most  easily  moulded. 
The  success  of  the  three  greatest  rulers  of  Prusso- Germany 
is  perhaps  largely  attributable  to  the  fact  that  they  set 
to  work  on  the  most  unpromising  raw  material,  upon  poor, 
ignorant,  and  submissive  boors. 

Frederick  William,  the  Great  Elector,  was  born  in  1620, 

b2 


4  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

and  he  came  to  the  throne  in  1640,  at  a  time  when  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  of  1618-48  was  still  raging.  As  a  youth  he  had 
spent  three  years  in  Holland,  which  was  then  the  wealthiest, 
the  most  advanced,  and  the  most  warlike  country  in  the 
world.  As  Brandenburg-Prussia  had  been  terribly  de- 
vastated by  the  warring  troops,  he  wished  before  all  to 
create  an  army  for  its  defence.  However,  he  found  it  very 
difficult  to  raise  the  necessary  money.  Self-government 
prevailed  in  his  scattered  dominions.  As  the  nobility 
and  the  Estates  jealously  defended  their  privileges  and 
refused  to  vote  the  necessary  funds,  the  Elector  resolved 
to  break  their  power  and  to  place  taxation  on  a  compulsory 
basis. 

He  gradually  destroyed  popular  representation,  such  as 
it  was,  and  made  the  Estates  a  mere  tool.  At  last  they 
were  called  together  exclusively  for  the  purpose  of  voting 
money.  They  were  allowed  to  sit  only  for  a  fortnight, 
and  to  discuss  nothing  except  the  proposals  which  the 
Elector  put  before  them.  At  the  same  time,  they  were 
informed  that  any  funds  which  they  failed  to  vote  would 
be  collected  from  them  by  force,  by  '  military  execution.' 
The  written  remonstrances  and  protests  of  his  Parliament 
were  usually  returned  unanswered.  At  last  the  Estates  of 
Prussia  declared  in  1674  that  they  did  not  care  to  attend 
the  Diet  any  longer  because  their  gathering  led  to  nothing 
except  an  increase  in  taxation.  The  Great  Elector  replied 
that  he  also  did  not  see  the  necessity  of  a  Diet  which  did 
nothing  but  complain  and  produce  nothing  but  unnecessary 
expense  and  delay.  Frederick  Wilham,  hke  Bismarck, 
preferred  governing  without  a  parliament. 

Soon  after  his  advent  the  Great  Elector  raised  a  force 
of  8000  men.  This  was  the  first  standing  army  of  the 
Hohenzollems,  and  it  grew  apace.  In  1651,  after  eleven 
years  of  government,  the  Great  Elector  had  an  army  of 
16,000,  and  in  the  war  of  1665  he  was  at  the  head  of  26,000 
men  supplied  with  seventy-two  guns.    His  soldiers  were 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  STRENGTH      5 

highly  trained  and  disciplined.  By  enormous  exertions  he 
had  made  Brandenburg-Prussia  an  important  military  Power. 
The  Great  Elector  ruthlessly  and  tyrannously  suppressed 
existing  self-government  in  his  possessions,  and  gave  to 
his  scattered  and  parochially  minded  subjects  a  strong 
sense  of  unity.  Relying  upon  his  powerful  army,  he  enforced 
his  will  upon  the  nobility,  the  Estates,  and  the  citizens, 
and  made  himself  the  absolute  master  of  the  country.  He 
ruled  the  State  with  savage  energy  and  with  great  abiHty. 
To  enable  the  people  to  bear  the  cost  of  a  large  army,  he  ^^"^^^z 
strove  to  increase  their  wealth  by  promoting  agriculture,  ,y(^ 
commerce,  and  the  manufacturing  industries.  He  im-  ^^^^ 
ported  from  Holland  skilled  engineers  who  reclaimed 
swamps,  and  able  farmers  and  gardeners  who  improved 
cultivation.  Every  peasant  had  to  lay  out  a  garden,  and 
none  might  marry  unless  he  had  planted  at  least  six  oak 
trees,  and  had  planted  and  grafted  at  least  six  fruit  trees. 
To  improve  industry  and  commerce,  he  constructed  the 
Frederick  Wilham  Canal,  connecting  the  Oder  with  the 
Spree  and  the  Elbe,  and  numerous  high  roads,  and  intro- 
duced a  modern  system  of  posts  and  mails. 

As  his  country  had  been  depopulated  by  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  he  wished  to  attract  to  it  new  inhabitants. 
By  an  Edict  of  October  29, 1685,  he  promised  to  the  Hugue- 
nots who  fled  from  France  owing  to  the  revocation  of  the 
Edict  of  Nantes  assistance  for  defraying  their  travelling 
expenses,  permission  to  settle  where  they  liked,  freedom 
to  bring  in  their  goods  and  chattels  free  of  all  charges.  The 
needy  were  to  receive  empty  houses  which  the  Elector 
would  buy  from  their  owners.  They  were  to  be  given 
building  material  of  every  kind  for  repairing  these  houses, 
and  to  be  freed  from  all  imposts  for  six  years.  The  well- 
to-do  who  wished  to  build  houses  for  themselves  were 
to  be  given  land  and  building  materials,  and  to  be  free  from 
all  imposts  for  ten  years.  The  rights  of  citizenship  were 
to  be  given  gratis. 


6  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

Manufacturers  and  artisans  were  to  receive  machines, 
raw  material,  and  monetary  subsidies.  Agriculturists  were 
to  obtain  ground  suitable  for  cultivation.  The  refugees 
were  to  be  allowed  to  settle  differences  among  themselves 
by  voluntary  courts  of  their  own,  and  in  every  town  a 
preacher  was  to  be  maintained  for  them  at  the  Elector's 
cost.  French  noblemen  were  to  enjoy  equality  with  Prussian 
noblemen,  &c. 

As  the  French  refugees  might  be  deterred  by  the  rigorous 
climate  and  the  poverty  of  Brandenburg  and  migrate  to 
Switzerland,  England,  and  Holland  instead,  the  Elector 
wisely  tried  to  induce  them  to  come  to  his  country  and 
remain  there  by  granting  them  far  more  valuable  faci- 
lities and  privileges  than  they  were  offered  elsewhere. 
The  result  of  his  pohcy  was  that  many  French  refugees 
who  had  gone  to  Switzerland  and  Holland  went  later  on 
to  Brandenburg.  According  to  Ancillon's  *  Histoire  de 
Testabhssement  des  Frangois  Refugies,'  there  were,  in  1697, 
12,297  French  refugees  in  Brandenburg,  not  counting 
the  military. 

Numerous  French  people  settled  in  Berlin,  brought^to 
that  town  their  industries,  and  raised  the  intelligence  of 
the  population  by  their  culture,  energy,  and  vivacity. 
The  French  immigrants  and  their  descendants  became 
most  valuable  citizens.  They  founded  industries,  entered 
the  professions,  and  many  of  the  most  eminent  Germans 
are  direct  descendants  of  the  French  refugees.  Some 
maintained  their  French  names,  like  De  la  Motte  Fouque, 
Michelet,  Lestocq,  Ancillon,  De  la  Courbiere.  Others 
Germanised  them.  Among  the  descendants  of  the  French 
refugees  were  the  brothers  Humboldt.  At  the  end  of^the 
Great  Elector's  reign  no  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Prussia  were  foreign  immigrants  and  descendants  of 
foreign  immigrants. 

By  the  pohcy  outlined  the  Great  Elector  greatly  in- 
creased the  population,  the  wealth;  and  the  mihtary  power 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH      7 

of  his  country.  By  a  skilful  and  daring  diplomacy,  and 
by  the  energetic  use  of  his  excellent  army,  which  he  had 
been  able  to  create  only  by  destroying  the  power  of  the 
Estates  and  by  greatly  increasing  the  wealth  of  the  people, 
he  vastly  enlarged  his  territories  and  gave  to  the  State 
a  great  prestige  throughout  Europe.  Among  his  victories, 
that  over  the  dreaded  Swedes  at  FehrbelHn  was  the  most 
glorious.  During  the  forty-eight  years  of  his  wise,  energetic, 
but  ruthless,  reign,  the  territory  of  Brandenburg-Prussia 
was  increased  by  nearlji  50  per  cent.  Its  population  rose 
from  1,000,000  to  1,500,000,  notwithstanding  wars,  famine, 
and  pestilence.  The  success  of  the  civil  administration 
of  a  country  can  be  gauged  largely  by  the  revenue  returns. 
During  the  rule  of  the  Great  Elector  the  State  revenue  of 
Brandenburg-Prussia  increased,  incredible  as  it  may  seem, 
nearly  five-fold,  from  500,000  to  2,500,000  thalers.  He  had 
found  a  poor,  devastated  country  without  order  and  without 
an  army.  He  left  a  greatly  enlarged  State,  a  comparatively 
wealthy  and  much  larger  population,  and  a  large  and 
excellent  army  to  his  successor. 

In  1688  the  Great  Elector  died.  His  place  was  taken 
by  Frederick  the  Third,  who  in  1701  assumed  the  royal 
crown  and  the  title  of  King  Frederick  the  First.  Frederick 
was  a  vain  and  worthless  monarch.  Under  his  rule  the 
country  decHned  and  decayed.  Maladministration  became 
general.  However,  he  maintained  and  even  increased 
the  Prussian  army.     That  was  his  only  merit. 

Under  the  inept  rule  of  this  Frederick,  who  tried  to  ape 
Louis  the  Fourteenth,  and  who  wasted  the  national  re- 
sources in  vain  ostentation,  luxury,  and  debauchery,  the 
Hfework  of  the  Great  Elector  was  largely  destroyed.  The 
unification,  concentration,  and  organisation  of  the  Prussian 
administration  and  of  the  whole  national  life  which  that 
great  ruler  had  effected  and  the  efficiency  which  he  had 
created  were  temporarily  lost.  Favourites  and  mistresses 
ruled  and  robbed  the  country,  and  the  worthless  King  went 


8  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

so  far  in  the  neglect  of  his  duties  that  he  handed  to 
his  Minister-favourites  signed  blanks  to  be  filled  with 
orders  and  instructions  at*  their  pleasure,  thus  saving 
himself  the  trouble  of  reading  documents  requiring  his 
signature. 

His  son,  Frederick  William  the  First,  was  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  and  one  of  the  greatest  rulers  the  world 
has  seen.  He  is  unknown  to  the  English-speaking  peoples, 
for  Carlyle  and  Macaulay  have  made  a  caricature  of  him. 
His  eminence  as  a  ruler  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
Frederick  the  Great,  in  writing  an  account  of  his  hfe,  closed 
it  with  the  words  :  *  As  all  the  strength  of  the  spreading 
oak  has  sprung  from  a  httle  acorn,  so  the  greatness  of 
Prussia  has  sprung  from  the  industrious  life  and  the  wise 
measures  of  Frederick  WilUam  the  First.'  Frederick 
Wilham  was  neither  briUiant,  nor  had  he  winning  ways. 
/He  was  the  organiser,  the  disciplinarian,  the  schoolmaster, 
the  true  maker  of  modern  Germany.  History  which  has 
named  his  son  *  the  Great '  should  call  Frederick  WilHam 
the  First   '  the  Thorough.' 

The  Great  Elector  had,  as  we  have  seen,  destroyed  the 
power  of  self-government  and  of  obstruction  in  Prussia, 
and  had  thus  cleared  the  way  for  his  successors.  Frederick 
William  the  First  made  use  of  the  opportunity  which  his 
grandfather  had  thus  provided,  and  founded  in  Prussia 
a  perfectly  organised  modern  State,  a  model  adminis- 
tration, and  created  a  perfectly  equipped  and  ever  ready 
army. 

Frederick  Wilham  was  in  every  respect  totally  different 
from  his  father.  He  was  uneducated,  boorish,  coarse, 
gluttonous,  harsh,  brutal,  suspicious,  domineering,  grasping, 
impetuous,  and  filled  with  energy  and  determination. 
While  he  lacked  nearly  all  the  finer  quahties,  Nature  had 
given  him  cunning,  unhmited  common  sense,  a  passionate 
love  of  industry  and  orderhness,  and  a  strong  sense  of 
acquisitiveness,  quahties  which  are  often  found  in  ilhterate 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STKENGTH      9 

peasants  who  succeed  in  accumulating  great  wealth  in  a 
life  of  unceasing  labour,  strife,  and  penurious  thrift. 

Frederick  WiUiam  the  First  had  watched  hfe  at  the 
Prussian  Court  in  his  father's  time  with  horror  and  disgust. 
He  came  to  the  government  in  1713.  Although  he  was  only 
twenty-five  years  old  and  quite  unacquainted  with  affairs 
of  State,  he  immediately  set  to  work  in  his  rough  and 
impulsive  way  to  clear  the  Augean  stable  of  Prussia,  being 
determined  to  save  it  from  bankruptcy  and  to  introduce 
in  it  a  regime  of  frugality,  thrift,  morality,  and  efficiency. 
His  first  action  consisted  in  dismissing  the  great  majority 
of  the  courtiers,  reducing  the  royal  expenditure  to  one-fifth, 
and  applying  the  amount  saved  to  increasing  the  army. 
He  sold  the  bulk  of  the  useless  jewellery,  plate,  valuable 
furniture,  horses,  carriages,  and  wine  which  his  spendthrift 
father  had  accumulated,  and  forced  those  who  had  robbed 
the  State  in  his  father's  lifetime  to  disgorge.  He  sold  or 
let  all  unnecessary  royal  edifices,  and  converted  vast  royal 
parks  and  pleasure  gardens  into  ploughed  fields  and  drill 
grounds.  While,  according  to  Beheim-Schwarzbach,  the 
coronation  of  King  Frederick  the  First  had  cost  6,000,000 
thalers,  his  own  cost  only  2547  thalers  and  9  pfennigs. 

King  Frederick  Wilham  had  seen  the  advantage  of 
conscientious  one-man  rule, in  the  case  of  the  Great  Elector. 
He  resolved  to  administer  Prussia  autocratically,  treating 
the  whole  country  hke  a  huge  private  estate,  and  to  improve 
it  in  every  direction  to  the  utniost  of  his  ability.  He  wrote 
on  one  of  the  first  days  of  his  government,  according  to 
Droysen,  that  he  would  be  his  own  field-marshal  and  his 
own  minister  of  finance.  He  might  have  added  that  he  would 
be  his  own  minister  of  war,  agriculture,  commerce,  education, 
justice,  religion,  and  home  affairs  as  well.  He  ordered 
the  affairs  of  the  Church,  and  prescribed  the  nature  of 
the  services  and  of  the  sermons.  In  every  sermon  the 
duties  of  the  subject,  and  especially  the  duty  of  paying 
the  taxes  punctually,  had  to  be  mentioned.     Other  creeds 


'./ 


10     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

were  not  to  be  attacked  by  the  clergy.  Sermons  were  to 
be  short.  If  a  sermon  lasted  longer  than  an  hour  the 
clergyman  was  to  be  fined  two  thalers.  Frederick  William 
despised  those  citizens  who  Hved  without  productive  work, 
especially  lawyers,  artists,  scientists,  actors,  dancing-masters, 
and  money-lenders,  and  he  prosecuted  usurers  with  the 
greatest  energy.  Usurers  advancing  money  to  minors 
could,  by  his  edict  of  1730,  be  punished  with  the  confiscation 
of  their  entire  capital,  with  a  whipping,  and  even  with 
death.  He  thought  newspapers  superfluous  and  wholly 
mischievous.  He  prosecuted  them,  and  in  1713  and  1714 
he  prohibited  their  appearance  in  BerHn  altogether. 

Frederick  Wilham  the  First  desired  to  strengthen 
Prussia  and  to  increase  its  territories.  Clearly  recognising  that 
wealth  is  power,  and  that  only  a  disciplined,  well-governed, 
and  prosperous  nation  can  provide  a  powerful  army,  he 
concentrated  his  boundless  energy  upon  improving  the 
national  administration,  increasing  the  wealth  of  the  people, 
and  strengthening  the  army.  When  Frederick  WiUiam 
came  to  the  throne  the  army  was  in  a  bad  state  and  was 
80,000  men  strong.  He  rapidly  increased  it.  In  1725 
it  came  to  64,263  and  in  1740,  the  year  of  his  death,  to 
89,099  men.  At  that  time  Prussia  had  only  2,240,000 
inhabitants.  How  enormous  Prussia's  army  was  may  be 
seen  by  the  fact  that  at  the  same  proportion  of  armed  men 
to  the  civil  population,  England  would  now  have  in  peace 
time  a  standing  army  of  nearly  2,000,000  men,  and  Germany 
one  of  nearly  3,000,000  men.  By  sleepless  vigilance  he 
made  his  army  the  most  perfectly  drilled  and  equipped 
and  the  most  ready  force  in  the  world.  Frederick  the 
Great  himself  acknowledged  in  his  writings  that  he  owed  his 
wonderful  victories  to  the  excellence  of  the  army  which  his 
father  had  created  by  twenty-seven  years  of  unceasing  labour. 

Frederick  WiUiam  worked  unremittingly  for  the  country 
from  dawn  till  deep  into  the  night.  Field-Marshal  Count 
von   Seckendorf,   the   Austrian  Ambassador  in   Berlin,   a 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STKENGTH     11 

most  reliable  observer,  admiringly  wrote  on  April  25,  1723, 
according  to  Ameth's  *  Life  of  Prince  Eugene  ' : 

It  is  certain  that  nowhere  in  the  world  one  can  see  troops 
comparable  with  the  Prussians  for  beauty,  cleanHness,  and 
order.  Although  in  drill,  training,  and  marching  much  is 
forced  and  affected,  nearly  everything  is  useful  and  efficient. 
Besides,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  army  and  the  troops 
lack  nothing  that  is  needed.  The  soldiers  number  70,000, 
and  every  regiment  has  at  least  a  hundred  more  men  than 
the  normal  figure.  The  Arsenal  is  superabundantly  provided 
with  field  artillery  and  siege  artillery,  and  only  the  teams 
are  missing.  Moreover,  there  is  such  an  enormous  store  of 
powder,  shot,  and  shells  as  if  a  great  war  was  threatening. 
In  Berlin  and  all  about  Brandenburg  one  sees  as  many 
troops  moving  as  one  saw  in  Vienna  during  the  last  war 
against  the  Turks.  All  this  activity  is  directed  by  the 
King  in  person,  and  only  by  him.  Besides,  he  looks  after 
the  whole  public  administration  in  all  its  branches  with 
such  care  and  thoroughness  that  not  a  thaler  is  spent  unless 
he  has  given  his  signature.  Those  who  do  not  see  it  cannot 
beheve  that  there  is  any  man  in  the  world,  however  intelhgent 
and  able  he  may  be,  who  can  settle  so  many  things  personally 
in  a  single  day  as  Frederick  William  the  First,  who  works 
from  3  o'clock  in  the  morning  till  10,  and  spends  the  rest  of 
the  day  in  looking  after  and  driUing  his  army.  .  .  . 

Frederick  Wilham  the  First  created  not  only  the  German 
army,  but  also  the  German  administration  and  the  Civil 
Service.  He  made  the  German  bureaucracy  the  ablest, 
the  most  hard-working,  the  most  thorough  and  the  most 
conscientious  body  of  Government  servants  in  the  world. 
He  created  its  traditions,  and  gave  it  that  ability,  zeal, 
and  integrity  which  it  has  shown  ever  since. 

Having  punished  severely  those  officials  who  had  taken 
advantage  of  his  father's  neglect  of  pubhc  affairs,  having 
dismissed  the  incompetent,  and  having  reduced  the  salaries 
of  the  over-paid,  he  endeavoured  to  force  thoroughness 
and   good  order  upon  the   bureaucracy   by  his  personal 


12     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

example  and  supervision,  and  by  the  severe  punishment 

of  all  who  failed  in  their  duty.    However,  the  existing 

organisation  could  not  be  made  to  work  smoothly  and 

with  despatch.    When  the  King  found  that  the  departments 

could  not  be  made  to  work  in  harmony,  and  when  all  the 

attempts  of  his  ministers  at  reforming  the  service  had 

failed,  he  retired  to  one  of  his  country  houses  and  drafted 

there  in  seclusion  in  his  almost  illegible  hand  and  in  very 

ungrammatical  German  the  most  comprehensive  regulations 

for  the  reform  of  the  Prussian  administration.     They  may 

be  found  in  Foerster's   '  Life  of  Frederick  Wilham  the 

First,'  in  which  they  fill  more  than  a  hundred  pages.     All 

the  departments  were  to  be  harmonised  by  being  united 

in  a  single  body.     The  King  gave  the  most  minute  orders 

regulating  the  proceedings  of  the  '  General  Directorate,' 

the  supreme  administrative   authority  of  Prussia,  and  of 

the  individual  departments.    The  nature,  thoroughness,  and 

minuteness  of  his  instructions  will  be  seen  from  the  following 

characteristic  and  amusing  extract  from  the  instructions 

to  the  General  Directorate  : 

In  summer  the  Ministers  shall  meet  at  7  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  in  winter  at  8  o'clock. 

The  meeting  shall  not  break  up  until  all  the  matters 
which  are  to  be  discussed  and  decided  upon  have  been 
disposed  of.  Not  a  single  document  must  be  left  over  for 
another  day. 

If  the  business  in  hand  can  be  finished  in  an  hour,  the 
Ministers  are  free  to  go.  If  it  cannot  be  settled  in  the  fore- 
noon, they  must  continue  sitting  without  interruption  until 
6  o'clock  in  the  evening  or  until  all  the  business  is  completed. 

We  herewith  order  Our  Minister  von  Printz  that,  if  the 
Ministers  are  working  later  than  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
he  shall  have  fetched  for  them  four  good  dishes  of  food  from 
the  royal  kitchens,  together  with  an  adequate  quantity 
of  wine  and  beer.  Half  of  the  Ministers  shall  dine  while 
the  other  half  shall  continue  working,  and  those  who  are 
working  shall  dine  as  a  second  shift  when  those  who  were 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANTS  STRENGTH    13 

dining  have  finished  and  are  again  at  their  work.    In  that 
way  the  work  will  be  diligently  and  faithfully  done.  .  .  . 

If  one  of  the  Ministers  or  one  of  their  Councillors  should 
arrive  an  hour  later  than  we  have  ordered,  and  if  he  has  not 
Our  written  permission  for  being  late,  one  hundred  ducats 
shall  be  deducted  from  his  salary.  If  one  of  the  Ministers  or 
Councillors  should  miss  an  entire  sitting  without  being 
prevented  by  illness  or  without  having  Our  permission,  he 
shall  be  fined  by  the  deduction  of  six  months'  pay.  If 
anyone  should  miss  a  second  sitting  without  Our  permission 
or  without  being  ill  he  shall  be  dismissed  from  his  office  with 
disgrace,  for  as  we  pay  our  Ministers  and  Councillors  they 
must  work. 

With  regard  to  the  dinner  of  the  Cabinet  and  the  Coun- 
cillors, Minister  von  Printz  received  further  instructions  : 

The  head  cook  must  at  every  sitting  inquire  at  eleven 
o'clock  through  a  servant  whether  he  should  provide  dinner 
or  not.  Now  we  order  herewith  that  in  case  dinner  should 
be  required  by  the  Ministers  and  high  officials  there  shall 
always  be  four  good  dishes,  namely  a  good  soup,  a  good  piece 
of  boiled  beef  with  vegetables,  a  good  dish  of  fish,  and  a  good 
piece  of  roast  beef,  mutton,  or  veal. 

In  addition  there  should  be  a  quart  bottle  of  good  Rhine 
wine  for  every  person.  However,  the  bill  of  fare  should  not 
always  be  the  same.  There  should  always  be  a  change  of 
dishes.  The  food  should  always  be  the  same  as  that  which 
is  put  before  their  Majesties  themselves.  It  shall  be  served 
only  by  a  single  servant,  for  otherwise  the  room  will  be 
crowded  with  servants.  To  reduce  the  number  of  servants, 
every  one  of  the  Ministers  shall  receive  together  four  plates 
and  a  glass,  and  a  large  basket  shall  be  provided  into  which 
the  soiled  plates  can  be  put. 

Frederick  William  had  the  highest  conception  of  duty. 
He  lived  not  for  himself  or  for  his  family,  but  for  his  country. 
He  worked  most  conscientiously  and  like  a  strenuous 
business  man.  Thoughts  of  his  duties  constantly  disturbed 
his  sleep.    Not  unnaturally  he  demanded  that  all  his  officials 


14  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

should  be  as  hard-working  and  as  thorough  as  he  was  himself, 
He  treated  his  ministers  as  unceremoniously  as  he  did  his 
non-commissioned  officers  if  they  neglected  their  duty. 
In  speaking  of  the  Prussian  Administration  he  habitually 
called  it  *  my  machine.'  It  became  indeed  a  machine 
absolutely  controlled  by  the  King.  It  acted  with  precision 
and  speed,  like  clockwork.  His  officials  had  to  work  un- 
ceasingly and  rapidly,  but  they  were  not  allowed  to  become 
mere  mechanical  tools,  for  intelligence  was  as  much  demanded 
of  them  as  was  industry.  Isaacsohn  in  his  excellent  three- 
volume  work,  '  Geschichte  des  preussischen  Beamtenthums,' 
described  the  reforms  introduced  by  Frederick  William  the 
First  as  follows  : 

The  Prussian  Civil  Service  was  organised  and  developed 
on  mihtary  lines.  In  the  Prussian  Civil  Service,  as  in  the 
army,  skill,  obedience,  punctuahty,  cleanliness,  and  deter- 
mination became  the  first  and  most  indispensable  qualifica- 
tions. Official  positions  were  given  only  to  those  who  pos- 
sessed a  thorough  practical  knowledge  of  their  office,  and 
whose  appointment  was  an  obvious  advantage  to  their 
superiors  and  to  the  State.  The  military  spirit  which  per- 
meated Prussia  since  the  time  of  Frederick  William  the  First 
filled  the  whole  body  of  officialdom  to  the  highest  degree, 
and  caused  Prussia  to  be  called  a  mihtary  State.  Already 
as  Crown  Prince,  Frederick  WilUam  wore  chiefly  a  military 
uniform,  and  after  1725  he  appeared  exclusively  in  mihtary 
dress.  .  .  . 

The  great  characteristic  of  the  new  Prussian  bureaucracy 
was  the  absolute  responsibility  of  every  official.  None 
could  hide  behind  another's  back  or  behind  a  piece  of  paper, 
or  plead  that  he  had  misunderstood  his  orders,  that  others 
were  responsible.  If  a  mistake  had  been  made  the  culprit 
could  invariably  be  found  and  punished.  Isaacsohn  tells 
us  : 

Never  before  had  the  officials  so  urgently  and  so  unceas- 
ingly had  impressed  upon  them  the  fact  that  they  were 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STKENGTH    15 

personally  responsible,  and  never  before  had  personal 
responsibility  so  sternly  been  enforced.  .  .  .  The  principle 
of  personal  responsibility  was  the  great  characteristic 
feature  of  the  instructions  given  by  the  King  to  his  Ministers. 
Every  document  put  by  the  higher  officials  before  the  General 
Directorate  had  to  be  signed  by  one  of  the  Councillors  who, 
by  giving  his  signature,  assumed  responsibihty  for  its  con- 
tents, and  every  document  put  before  the  King  bore  in  addi- 
tion the  signatures  of  the  five  departmental  Ministers.  .  .  . 

No  Councillor  was  to  be  employed  in  the  province  to 
which  he  belonged,  in  order  to  abolish  favouritism  and 
personal  considerations  of  every  kind.  Officials  were  to  act 
with  absolute  impartiality.  .  .  .  That  was  particularly 
necessary  because  the  nobility  and  the  prosperous  citizens, 
from  whose  ranks  the  higher  officials  were  recruited,  were 
not  in  sympathy  with  the  administrative  and  financial 
reforms  introduced  by  the  King.  .  .  . 

The  absolute  subordination  of  the  Civil  Service  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  their  unquestioning  obedience  to  the 
King,  together  with  their  absolute  responsibihty  not  only  for 
their  own  actions,  but  also  for  those  of  their  colleagues  and 
their  inferiors,  created  among  them  an  extremely  strong 
sense  of  professional  honour,  solidarity,  and  of  professional 
pride.  The  influence  of  the  nobihty  and  of  Society  dimin- 
ished unceasingly.  The  service  of  the  King  required  un- 
divided attention.  The  King's  uniform,  which  every  Civil 
Servant  had  to  wear  when  on  duty,  kept  the  feehng  alive 
among  them  that  they  were  the  King's  servants  and  had  to 
represent  the  King's  interests.  The  power  of  the  officials 
and  their  independence,  in  case  they  were  opposed  by  strong 
social  influences,  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  officials 
were  strangers  in  the  districts  in  which  they  were  employed, 
for  Frederick  WilHam  continued  the  policy  of  appointing 
only  strangers  to  the  district  to  official  positions,  a  poHcy 
which  the  Great  Elector  had  introduced  in  order  to  overcome 
the  opposition  of  the  Estates  in  his  policy  of  centralisation 
and  of  unlimited  personal  Government.  .  .  . 

Every  official  document  had  to  be  signed,  and  every 
signature  involved  the  responsibility  of  the  man  who  gave 


16     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

it.  The  members  of  the  Ministry  were  jointly  responsible 
for  one  another.  Every  mistake,  every  error,  every  delay 
was  visited  on  the  guilty.  The  greatest  exertions  were 
demanded  from  all  officials.  Remonstrances  and  protests 
were  useless.  The  King  enforced  discipline  absolutely, 
and  his  servants  had  either  to  obey  or  to  go  under.  The 
discipline  enforced  had  the  most  marvellous  results.  He 
taught  the  officials  to  work  with  exactitude,  rapidity, 
conscientiousness,  and  care,  and  thus  Prussian  officialdom 
became  a  model  throughout  Germany. 

Ministers  of  State,  hke  generals  and  colonels,  obeyed 
unquestioningly  and  carried  out  their  orders  with  military 
precision  and  punctuahty.  Only  if  the  King  had  clearly 
acted  in  error  they  ventured  upon  a  respectful  protest. 
Every  Minister,  even  if  he  were  personally  easy-going  and 
soft-hearted,  was  compelled  in  his  own  interest  to  maintain 
in  his  department  the  same  rigid  spirit  of  order,  punctuality, 
and  rapidity  which  the  King  enforced  upon  his  Ministers, 
and  from  the  Minister's  room  the  spirit  of  order  and  efficiency 
spread  through  the  departments  and  through  all  ranks  down 
to  the  humblest  officials. 

Frederick  William  hated  flattery,  and  demanded  from 
all  his  officials  brevity  and  the  naked  truth.  An  official 
who  had  deceived  him  was  lost.  In  his  instructions  to 
the  General  Directorate  he  stated  emphatically  in  specially 
large  print : 

We  do  not  wish  in  any  way  to  he  treated  with  flattery.  We 
wish  always  to  hear  the  clear  truth.  Nothing  must  he  hidden 
from  Us,  and  no  falsehood  must  he  put  hefore  Us,  for  We  are 
the  Lord  and  King  and  can  do  what  We  like. 

In  order  to  ensure  the  integrity  and  efficiency  of  the 
Prussian  Administration  and  of  the  whole  body  of  officials, 
Frederick  William  created  a  special  authority,  the  '  Fiskalat,' 
which,  by  means  of  agents,  was  to  supervise  and  watch 
all  the  officials  and  to  bring  every  irregularity  directly 
before  the  King.    In  his  instructions  to  the  chief  of  the 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STEENGTH    17 

Fiskalat,  von  Kattsch,  the  King  wrote  with  his  own  hand  : 
*  Von  Kattsch  shall  not  spare  anyone,  whoever  it  may  be^ 
even  if  it  be  my  own  brother.  He  must,  of  course,  carefully 
look  out  for  thieves  of  every  kind.  He  must  watch  all 
and  spare  none,  and  he  may  be  assured  that  I  shall  support 
him  with  energy  against  all  as  long  as  I  live.'  The  monthly 
and  quarterly  reports  of  the  Fiskalat  enabled  the  King 
to  deal  rapidly  with  every  abuse,  trace  it  to  its  very  source, 
and  punish  the  guilty. 

A  government  which  governs  can  easily  form  the 
character  and  the  habits  of  the  people.  The  German 
people  are  often  praised  for  their  thoroughness,  industry, 
frugality,  and  thrift.  These  qualities  are  not  natural^/-^ 
to  them.  They  received  them  from  their  rulers,  and 
especially  from  Frederick  William  the  First.  He  was  an 
example  to  his  people,  and  his  son  carried  on  the  paternal 
tradition.  Both  Kings  acted  not  only  with  thoroughness, 
industry,  frugality,  and  economy,  but  they  enforced  these 
qualities  upon  their  subjects.  Both  punished  idlers  of 
every  rank  of  society,  even  of  the  most  exalted.  The 
regime  of  Thorough  prevailed  under  these  Kings,  who 
together  ruled  during  seventy-three  years.  These  seventy- 
three  years  of  hard  training  gave  to  the  Prussian  people 
those  sterhng  qualities  which  are  particularly  their  own, 
and  by  which  they  can  easily  be  distinguished  from  the 
easy-going  South  Germans  and  Austrians  who  have  not 
similarly  been  disciplined. 

Frederick  William  the  First  was  a  stern  disciplinarian, 
not  only  to  his  people,  but  even  to  his  family.  When  his 
son  and  heir  tried  to  flee  the  country  in  order  to  escape 
the  bodily  violence  which  he  had  to  suffer  from  his  father, 
Frederick  William  wished  to  have  him  shot  by  a  court- 
martial  as  a  deserter,  although  he  loved  his  children,  for 
duty,  as  he  conceived  it,  was  with  him  a  stronger  sentiment 
than  affection.  The  harshness  of  Prussian  education  and 
the  absolute  discipline  enforced  in  the  Prussian  families  ^ 


18     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

and  the  Prussian  schools  are  due  to  the  example  of  the 
man  who  not  only  created  the  Prussian  State  but  moulded 
J  the  character  of  the  German  people  upon  his  own. 

Following  the  example  of  the  Great  Elector,  King 
Frederick  WilHam  strove  to  increase  the  wealth  of  the 
people,  by  improving  communications  and  agriculture, 
by  encouraging  commerce  and  industry,  and  by  settUng 
numerous  foreigners  on  the  waste  lands  in  his  dominions. 
He  drained  swamps,  constructed  canals  and  roads,  and  on 
June  3, 1713,  three  months  after  he  had  come  to  the  throne, 
he  demanded  that  all  the  suppUes  for  the  army  should  be 
bought  in  Prussia.  Only  then  it  was  discovered  how  low 
the  Prussian  industries  had  sunk.  To  raise  them,  Frederick 
WilHam  protected  the  manufacturing  industries,  especially 
the  woollen  industry,  and  forbade  in  his  instructions  to 
the  General  Directorate  the  investment  of  Prussian  capital 
abroad. 

How  lavishly  the  thrifty  King  spent  money  for  the 
improvement  of  the  country  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that, 
although  the  whole  income  of  the  State  amounted  only  to 
7,400,000  thalers  per  year,  he  spent  in  the  course  of  six  years 
6,000,000  thalers  for  improving  the  Province  of  Lithauen 
alone.  He  created  there  a  number  of  towns,  332  villages, 
twenty-four  water-mills,  eleven  churches,  hundreds  of 
schools,  &c. 

The  Germans  are  perhaps  the  best  educated  people, 
and  they  have  Frederick  Wilham  to  thank  for  it,  for  he 
was  the  first  monarch  who  introduced  compulsory  education. 
It  aimed  at  making  the  people  useful  and  patriotic  citizens. 
On  September  28,  1717,  Frederick  Wilham  pubhshed  an 
edict,  which  stated  : 

We  regret  that  we  have  noticed  that  parents,  particularly 
in  the  country,  omit  to  send  their  children  to  the  schools, 
and  allow  them  to  grow  up  in  ignorance  not  only  of  reading, 
writing,  and  reckoning,  but  also  in  the  knowledge  of  those 
things  which  are  necessary  for  their  soul  and  their  salvation. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH    19 

In  order  to  abolish  this  most  pernicious  evil  we  have 
resolved  to  pubHsh  this  edict  and  to  order  most  earnestly 
that  in  those  places  where  there  are  schools  parents  shall  be 
compelled  by  severe  pmiishment  to  send  their  children  to 
school  daily  in  winter  and  at  least  once  or  twice  a  week  in 
summer,  when  they  are  not  wanted  at  home,  so  that  they 
shall  not  forget  entirely  in  the  summer  what  they  have 
learned  in  winter.  The  children  shall  pay  2  dreiers  per  week 
to  the  schools,  and  if  the  parents  cannot  afford  it,  the  school 
money  shall  be  paid  by  the  Local  Authorities. 

While  Frederick  William  promoted  elementary  educa- 
tion, recognising  its  practical  utihty,  his  peasant-Hke 
ignorance  prevented  him  understanding  the  use  of  the 
sciences  and  arts.  He  despised  higher  education,  learning,  ^ 
and  the  arts  of  civiHsation,  to  the  despair  and  dismay  of  his 
son  and  heir,  who  loved  them.  He  made  learned  professors 
court  fools,  and  made  his  court  fools  university  professors. 
Hence,  Prussia  remained  a  land  of  boors  and  soldiers,  and 
Frederick  the  Great  beheved  to  his  death  that  Germany 
was  an  unsuitable  soil  for  the  sciences  and  arts,  that  German .-' 
was  and  always  would  remain  a  barbarous  tongue,  that 
the  arts  and  sciences  could  not  flourish  in  Prussia,  and  he 
surrounded  himself  with  Frenchmen. 

King  Frederick  Wilham  was  a  great  organiser  and 
administrator.  He  created  the  framework  of  the  Prussian 
State  and  its  traditions,  and  impressed  his  own  character 
upon  the  nation.  However,  he  did  not  possess  the  gifts 
of  a  great  commander,  and  still  less  those  of  a  diplomat. 
His  boorish  roughness,  his  impetuousness,  and  his  choleric 
temperament  prevented  him  securing  any  success  in  the 
field  of  diplomacy.  Therefore,  he  obtained  only  an  in- 
significant accession  of  territory.  However,  owing  to 
his  excellent  administration  and  his  thrift,  he  built  for 
the  future.  He  enormously  increased  the  strength  and  the 
efficiency  of  the  country.  He  trebled  the  national  revenues. 
He  greatly  increased  the  wealth  and  the  number  of  the 

c2 


20     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

people.  He  vastly  improved  the  land.  He  nearly  trebled 
the  army,  made  it  the  most  efficient  force  in  the  world, 
and  accumulated  a  vast  store  of  war  material  and  a  large 
War  Fund,  with  the  help  of  which  his  son  acquired  Silesia 
and  successfully  resisted  nearly  all  Europe  during  the 
Seven  Years'  War. 

The  Great  Elector  prepared  the  ground,  King  Frederick 
WiUiam  the  First  firmly  laid  the  foundations,  and  Frederick 
the  Great  erected  thereon  the  edifice  of  modem  Germany. 

The  strength  of  Germany  lies  in  her  form  of  government, 
as  shaped  by  her  rulers.  She  owes  her  power  to  her  great 
sovereigns.  The  Great  Elector  and  Frederick  WilHam 
the  First  were  not  men  of  many  words.  They  were  men 
of  action.  They  practised  an  enlightened  absolutism,  but 
did  not  preach  it.  While  sovereigns  hke  Louis  the  Four- 
teenth of  France  and  Frederick  the  First  of  Prussia  used 
their  absolute  power  chiefly  for  gratifying  their  vanity, 
their  greed,  and  their  lust,  men  hke  the  Great  Elector  and 
Frederick  WilUam  the  First  saw  in  their  power  a  trust. 
They  worked  with  all  their  might  for  the  greatness  and 
glory  of  their  coimtry  and  for  posterity,  and  they  crushed 
all  opposition,  and  made  themselves  absolute  masters  of 
the  State  in  order  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  their  action. 

Frederick  the  Great's  character  widely  differed  from 
that  of  his  father.  He  was  a  man  both  of  action  and  of 
words.  He  possessed  eloquence,  imagination,  and  a  fluent 
pen — he  would  have  made  an  excellent  jom'nalist — and  he 
both  practised  and  preached  an  enlightened  absolutism. 
He  gave  eloquent  expression  to  the  faith  within  him,  and 
he  tried  to  make  the  people  understand  the  policy  of  their 
rulers  and  to  make  them  partners  in  their  Sovereign's  glory. 

Frederick  the  Great  was  the  most  gifted  and  the  most 
successful  Prussian  monarch.  He  was  a  great  strategist, 
a  great  tactician,  a  great  diplomat,  a  great  economist  and 
financier,  a  great  organiser,  and  a  great  administrator. 

As  he  had  been  most  successful  in  all  his  undertakings, 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH      21 

it  is  only  natural  that  his  views  and  teachings  have  always 
enjoyed  the  greatest  prestige  in  the  highest  Prusso- German 
circles,  and  that  they  have  deeply  influenced  the  action 
of  his  successors  and  of  their  statesmen.  Among  the 
numerous  writings  which  he  left,  his  confidential  memoirs 
written  for  the  guidance  of  future  generations  and  his 

*  Political  and  Military  Testaments '  are  of  course  most 
authoritative.  Among  the  many  pupils  of  Frederick  the 
Great  was  Bismarck.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the 
writings  which  Frederick  the  Great  addressed  to  posterity 
are  the  arcana  imperii  of  modern  Germany.  Those  who 
desire  to  learn  the  secret  of  Germany's  strength,  wealth, 
and  efficiency,  should  therefore  most  carefully  study  the 
teachings  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

Frederick's  *  Political  Testament'  of  1752,  addressed 
to  his  successors,  begins  with  the  significant  words : 

The  first  duty  of  a  citizen  consists  in  serving  his  country; 
I  have  tried  to  fulfil  that  duty  in  all  the  different  phases 
of  my  life. 

The  idea  that  the  King  is  merely  the  first  citizen,  and 
that  his  duty  consists  in  serving  his  country  with  all  his 
strength  and  all  his  ability  runs  through  the  writings  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  In  his  later  memoirs  he  elaborated  that 
idea.  For  instance,  in  his  '  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvern- 
ment,'  written  in  1777,  twenty-five  years  after  his  first 

*  Pohtical  Testament,'  he  stated  : 

The  citizens  have  accorded  pre-eminence  to  one  of  their 
number  only  because  of  the  services  which  he  can  render 
them.  These  services  consist  in  maintaining  the  laws,  in 
meting  out  justice,  in  opposing  with  all  his  strength  the 
deterioration  of  morals,  in  defending  the  State  against  its 
enemies. 

The  ruler  should  carefully  watch  the  cultivation  of  the 
soil.  He  should  provide  an  abundance  of  food  for  the  people, 
encourage  industry,  and  further  commerce.    He  ought  to 


22     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

be  like  a  sentinel  who  watches  unceasingly  the  neighbours  of 
the  State  and  the  activities  of  its  enemies. 

It  is  necessary  that  the  sovereign  should  act  with  fore- 
sight and  prudence  and  conclude  alliances  in  good  time, 
and  he  ought  to  choose  his  AUies  among  those  who  are  most 
likely  to  promote  the  interests  of  his  country. 

Each  of  the  functions  named  requires  a  wealth  of  know- 
ledge from  the  sovereign.  He  must  study  profoundly  the 
physical  conditions  of  his  country,  and  should  thoroughly 
know  the  spirit  and  character  of  the  people,  for  an  ignorant 
sovereign  is  as  guilty  as  an  ill-disposed  one.  Ignorance  in 
the  ruler  is  due  to  his  laziness,  while  malice  springs  from  an 
evil  mind.  However,  the  sufferings  caused  by  his  mistakes 
are  as  great  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

Princes,  sovereigns,  and  kings  have  not  been  given 
supreme  authority  in  order  to  live  in  luxurious  self-indul- 
gence and  debauchery.  They  have  not  been  elevated  by 
their  fellow-men  to  enable  them  to  strut  about  and  to  insult 
with  their  pride  the  simple-mannered,  the  poor,  and  the 
suffering.  They  have  not  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
State  to  keep  around  themselves  a  crowd  of  idle  loafers  whose 
uselessness  drives  them  towards  vice.  The  bad  administra- 
tion which  may  be  found  in  monarchies  springs  from  many 
different  causes,  but  their  principal  cause  lies  in  the  character 
of  the  sovereign.  A  ruler  addicted  to  women  will  become 
a  tool  of  his  mistresses  and  favourites,  and  these  will  abuse 
their  power  and  commit  wrongs  of  every  kind,  will  protect 
vice,  sell  offices,  and  perpetrate  every  infamy.  .  .  . 

The  sovereign  is  the  representative  of  his  State.  He  and 
his  people  form  a  single  body.  Euler  and  ruled  can  be  happy 
only  if  they  are  firmly  united.  The  sovereign  stands  to  his 
people  in  the  same  relation  in  which  the  head  stands  to  the 
body.  He  must  use  his  eyes  and  his  brain  for  the  whole 
community,  and  act  on  its  behalf  to  the  common  advantage. 
If  we  wish  to  elevate  monarchical  above  republican  govern- 
ment, the  duty  of  sovereigns  is  clear.  They  must  be  active, 
hard-working,  upright  and  honest,  and  concentrate  all  their 
strength  upon  filling  their  office  worthily.  That  is  my  idea 
of  the^duties  of  sovereigns. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STRENGTH    23 

A  sovereign  must  possess  an  exact  and  detailed  knowledge 
of  the  strong  and  of  the  weak  points  of  his  country.  He 
must  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  its  resources,  the 
character  of  the  people,  and  the  national  commerce.  .  .  . 

Eulers  should  always  remind  themselves  that  they  are 
men  like  the  least  of  their  subjects.  The  sovereign  is  the 
foremost  judge,  general,  financier,  and  minister  of  his 
country,  not  merely  for  the  sake  of  his  prestige.  Therefore, 
he  should  perform  with  care  the  duties  connected  with  these 
offices.  He  is  merely  the  principal  servant  of  the  State. 
Hence,  he  must  act  with  honesty,  wisdom,  and  complete 
disinterestedness  in  such  a  way  that  he  can  render  an  account 
of  his  stewardship  to  the  citizens  at  any  moment.  Conse- 
quently, he  is  guilty  if  he  wastes  the  money  of  the  people, 
the  taxes  which  they  have  paid,  in  luxury,  pomp,  and  de- 
bauchery. He  who  should  improve  the  morals  of  the 
people,  be  the  guardian  of  the  law,  and  improve  their  educa- 
tion should  not  pervert  them  by  his  bad  example. 

Frederick  took  his  regal  duties  very  seriously.  Like 
his  father  he  worked  indefatigably  and  unceasingly  for 
his  country.  He  rose  in  summer  at  three  o'clock,  and  in 
winter  at  four  o'clock,  and  a  quarter  of  an  hour  later  he 
was  at  his  desk.  Like  his  father  he  worked  much  and 
slept  little,  and  set  an  example  of  industry  and  thoroughness 
to  his  subjects. 

His  capacity  for  work  was  prodigious.  Like  Frederick 
William  the  First  he  supervised  the  army  and  the  Civil 
Service  in  all  its  branches.  In  addition,  he  conducted 
personally  the  enormous  business  of  his  very  active  diplomacy, 
and  as  chief  of  the  staff  he  planned  his  campaigns. 

He  was  ready  to  practise  that  absolute  devotion  to 
the  State  which  he  preached  in  his  writings.  That  may 
be  seen  by  his  unceasing  activity.  It  may  also  be  seen 
by  the  fact  that  he  was  prepared  to  lay  down  his  life  for 
his  country  not  only  in  the  heat  of  battle  but  in  cold  deliber- 
ation. He  repeatedly  gave  instruction  that,  if  made  a 
prisoner,  he  should  be  sacrificed  for  Prussia.    On  January  10, 


24     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

1757,  for  instance,  during  the  second  year  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  when  Prussia's  position  was  critical,  he  sent 
the  following  instructions  to  his  Minister  and  confidential 
friend  and  adviser,  Count  Fink  von  Finkenstein  : 

In  the  critical  position  of  Prussia's  affairs,  I  must  give 
you  my  orders.  These  will  empower  you  to  take  all  the 
necessary  measures  in  case  of  a  great  misfortune. 

(1)  If,  which  Heaven  forbid,  one  of  my  armies  should  be 
completely  defeated  in  Saxony,  or  if  the  French  should  drive 
the  Hanoverians  out  of  the  country,  occupy  Hanover,  and 
threaten  to  invade  Brandenburg  itself,  or  if  the  Eussians 
should  penetrate  into  Brandenburg,  the  royal  family,  the 
Highest  Courts  of  Justice,  and  the  Departments  of  State 
must  be  brought  into  a  place  of  security.  If  we  are  defeated 
in  Saxony  about  Leipzig,  the  most  suitable  place  for  the 
royal  family  and  the  treasure  is  Kiistrin.  If  the  Eussians 
should  advance  into  Brandenburg,  or  if  a  disaster  should 
overwhelm  us  in  Lusatia,  everything  must  be  brought  to 
Magdeburg.  The  last  place  of  refuge  is  Stettin,  but  it  must 
be  resorted  to  only  in  case  of  the  utmost  necessity.  The 
garrison,  the  royal  family,  and  the  treasure  are  inseparable. 
They  always  go  together.  To  the  treasure  must  be  added 
the  crown  diamonds  and  the  royal  table  silver.  In  case  of 
need  the  royal  silver  and  the  gold  plate  must  be  melted  down 
without  delay. 

(2)  If  I  should  be  killed  in  action,  the  national  business 
must  be  carried  on  without  the  slightest  change.  Nobody 
must  notice  that  the  government  has  changed  hands.  The 
rendering  of  the  oath  and  the  act  of  homage  to  the  new 
ruler  should  take  place  as  quickly  as  possible  throughout 
Prussia,  and  especially  in  Silesia. 

(3)  I  might  have  the  misfortune  of  being  made  prisoner 
by  the  enemy.  In  that  case,  I  absolutely  prohibit  that  the 
slightest  consideration  be  paid  to  my  person  and  that  any 
notice  whatever  be  taken  of  the  letters  which  I  may  write 
from  my  place  of  confinement.  In  case  of  such  a  misfortune 
I  will  sacrifice  myself  to  the  State.  Everyone  must  obey 
my  brother,  and  he  and  all  my  ministers  and  generals  are 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANTS  STRENGTH    25 

responsible  to  me  with  their  heads  that  neither  territory  nor 
money  is  offered  to  the  enemy  in  exchange  for  my  liberty, 
that  the  war  will  be  continued,  that  all  advantages  for 
defeating  the  enemy  will  be  made  use  of,  that  matters  will 
be  treated  as  if  I  had  never  existed. 

I  hope  and  believe  that  you,  Count  Fink,  will  not  find  it 
necessary  to  make  use  of  the  orders  contained  in  this  letter. 
However,  in  case  of  misfortune  I  empower  you  herewith 
to  carry  out  these  instructions,  and  as  a  token  that  they 
embody  my  firm  and  constant  will,  and  that  they  have  been 
given  after  thorough  and  careful  deliberation,  I  sign  this 
letter  with  my  own  hand  and  append  to  it  my  own  seal. 

Frederick  concentrated  his  whole  energy  and  ability 
upon  the  government  and  the  advancement  of  his  country, 
and  he  desired  that  his  successors  also  should  manage  them- 
selves the  entire  business  of  the  State.  In  order  to  enable 
them  to  fulfil  this  heavy  task,  he  considered  that  a  special 
education  was  required. 

In  a  State  such  as  Prusso- Germany  the  education  of 
the  future  ruler  is  of  course  a  matter  of  supreme  importance, 
for  the  fate  of  the  country  depends  upon  the  character  and 
ability  of  the  monarch.  Therefore,  the  instructions  which 
Frederick  the  Great  wrote  for  the  education  of  his  nephew 
and  successor,  and  sent  to  Major  Borcke  on  September  24, 
1751,  when  the  heir-presumptive  was  seven  years  old,  are 
of  the  highest  interest  and  importance  to  all  who  wish 
to  understand  the  policy  and  character  of  modern  Germany 
and  the  causes  of  its  success,  for  it  may  be  said  that 
Frederick's  instructions  have  guided  all  his  successors  in 
the  education  of  their  heirs.  The  following  are  the  most 
interesting  passages  from  that  most  important  document : 

I  entrust  to  you  the  education  of  my  nephew,  the  Heir- 
Presumptive  of  Prussia.  As  there  is  a  great  difference 
between  the  education  of  the  child  of  a  private  citizen  and 
of  a  child  that  will  be  called  upon  to  rule  the  State,  I  here- 
with give  you  my  instructions   for  your  guidance.  .  .  . 


26     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

The  boy  should  learn  history,  but  not  Uke  a  parrot. 
The  great  utility  of  history  consists  in  enabling  us  to  compare 
the  present  with  the  past.  The  intelligent  study  of  history 
shows  the  causes  which  have  brought  about  vast  changes 
in  the  world.  It  shows  besides  that,  generally  speaking, 
vice  is  punished  and  virtue  rewarded.  Attention  must  be 
drawn  to  the  fact  that  the  ancient  writers  are  not  always 
reliable,  and  that  one  must  critically  examine  their  state- 
ments before  beheving  them.  .  .  . 

The  greatest  and  most  important  part  of  education  con- 
sists in  shaping  the  character.  Neither  you  nor  all  the 
powers  of  the  world  can  change  the  character  of  a  child. 
Education  can  only  moderate  its  passions  and  instincts. 

You  should  treat  my  nephew  like  an  ordinary  child  that 
will  be  called  upon  to  succeed  by  its  own  exertions.  Ee- 
proach  the  boy  for  his  faults,  and  tell  him  that  he  will  be 
despised  by  all  if  he  will  not  learn.  He  must  not  be  allowed 
to  become  conceited.  He  should  be  brought  up  quite 
simply.  He  must  be  courteous  towards  all,  and  must  be 
made  to  apologise  immediately  if  he  has  been  rude  to  any- 
body. He  must  be  taught  that  all  men  are  equal,  and  that 
exalted  birth  without  exalted  merit  is  worthless.  Let  him 
talk  freely  to  all.  That  will  make  him  self-possessed.  It 
does  not  matter  if  he  talks  nonsense,  for  he  is  only  a  child. 
His  whole  education  should  be  directed  with  the  aim  of 
making  him  self-reliant.  He  should  not  be  guided  by 
others.  Whether  he  speaks  foolishly  or  wisely,  his  ideas 
should  only  be  his  own. 

It  is  very  important  that  he  should  love  the  army. 
Therefore  he  m.ust  be  told  at  all  occasions  and  by  all  whom 
he  meets  that  men  of  birth  who  are  not  soldiers  are  pitiful 
wretches.  He  must  be  taken  to  see  the  troops  drilling  as 
often  as  he  likes.  He  ought  to  be  shown  the  Cadets,  and 
be  given  five  or  six  of  them  to  drill.  That  should  be  an 
amusement  for  him,  not  a  duty.  The  great  point  is  that  he 
should  become  fond  of  military  affairs,  and  the  worst  that 
could  happen  would  be  if  he  should  become  bored  with  them. 
He  should  be  allowed  to  talk  to  all,  to  cadets,  soldiers, 
citizens,  and  officers,  to  increase  his  self-reliance. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH    27 

It  is  particularly  important  that  he  should  learn  to  love 
his  country,  and  that  all  people  whom  he  meets  should  utter 
only  patriotic  sentiments.  With  all  questions  discussed 
some  moral  ideas  might  be  connected.  He  should  learn  to 
love  humanity  and  kindness,  sentiments  which  grace  all 
honourable  men,  and  particularly  princes. 

My  nephew  will,  when  he  becomes  older,  begin  to  do 
service  as  a  lieutenant.  He  must  pass  gradually  through 
all  the  ranks.  That  will  prevent  him  becoming  conceited. 
The  officers  who  dine  with  him  should  contradict  and  tease 
him  freely  to  make  him  self-possessed  and  bright.  He 
should  see  as  much  of  the  world  as  possible.  ...  At  every 
opportunity  you  should  inculcate  in  him  love  and  respect 
for  his  father  and  mother  and  for  his  relatives.  You  will 
find  out  his  passions,  but  you  must  try  to  moderate,  but  not 
to  destroy  them.  He  should  never  do  anything  without 
good  reason,  except  during  his  hours  of  recreation.  For 
minor  transgressions  he  should  be  scolded.  For  greater 
ones  he  should  be  punished  by  being  deprived  of  his  sword, 
by  being  placed  under  arrest,  and  by  other  punishments 
likely  to  appeal  to  his  sense  of  honour. 

Eeport  to  me  about  him  every  month,  and  more  often  if 
necessary.  Do  not  make  him  timid  by  showing  too  much 
anxiety  about  his  health  and  safety.  Great  care  must  of 
course  be  taken  of  him,  but  he  must  not  notice  it.  Other- 
wise he  will  become  soft,  timid,  and  nervous.  These  instruc- 
tions are  valid  only  till  the  child  is  ten  or  twelve  years  old. 

Prussia  has  been  a  military  State  since  its  beginning. 
The  country  has  grown  great  by  successful  wars  and  by 
conquest.  Frederick  WiUiam  the  First  not  only  created 
a  powerful  army  but  militarised  the  administration  and 
the  civil  institutions  as  well.  He  made  the  entire  civil 
life  of  the  country  subservient  to  his  military  requirements 
and  ambitions.  Frederick  the  Great  clearly  recognised 
that  the  future  of  Prussia  would  depend  upon  its  army,  and 
upon  the  military  strength  of  the  country  as  a  whole,  that 
it  needed  a  form  of  government  which  was  most  likely  to 


28     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

increase  the  power  of  the  State.  The  activity  of  the 
Great  Elector,  of  Frederick  William  the  First,  and  his 
own  achievements  had  shown  him  how  greatly  an  able 
monarch,  who  is  entirely  unhampered  by  popular  interfer- 
ence and  control,  can  advance  a  naturally  poor  and  weak 
country. 

Frederick  was  deeply  convinced  of  the  superiority 
of  monarchical  over  democratic  government  in  adminis- 
trative matters  in  general,  and  especially  in  matters  of 
foreign  policy  and  of  war.  A  military  State,  like  an  army, 
should,  in  his  opinion,  be  governed  not  by  an  Administration, 
not  by  statesmen  and  generals,  but  by  a  commander-in- 
chief,  by  the  Sovereign  himself.  He  showed  an  unlimited 
contempt  for  feeble  sovereigns,  for  the  weakness  and  in- 
efficiency of  the  then  existing  republics,  such  as  Holland, 
and  for  those  States  which  under  monarchical  forms  were 
democratically  governed,  such  as  England.  He  repeatedly 
described  England  as  a  republic  in  disguise  and  sneered 
at  its  army.  He  frequently  expressed  his  opinion  that 
monarchy  was  a  far  more  efficient  form  of  government, 
especially  in  war,  than  democracy.  He  wrote,  for  instance, 
in  his  *  Lettre  sur  I'Amour  de  la  Patrie  ' : 

A  monarch  is  not  a  despot,  whose  only  rule  of  conduct  is 
his  caprice.  He  must  be  the  centre  of  the  State  where  all 
the  lines  from  the  circumference  unite.  A  monarchical 
government  can  maintain  in  its  deliberations  that  secrecy 
which  is  absent  in  republics,  and  the  various  branches  of  the 
administration  can  act  together  like  a  well-trained  team  of 
horses.  Besides  in  monarchies  party  spirit  is  far  less  ramp- 
ant than  in  republics,  which  are  often  plagued  by  party  strife 
and  by  party  intrigue. 

In  his  *  Histoire  de  mon  Temps,'  Frederick  wrote  : 

Sweden  which,  under  Gustavus  Adolphus,  had  been  a 
land  of  heroes  became  the  home  of  cowardice  and  infamy 
under    a    republican    government.     Thus    kingdoms    and 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STKENGTH    29 

empires  may  decline  and  fall  after  having  risen  to  the 
greatest  glory.  The  cause  of  Sweden's  decline  may  probably 
be  found  in  the  change  in  the  form  of  its  government.  While 
Sweden  was  a  monarchy,  the  army  was  honoured.  It  was 
efficient  for  the  defence  of  the  State,  and  could  never  become 
a  public  danger. 

In  republics  the  government  must,  by  its  very  nature, 
be  peaceful,  and  the  military  must  be  kept  down,  for  the 
politicians  in  power  are  afraid  of  generals  who  are  worshipped 
by  their  troops  and  who  may  bring  about  a  revolution. 
In  republics  men  of  ambition  can  obtain  power  only  by 
intrigue.  Thus  corruption  arises  and  destroys  public 
morality.  The  true  sense  of  honour  is  lost.  All  try  to 
succeed  by  intrigue.  Besides,  in  republics  secrecy  is  never 
observed  in  matters  of  State.  The  enemy  knows  their 
plans  beforehand  and  can  foil  them.  .  .  . 

When  Sweden  was  turned  into  a  republic  it  became 
weak.  The  love  of  glory  was  replaced  by  the  spirit  of 
intrigue.  Disinterestedness  was  replaced  by  cupidity.  The 
public  welfare  was  sacrificed  to  individual  advantage. 
Corruption  went  so  far  that  in  the  Swedish  Parliament 
sometimes  the  French  and  sometimes  the  Kussian  party 
was  supreme,  but  never  the  Swedish. 

The  views  expressed  by  Frederick  regarding  the  republic 
of  Sweden  should  give  food  for  thought  to  EngHshmen  and 
Americans.  Democracy,  both  in  the  monarchical  and  in 
the  republican  form,  provides  undoubtedly  a  less  efficient 
government  than  a  monarchy.  In  democracies  party 
spirit  proves  only  too  often  more  powerful  than 
patriotism.  While  party  interests  are  promoted  those  of 
the  nation  are  disregarded  and  suffer  neglect.  Besides, 
democracies  are  administered  not  by  men  of  action  but 
by  men  of  words,  by  amateurs  whose  position  depends  on 
the  popular  will  and  upon  the  popular  whim.  Consequently, 
nearly  every  Government  measure  brought  forward  in  a 
democratic  State  is  determined  not  on  its  merits,  not  by  its 
national  utility  or  necessity,  but  by  the  question :  Will  it  be 


30     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

popular  or  unpopular  ?  Will  it  gain  or  lose  votes  ?  Will 
it  strengthen  or  weaken  the  politicians  in  power  or  the 
Opposition  ?  Besides,  every  measure,  however  secret,  must 
be  discussed  in  pubhc  although  pubHc  discussion  may 
imperil  the  existence  of  the  State.  While  a  monarch  in  a 
well-organised  monarchy  such  as  Germany  can,  in  a 
time  of  danger,  command  and  thus  employ  the  whole 
national  resources  to  the  best  advantage  without  delay, 
the  head  of  a  democratic  Government  can  hope  to  unite 
the  citizens  and  impel  them  to  action  only  by  begging 
and  imploring,  by  exhorting  and  beseeching  them  to  do  their 
duty. 

A  modem  democracy,  like  an  old-fashioned  charity, 
is  run  on  voluntary  contributions.  A  democracy  has  not 
one  master,  but  many  masters.  Every  deniocratic  citizen 
claims  for  himself  the  right  to  decide  whether  he  will  obey 
or  not,  for  he  is  one  of  the  sovereigns.  In  the  words  of  the 
judicious  Bagehot :  *  The  natural  instinct  of  Englishmen 
is  to  resist  authority.'  Politicians  pander  to  the  electors, 
and  thus  the  people  in  democracies  are  taught  that  they 
have  rights,  but  not  that  they  had  duties.  Many  months 
after  the  beginning  of  a  war  in  which  Great  Britain's  existence 
is  at  stake,  the  pohticians  who  had  prevented  and  opposed 
the  tuition  of  patriotism  in  the  schools  began  teaching 
the  citizens  by  posters,  by  the  methods  of  patent  medicine 
vendors,  the  duty  of  defending  their  country. 

Organisation  in  time  of  a  crisis  can  be  efficient  only  if 
the  men  in  power  can  command,  and  if  those  over  whom 
they  have  authority  are  certain  to  obey.  Democracy  is 
government  by  argument.  It  does  not  organise,  but  it 
disorganises,  and  the  men  in  authority  are  afraid  to  order 
men  to  fight  or  to  work  because  every  democrat  claims  for 
himself  the  right  to  do  what  he  likes,  the  right  to  resist 
authority.  The  German  Government  has  opposed  parha- 
mentary  institutions  to  the  utmost,  and  has  given  to  the 
ParHament  which  it  has  granted  to  the  people  merely  the 


FOUNDATIONS  OP  GERMANY'S  STRENGTH    31 

power  of  a  suburban  debating  society,  not  so  much  because 
the  rulers  and  the  aristocracy  were  jealous  of  their  privileges, 
but  because  they  feared,  and  rightly  feared,  that  the  de- 
mocratisation  of  Germany  would  destroy  its  power,  and 
would  prove  fatal  to  the  country  in  case  of  war. 

Circumstances  have  made  Prussia  a  military  State. 
The  country  has  grown  great  by  its  military  strength. 
Frederick  clearly  recognised  that  the  existence  and  the 
future  of  Prussia  depended  upon  the  army.  Therefore 
the  army  was  his  principal  care.  It  was  to  be  an  army 
not  for  show  and  for  parade,  but  exclusively  for  use  in 
war.  In  his  *  Political  Testament '  of  1752  he  wrote : 
'  The  army  must  be  managed  in  peace  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  make  it  as  efficient  as  possible  in  case  of  war.'  Nothing 
was  to  be  left  to  chance.  Preparation  down  to  the  smallest 
details  was  unceasingly  recommended  by  Frederick.  Prussia 
was  to  rely  in  war  not  on  her  Allies,  but  entirely  on  her 
own  unaided  strength.  The  King  wrote  in  his  *  Essai  sur 
les  Formes  de  Gouvernement '  : 

The  size  of  the  national  army  must  depend  on  the  strength 
of  possible  enemies.  A  ruler  cannot  safely  reckon  upon  his 
Allies,  for  these  do  not  always  fulfil  their  obligations,  or  they 
fulfil  them  only  in  part.  Those  who  count  upon  the  strength 
of  their  Allies  as  upon  their  own  are  sure  to  be  deceived. 

Frederick  thought  it  of  the  highest  importance  that 
the  Sovereign  himself  should  direct  and  command  the 
army.    He  wrote  in  his  *  Political  Testament  '  of  1776  : 

If  the  sovereign  himself  does  not  manage  the  army  and 
does  not  set  an  example  to  his  people  in  military  matters 
all  is  lost.  If  the  ruler  shows  by  his  actions  that  he  prefers 
the  loafing  courtiers  to  his  officers,  all  men  will  prefer  idling 
at  court  to  working  hard  in  the  army. 

In  his  *  Political  Testament '  of  1752  he  wrote  : 

That  ruler  rules  best  who  has  carefully  laid  down  his 


32     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

policy  and  who  rules  himself.  He  will  not  be  hampered 
at  the  moment  when  a  decision  must  promptly  be  made,  for 
he  holds  all  the  threads  in  his  own  hands.  It  is  particu- 
larly important  for  him  that  he  should  possess  as  much 
knowledge  as  possible  of  all  mihtary  details. 

Men  who  are  not  soldiers  are  ill-fitted  for  devising  a  plan 
of  campaign,  especially  if  they  are  unacquainted  with  all  the 
mihtary  technicaUties,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  indispens- 
able. He  who  does  not  know  the  need  of  an  army,  who  is 
not  acquainted  with  its  thousand  and  one  requirements, 
who  does  not  know  how  an  army  is  mobilised,  and  who  is 
unacquainted  with  the  art  of  war,  who  neither  knows  how  to 
keep  discipline  among  troops  in  peace  time,  nor  how  to  lead 
them  in  time  of  war,  will  never  succeed  in  conducting  a  war 
even  if  he  should  be  a  most  able  man  and  statesman,  econo- 
mist, and  financier. 

I  wish  to  convince  my  successors  that  it  is  necessary  for 
every  King  of  Prussia  to  make  war  his  particular  study  and 
to  encourage  those  who  wish  to  take  up  the  noble  and 
dangerous  profession  of  arms. 

As  Prussia  is  surrounded  by  powerful  States  my  succes- 
sors must  be  prepared  for  frequent  wars.  The  soldiers  must 
be  given  the  highest  positions  in  Prussia  for  the  same  reason 
for  which  they  received  them  in  ancient  Eome  when  that 
State  conquered  the  world.  Honours  and  rewards  stimulate 
and  encourage  talent,  and  praise  arouses  men  to  a  generous 
emulation.  It  encourages  men  to  enter  the  army.  It  is 
paradoxical  to  treat  officers  contemptuously  and  call  theirs 
an  honoured  profession.  The  men  who  are  the  principal 
supports  of  the  State  must  be  encouraged  and  be  preferred 
to  the  soft  and  insipid  society  men  who  can  only  grace  an 
ante-chamber. 

Only  the  sovereign  can  create  and  maintain  perfect 
discipline,  for  only  he  can  act  with  authority,  and  blame 
and  punish  severely  according  to  desert  without  respect  to 
birth  and  rank.  Only  he  can  liberally  reward  the  deserving, 
can  constantly  review  the  troops  and  keep  them  efficient. 
Therefore  the  King  of  Prussia  should  be  a  soldier  and  should 
be  himself  the  Commander-in-Chief.  .  .  . 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  STRENGTH     83 

Monarchies  are  disgraced  by  soft  and  idle  rulers  who 
leave  the  command  of  their  troops  to  their  generals,  and  thus 
tacitly  avow  their  pusillanimity  and  their  incapacity. 

Those  who  have  asserted  in  the  past  that  civiUan 
politicians  are  fit  to  manage  the  army  and  navy,  and  that 
a  Cabinet,  a  number  of  politicians,  can  make  plans  of  war, 
will  do  well  to  ponder  on  Frederick  the  Great's  testamentary 
views. 

Frederick  was  of  opinion  that  the  quality  of  the  army 
depends  in  the  first  instance  upon  the  ability  and  character 
of  the  commander.  He  was  exceedingly  careful  in  selecting 
men  for  high  command,  and  he  wrote  in  his  *  Guerre  de 
Sept  Ans  ' : 

The  ability  and  determination  of  a  general  are  more 
decisive  in  war  than  the  number  of  soldiers.  .  .  . 

Generally  speaking,  towns  are  defended  neither  by  their 
fortifications  nor  by  the  strength  of  their  garrison,  for  all 
depends  on  the  ability,  courage,  and  determination  of  their 
commander. 

The  perfect  discipline  of  the  German  army  has  surprised 
many  observers.  At  the  word  of  command  German  soldiers 
will  act  like  automata,  perform  the  greatest  deeds  of  valour, 
or  commit  the  most  shocking  crimes.  That  perfect  dis- 
cipline which  makes  men  machines  in  time  of  war  was  created 
by  Frederick  William  the  First  and  was  recommended  as 
indispensable  by  Frederick  the  Great.  The  latter  wrote 
in  his  '  Political  Testament '  of  1752 : 

Military  discipline  makes  the  troops  absolutely  obedient. 
It  makes  blindly  obedient  the  soldier  to  his  officer,  the  officer 
to  his  colonel,  the  colonel  to  his  general,  and  the  generals  to 
the  commander-in-chief.  A  soldier  who  murmurs  against  a 
non-commissioned  officer,  or  who  draws  his  weapon  against 
him,  and  an  officer  who  draws  his  weapon  against  his  com- 
mander, must  be  punished  with  death,  for  no  clemency  is 
possible  towards  those  who  violate  the  rules  of  discipline. 


84     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Insubordination  supplies  a  dangerous  example.  The  slight- 
est loosening  of  the  bonds  of  discipline  would  create  a  spirit 
of  lawlessness  and  of  mutiny,  and  would  force  the  com- 
manders to  obey  their  men.  Therefore  the  generals  and 
colonels  are  given  a  despotic  power  over  their  regiments. 

The  commanders  must  be  responsible  to  the  sovereign 
with  their  lives  for  the  obedience  of  their  men.  Hence  a 
ruler  is  certain  that  his  orders  will  be  carried  out.  Strict 
discipline  makes  the  troops  so  accustomed  to  absolute 
obedience  that  they  no  longer  know  how  to  disobey.  They 
will  neither  grumble,  nor  argue,  nor  complain.  They  will 
do  what  they  are  told,  act  according  to  orders,  expose  them- 
selves to  the  greatest  dangers,  and  go  to  their  death  at  the 
word  of  command.  They  will  follow  their  officers  and 
perform  deeds  of  marvellous  valour. 

Discipline  fills  and  regulates  the  lives  of  the  soldiers, 
prevents  them  using  violence,  stealing,  drinking,  and  gamb- 
ling, and  causes  them  to  return  to  their  quarters  at  the 
appointed  time.  Thus  discipline  will  be  better  observed 
among  soldiers  in  the  army  than  among  monks  in  a  monas- 
tery. Absolute  subordination  through  all  grades  makes  the 
whole  army  dependent  upon  the  will  of  a  single  man,  the 
ruler,  and  if  he  is  a  skilful  general  he  need  only  give  his 
orders,  for  he  can  be  certain  that  they  will  be  carried  out 
with  exactitude. 

In  a  democracy  in  which  indiscipline  is^general,  where 
men  in  authority  can  request,  but  not  command, f where 
the  army  is  controlled  by  civilian  politicians,  the  maintenance 
of  perfect  military  discipline  is  of  course  impossible.  More- 
over, the  English  soldier  has  two  masters  :  his  officer  and 
the  law.  If  he  shoots  at  the  word  of  command  he  may  be 
hanged  for  murder.  That  conception  alone  suffices  to 
destroy  a  perfect  sense  of  discipline  in  the  army. 

Frederick  kept  the  greatest  secrecy  with  regard  to 
Prussian  affairs.  His  opponents  were  rarely  able  to  antici- 
pate the  King's  plans.  On  the  other  hand,  Frederick 
was  determined  to  become  acquainted  with  the  intentions 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH     85 

of  his  possible  enemies.  With  this  object  in  view  he 
developed  a  most  perfect  system  of  espionage  in  all  the 
countries  in  which  Prussia  was  chiefly  interested.  The 
King  wrote  in  his  memoirs  : 

If  one  wishes  to  oppose  the  plans  of  one's  enemies  one 
must  know  their  plans. 

Natural  allies  are  those  States  the  interests  of  which  are 
identical  with  our  own.  Nevertheless  alliances  may  be 
concluded  among  nations  the  interests  of  which  differ, 
although  they  will  be  only  short-lived. 

In  the  present  position  of  Europe  all  States  are  strongly 
armed,  and  as  a  Power  of  superior  strength  can  destroy 
the  weaker  ones,  it  is  necessary  to  conclude  alliances  either 
for  mutual  defence  or  for  foiling  the  plans  of  one's  enemies. 
However,  alliances  by  themselves  do  not  suffice.  It  is 
necessary  to  have  in  one's  neighbour  States,  and  especially 
among  one's  enemies,  agents  who  report  faithfully  all  they 
see  and  hear.  Men  are  bad.  It  is  most  necessary  to  protect 
oneself  against  being  surprised. 

Germany's  financial  strength  and  her  financial  pre- 
paredness for  war  have  surprised  all  observers,  except 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  Prusso- Germany's  financial 
policy,  and  with  her  financial  preparedness  for  war  in  the 
past.  Here  also  Frederick  Wilham  the  First,  and  especially 
Frederick  the  Great,  have  created  a  tradition  by  which 
Germany  continues  to  be  guided. 

Finance  is  a  most  powerful  weapon  in  war,  and  none 
understood  its  importance  better  than  Frederick  the  Great. 
He  wrote  in  his  *  Political  Testament '  of  1752 : 

If  a  country  wishes  to  be  happy  and  respected  it  is 
necessary  that  good  order  in  the  national  finances  should  be 
maintained.  .  .  . 

Prussia  has  not  the  riches  of  Peru,  nor  wealthy  mer- 
chants and  banks,  nor  all  the  numerous  resources  possessed 
by  France,  Spain,  and  England.  However,  by  means  of 
industry  and  thrift,  Prussia  may  succeed  in  occupying  a 

d2 


86     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

worthy  place  by  their  side.  The  most  important  thing  is 
that  carefulness  and  good  order  should  be  observed  in  both 
income  and  expenditure. 

In  his  '  PoHtical  Testament '  of  1776  Frederick  stated 
his  views  on  financial  preparation  for  war  more  fully.  He 
wrote : 

Since  the  Seven  Years'  War  Prussia's  State  revenues 
have  prodigiously  increased.  .  .  .  The  national  revenue 
amounts  at  present  to  21,700,000  thalers.  With  that  sum 
the  whole  of  the  national  expenditure  is  provided  and  187,000 
soldiers  are  maintained.  After  all  the  necessary  expenditure 
has  been  provided  for,  there  remains  every  year  a  surplus 
balance  of  5,700,000  thalers.  Of  that  sum  2,000,000 
thalers  are  deposited  every  year  in  the  Treasury,  while  the 
remaining  3,700,000  thalers  are  spent  on  fortifications,  on 
land  improvements,  on  compensation  for  disasters,  &c. 
These  5,700,000  thalers  are  used  in  war  time  for  paying  the 
war  expenditure,  which  comes  to  11,000,000  thalers  per 
annum.  Hence,  5,300,000  thalers  are  required  as  extra- 
ordinary expenditure  for  every  year  of  war. 

That  sum  may  be  drawn  from  the  Treasury,  which 
contains  at  present  19,300,000  thalers.  Besides  that  sum 
Prussia  has  another  War  Fund  of  4,500,000  thalers,  the  so- 
called  Small  War  Fund,  from  which  the  cost  of  mobilisation 
will  be  defrayed.  In  addition,  there  exists  a  War  Fund  of 
4,200,000  thalers  at  Breslau  for  purchasing  forage  for  an 
army  of  60,000  men,  and  there  is  a  Fund  of  900,000  thalers  in 
the  Bank  at  Magdeburg  with  which  forage  for  six  weeks  can 
be  bought. 

Besides,  the  War  Chest  should  contain  11,000,000  thalers 
for  paying  the  regiments  in  advance  in  war  time.  Of  that 
sum  4,000,000  thalers  are  there,  and  the  remaining  7,000,000 
will  be  added  within  three  years.  It  should  be  noted  that 
if  the  whole  war  expenditure  is  to  come  out  of  the  war 
treasure,  the  money  in  hand  sufl&ces  only  for  a  campaign  of 
four  years.  Hence  Prussia  must  act  with  the  greatest  cir- 
cumspection and  economy  so  as  to  have  money  in  hand  at 
the  time  when  peace  comes  again  in  sight. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  STRENGTH     37 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  1776,  thirteen  years  after 
the  ruinous  Seven  Years'  War,  Frederick  the  Great  had 
accumulated  financial  resources  sufficient  to  pay  for  a  war 
lasting  four  years.  Yet  he  deplored  that  the  money  in 
hand  sufficed  '  only  for  a  four  years'  campaign.'  Foresight 
in  financial  affairs,  the  necessity  of  the  most  ample  financial 
preparation  for  war,  was  taught  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
and  subsequent  rulers  have  acted  in  accordance  with  his 
teachings. 

Frederick  the  Great  attached  the  highest  value  to 
well-ordered  finances,  to  the  possession  of  large  funds 
which  might  be  used  in  time  of  national  emergency.  Hence 
he  valued  a  good  system  of  taxation  which  would  incon- 
venience the  citizens  as  little  as  possible  and  which  would 
be  strictly  just.  In  his  *  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de 
Gouvernement '  we  read  : 

Foreign  policy  cannot  prosper,  and  the  army  cannot  be 
strong,  unless  the  national  finances  are  in  perfect  order, 
and  unless  the  ruler  himself  is  economical  and  prudent. 
Money  is  like  a  sorcerer's  wand.  Miracles  may  be  per- 
formed with  it.  Great  political  undertakings,  the  main- 
tenance of  an  army,  and  a  wise  social  policy  require  money. 

No  Government  can  exist  without  taxation.  The  great 
art  of  raising  taxes  consists  in  doing  it  without  oppressing 
the  citizens.  To  ensure  that  taxation  should  be  fair, 
careful  Government  surveys  and  valuations  of  land  are  made. 
These  are  carefully  classified,  and  thus  taxation  is  imposed 
in  accordance  with  the  capacity  of  the  individuals.  It 
would  be  unpardonable  if  through  a  clumsy  taxation  the 
tillers  of  the  soil  should  be  made  to  abandon  the  land. 
Having  acquired  their  property,  they  ought  to  be  able  to  live 
on  it  with  their  families  in  comfort. 

Frederick  the  Great  provided  in  peace  not  only  all  the 
money  required  for  a  protracted  war,  but  the  food  as  well. 
He  wrote  in  his  '  PoHtical  Testament '  of  1776 : 

We  have  in  Berlin  a  magazine  of  corn  of  36,000  wispels, 


88    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OP  GEEMANY 

sufficient  to  feed  an  army  of  60,000  men  dm:ing  a  whole 
year.  There  is  an  equally  large  magazine  in  Silesia  for 
another  60,000  men.  Besides  there  is  a  fund  of  2,000,000 
thalers  reserved  for  purchasing  grain  in  Poland.  That 
sum  can  furnish  120,000  wispels.  Thus  Prussia  is  protected 
against  the  possibility  of  famine  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  time 
of  war  she  has  sufficient  corn  in  hand  for  a  campaign  of 
three  years. 

Those  who,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  believed  that 
Germany  could  be  starved  into  surrender  were  not  ac- 
quainted with  the  providence  of  the  German  Government, 
and  with  the  food  pohcy  which  Frederick  William  the  First 
and  Frederick  the  Great  had  introduced,  and  which  is 
still  pursued  by  the  Prusso-German  Government.  That 
Government  not  unnaturally  follows  the  tradition  created 
by  the  greatest  Prussian  rulers. 

Frederick  William  the  First  had,  as  we  have  seen,  created 
in  the  General  Directorate  a  Supreme  Administrative 
Authority,  in  which  all  the  Departments  of  State  were  co- 
ordinated so  that  all  should  work  in  harmony  and  unison 
instead  of  hampering  and  obstructing  one  another  as  they 
had  done  hitherto.  That  co-ordination  was  still  further 
developed  by  Frederick  the  Great,  who  thought  it  indis- 
pensable for  the  efficiency  of  the  national  administration 
that  all  the  great  departments  of  Prussia  should  work 
like  a  single  body.  He  wrote  in  his  '  Political  Testament  * 
of  1752 : 

All  the  branches  of  government  should  be  closely  inter- 
connected. The  management  of  the  national  finances,  the 
national  policy,  and  the  army  are  inseparable.  It  does  not 
suffice  that  one  of  these  branches  is  well  managed.  All 
three  must  be  efficiently  conducted  and  must  advance  in  the 
same  direction,  like  a  well-trained  team,  pulling  the  car  of 
State. 

[§,  In  his  *  PoHtical  Testament '  of  1776  Frederick  once 
more  exhorted  his  successors  : 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STKENGTH     89 

Foreign  policy,  the  army,  and  the  finances  are  the  three 
great  branches  of  statesmanship,  and  they  are  so  closely 
interwoven  that  they  cannot  be  separated.  All  three  must 
be  cultivated  simultaneously.  If  all  three  are  promoted 
simultaneously  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  sound  policy 
the  State  will  reap  the  greatest  advantage.  ...  In  France 
there  is  no  real  union  among  these  three  branches.  They 
do  not  co-operate.  Each  Minister  is  occupied  only  with 
the  care  of  his  own  department.  If  a  similar  state  of  affairs 
should  arise  in  Prussia  the  State  would  be  lost. 

In  the  following  extract  from  his  *  Essai  sur  les  Formes 
de  Gouvernement '  of  1777,  Frederick  the  Great  seems 
almost  to  describe  Cabinet  government  on  a  democratic 
basis,  such  as  exists  in  England,  where  men  govern  without 
system  and  without  a  plan,  and  where  government  naturally 
and  inevitably  results  in  waste,  confusion,  muddle,  and 
inefficiency,  if  not  in  disaster.     The  King  wrote : 

If  a  ruler  abandons  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  State  and 
places  it  into  the  hands  of  paid  men,  of  the  Ministers  ap- 
pointed by  him,  one  will  steer  to  the  right  and  another  to  the 
left.    A  general  plan  is  no  longer  followed. 

Every  Minister  disapproves  of  the  actions  of  his  prede- 
cessor, and  makes  changes  even  if  they  are  quite  unnecessary, 
wishing  to  originate  a  new  policy  which  often  is  harmful. 
He  is  succeeded  by  Ministers  who  also  hasten  to  over- 
throw the  existing  institutions  in  order  to  show  their  ability. 
In  consequence  of  the  numerous  innovations  made  none  can 
take  root.  Confusion,  disorder,  and  all  the  other  vices  of  a 
bad  administration  arise,  and  incapable  or  worthless  officials 
blame  the  multitude  of  changes  for  their  shortcomings. 

Men  are  attached  to  their  own.  As  the  State  does  not 
belong  to  the  Ministers  in  power  they  have  no  real  interest 
in  its  welfare.  Hence  the  government  is  carried  on  with 
careless  indifference,  and  the  result  is  that  the  administra- 
tion, the  public  finances,  and  the  army  deteriorate.  Thus 
the  monarchy  becomes  an  oligarchy.  Ministers  and  generals 
direct  affairs  in  accordance  with  their  fancy.    Systematic 


40     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OP  GEEMANY 

administration  disappears.  Everyone  follows  his  own 
notions.  No  link  is  left  which  connects  the  directing  factors. 
As  all  the  wheels  and  springs  of  the  watch  serve  together 
the  single  object  of  measuring  time,  all  the  springs  and 
wheels  of  a  Government  should  be  so  arranged  and  co- 
ordinated that  all  the  departments  of  the  national  admin- 
istration work  together  with  the  single  aim  of  promoting 
the  greatest  good  of  the  State.  That  aim  should  not  be 
lost  sight  of  for  a  single  moment.  Besides,  the  individual 
interests  of  ministers  and  generals  usually  cause  them  to 
oppose  each  other.  Thus  personal  differences  often  prevent 
the  carrying  through  of  the  most  necessary  measure. 

These  wise  words  of  Frederick  the  Great  should  be 
placed  in  golden  letters  in  all  the  pubHc  offices,  and  be 
learned  by  heart  by  every  school  child. 

In  modern  times  Great  Britain  has  experienced  the 
efficiency  of  one-man  rule  in  the  time  of  Cromwell  and  of 
the  elder  Pitt.  Under  these  two  men  the  British  Govern- 
ment worked  like  a  single  body,  animated  by  a  single  will, 
with  the  most  gratifying  success.  A  Prime  Minister  can 
preserve  the  unity  in  the  Cabinet,  and  the  unity  of  govern- 
mental action,  only  if  he  possesses  the  supreme  direction 
of  all  departments,  if  Cabinet  Ministers  are  not  his  equals, 
but  his  subordinates,  if  the  curious  fiction  of  joint  responsi- 
bility of  the  Cabinet  is  abandoned,  if  the  Prime  Minister 
alone  is  responsible.  A  Prime  Minister  cannot  unify  the 
great  departments  and  services  by  acting  merely  the  part 
of  an  amiable  chairman  at  a  suburban  temperance  meeting. 

Unfortunately,  Democracy,  after  having  destroyed 
the  power  of  the  King,  has  gradually  undermined  that  of 
the  Ministers  as  well.  Thus  the  nation  is  left  without  a 
guide.  It  has  become  a  gigantic  business  with  a  large 
body  of  squabbling  amateur  directors,  but  without  a  general 
manager.  No  one  is  there  to  command.  Amateurs,  men 
without  knowledge,  without  practical  experience,  without 
authority,   without   power,   without   initiative,   nominally 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STKENGTH     41 

govern  the  country,  but  in  reality  they  merely  occupy 
office,  pose  as  administrators,  and  allow  things  to  drift. 
And  what  is  worst,  they  have  suppressed  the  expert.  Amateur 
politicians  have  muzzled  the  military  and  naval  experts,  and 
the  *  sovereign  '  nation  is  not  allowed  to  know  the  truth. 

The  Ministers  in  power  practise  on  the  nation  the  con- 
fidence trick  on  a  gigantic  scale.  They  attribute  all  the 
achievements  of  the  experts  to  themselves,  but  make  the 
experts  scapegoats  for  their  mistakes.  Custom,  tradition, 
the  system  is  to  blame  for  this  state  of  affairs  rather  than 
the  men  who  occupy  ministerial  positions.  That  practice 
prevails  not  only  in  England,  but  in  all  democracies,  Switzer- 
land alone  excepted.  France  was  almost  as  unprepared 
for  war  as  was  Great  Britain,  owing  to  the  inefficiency  of 
her  political  system. 

Germany  owes  her  efficiency  not  to  the  greater  ability 
of  the  Germans  themselves,  but  to  the  political  system 
which  Frederick  William  the  First  and  Frederick  the  Great 
have  created,  to  the  fact  that  a  single  will  animates  the 
whole  administration  of  the  State,  that  the  whole  nation 
acts  like  a  single  man,  and  every  other  consideration  is 
subordinated  to  the  national  interest,  while  in  democracies 
parties  and  people  are  squabbling,  and  the  Departments 
of  State  are  aimlessly  pulling  some  in  one  direction  and 
some  in  another. 

Administrative  efficiency  requires  not  only  a  good  system 
but  also  good  men.  Frederick  the  Great  knew  no  favourites. 
In  his  own  words,  *  Nature  has  not  distributed  talents  accord- 
ing to  rank  and  lineage.'  Frederick,  like  Napoleon,  gave 
rank  and  position  only  to  merit.  For  obtaining  good  public 
servants  and  increasing  their  zeal,  he  attached  the  greatest 
value  to  two  factors — to  rewards  and  to  punishments.  He 
wrote  in  his  *  Political  Testament '  of  1752  : 

Men  are  ruled  by  two  motives  :  by  the  fear  of  punish- 
ment and  the  hope  of  reward.  .  .  . 


42     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OP  GEEMANY 

A  ruler  should  search  for  unknown  merit  and  reward 
men  for  worthy  deeds  performed  in  secret.  He  should 
always  pay  attention  to  this  and  keep  agents  everywhere 
so  as  to  be  informed  of  meritorious  deeds.  He  should 
watch  for  good  actions  as  carefully  as  tyrants  do  for  con- 
spiracies. 

In  his  *  Political  Testament '  of  1776  we  read  : 

It  is  particularly  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  morals 
that  distinctions  should  be  bestowed  only  for  merit  and  not 
for  wealth.  That  principle  has  been  disregarded  in  France, 
and  the  consequence  has  been  that  public  morals  have 
declined.  Formerly  Frenchmen  could  obtain  honours 
only  by  worthy  deeds,  but  now  they  beheve  that  wealth 
alone  suffices  to  bring  them  honours. 

In  his  *  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvernement  *  of 
1777  he  stated  : 

The  promotion  of  morality  in  the  widest  sense  is  one  of 
the  most  important  duties  of  the  sovereign.  He  can  do 
much  by  distinguishing  and  rewarding  the  worthy  and  by 
showing  his  contempt  for  the  worthless.  A  ruler  should 
loudly  disapprove  of  every  dishonourable  act  and  refuse 
distinction  to  those  who  will  not  mend  their  ways. 

A  sovereign  may  do  irremediable  injury  to  the  State  by 
distinguishing  people  of  wealth  but  without  merit,  for 
honours  bestowed  on  the  worthless  rich  strengthen  the 
widely  held  idea  that  wealth  alone  suffices  to  give  distinction. 
If  that  behef  should  gain  ground,  greed  and  cupidity  will 
break  all  bounds.  A  scramble  for  wealth  will  ensue,  and  the 
most  reprehensible  means  for  acquiring  riches  will  be 
employed.  Corruption  will  spread  apace,  become  general, 
and  take  deep  root.  Men  of  talent  and  of  character  will  be 
disregarded,  and  the  people  will  honour  only  those  who  by 
ostentatious  expenditure  advertise  their  wealth. 

To  prevent  the  corruption  of  the  national  character  the 
sovereign  must  distinguish  only  men  of  true  merit  and 
treat  with  contempt  men  of  wealth  without  virtue. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STRENGTH     43 

The  way  in  which  Frederick  practised  what  he  preached 
may  be  seen  by  the  methods  by  which  he  forced  the  nobiHty 
to  act  worthily  towards  their  country.  In  the  Prussian 
Code,  compiled  under  the  inspiration  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
we  read  in  the  chapter  on  the  nobility  : 

Men  of  nobility  are  particularly  entitled  to  honourable 
employment  in  the  service  of  the  State  according  to  their 
abilities.  .  .  . 

Loss  of  nobility  is  the  consequence  if  a  person  of  noble 
birth  leads  a  dishonourable  life,  or  a  life  by  which  he  lowers 
himself  to  the  level  of  the  common  people. 

For  committing  a  common  crime  people  of  noble  birth 
may  be  deprived  of  their  nobility  by  judicial  decision. 

Unfortunately,  England  has  been  corrupted  by  pohticians 
who  have  bestowed  rewards  on  the  worthless  and  neglected 
and  discouraged  the  deserving.  Distinctions  and  honours 
are  rarely  given  for  services  rendered  to  the  nation.  Hence 
the  saying,  '  Patriotism  does  not  pay,'  is  generally  heard. 
Titles  and  honours  are  frequently  bestowed  by  party  men 
upon  other  party  men.  They  are  sold  for  cash  or  are  given 
for  party  services,  and  often  for  unavowable  ones,  to  people 
who  sometimes  have  done  the  greatest  injury  to  the  State 
and  nation  by  preying  upon  the  people,  drugging  them 
with  patent  medicines,  plying  them  with  bad  drink,  or 
deceiving  them  in  the  interest  of  the  governing  party. 
On  the  other  hand,  patriots  who  have  laboured  all  their 
life  for  their  country  die  in  poverty  and  obscurity.  Thus 
intrigue  is  rewarded  and  patriotism  discouraged. 

People  who  have  travelled  in  Germany  have  been  sur- 
prised by  the  efficiency  of  the  Government  services,  by  the 
punctuality  of  the  trains,  by  the  cheapness  and  promptness 
of  justice,  the  excellence  of  the  post  and  telephone,  the 
efficiency  of  national  education,  the  conscientiousness  and 
the  honesty  of  all  officials,  and  the  absence  of  muddle, 
delay,  and  waste.    The  excellence  of  the  German  officials 


44     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

is  due  to  their  training.  Frederick  the  Great  considerably- 
increased  the  efficiency  of  the  wonderful  civil  service  which 
his  father  had  created  by  applying  to  it  his  principle  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  and  by  appropriate  laws  such  as 
the  following.  They  form  part  of  the  Prussian  code,  which 
breathes  in  every  chapter  the  Frederician  spirit.     We  read  : 

Nobody  may  be  given  official  employment  unless  he  is 
sufficiently  qualified  for  his  post  and  has  given  proof  of  his 
ability  to  fill  it. 

He  who  by  bribery  or  by  other  improper  means  has 
obtained  official  employment  must  immediately  be  dismissed. 

All  agreements  and  promises  by  which  private  advan- 
tages are  promised  for  obtaining  official  employment  are 
null  and  void. 

He  who  knowingly  entrusts  an  official  position  to  an 
unfit  person  must  make  good  the  damage  which  may  arise 
to  the  State  or  to  private  individuals  through  the  ignorance 
or  the  incompetence  of  the  person  appointed. 

Officials  in  authority  who  have  neglected  to  prevent 
mistakes  and  misdemeanours  on  the  part  of  their  subordin- 
ates which  they  might  have  prevented  by  acting  in  accord- 
ance with  the  official  regulations  are  liable  for  the  damage 
which  their  neglect  has  caused  to  the  State  and  to  private 
citizens. 

These  laws  and  their  watchful  observance  have  naturally 
increased  greatly  the  efficiency  of  the  Prussian  bureaucracy. 

Before  the  advent  of  Frederick  the  Great,  important 
positions  in  the  State  were  given  rather  according  to  favour 
than  according  to  merit.  Frederick  abolished  this  abuse. 
He  was  determined  to  give  official  positions  only  to  men  of 
ability,  regardless  of  their  birth  and  descent.  He  wrote 
in  his  '  Histoire  de  mon  Temps ' :  *  Nature  has  distributed 
gifts  amongst  men  without  considering  their  ancestors.' 
He  anticipated  Napoleon's  principle,  *  La  carriere  ouverte 
aux  talents.' 

Frederick  believed  that  the  strength  of  a  State  consists 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  STRENGTH     45 

not  in  its  wealth,  but  in  its  power — that  men  are  more  im- 
portant than  commodities.  He  attached  particular  value 
to  agriculture,  recognising  that  the  peasantry  would  supply 
him  with  excellent  soldiers,  and  that  the  development  of 
the  national  agriculture  would  enable  the  soil  to  nourish 
a  very  large  population.  The  King  wrote  in  his  *  Anti- 
Machievel ' : 

The  strength  of  the  State  consists  not  in  the  extent  of  its 
territory,  not  in  the  possession  of  a  large  solitude,  but  in  the 
wealth  and  in  the  number  of  inhabitants.  Therefore  it  is 
to  the  interest  of  a  prince  to  people  his  country  and  to  make 
the  inhabitants  prosperous. 

In  his  *  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvernement '  we 
read  : 

The  agriculturists  are  truly  the  bread-winners  of  the 
State.  They  should  be  encouraged  to  cultivate  the  land 
carefully,  for  the  true  wealth  of  the  country  consists  in  the 
productivity  of  the  soil.  It  is  true  that  Holland  flourishes, 
although  she  produces  scarcely  one-hundredth  of  the  food 
consumed  by  the  people.  However,  Holland  is  a  small 
State,  where  commerce  has  replaced  agriculture.  It  is 
clear  that  the  greater  the  territory  of  the  State  is,  the  more 
necessary  is  it  to  promote  its  rural  industries.  .  .  . 

The  King  stated  in  his  *  Political  Testament '  : 

War  is  a  bottomless  pit,  which  swallows  up  men.  There- 
fore attention  must  be  paid  to  people  the  country  as  much 
as  possible.  Consequently  it  is  necessary  that  the  land 
should  be  well  cultivated  and  that  the  cultivators  should 
be  prosperous . 

In  Frederick's  '  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvernement' 
we  read  :  » 

Steps  must  be  taken  to  provide  at  all  times  an  abundance 
of  food  for  the  people.  To  do  this  the  first  requirement  is 
to  have  the  soil  carefully  cultivated,  to  drain  all  the  wet  land 
which  can  be  drained,  and  to  increase  the  number  of  cattle 


46     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

and  thereby  increase  also  the  production  of  milk,  butter, 
cheese,  and  manure.  Besides,  an  exact  account  must  be 
made  of  the  quantity  of  grain  of  every  kind  produced  in 
good,  medium,  and  bad  years.  When  allowance  is  made  for 
the  quantity  of  grain  consumed,  we  know  how  much  surplus 
there  is  for  exportation  in  good  years,  or  how  much  shortage 
there  is  likely  to  be  in  bad  ones. 

Every  provident  sovereign  should  establish  magazines 
to  protect  the  people  against  scarcity  and  famine.  In  the 
bad  years  1771-1772,  Saxony  and  the  provinces  of  the 
Empire  suffered  terribly  because  they  had  neglected  that 
precaution.  The  people  were  forced  to  eat  the  bark  of  trees. 
Entire  districts  became  depopulated.  Thousands  of  people, 
pale  and  emaciated,  like  spectres,  left  the  country  in  order 
to  find  sustenance  abroad.  How  their  rulers  must  have 
reproached  themselves  when  they  saw  the  calamities  which 
they  had  caused  ! 

Frederick  the  Great,  like  the  Great  Elector  and  Frederick 
William  the  First,  strove  to  enrich  the  people  by  wise 
governmental  action.  He  settled  large  numbers  of  immi- 
grants in  his  thinly  peopled  provinces,  and  promoted  the 
national  industries  by  protection  and  by  importing  skilled 
workers  from  abroad  who  created  new  industries  in  Prussia. 
According  to  his  Minister  Hertzberg,  Frederick  founded 
more  than  1200  villages,  and^in}1786,  the  year  of  his  death, 
between  one-fifth  and  one-sixth  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Prussia,  or  more  than  a  million,  were  immigrants,  or  de- 
scendants of  immigrants.  During  Frederick's  rule  about 
350,000  foreigners  were  induced  to  settle  in  Prussia.  In 
1785  Prussia  had  165,000  industrial  workers  who  produced 
manufactures  to  the  value  of  30,000,000  thalers  per  year, 
an  enormous  sum  at  the  time. 

The  productivity  of  Prussia's  agriculture  was  stimulated 
by  wise  laws.  The  code  drafted  in  Frederick's  Hfetime 
laid  down : 

Every  agriculturist  is  obliged  to  cultivate  his  property 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STEENGTH     47 

thoroughly  and  economically  for  his  own  good  and  for  that 
of  the  community  in  general.  Therefore  he  may  be  forced 
by  the  State  to  cultivate  his  land  adequately,  and  if  he  never- 
theless continues  to  neglect  it  he  may  be  compelled  to  cede 
it  to  others. 

No  peasant  is  permitted  to  sell  crops  before  they  are 
gathered. 

The  number  of  peasant  holdings  must  not  be  dimin- 
ished, either  by  incorporating  them  in  landed  estates  or  by 
combining  several  of  them  in  one  hand.  On  the  contrary, 
landed  proprietors  are  obliged  to  see  that  the  holdings  in 
their  villages  are  duly  occupied.  Peasants'  properties 
where  teams  are  kept  must  not  be  converted  into  holdings 
where  no  teams  are  kept  except  by  special  permission  of  the 
State. 

Desiring  to  increase  the  strength  of  Prussia,  Frederick 
the  Great  was  as  much  interested  in  matters  economic 
as  in  war.  As  soon  as  a  war  was  ended,  the  King  en- 
deavoured to  repair  its  ravages  and  to  increase  the  wealth 
of  the  people  as  much  as  possible.  Immediately  after 
the  end  of  the  first  and  second  Silesian  wars,  Frederick 
concentrated  all  his  energy  upon  raising  the  economic 
strength  of  the  nation.  In  the  first  chapter  of  his  *  Guerre 
de  Sept  Ans,'  the^King  tells^us  :) 

Although  the  late  King  Frederick  William  I  had  taken 
care  to  bring  order  into  the  finances  of  Prussia,  he  had  not 
been  able  to  do  everything  that  was  needed.  He  had  neither 
the  time  nor  the  means  to  accomplish  so  great  a  work,  and 
the  things  which  had  to  be  done  were  numerous.  Waste 
lands  had  to  be  cleared  and  cultivated,  factories  to  be  estab- 
lished, commerce  to  be  extended,  and  industry  to  be  en- 
couraged. 

As  the  first  years  of  the  King's  reign  were  devoted  to 
war,  he  could  turn  his  attention  to  internal  affairs  only  after 
the  establishment  of  peace.  Along  the  Eiver  Oder  there 
were  vast  swamps,  which  had  probably  been  uncultivated 
since  the  beginning  of  time.     Plans  were  made  for  draining 


48     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

the  country.  This  was  done  by  a  canal  from  Kiistrin  to 
Wrietzen,  and  2000  famihes  were  established  on  the  re- 
claimed land.  Farther  on,  about  Stettin,  1200  families 
were  planted.  Thus  a  small  province  was  conquered  by 
industry  from  ignorance  and  sloth.  The  manufacture  of 
woollens  was  hampered  by  the  lack  of  weavers.  These 
were  imported  from  abroad,  and  a  number  of  weaving 
villages,  comprising  two  hundred  families  each,  were 
created. 

In  the  district  of  Magdeburg  it  had  been  a  custom  since 
time  immemorial  that  foreigners  should  come  in  for  the 
harvest  and  return  to  their  homes  when  it  had  been  gathered. 
King  Frederick  permanently  established  these  immigrants 
about  Magdeburg,  and  thus  settled  a  large  number  of  strangers 
on  the  land.  Through  the  various  measures  taken,  two 
hundred  and  eighty  new  villages  were  created ;  but  the 
towns  were  not  neglected.  The  King  built  a  new  town  on 
the  river  Swine  near  the  mouth  of  the  Oder.  It  was  called 
Swinemtinde. 

Everywhere  new  industries  were  called  into  being.  In 
Berlin  the  manufacture  of  rich  stuffs  and  velvets  was 
established.  Factories  producing  light  velvets  and  mixed 
stuffs  were  erected  at  Potsdam.  A  sugar  refinery  was 
established  in  Berlin.  A  factory  for  making  curtain  stuffs 
was  made  to  enrich  the  town  of  Brandenburg.  At  Frank- 
fort-on-the-Oder  the  making  of  Eussian  leather  was  intro- 
duced, and  in  Berlin,  Magdeburg,  and  Potsdam  was  intro- 
duced the  manufacturing  of  silk  stockings  and  silk  hand- 
kerchiefs. The  planting  of  mulberry  trees  was  established 
all  over  German3^  The  clergy  were  made  to  serve  as  leaders 
to  the  cultivators,  and  they  taught  them  how  to  raise  silk- 
worms. In  out-of-the-way  places  where  wood  was  super- 
abundant but  unsaleable  through  lack  of  rivers  ironworks 
were  established  which  furnished  the  army  with  guns  and 
shells.  About  Minden  and  in  the  Mark,  saltworks  were 
created  and  those  at  Halle  were  improved.  In  a  word, 
industry  was  encouraged  in  the  capital  and  in  the  provinces. 
The  Emden  Trading  Company  established  an  important 
branch  in  China.    By  reducing  the  export  duties  of  the 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STKENGTH     49 

harbours  of  Stettin,  Konigsberg,  and  Kolberg,  the  customs 
receipts  were  doubled. 

Through  all  these  enterprises  the  revenues  of  the  Crown, 
excluding  those  of  Silesia  and  East  Frisia,  were  increased  in 
1756  by  1,200,000  thalers  although  the  King  had  not  intro- 
duced any  additional  imposts  whatever.  A  census  showed 
that  the  number  of  the  inhabitants  amounted  to  5,000,000. 
As  it  is  certain  that  the  wealth  of  the  State  consists  in  the 
number  of  their  inhabitants,  Prussia  could  consider  herself 
to  be  twice  as  powerful  as  she  had  been  during  the  last 
years  of  the  reign  of  Frederick  William  I,  the  father  of  King 
Frederick. 

The  national  finances  and  the  administration  of  justice 
did  not  monopolise  the  king's  attention.  The  army,  that 
powerful  instrument  for  the  glory  and  preservation  of  States, 
was  not  neglected.  Eighty  pieces  of  heavy  artillery  were 
cast,  and  twenty  mortars.  The  store  of  gunpowder  which 
had  been  accumulated  amounted  to  56,000  quintals.  In  the 
magazines  there  were  36,000  wispels  of  oats.  Thus  every- 
thing was  prepared  for  a  war  which  was  to  be  foreseen.  .  .  . 
The  ants  gather  in  summer  the  food  they  consume  during 
the  winter,  and  a  ruler  must  save  in  time  of  peace  the  funds 
which  he  has  got  to  spend  in  time  of  war. 

Prussia  had  been  devastated  by  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
which  ended  in  1763.  It  had  largely  been  fought  on  Prussian 
territory.  The  condition  of  the  country  resembled  its 
condition  after  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Frederick  has 
told  us  in  his  *  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix  de  Hubertusbourg  *: 

Prussia's  population  had  diminished  by  500,000  during 
the  Seven  Years'  War.  On  a  population  of  4,500,000  that 
decrease  was  considerable.  The  nobility  and  the  peasants 
had  been  pillaged  and  ransomed  by  so  many  armies  that 
they  had  nothing  left  except  the  miserable  rags  which 
covered  their  nudity.  They  had  not  credit  enough  to 
satisfy  their  daily  needs.  The  towns  possessed  no  longer  a 
police.  The  spirit  of  fairness  and  order  had  been  replaced 
by  anarchism  and  self-interest.     The  judges  and  the  revenue 


50     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

authorities  had  given  up  their  work  owing  to  the  frequency 
of  invasions.  In  the  absence  of  laws,  a  spirit  of  recklessness 
and  of  rapacity  arose.  The  nobility  and  the  merchants, 
the  farmers,  the  working-men,  and  the  manufacturers  had 
raised  the  price  of  their  labour  and  productions  to  the  utmost. 
All  seemed  intent  upon  ruining  each  other  by  their  exactions. 
That  was  the  terrible  spectacle  which  the  formerly  so  flourish- 
ing provinces  of  Prussia  offered  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
war.  The  appearance  of  the  provinces  resembled  that  of 
Brandenburg  after  the  end  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

However,  Prussia  rapidly  recovered  owing  to  the  King's 
wise  and  energetic  policy.  Keferring  to  himself  in  the  third 
person,  as  he  habitually  did  in  his  writings,  he  stated  in 
his  '  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix  '  : 

There  is  no  way  to  increase  the  wealth  of  a  country  except 
by  increasing  its  manufacturing  industries.  That  is  clear 
and  evident.  Hence  the  King,  after  the  peace,  concentrated 
all  his  energy  upon  this  object.  Within  ten  years,  by  1773, 
264  new  factories  had  been  established  in  the  Prussian 
provinces.  Among  them  was  the  porcelain  factory  in 
Berlin  which  gave  work  to  500  people,  and  its  produce  soon 
exceeded  in  quality  the  famous  Saxon  china.  A  tobacco 
factory  with  branches  in  all  the  provinces  was  created,  and 
it  developed  an  export  trade  in  manufactured  goods. 

The  war  had  disastrously  influenced  the  Prussian  Ex- 
change, and  had  thus  harmed  Prussia's  foreign  commerce. 
Immediately  after  the  peace  the  inferior  coinage  was  with- 
drawn and  the  exchange  was  improved  by  a  State  Bank 
founded  with  this  object  in  view.  It  had  a  capital  of  800,000 
thalers,  which  was  found  by  the  King.  It  had  at  first  some 
bad  experiences,  but  later  on  proved  a  great  success. 

Sovereigns,  like  private  people,  must  make  economies 
BO  as  to  have  money  when  it  is  wanted.  Wise  agriculturists 
regulate  watercourses  and  use  them  for  increasing  the  fer- 
tility of  the  soil.  Acting  on  the  same  principle,  the  Prussian 
Government  increased  its  revenue  and  used  the  surplus  for 
promoting  the  public  good.  It  not  only  restored  what 
the  war  had  destroyed,  but  improved  all   that  could  be 


FOUNDAO'IONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  STRENGTH     61 

improved.  It  drained  swamps,  improved  the  land,  increased 
the  number  of  animals  in  the  country,  and  utilised  the  sandy 
soil  for  afforestation. 

The  draining  of  the  swamps  along  the  rivers  Netze  and 
Warthe  cost  750,000  thalers,  and  3500  families  were  settled 
on  the  land  thus  regained  to  agriculture.  The  work  was 
finished  in  1773,  and  15,000  people  were  settled  where 
formerly  had  been  a  wilderness.  The  marshes  about  Fried- 
berg  were  similarly  treated  and  400  foreign  families  were 
settled  there.  In  Pomerania  similar  works  were  under- 
taken. In  Brandenburg  the  marshes  of  the  Havel,  of  the 
Rhine,  and  many  others  were  drained.  About  Magdeburg 
2000  new  families  were  planted.  Since  the  death  of  his 
father,  Frederick  WiUiam  the  First,  the  King  had  settled 
13,000  new  families. 

Silesia  was  not  neglected.  The  ravages  which  the  war 
had  inflicted  were  made  good  and  improvements  begun. 
The  rich  abbeys  were  compelled  to  establish  manufacturing 
industries,  and  soon  linen,  copper,  and  iron  industries, 
tanneries,  and  oil  mills  arose,  and  4000  new  families  were 
planted  in  the  agricultural  district  of  Lower  Silesia. 

Large  landowners  had  incorporated  numerous  peasant 
properties  in  their  land.  Recognising  that  the  posses- 
sion of  property  attaches  the  citizens  to  their  country,  and 
that  they  can  care  little  for  a  State  where  they  have  nothing 
to  lose,  the  landowners  were  compelled  to  re-establish  the 
peasants.  In  compensation  the  King  helped  them  and 
improved  their  credit  by  means  of  loan  banks.  Also  he 
took  pleasure  in  spending  300,000  thalers  in  repaying  some 
of  their  most  pressing  debts. 

All  these  expenses  were  necessary.  Money  had  to  be 
lavishly  spent  in  the  provinces  to  accelerate  their  recovery, 
which  otherwise  would  have  required  a  century.  By  acting 
generously  and  lavishly  prosperity  quickly  returned,  and 
100,000  people  who  had  fled  from  the  war-stricken  country 
returned. 

In  1773  the  population  was  by  200,000  larger  than  it  was 
in  1756,  when  the  Seven  Years'  War  began.  In  Upper 
Silesia  213  new  villages  were  created.     They  had  23,000  in- 

e2 


52     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

habitants,  and  plans  were  made  for  increasing  the  Pomeranian 
agriculturists  by  50,000  and  those  of  the  Mark  by  12,000. 
That  project  was  carried  out  toward  1780.  Between  the 
years  1740,  when  King  Frederick  came  to  the  throne,  and 
1779  the  population  of  the  provinces  increased  as  follows  : 
That  of  Prussia  from  370,000  to  780,000  ;  that  of  the  Mark 
from  480,000  to  710,000  ;  that  of  Magdeburg  and  Halber- 
stadt  from  220,000  to  280,000  ;  that  of  Silesia  from  1,100,000 
to  1,520,000. 

Although  enormous  sums  were  spent  on  improving  the 
country,  vast  amounts  were  devoted  to  military  purposes 
as  well.  On  the  other  hand,  King  Frederick  did  not  indulge 
in  ostentatious  expenditure,  usually  found  at  Courts,  but 
lived  like  a  private  man.  With  rigid  economy  the  Treasuries 
were  filled. 

In  1770  all  Northern  Europe  was  stricken  by  famine. 
The  infliction  required  vigorous  action.  The  poor  received 
gifts  of  corn.  The  King  had  accumulated  large  magazines 
in  all  parts  of  the  country.  He  had  76,000  wispels  of  grain, 
enough  to  feed  the  army  during  a  whole  year,  and  9000 
wispels  for  the  capital  alone.  His  providence  protected 
the  people  from  starvation.  The  army  was  fed  from  the 
magazines,  and  the  people  were  given  grain  for  food  and 
seed.  Next  year  the  harvest  was  bad  again,  and  the  neigh- 
bour States  suffered  much  more  than  Prussia  because  they 
had  neglected  establishing  magazines  in  time  of  abundance. 

While  barley  cost  two  thalers  per  measure  in  Prussia, 
it  cost  five  thalers  in  Saxony  and  Bohemia.  Saxony  lost 
more  than  100,000  inhabitants  through  starvation  and  flight, 
and  Bohemia  at  least  180,000.  On  the  other  hand,  more 
than  20,000  Bohemian  peasants  and  as  many  from  Saxony  fled 
to  Prussia,  where  they  were  welcomed,  and  they  were  made  to 
people  the  territories  which  had  been  reclaimed  to  agriculture. 

In  economic  matters,  as  in  matters  concerning  the 
national  defence,  the  public  administration,  and  the  national 
iinances,  Frederick  the  Great  acted  with  foresight  and 
providence,  and  his  successors  continued  his  policy.  He 
wrote  prophetically  in  his  *  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix ' : 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STKENGTH     63 

A  "wise  economic  policy  constantly  improved  upon  from 
father  to  son  can  change  the  character  of  the  State  and 
convert  it  from  a  poor  into  a  wealthy  country.  A  wise 
economic  policy  can  make  a  State  so  wealthy  that  it  can 
exercise  in  Europe  as  great  an  influence  as  any  one  of  the 
leading  States. 

By  pursuing  the  wise  fostering  policy  which  Frederick 
the  Great  had  initiated,  the  Hohenzollerns  have  indeed 
converted  poor  agricultural  Prussia  into  a  wealthy  Great 
Power,  possessed  of  highly  developed  industries  and  a 
vast  international  trade. 

During  the  last  four  decades,  while  British  agriculture 
has  utterly  declined  and  decayed,  Germany's  agricultural 
production  has  fully  doubled  in  weight,  and  has  more  than 
doubled  in  value.  Hence,  Germany  is  agriculturally 
almost  self-supporting.  On  a  territory  which  is  only 
75  per  cent,  larger  than  that  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Ger- 
many grows  bread-corn  for  45,000,000  people,  while  the 
United  Kingdom  grows  bread-corn  only  for  5,000,000. 
Besides,  Germany  produces,  on  her  75  per  cent,  larger  area, 
three  times  as  much  meat,  about  nine  times  as  much  potatoes, 
and  twenty  times  as  much  timber  as  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  enormous  quantities  of  sugar  and  tobacco,  of  which 
none  are  produced  in  this  country,  although  it  is  suitable 
for  their  production.  Hence  food  is  far  cheaper  in  blockaded 
Germany  than  in  Great  Britain. 

The  wise  policy  of  encouragement  initiated  by  Frederick 
William  the  First  and  Frederick  the  Great,  and  reintroduced 
by  Bismarck,  has  not  only  enormously  increased  Germany's 
agricultural  production  and  rural  wealth,  but  has  had  a 
still  more  marvellous  effect  upon  her  manufacturing 
industries.  During  the  last  thirty-five  years  the  engine 
power  of  Prussia  has  increased  more  than  seven-fold. 
While  the  British  manufacturing  industries  as  a  whole, 
comparatively  speaking,  have  remained  stagnant,  the 
German  manufacturing  industries  have  marvellously  in- 


54  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

creased,  and  her  formerly  insignificant  iron  and  steel  industry 
is  now  far  greater  than  that  of  this  country. 

In  the  manufacturing  industries,  as  in  commerce, 
Germany  has  successfully  challenged  the  formerly  un- 
challengeable supremacy  of  this  country.  The  policy 
of  action,  of  wise  governmentalism,  has  triumphed  in 
agriculture,  in  industry  and  in  commerce  over  that  of 
laissez-faire  and  non-interference.  Unfortunately,  those 
who  during  the  last  two  decades  have  unceasingly  pointed 
out  the  danger  of  allowing  Great  Britain's  agriculture  to 
decay  and  her  manufacturing  industries  to  decline  and  to 
be  outstripped  by  German  competition,  as  the  writer  of 
this  book  has  frequently  done  in  the  pages  of  The  Nine- 
teenth Century^  The  Fortnightly  BevieWy  and  elsewhere, 
preached  to  ears  deliberately  deaf.  The  politicians  in 
power  did  not  ask  whether  the  national  safety  was  en- 
dangered by  allowing  the  manufacturing  industries,  and 
even  the  iron  and  steel  industry,  which  provides  weapons 
for  war,  to  stagnate  or  to  decline,  or  whether  the  decay 
of  agriculture  would  do  irremediable  harm  to  this  country 
and  perhaps  cripple  it  in  the  hour  of  peril ;  they  simply 
asked  whether  Protection  was  politically  a  *  profitable  ' 
policy,  whether  it  would  gain  or  lose  votes,  and,  believing 
that  it  was  an  unpopular  policy,  that  it  might  lose  votes, 
the  politicians  in  power  preached  Free  Trade. 

Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  causes  of  Germany's 
efficiency  and  success  must  look  towards  the  future  with 
concern.  Germany  makes  war  cheaply  but  efficiently. 
Great  Britain  makes  war  wastefuUy.  She  has  spent 
colossal  amounts  with  lamentably  inadequate  results. 
In  view  of  the  comparatively  small  war  expenditure  of 
Germany  and  the  enormous  expenditure  of  Great  Britain, 
and  in  view  of  the  wonderful  revival  which  the  Prussian 
industries  have  experienced  after  the  greatest  national 
disasters,  even  after  1763  and  1806,  in  consequence  of 
the  energetic  action  of  her  Government,  and  of  nation- 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  STEENGTH     65 

wide  co-operation,  Germany  may  conceivably  be  able  to 
bear  the  costs  of  the  present  war  better  than  Great  Britain, 
and  Great  Britain  may  emerge  from  the  war  more  crippled 
than  Germany.  Unpreparedness  and  muddle  are  very 
expensive  luxuries  in  war,  in  administration,  and  in  matters 
economic  as  well. 

A  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago  Prussia  was  a  land  peopled 
by  boors.  Now  it  is  a  land  peopled  by  professors,  scientists, 
and  artists.  Frederick  the  Great  was  the  first  Prussian 
monarch  to  realise  that  science  and  art  increase  the  strength 
and  prestige  of  nations.  Hence,  he  began  cultivating 
the  sciences  and  arts,  and  his  successors  followed  his  example. 
As  science  and  art  were  found  to  be  sources  of  national 
power,  they  were  as  thoroughly  promoted  as  was  the  army 
itself,  while  in  this  country  education  remained  amateurish. 
Men  toyed  with  science,  and  the  universities  rather  taught 
manners  than  efficiency. 

Frederick  the  Great  vastly  improved  the  Prussian 
law.  He  desired  that  people  should  be  able  to  obtain, 
not  law,  but  justice  speedily  and  cheaply.  With  this  end 
in  view  he  caused  legal  procedure  to  be  shortened  by  wise 
regulations,  and,  in  order  to  simphfy  the  law,  he  had  it 
codified.  Herein  lies  the  reason  that  justice  may  be  obtained 
quickly  and  cheaply  in  Germany,  and  that  the  laws  are 
simple  and  plain ;  whereas  in  this  country  the  laws  are  a 
maze,  and  justice  is  sometimes  unobtainable  because  of  the 
intricacies  of  the  law,  its  uncertainty,  and  its  ruinous  cost. 

The  details  given  in  these  pages  show  clearly  that 
Germany's  strength,  wealth,  and  efficiency  are  due  to  the 
governmental  system  of  the  country.  Germany's  power 
has  been  created  by  her  most  eminent  rulers,  the  Great 
Elector,  King  Frederick  William  the  First,  and  Frederick 
the  Great.  They  abolished  self-government  of  every 
form,  and  made  the  whole  nation  a  gigantic  machine  for 
carrying  out  the  sovereign's  will  in  war  and  in  peace.  In- 
dividually, the  Germans  are  very  ordinary  men.    Collectively 


66     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

they  have  been  amazingly  successful  because  the  whole 
power  of  the  nation  is  organised,  and  can  be  employed 
against  other  nations  in  peace  and  war  by  an  absolute 
sovereign.  The  secret  of  Germany's  strength,  wealth 
efficiency,  may  be  summed  up  in  a  single  word :  Discipline. 
Apparently  Germany  is  a  constitutionally  governed  State 
possessing  a  Parliament,  manhood  franchise,  &c.  In  reality 
Germany  is  more  absolutely  governed  than  ever  before,  for 
with  the  introduction  of  universal  military  service  resistance 
on  the  part  of  the  people  has  become  impossible. 

At  first  sight  it  may  seem  that  it  is  hopeless  for  a  de- 
mocracy to  compete  with  a  highly  organised  monarchy 
such  as  Germany,  that  Great  Britain  is  now  suffering  for 
the  execution  of  Charles  the  First,  that  in  the  conflict 
between  absolutism  and  democracy,  democracy  is  bound 
to  be  defeated,  that  democracy  is  doomed.  The  conclusion 
is  scarcely  justified.  A  democracy  may  be  efficient,  business- 
like, provident,  and  ready  for  war.  That  can  be  seen 
by  the  example  of  Switzerland.  It  would  be  more  correct 
to  say  that  a  Government  which  governs  is  likely  to  defeat, 
in  peace  and  in  war,  a  Government  which  drifts. 

Nations  are  made  by  their  leaders.  Unfortunately  the 
characteristic  of  British  democracy  is  self-indulgence,  while 
the  characteristic  of  the  German  people,  and  of  the  Swiss 
people,  too,  is  duty,  patriotism,  and  work.  British  politicians 
have  pursued  the  policy  of  pander  which  German  statesmen 
and  Swiss  politicians  have  wisely  disdained.  The  advocates 
of  democracy,  and  especially  of  British  democracy,  may 
point  to  the  successes  of  the  English  race  in  every  cHme, 
and  to  the  fact  that  it  owns  one  half  of  the  habitable  globe  ; 
the  English  race,  however,  has  expanded  so  successfully, 
not  because  of  democratic  government,  but  in  spite  of  it. 
It  has  flourished  so  greatly  because  of  its  capacity  for 
colonising,  because  it  was  first  in  the  field,  because  it  was 
favoured  by  chance,  because  the  great  nations  were  fighting 
among  themselves  while  Englishmen  were  conquering  the 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANTS  STRENGTH     57 

globe,  because  it  never  had  to  fight  an  organised  absolutism 
such  as  the  German. 

Will  the  British  and  American  democracy  hold  its 
own  against  Germany,  or  will  it  go  under  ?  That  is  the 
question  which  the  war  will  settle. 

It  is  too  late  to  discuss  principles  of  government  when 
existence  is  at  stake.  The  problem  is  to  defend  the  Hberty 
of  Great  Britain,  of  the  British  Empire,  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race,  and  of  its  Allies  in  the  Hfe  and  death  struggle 
in  which  they  are  engaged.  The  resources  of  the  British 
Empire  and  of  its  AlHes  are  boundless.  They  dispose 
of  700,000,000  men  as  compared  with  only  150,000,000 
Germans,  Austrians,  Bulgarians,  and  Turks.  The  German 
combination  has  no  chance  against  the  Entente  Powers  if 
the  gigantic  resources  of  the  British  Empire  are  at  last 
organised  for  war. 

Analysis  of  Germany's  organisation  shows  that  nation- 
wide and  Empire-wide  organisation  cannot  be  effected 
by  voluntary  methods,  by  persuasion,  and  by  entreaty. 
By  persuasion  one  can  organise  a  team  of  athletes,  not  an 
Empire.  Effort  is  merely  wasted  if  those  who  ought  to 
work  in  the  factory  fight,  and  those  who  ought  to  fight 
continue  working,  or  idling.  Organisation  must  be  met 
by  organisation,  absolutism  by  absolutism.  The  nation 
and  Empire  want  real  leading,  a  system  which  can  compel 
those  who  ought  to  fight  to  join  the  army,  and  those 
who  ought  to  work  to  labour  to  the  best  of  their  ability. 
It  seems  that  only  a  system  conferring  absolute  power 
for  the  duration  of  the  war  can  organise  the  forces  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  of  the  Empire  as  a  whole. 

Democracy  is  on  its  trial.  The  Anglo-Saxon  race  is 
fighting  for  its  existence.  There  is  danger  in  delay.  War 
is  a  one-man  business.  Every  other  consideration  should 
be  subordinated  to  that  of  achieving  victory.  When  the 
United  States  fought  for  their  hfe,  they  made  President 
Lincoha  virtually  a  Dictator.    The  freest  and  most  unruly 


68     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

democracy  allowed  Habeas  Corpus  to  be  suspended  and 
conscription  to  be  introduced,  to  save  itself.  Great  emer- 
gencies call  for  great  measures.  The  war  demands  great 
sacrifices  in  every  direction.  However,  if  it  leads  to  Eng- 
land's modernisation,  to  the  elimination  of  the  weaknesses 
and  vices  of  Anglo-Saxon  democracy,  if  it  leads  to  the 
unification  and  organisation  of  the  Empire,  the  purifica- 
tion of  its  institutions,  and  the  recreation  of  the  race,  the 
gain  may  be  greater  than  the  loss,  the  colossal  cost  of  the 
war  notwithstanding.  The  British  Empire  and  the  United 
States,  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  both  hemispheres,  have 
apparently  arrived  at  the  turning-point  in  their  history. 


CHAPTEE   II 

THE   FOUNDATIONS    OF   GEKMANY^S   DIPLOMACY  ^ 

Many  British  historians,  statesmen,  and  publicists  have 
endeavoured  to  explain  to  us  the  hidden  causes  of  the 
present  war.  They  have  dwelt  on  the  warlike  and  bom- 
bastic utterances  which  WiUiam  the  Second  has  made  ever 
since  he  came  to  the  throne,  and  have  traced  the  conflagration 
to  two  powerful  influences  :  to  the  boundless  ambition  and 
conceit  of  the  German  Emperor  and  to  the  support  which 
he  received  by  the  teachings  of  German  jingoes  of  the 
military  and  of  the  professorial  variety,  from  Treitschke 
to  Bernhardi.  They  have  compared  the  Emperor  to 
Bismarck,  Louis  the  Fourteenth,  and  Napoleon  the  First. 
However,  nothing  is  easier  than  to  establish  superficial 
but  entirely  misleading  historical  parallels. 

Unfortunately,  the  British  Universities,  while  devoting 
much  time  to  abstract  economic  theory,  miscalled  political 
economy,  and  to  the  dust  and  dry  bones  of  history,  have 
completely  neglected  statesmanship,  that  most  important 
of  all  sciences,  in  its  practical  and  historical  aspects.  Before 
the  war  mediaeval  Germany  was  assiduously  studied  by 
the  professors,  but  modern  Germany  was  disregarded 
and  was  scarcely  known.  Militarily  and  intellectually 
Great  Britain  was  equally  unprepared  for  Germany's 
attack,  and  those  who  unceasingly  tried  to  warn  the  nation, 
as  the  writer  of  these  pages  has  done  in   The   Nineteenth 

^  From  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  June  1915. 
69 


60     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Century,  The  Fortnightly  Beview,  and  elsewhere  during 
fifteen  years,  were  treated  as  alarmists,  cranks,  and  anti- 
Germans. 

After  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  British  soldiers  and 
statesmen  hastily  began  to  organise  a  national  army, 
and  British  professors  endeavoured  to  explain  to  the  public 
modern  German  history  and  German  statesmanship,  two 
subjects  with  which  they  are  deplorably  ill  acquainted. 
When  it  was  too  late,  scraps  from  the  political  writings 
of  Treitschke  and  his  disciples  were  published  in  translation 
for  the  information  of  the  pubhc,  and  now  everyone  who 
has  read  some  extracts  from  Treitschke  and  Bernhardi 
believes  that  he  fully  understands  Germany's  character 
and  policy. 

The  rash  poHcy  of  WiUiam  the  Second  in  no  way  re- 
sembles that  of  Prince  Bismarck,  nor  is  it  comparable 
with  that  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth  and  Napoleon  the  First. 
In  another  part  of  this  book  I  shall  show  that  William 
the  Second,  soon  after  his  advent,  threw  Bismarck's  policy 
and  teaching  to  the  winds,  and  that  the  Iron  Chancellor 
spent  the  last  eight  years  of  his  life  in  strenuous  opposition 
to  the  Emperor's  reckless  poHcy,  and  foretold  that  it  would 
lead  to  Germany's  ruin.  William  the  Second  has  certainly 
not  acted  in  accordance  with  Bismarck's  views  and  methods. 
His  world-embracing  ambitions  may  resemble  those  of 
Napoleon  the  First,  and  his  attitude  and  his  absolutist 
pronouncements  no  doubt  remind  us  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth's 
celebrated  Uetat  c^est  moi.  He  has  not,  however,  taken 
Frenchmen  for  his  model,  but  one  of  his  predecessors, 
Frederick  the  Great. 

The  Emperor  bears  in  many  respects  a  most  remarkable 
resemblance  to  his  great  ancestor.  Modern  German  states- 
manship is  not  Bismarckian  but  Frederickian.  Treitschke 
and  Bernhardi  are  not  innovators,  but  imitators.  They 
are  merely  expounders  of  the  methods  of  Frederick  the 
Great.    A  study  of  Frederick's  policy  is  not  only  interesting 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY^S  DIPLOMACY      61 

at  the  moment,  but  it  should  prove  of  very  considerable 
practical  value  to  the  statesmen  of  the  nations  allied  against 
Germany.  Such  a  study  will  reveal  to  us  the  hidden  causes 
of  the  war  and  of  Germany's  conduct  before  and  during 
the  struggle,  and  it  will  give  us  an  excellent  insight  into  the 
traditional  methods  of  Prussian  statesmanship.  It  will 
show  us  how  Prusso- Germany  rose  from  insignificance  and 
poverty  to  greatness  and  affluence,  and  it  will  at  the  same 
time  teach  us  the  way  by  which  alone  the  Entente  Powers 
can  bring  the  war  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

The  British  Universities,  while  pubhshing  at  great 
expense  editions  and  translations  of  the  writings  of  remote 
antiquity,  which  are  entirely  useless  for  all  practical  purposes, 
have  paid  no  attention  to  the  most  important  foreign 
political  writings  with  which  every  well-educated  English- 
man ought  to  be  acquainted.  For  Bismarck's  statesmanship 
those  who  do  not  read  German  have  to  rely  mainly  upon 
his  badly  translated  '  Memoirs,'  which  contain  chiefly 
personal  matters,  and  upon  Busch's  chatter  ;  while  for 
that  of  Frederick  the  Great  they  have  to  turn  to  the  roman- 
cings  of  Carlyle  and  Macaulay.  Frederick  the  Great's 
most  valuable  political  writings  are  as  unknown  in  this 
country  as  are  Bismarck's.  Frederick  wielded  a  most 
prolific  pen.  His  general  writings  fill  thirty  moderate-sized 
volumes,  and  his  political  correspondence,  of  which  so  far 
only  part  has  been  published,  forty  very  large  ones.  He 
wrote  only  in  French,  and  the  large  majority  of  the  extracts 
from  his  writings  and  letters  given  in  the  following  pages 
have  not  previously  been  published  in  English. 

The  Germans  are  stolid  and  one-sided  people.  WiUiam 
the  Second  strikingly  resembles  his  great  ancestor  by  his 
un- German  vivacity,  his  restlessness,  and  his  great  ver- 
satility. The  Emperor  poses  as  an  authority  on  aU  things 
human  and  divine,  and  endeavours  not  only  to  direct  in  person 
the  Army,  the  Navy,  the  Church,  and  all  the  Departments  of 
State,  but  all  the  arts  and  sciences  and  the  economic  activities 


62     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

of  Germany  as  well.  Similarly,  Frederick  the  Great  was 
the  Government.  He  was  his  own  Commander-in-Chief, 
Minister  of  War,  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Minister  of  Finance,  of  Commerce,  and  of  Justice, 
&c.  His  assistants  were  mere  clerks.  In  addition  he  was 
an  excellent  economist,  historian,  and  musician.  He  wrote 
a  good  deal  of  indifferent  French  poetry  and  philosophy, 
and  he  patronised  and  endeavoured  to  direct  all  the  sciences 
and  arts  and  the  entire  business  of  Prussia. 

WiUiam  the  Second,  like  Frederick  the  Great,  is  a 
consummate  actor.  Frederick  the  Great  posed  before 
the  world  as  a  philosopher,  a  friend  of  man,  and  a  free- 
thinker. William  the  Second  poses  as  a  devout  and  deeply 
religious  man.  Both  Frederick  the  Great  and  WiUiam 
the  Second  have  acted  with  the  greatest  hypocrisy,  un- 
scrupulousness,  and  heartless  brutality.  Both  have  success- 
fully deceived  the  world  in  the  early  part  of  their  career 
by  their  frequently  made  fervent  protestations  that  they 
loved  peace  and  pubHc  morality,  and  condemned  injustice, 
tyranny,  and  war,  and  both  have  attacked  their  unsus- 
pecting and  unprepared  neighbours  after  having  lulled 
them  to  sleep  by  their  pacific  and  generous  utterances. 

Before  studying  the  views  and  poUcy  of  Frederick  the 
Great  we  should  cast  a  glance  at  his  immediate  predecessors, 
for  thus  we  shall  be  able  to  follow  the  progress  of  Prussia 
since  the  time  when  it  became  a  kingdom. 

Frederick's  grandfather,  the  first  King  of  Prussia,  who 
was  crowned  a  king  in  1701,  was  despicable  as  a  man  and 
a  monarch.  Frederick  the  Great  has  drawn  a  terrible 
picture  of  him  in  his  '  Memoires  de  Brandebourg,'  pubHshed 
in  1751.    He  wrote  : 

Frederick  the  First  was  attracted  by  the  pomp  surround- 
ing royalty.  He  was  actuated  by  vanity  and  self-love.  He 
liked  to  exalt  himself  above  others.  His  acquisition  of  the 
royal  crown  was  caused  by  a  common  and  childish  vanity. 
In  the  end  it  proved  a  poUtical  master-stroke,  for  the  royal 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      63 

dignity  delivered  the  House  of  Brandenburg  from  the  yoke 
of  the  House  of  Austria.  The  crown  became  a  spur  and  a 
challenge  to  his  posterity,  and  he  seemed  to  urge  his  heirs  : 
*  I  have  acquired  for  you  a  great  title.  Make  yourselves 
worthy  of  it.  I  have  laid  the  foundation  of  your  great- 
ness. It  is  your  duty  to  accomplish  the  work  which  I  have 
begun.  .  .  . ' 

The  armies  marching  through  Prussia,  in  the  time  of 
Frederick  the  First,  had  spread  disease  throughout  the 
country,  and  famine  had  increased  the  effect  of  the  pestil- 
ence. The  King  abandoned  his  people  in  their  misfortune, 
and,  while  his  revenues  did  not  suffice  for  the  magnificence 
of  his  expenditure  on  vain  pomp,  he  saw  in  cold  blood  more 
than  200,000  of  his  subjects  perish  whose  lives  he  could 
have  saved  by  timely  action.  .  .  . 

To  obtain  the  royal  crown  he  sacrificed  the  lives  of  30,000 
of  his  subjects  in  wars  made  on  behalf  of  the  Emperor. 
The  royal  dignity  appealed  only  to  his  vanity  and  his  love 
of  dissipation.  He  was  open-handed  and  generous,  but 
bought  his  pleasures  at  a  terrible  cost.  He  sold  his  subjects 
as  soldiers  to  England  and  Holland  like  cattle  to  the  butcher. 

He  wasted  the  wealth  of  the  nation  in  prodigal  and  vain 
dissipation.  His  Court  was  one  of  the  most  magnificent 
in  Europe.  His  favourites  received  large  pensions.  Nothing 
could  equal  the  magnificence  of  his  palaces.  His  fetes  were 
superb.  His  stables  were  filled  with  horses,  his  kitchens 
with  cooks,  and  his  cellars  with  wine.  He  gave  an  estate 
worth  40,000  thalers  to  a  servant  for  shooting  a  large  stag. 
He  intended  to  pawn  his  domains  at  Halberstadt  in  order 
to  buy  the  Pitt  diamond  which  ultimately  was  bought  by 
Louis  the  Fifteenth.  .  .  .  His  favourites  were  overwhelmed 
with  gifts  ;  and  while  his  eastern  provinces  perished  through 
famine  and  pestilence  he  did  not  lift  a  finger  to  help  them. 

Frederick  the  First  died  for  the  good  of  his  country 
in  1713,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Frederick  William 
the  First,  the  father  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Frederick 
Wilham  the  First  reduced  the  expenditure  of  the  Court 
to  a  minimum,  introduced  the  most  rigid  economy  in  the 


64     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

country,  and  employed  the  national  resources  exclusively 
for  creating  a  large  army  and  a  great  war  chest.  He  con- 
verted Prussia  into  an  armed  camp  and  militarised  the 
whole  nation.  His  character  is  drawn  as  follows  by  Frederick 
the  Great  in  the  '  Histoire  de  mon  Temps '  : 

The  late  King  Frederick  William  the  First  strove  to 
make  his  country  happy,  to  create  a  well- disciplined  army, 
and  to  administer  his  finances  with  order  and  wise  economy. 
He  avoided  war  in  order  not  to  be  diverted  from  this  worthy 
aim,  and  thus  he  advanced  his  country  unostentatiously 
on  the  way  to  greatness  without  awakening  the  envy  of 
other  States. 

In  Frederick's  essay  '  Des  McBurs,  des  Coutumes,  de 
rindustrie,'  we  read  : 

Under  Frederick  the  First  Berlin  had  been  the  Athens  of 
the  North.  Under  Frederick  William  the  First  it  became 
its  Sparta.  Its  entire  government  was  militarised.  The 
capital  became  the  stronghold  of  Mars.  All  the  industries 
which  serve  the  needs  of  armies  prospered.  In  Berlin 
were  established  powder  mills  and  cannon  foundries,  rifle 
factories,  &c.  .  .  . 

Frederick  William  the  First  strove  less  to  create  new 
industries  than  to  abolish  useless  expenditure.  Formerly, 
mourning  had  been  ruinously  expensive.  Funerals  were 
accompanied  by  extremely  costly  festivities.  These  abuses 
were  abolished.  Houses  and  carriages  were  no  longer 
allowed  to  be  draped  in  black,  nor  were  black  Hveries  to  be 
given  to  servants.  Henceforward  people  died  cheaply. 
The  military  character  of  the  Government  affected  both 
customs  and  fashions.  Society  took  a  military  tone.  No 
one  used  more  than  three  ells  of  cloth  for  a  coat.  The  age  of 
gallantry  passed  away.  Ladies  fled  the  society  of  men, 
and  these  compensated  themselves  with  carousals,  tobacco, 
and  buffoonery. 

Frederick  William  the  First  died  on  May  17,  1740,  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Frederick  the  Second,  the  Great. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      65 

As  Frederick  loved  the  French  language  and  French  elegance, 
was  devoted  to  poetry,  music,  and  art,  and  hated  the  army, 
he  was  despised  by  his  coarse  and  brutal  father.  He  seemed 
to  him  a  fop  and  a  degenerate,  another  Frederick  the  First. 
Men  in  Prussia  and  abroad  who  had  suffered  under  the  harsh 
and  parsimonious  government  of  Frederick  WilKam  the  First 
hailed  Frederick's  advent  with  joy.  They  thought  that  the 
rule  of  the  martinet  had  come  to  an  end,  that  life  in  Prussia 
under  the  new  sovereign  would  be  pleasant  and  peaceful. 

Frederick  was  twenty-eight  years  old  when  he  came 
to  the  throne,  and  he  had  done  his  best  to  deceive  the  world 
as  to  his  real  character.  He  was  beheved  to  be  witty, 
genial,  and  peaceful,  if  not  unmiHtary.  In  1737,  three 
years  before  he  ascended  the  throne,  he  published  a  book 
called  '  Considerations  sur  Tetat  du  corps  pohtique  de 
I'Europe,'  which  concluded  with  the  words  :  *  It  is  a  dis- 
grace for  a  ruler  to  ruin  his  State  ;  and  to  attempt  to  obtain 
territories  to  which  one  has  no  justified  claim  must  be 
branded  as  criminal  injustice  and  rapacity.' 

Two  years  later,  in  1739,  Frederick  the  Great  wrote 
his  celebrated  book  *  The  Anti-Machiavel.'  It  was  pub- 
lished in  1740,  the  year  when  he  came  to  the  throne.  In 
it  he  stated  with  the  greatest  emphasis  that  policy  should 
be  based  upon  morality,  and  laid  down  the  remarkable 
doctrine  that  ruler  and  subjects  were  equals,  and  that  the 
sovereign  was  the  first  servant  of  the  State.  In  the  first 
chapter  of  the  '  Anti-Machiavel '  we  read  :  '  A  sovereign, 
far  from  being  the  absolute  master  of  the  people,  should 
only  be  the  highest  official  (le  premier  mctgistrat).'  In 
another  edition  of  the  same  book  that  expression  was  re- 
placed by  *le  premier  domestique.'  In  the  *  Memoires  de 
Brandebourg  '  he  stated  that  a  ruler  should  be  *  le  premier 
serviteur  de  I'Etat.'  Frederick  the  Great,  in  his  *  Anti- 
Machiavel,*  laid  down  the  duties  of  kingship  as  follows  : 

Eulers  ought  to  be  exclusively  occupied  with  the  duties 


66     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

of  study  and  of  government  in  order  to  be  able  to  act  with 
intelligence  and  in  the  fullness  of  knowledge.  Their  business 
consists  in  thinking  correctly  and  in  acting  in  accordance 
with  their  intelHgence  and  convictions. 

In  the  *  Anti-Machiavel '  Frederick  utterly  condemned 
the  pohcy  advocated  by  the  great  Florentine  statesman.  He 
castigated  the  boundless  ambitions  of  rulers,  and  urged  that 
the  action  of  sovereigns  should  be  animated  by  philosophy, 
by  a  lofty  ideahsm,  by  love  of  mankind,  by  virtue,  and  by 
love  of  peace.    We  read  in  the  Preface  and  in  Chapter  VI : 

While  Spinoza  undermined  the  foundations  of  faith, 
MachiavelU  undermined  those  of  statesmanship.  ...  I 
venture  to  take  up  the  defence  of  humanity  against  that 
monster  which  strives  to  destroy  humanity,  and  would 
oppose  reason  and  justice  to  sophistry  and  crime.  .  .  . 
Floods  which  overwhelm  the  land,  the  fire  of  Ughtning  which 
reduces  towns  to  ashes,  and  pestilences  which  depopulate 
entire  provinces  are  not  as  terrible  to  the  world  as  the 
dangerous  morals  and  the  unbridled  passions  of  kings.  The 
celestial  inflictions  last  only  for  a  time.  They  rage  only 
over  a  hmited  space,  and  Nature  makes  good  the  destruction 
they  have  caused,  but  for  the  crimes  of  kings  entire  nations 
Buffer  for  a  very  long  time.  .  .  . 

I  would  tell  the  kings  that  their  true  political  interest 
consists  in  outshining  their  subjects  in  virtue.  I  would 
tell  them  that  it  is  not  enough  for  them  to  establish  for 
themselves  a  great  reputation  by  means  of  brilliant  and 
glorious  actions,  but  that  on  their  part  actions  are  required 
which  will  promote  the  happiness  of  the  human  race. 

Of  all  the  sentiments  which  exercise  a  tyrannic  influ- 
ence over  our  minds,  none  is  more  fatal,  more  contrary  to 
humanity,  and  more  pernicious  to  the  peace  of  the  world 
than  unrestrained  ambition,  an  unquenchable  desire  for 
false  glory. 

No  terms  were  strong  enough  for  Frederick  with  which 
to  brand  a  conquering  prince,  who  to  him  was  merely  a 
crowned  villain.    He  told  the  world  in  his  *  Anti-Machiavel  * : 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      67 

Heroes  and  highwaymen  possess  the  same  courage  and 
the  same  skill.  The  only  difference  between  them  is,  that  a 
conqueror  is  an  illustrious  thief  and  that  a  highwayman  is 
an  obscure  one.  The  former  is  rewarded  for  his  deeds  with 
a  laurel  wreath,  and  the  latter  with  the  rope. 

The  '  Anti-Machiavel '  is  a  paean  of  peace.  Peace  is 
described  as  the  greatest  blessing  and  war  as  the  greatest 
crime.  The  book  significantly  ends  with  the  following 
powerful  sentences  : 

I  feel  convinced  that  if  monarchs  would  fully  realise  the 
miseries  which  a  declaration  of  war  inflicts  upon  their  peoples 
I  should  not  appeal  in  vain  to  their  better  feelings.  But 
their  imagination  is  not  sufficiently  strong.  They  do  not 
appreciate  the  evils  of  war  ;  they  do  not  know  them,  and 
they  are  protected  against  war's  horrors  by  their  exalted 
position.  They  do  not  feel  the  taxes  and  imposts  which 
crush  the  people,  the  loss  of  the  youth  of  the  nation  enrolled 
in  the  army,  the  infectious  diseases  which  decimate  the  troops, 
the  horrors  of  battles  and  sieges,  the  sufferings  of  the 
wounded  and  of  the  mutilated,  the  sorrows  of  the  orphans 
who  have  lost  in  their  father  their  only  support,  the  loss  of 
so  many  useful  men  who  have  been  cut  off  before  their  time. 

Sovereigns  who  see  in  their  subjects  merely  their  slaves 
will  sacrifice  them  without  pity  and  see  them  perish  without 
regret,  but  princes  who  see  in  otherfmen  their  equals  and 
consider  themselves  as  the  soul  of  the  body  politic,  of  the 
people,  will  carefully  preserve  thejprecious  blood  of  their 
subjects. 

As  government  should  be  based  on  virtue  and  on  the 
love  of  mankind,  it  should  be  carried  on  with  scrupulous 
honesty,  the  more  so  as  honesty  is  not  only  a  virtue  but 
an  advantage  to  those  who  possess  it.  Treaties  should  be 
observed  most  rehgiously  and  be  broken  only  in  case  of 
direst  need.    We  read  in  the  *  Anti-Machiavel ' : 

Both  honesty  and  worldly  wisdom  demand  that  sove- 
reigns should  religiously  observe  the  treaties  which  they 

f2 


68     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

have  concluded,  and  that  they  should  scrupulously  fulfil 
all  their  stipulations.  .  .  . 

A  ruler  is  sometimes  compelled  by  disagreeable  necessity 
to  break  his  treaties  and  alliances.  However,  he  should 
part  with  his  obligations  like  an  honest  man.  He  should 
advise  his  Allies  in  time  of  his  intention,  and  he  should 
before  all  never  take  such  an  extreme  step  unless  the  welfare 
of  the  people  and  absolute  necessity  make  it  inevitable.  .  .  . 

Looking  solely  at  the  interest  of  rulers,  I  assert  that  it  is 
very  bad  policy  on  their  part  to  act  like  rascals  and  to  deceive 
the  world.  They  deceive  only  once,  and  then  lose  credit 
everywhere. 

According  to  the  '  Anti-Machiavel,'  Frederick's  ideal  form 
of  government  was  a  limited  monarchy  on  the  English 
model : 

It  seems  to  me  that  if  we  look  for  a  model  among  the 
Governments  of  the  present  time  we  find  it  in  England.  In 
England,  Parliament  stands  between  the  King  and  the  people. 
The  English  King  has  the  greatest  power  for  doing  good,  but 
none  for  doing  evil. 

The  '  Anti-Machiavel '  is  not  merely  an  expression  of 
the  purest  and  most  praiseworthy  sentiments,  for  it  con- 
tains at  the  same  time  many  exceedingly  shrewd  and  practical 
political  observations.  Frederick  the  Great  utterly  con- 
denmed  entrusting  the  forces  of  the  country  to  ministers 
or  generals,  to  underlings.  In  his  opinion,  the  ruler  should 
command  the  army  in  person,  and  should  be  supported 
by  an  able  general  if  he  did  not  possess  the  necessary  military 
gifts: 

A  ruler  should  command  his  troops  in  person.  His  army 
is  his  home,  his  interest,  his  duty,  his  glory.  Being  the 
defender  of  justice,  he  ought  to  be  the  defender  of  his 
subjects,  and  as  this  is  one  of  the  most  important  objects 
of  his  ofi&ce,  he  ought  not  to  entrust  it  to  anyone  else.  Be- 
sides, his  presence  with  the  army  abolishes  misunderstanding 
among  his  generals  and  differences  between  them  which  are 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      69 

harmful  to  his  interests  and  to  those  of  the  army.  His 
presence  creates  order  in  the  matter  of  magazines,  ammuni- 
tion and  warHke  provisions,  without  which  even  a  Julius 
Caesar  would  be  helpless.  As  the  ruler  orders  battles  to  be 
fought,  he  should  also  command  in  battle,  and  should  by  his 
presence  increase  the  courage  and  confidence  of  his  troops 
and  animate  them  by  his  example. 

Although  Frederick  censured  in  the  strongest  terms 
war  in  the  abstract,  he  very  sensibly  recognised  the  necessity 
of  war  against  oppression  and  against  the  overweening 
ambitions  of  another  nation.  He  justified  only  wars  of 
defence,  and  he  laid  down  the  theory  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  following  sentences  : 

Sometimes  sovereigns  are  wise  in  undertaking  wars  of 
precaution.  Such  wars  are  technically  wars  of  attack. 
Nevertheless,  they  are  just.  When  the  excessive  strength 
of  a  State  threatens  to  overflow  its  boundaries  and  to  engulf 
the  world,  wisdom  commands  us  to  oppose  dykes  and  to 
arrest  thereby  the  torrent  while  it  can  still  be  controlled. 
When  we  see  clouds  arise  on  the  horizon  and  when  lightning 
announces  to  us  the  coming  storm,  the  threatened  sovereign 
who  cannot  weather  it  alone  will,  if  he  is  wise,  combine  with 
those  who  are  threatened  with  the  same  danger,  and  who 
have  therefore  the  same  interests. 

If  the  kings  of  Egypt,  Syria,  and  Macedonia  had  allied 
themselves  in  time  against  the  power  of  Eome,  Eome  would 
never  have  been  able  to  overthrow  them.  A  carefully 
devised  alliance  and  an  energetically  conducted  war  would 
have  prevented  Eome  from  achieving  its  aims  and  enslaving 
the  world.  It  follows  that  a  ruler  will  act  more  wisely  if 
he  embarks  upon  a  war  of  aggression  while  he  is  still  master 
of  his  destiny,  while  he  can  still  choose  between  war  and 
peace,  than  if  he  should  sit  still  and  wait  until  times  have 
become  desperate,  for  then  a  declaration  of  war  on  his  part 
would  serve  no  purpose  except  to  delay  his  enslavement  and 
ruin  for  a  little  while. 

It  is  an  excellent  maxim  that  it  is  better  to  surprise  than 


70     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

to  be  surprised  in  war,  and  all  great  men  have  taken  advan- 
tage of  it. 

The  *  Anti-Machiavel  *  was  an  act  of  self-revelation 
on  the  part  of  Frederick.  At  the  end  of  the  sixth  chapter 
we  read  the  remarkable  words  :  *  Let  Caesar  Borgia  be 
the  model  of  those  who  admire  Machiavelli.  My  model 
is  Marcus  Aurelius.' 

We  have  listened  to  Frederick's  profession  of  faith 
publicly  made  in  the  year  1740,  when  he  came  to  the  throne. 
His  book  created  an  immense  sensation  throughout  Europe, 
and  impressed  rulers  and  peoples  with  the  idea  that  a  mild, 
generous,  and  peace-loving  Sovereign  had  ascended  the 
Prussian  throne.  However,  the  world  was  deceived. 
While  Frederick  seemed  to  be  devoted  to  peace,  art,  beauty, 
and  all  the  virtues,  he  was  devoured  by  an  insatiable  thirst 
for  glory.  He  was  determined  to  win  renown  either  by 
fair  means  or  by  foul,  and  was  prepared  to  use  the  worst 
methods  described  by  Machiavelli  to  fulfil  his  ambitions. 
He  was  ready  to  bring  about  a  war  which  would  cost  count- 
less lives,  and  which  might  end  in  the  utter  destruction 
of  his  country  and  of  his  dynasty. 

The  Emperor  Charles  the  Sixth  had  no  son.  He  desired 
that  his  hereditary  rights,  after  his  death,  should  fall  to  his 
daughter  Maria  Theresa,  and  had  endeavoured  to  guarantee 
her  peaceful  succession  by  treaties  with  nearly  all  the 
Powers,  the  so-called  Pragmatic  Sanction,  to  which  Prussia 
also  had  adhered.  Although  Prussia  had  signed  that 
solemn  act  which  guaranteed  Austria's  integrity,  Frederick 
resolved  to  claim  under  the  flimsiest  of  pretexts  from 
Austria  four  duchies  of  Silesia  which  had  been  in  Austria's 
undisputed  possession  ever  since  the  Peace  of  Westphaha  in 
1648.  We  shall  learn  Frederick's  motives  for  attacking 
Austria  partly  from  his  correspondence,  partly  from  his 
*  Histoire  de  mon  Temps.'  The  latter  is  an  historical 
document  of  the   very   greatest   importance.    It   is   true 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      71 

its  style  is  occasionally  flippant.  However,  it  was  written 
by  Frederick  for  the  guidance  of  the  future  rulers  of  Prussia, 
and  is  therefore  an  invaluable  supplement  to  his  political 
and  military  testaments.    Its  author  told  us  in  the  Preface  : 

I  wish  to  transmit  to  posterity  the  principal  events  in 
which  I  have  taken  a  part,  or  of  which  I  have  been  witness, 
for  the  guidance  of  those  who  will  rule  Prussia  after  me. 
Thus  they  may  learn  the  reasons  of  my  actions,  the  means 
which  1  employed,  the  enterprises  of  Prussia's  enemies, 
the  course  of  diplomatic  negotiations,  &c. 

While  in  his  *  Anti-Machiavel '  Frederick  described  love 
of  peace  and  morality  as  the  greatest  virtues  of  a  ruler,  and 
condemned  ambition,  love  of  glory,  and  love  of  conquest 
in  unmeasured  terms,  he  revealed  his  true  character  in 
the  Preface  of  the  *  Histoire  de  mon  Temps.'  There  he 
revealed  the  fact  that  love  of  glory  and  conquest  was  after 
all  a  virtue  and  his  principal  motive.    He  stated  : 

The  true  merit  of  a  good  prince  consists  in  being  sincerely 
attached  to  the  public  welfare — to  love  his  country  and  to 
love  glory.  I  mention  glory  because  that  happy  instinct 
which  arouses  in  men  a  strong  desire  to  acquire  a  good 
reputation  is  the  mainspring  which  incites  them  to  heroic 
actions.  The  love  of  glory  is  the  power  which  awakens  the 
mind  from  its  lethargy  and  causes  us  to  embark  upon  useful, 
necessary,  and  praiseworthy  enterprises. 

The  Emperor  Charles  the  Sixth,  a  naturally  strong 
and  healthy  man,  died  suddenly  and  rather  unexpectedly 
on  October  20, 1740,  at  the  early  age  of  fifty-five.  Frederick 
was  at  the  time  in  the  country,  at  Eheinsberg,  and  he 
immediately  wrote  to  Jordan  and  other  friends  of  his  that 
he  would  make  use  of  the  opportunity  and  attack  Austria 
in  order  to  acquire  glory,  that  he  wished  to  employ  the 
powerful  army  which  Frederick  William  the  First  had 
created  and  the  war  treasure  which  he  had  accumulated 


72     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

by  his  thrift.     On  November  1,  1740,  Frederick  wrote  to 
his  principal  Minister,  von  Podewils  : 

...  I  give  you  a  question  to  solve.  When  one  has  the 
advantage,  should  one  make  use  of  it  or  not  ?  I  am  ready 
with  my  troops  and  with  everything  else.  If  1  do  not  use 
them  now  1  keep  in  my  hands  a  powerful  but  useless  instru- 
ment. If  I  use  my  army  it  will  be  said  that  I  have  had 
the  skill  of  taking  advantage  of  the  superiority  which  I 
have  over  my  neighbours. 

Frederick  made  war  upon  Austria  in  1740,  not  because 
Prussia  had  any  serious  and  valid  claims  to  Silesia,  but 
merely  because  the  young  King  was  eager  to  acquire  glory 
and  had  a  strong  and  ready  army,  while  Austria  was  dis- 
organised, was  totally  unprepared  for  war,  and  was  likely 
to  prove  an  easy  prey.  The  Austrian  Government  had 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  young  and  inexperienced  woman, 
who  lacked  good  advisers  and  generals  ;  and  other  Powers 
were  likely  to  follow  Frederick's  example,  dispute  the 
Austrian  succession,  and  endeavour  to  seize  part  of  the 
Austrian  heritage.  The  King  has  told  us  with  great  can- 
dour— or  should  one  call  it  cynicism  ? — ^in  his  '  Histoire  de 
mon  Temps  *  : 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  Turco-Austrian  War  [in 
which  Austria  was  badly  defeated]  the  Austrian  army  was 
completedly  ruined.  .  .  .  The  larger  part  of  the  Austrian 
troops  remained  in  Hungary,  but  they  numbered  only  43,000 
combatants.  No  one  thought  of  reorganising  and  complet- 
ing the  army.  Besides  these,  the  Austrians  had  only 
16,000  men  in  Italy,  at  most  12,000  in  Flanders,  while  five 
or  six  regiments  were  distributed  in  the  Hereditary  Lands. 
Instead  of  being  175,000  men  strong,  the  Austrian  effectives 
did  not  reach  82,000.  .  .  . 

Notwithstanding  her  disorganisation  and  hidden  weak- 
ness, Austria  was,  in  1740,  still  reckoned  among  the  most 
formidable  of  European  Powers.  People  thought  of 
Austria's  vast  resources,  and  believed  that  a  man  of  genius 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      73 

might  put  everything  right.  Meanwhile,  Austria  replaced 
strength  with  pride,  and  she  sought  comfort  for  her  recent 
humiliation  by  thinking  of  her  glorious  past.  .  .  . 

Prussia  had  a  national  income  of  only  seven  milHon 
thalers.  The  provinces  were  poor  and  backward  owing  to 
the  devastation  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  were  unable 
to  furnish  adequate  resources  to  the  sovereign.  Hence  the 
ruler  had  to  rely  for  financing  a  war  on  the  economies  made 
in  the  past.  The  late  King  Frederick  WilHam  the  First 
had  accumulated  a  war  treasure.  Although  it  was  not 
very  large  it  sufficed.  One  could  make  use  of  one's  oppor- 
tunities. However,  matters  had  to  be  managed  with 
prudent  care.  One  had  to  avoid  a  long-drawn-out  war,  and 
to  hasten  a  decision. 

It  was  most  awkward  that  Prussia  had  no  regular  shape. 
The  provinces  of  the  country  were  small  in  size,  and  were 
spread  all  about  Central  Germany  from  Poland  to  Brabant. 
Her  geographical  position  gave  Prussia  many  neighbours 
more  than  she  would  have  had  if  her  territory  had  been 
rounded  off  and  formed  a  solid  block. 

As  matters  stood,  Prussia  could  go  to  war  only  if  she  was 
supported  either  by  France  or  by  England.  One  could 
march  hand  in  hand  with  France,  for  that  country  thirsted 
for  glory  and  desired  to  humble  the  House  of  Austria. 
From  the  English  one  could  have  obtained  nothing  except 
subsidies,  which  they  would  pay  only  for  the  promotion  of  a 
poHcy  favourable  to  British  interests,  while  Eussia  had  as 
yet  not  sufficient  weight  in  the  balance  of  European  power. 

After  the  death  of  the  Emperor,  Austria  was  in  a  most 
difficult  position.  The  national  finances  were  in  confusion. 
The  army  had  fallen  to  pieces  and  was  disheartened  by  its 
failure  in  the  War  with  the  Turks.  The  Ministers  were  dis- 
united. At  the  head  of  the  Government  was  a  young  woman 
without  experience  [Maria  Theresa,  who  was  only  twenty- 
three  years  old]  who  had  to  defend  a  disputed  succession. 
Hence  the  Austrian  Government  did  not  appear  redoubtable. 

The  King  of  Prussia  was  certain  that  he  was  able  to 
obtain  alHes.  Frederick's  determination  to  make  war  upon 
Austria  was  confirmed  by  the  death  of  the  Empress  Anna  of 


74     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Eussia.  Through  her  demise  the  Eussian  crown  fell  to  the 
youthful  Grand  Duke  Ivan,  a  son  of  a  Princess  of  Mecklen- 
burg and  of  Prince  Anton  Ulrich  of  Brunswick,  and  the 
latter  was  Frederick's  brother-in-law.  To  all  appearances, 
Eussia  would,  therefore,  during  the  minority  of  the  young 
Czar,  be  more  interested  in  maintaining  order  in  the  interior 
of  the  Empire  than  in  defending -the  Pragmatic  Sanction  in 
Austria.  .  .  . 

Marshal  Miinnich,  who^had  caused  the  elevation  of  the 
Prince  of  Brunswick  and  of  his  Mecklenburg  consort,  was 
the  most  eminent  personage  in  Eussia.  He  wielded  for  all 
practical  purposes  the  sovereign  power  during  the  Grand 
Duke's  minority.  The  Prince  of  Brunswick  was  weak  and 
unintelligent.  His  wife  was  capricious,  and  she  possessed 
all  the  faults  of  an  ill-educated  woman.  Under  the  pretext 
of  congratulating  the  Prince  of  Brunswick  and  his  wife, 
the  King  sent  Baron  Winterfeld  on  a  mission  to  Eussia.  His 
real  reason  for  sending  Winterfeld  was  to  gain  over  Marshal 
Miinnich,  who  was  Winterfeld's  father-in-law.  He  wished 
to  induce  the  Field-Marshal  to  favour  the  designs  which 
Prussia  was  on  the  point  of  carrying  out.  The  success  of 
Winterfeld's  mission  was  as  great  as  could  be  desired. 

Although  every  precaution  was  taken  to  disguise  the 
intended  expedition  against  Austria,  it  was  impossible  to 
accumulate  perishable  provisions,  to  establish  magazines, 
to  assemble  artillery,  and  to  move  large  bodies  of  troops 
without  attracting  attention.  The  public  began  to  suspect 
that  some  enterprise  was  about  to  be  undertaken.  The 
Austrian  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  Damrath,  advised  his  Court 
that  a  storm  was  brewing  which  might  sweep  over  Silesia. 
The  Council  in  Vienna  replied  :  *  We  will  not  and  cannot 
believe  your  news.'  Nevertheless,  the  Austrian  Court 
sent  the  Marquis  Botta  to  Berlin  nominally  with  the  mission 
of  congratulating  King  Frederick  on  his  succession,  but 
really  in  order  to  find  out  whether  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
was  right  or  whether  he  had  given  a  false  alarm.  .  .  . 

Although  King  Frederick  was  firmly  determined  upon 
his  policy,  he  thought  it  useful  to  make  an  attempt  at 
arriving  at  an  agreement  with  Vienna.    With  this  object 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      76 

in  view,  Count  Gotter  was  dispatched  to  Vienna.  He  was 
to  declare  to  Maria  Theresa  that  King  Frederick  would 
assist  her  against  all  her  enemies  if  she  would  cede  Silesia 
to  him.  As  that  offer  was  likely  to  be  rejected,  Count  Gotter 
was  authorised  to  declare  war  on  Prussia's  behalf.  However, 
the  Prussian  army  travelled  more  quickly  than  the  Prussian 
Ambassador.  It  entered  Silesia  two  days  before  Count 
Gotter  arrived  in  Vienna. 

Twenty  battalions  and  thirty-six  squadrons  were  directed 
towards  Silesia,  and  these  were  followed  by  six  battalions 
who  were  to  besiege  the  fortress  of  Glogau.  Although  that 
number  was  quite  small  it  seemed  sufficient  to  seize  an 
undefended  country.  .  .  . 

On  December  23,  1740,  the  Prussian  army  entered 
Silesia.  On  their  march  the  troops  distributed  everywhere 
proclamations "  in  which  were  shown  the  rights  which  the 
House  of  Brandenburg  had  to  Silesia.  At  the  same  time 
manifestoes  were  distributed  in  which  it  was  stated  that 
the  Prussians  took  possession  of  Silesia  in  order  to  defend 
that  country  against  attacks  from  a  third  Power.  Thus 
it  was  hinted  with  sufficient  clearness  that  Prussia  would  not 
abandon  Silesia  without  fighting.  At  the  same  time,  in 
consequence  of  these  proclamations,  the  nobility  and  people 
of  Silesia  did  not  look  upon  the  Prussians  who  entered  their 
province  as  hostile  invaders,  but  considered  their  arrival 
as  an  endeavour  on  the  part  of  a  neighbour  and  ally  to 
assist  in  the  defence  of  that  province  against  third 
parties. 

Frederick  the  Great  has  told  us  in  his  *  Guerre  de  Sept 
Ans  '  : 

If  sovereigns  wish  to  make  war  they  are  not  restrained 
by  arguments  suitable  for  a  public  proclamation.  They 
determine  the  course  upon  which  they  wish  to  embark, 
make  war  and  leave  to  some  industrious  jurist  the  trouble 
of  justifying  their  action. 

Frederick's  intention  to  attack  Austria  without  cause 
surprised    and    scandahsed    even    his    best    friends.    His 


76     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

intimate  friend  Jordan  wrote  to  the  King  from  Berlin  on 
December  14,  1740  : 

Les  critiques  croient  la  demarche  presente  directement 
opposee  aux  maximes  renfermees  dans  le  dernier  chapitre 
de  I'Antimachiavel. 

To  this  the  King  replied  : 

Laisse  parler  les  envieux  et  les  ignorants  ;  ce  ne  seront 
jamais  eux  qui  serviront  de  boussole  a  mes  desseins,  mais 
bien  la  gloire.  J'en  suis  penetre  plus  que  jamais,  mes 
troupes  en  ont  le  cceur  enfle,  et  je  reponds  du  succes. 

On  November  1,  1740,  Frederick  had  expressed  to  his 
Minister,  von  Podewils,  as  we  have  seen,  his  determination 
to  attack  Austria.  Five  days  later,  on  November  6,  he 
requested  Professor  von  Ludewig,  who  during  forty  years 
had  collected  material  showing  Prussia's  claims  to  four 
Silesian  duchies,  to  send  him  a  memoir  for  his  justification. 

Although  Frederick  had  in  his  *  Anti-Machiavel '  recom- 
mended honesty  and  straightforwardness  in  diplomatic 
negotiations,  he  acted  with  incredible  unscrupulousness. 
Writing  on  November  15  to  his  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 
he  stated  that  the  position  in  Europe  had  become  so  critical, 
and  that  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  the  preservation 
of  the  German  Empire  and  German  liberty  were  so  much 
endangered,  that  he  was  forced  to  employ  violent  remedies. 
Hence  he  had  resolved  to  invade  Silesia,  partly  in  order 
to  prevent  that  province  being  seized  by  another  State, 
partly  in  order  to  be  able  to  support  and  save  Austria 
from  the  ruin  with  which  she  was  threatened.  He 
dwelt  on  the  purity  of  his  motives,  and  stated  that  he 
was  ready  to  guarantee  the  Austrian  possessions  against 
all  comers  and  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  Austria  if  that 
country  would  cede  Silesia  to  Prussia. 

Very  naturally,  his  '  offer  '  was  decHned. 

Frederick  invaded  Silesia  before  Count  Gotter,  the  bearer 
of  his   ultimatum,  had  arrived  in  Vienna.    The  province 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      77 

stood  open  to  the  Prussian  troops,  and  was  entirely  un- 
defended. In  order  to  disarm  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants,  Frederick  informed  them  by  a  Proclamation, 
dated  December  1,  that,  as  the  Emperor  had  died  without 
leaving  an  heir  male,  the  Austrian  succession  had  been 
challenged,  that  there  was  a  danger  that  other  Powers 
might  seize  Silesia,  and  that  he  occupied  that  province 
with  his  troops,  '  not  at  all  in  the  intention  of  insulting 
Her  Majesty,  Maria  Theresa,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in 
order  to  manifest  his  friendship  with  the  house  of  Austria, 
to  promote  its  true  interests,  and  to  contribute  to  its 
preservation  ;  that  no  hostihty  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  Prussian  troops,  and  that  he  hoped  that  the  inhabitants 
would  act  hke  good  neighbours.' 

That  Proclamation  singularly  resembles  the  one 
addressed  to  the  inhabitants  of  Belgium  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  war. 

Wishing  to  deceive  the  other  European  Powers  as 
to  his  intentions  as  long  as  possible,  Frederick  sent,  on 
December  6,  1740,  a  declaration  to  the  principal  embassies, 
according  to  which  the  invasion  of  Silesia  was  not  intended 
to  be  a  hostile  attack,  for  it  was  worded  as  follows  : 

Le  Eoi,  en  faisant  entrer  ses  troupes  en  Silesie,  ne  s'est 
porte  k  cette  demarche  par  aucune  mauvaise  intention  contre 
la  cour  de  Vienne  et  moins  encore  dans  celle  de  vouloir 
troubler  le  repos  de  I'Empire.  Sa  Majeste  s'est  cru  indis- 
pensablement  oblige  d'avoir  sans  delai  recours  ^  ce  moyen 
pour  revendiquer  les  droits  incontestables  de  sa  maison 
sur  ce  duche,  fondes  sur  des  anciens  pactes  de  famille  et 
de  confraternite  entre  les  electeurs  de  Brandebourg  et 
les  princes  de  Silesie,  aussi  bien  que  sur  d'autres  titres 
respectables. 

Les  circonstances  presentes  et  la  juste  crainte  de  se  voir 
prevenir  par  ceux  qui  forment  des  pretentions  sur  la  succes- 
sion de  feu  I'Bmpereur  ont  demand^  de  la  promptitude  dana 
cette  entreprise,  et  de  la  vigueur  dans  son  execution.    Mais 


78     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

si  ces  raisons  n'ont  pas  voulu  permettre  au  Koi  de  s'eclaircir 
prealablement  la-dessus  avec  la  reine  de  Hongrie  et  de 
Boheme,  elles  n'empecheront  jamais  S.M.  de  prendre  tou- 
jours  les  interets  de  la  maison  d'Autriche  fortement  ^  coeur, 
et  d'en  etre  le  plus  ferme  appui  et  soutien,  dans  toutes  les 
occasions  qui  se  presenteront. 

In  a  letter  sent  to  the  King  of  England  on  December  4, 
he  stated  that  he  had  invaded  Silesia  in  order  to  guarantee 
Germany's  Hberty  and  to  protect  Austria,  and  that  he  was 
acting  in  Austria's  true  interests.    He  wrote  : 

Monsieur  mon  Frere  :  La  grande  confiance  que  j'ai  dans 
I'amitie  de  Votre  Majeste,  et  nos  interets  communs  dans  les 
conjonctures  critiques  d'a  present,  m'obligent  ^  Lui  com- 
muniquer  sans  reserve  mes  sentiments  sur  les  mesures  a 
prendre  dans  la  situation  epineuse  des  affaires  ou  I'Europe  se 
trouve  maintenant,  et  k  Lui  faire  part  en  meme  temps  de  la 
demarche  ^Jlaquelle  j'ai  ete  oblige  de  recourir,  pour  remedier 
promptement  au  danger  dont  I'Europe  entiere,  la  liberte 
de  I'AUemagne,  et  le  systeme  de  I'Empire  sont  menaces 
6galement. 

La  maison  d'Autriche,  en  butte  a  tons  ses  ennemis, 
depuis  la  perte  de  son  chef  et  le  delabrement  total  de  ses 
affaires,  est  sur  le  point  de  succomber  sous  les  efforts  de  ceux 
qui  font  ouvertement  des  pretentions  sur  la  succession,  ou 
qui  meditent  en  secret  d'en  arracher  une  partie  ;  et  comme 
par  la  situation  de  mes  Etats  je  me  trouve  le  plus  interess6 
^  en  empecher  les  suites  et  k  prevenir  surtout  ceux  qui 
pourraient  avoir  forme  le  dessein  de  s'emparer  de  la  Silesie, 
qui  fait  la  surete  et  la  barriere  de  mes  provinces  limitrophes, 
je  n'ai  pu  me  dispenser  de  faire  entrer  mes  troupes  dans  ce 
duche,  pour  empecher  que  d'autres,  dans  les  conjonctures 
pr6sentes,  ne  s'en  emparent  k  mon  grand  prejudice  et  k 
celui  des  droits  incontestables  que  ma  maison  a  eus  de  tout 
temps  sur  la  plus  grande  partie  de  ce  pays-1^,  comme  je  ne 
manquerai  pas  de  le  manifester  en  temps  et  lieu. 

Mon  intention  en  cela  n'a  d 'autre  but  que  la  conservation 
et  le  veritable  bien  de  la  maison  d'Autriche. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      79 

Je  me  suis  meme  explique  sur  cela  par  mon  ministre  k  la 
cour  de  Vienne  d'une  maniere  que,  si  elle  entend  ses  veritables 
interets,  elle  ne  balancera  pas  un  moment  ^  y  domaer  les 
mains.  .  .  . 

In  striking  at  unprepared  Austria  Frederick  had  well 
calculated  his  chances.  Austria  and  all  the  other  Powers 
were  unready  for  war.  The  King  tells  us  in  his  *  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps,'  in  tones  of  satisfaction  : 

[Towards  the  end  of  1740  all  the  Powers  discussed, 
negotiated,  intrigued,  and  strove  to  come  to  some  arrange- 
ment, to  form  alliances.  However,  none  of  the  European 
Powers  disposed  of  troops  ready  for  immediate  action.  None 
had  had  the  time  to  accumulate  magazines  and  stores.  So 
King  Frederick  made  use  of  this  state  of  affairs  in  order  to 
carry  out  his  great  plan. 

Frederick  no  longer  considered  his  subjects  as  his  equals 
whose  hves  should  be  cherished,  as  he  had  done  in  the 
'  Anti-Machiavel.'  He  wrote  callously  in  this  '  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps  ' :  *  When  Kings  play  for  provinces,  men 
are  merely  gambhng  counters.'  Summing  up  the  events 
of  the  first  Silesian  war,  the  King  stated  : 

The  acquisition  of  Silesia  increased  Prussia's  revenues 
by  3,600,000  thalers.  The  greater  part  of  that  sum  was  used 
to  increase  the  army.  In  1741  it  consisted  of  106  battalions 
and  191  squadrons,  and  we  shall  presently  see  the  use  which 
Frederick  made  of  these  troops.  .  .  . 
:.,  Silesia  was  united  to  Prussia.  A  campaign  of  two  years 
had  sufficed  for  conquering  that  important  province.  The 
War  Fund  which  the  late  King  had  collected  was  nearly 
exhausted.  Still,  it  is  very  cheap  to  acquire  States  when 
they  cost  only  seven  or  eight  millions.  Chance  helped  in 
carrying  through  the  enterprise  successfully.  It  was  neces- 
sary that  France  should  allow  herself  to  be  dragged  into 
the  war  with  Austria.  .  .  . 

The  principal  cause  of  the  successful  conquest  of  Silesia 
was  the  army  which  had  been  formed  in  the  course  of  twenty- 


80     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

two  years  by  an  admirable  discipline  and  which  was  superior 
to  the  troops  of  all  the  other  States  of  Europe.  Besides,  the 
Prussian  generals  were  true  citizens.  The  ministers  were 
wise  and  incorruptible,  and  the  whole  enterprise  was  accom- 
panied by  that  good  fortune  which  often  favours  youth 
but  shuns  old  age.  If  that  great  undertaking  had  failed, 
King  Frederick  would  have  been  called  a  foolish  prince.  He 
would  have  been  reproached  for  having  begun  an  enterprise 
that  was  beyond  his  strength.  Owing  to  his  success  he  was 
declared  to  be  lucky.  Indeed,  Fortune  makes  one's  reputation. 
Fortunate  men  are  praised  and  unfortunate  men  are  blamed. 

Silesia  was  to  be  merely  a  stepping-stone  towards 
further  conquests.  Describing  the  events  of  the  year  1744, 
Frederick  the  Great  significantly  wrote  in  his  '  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps ' :  '  The  acquisition  of  Silesia  had  given 
new  strength  to  Prussia.  Hence  Prussia  was  now  able 
to  carry  out  with  energy  the  plans  of  the  ruler.' 

Frederick's  calculations  had  proved  correct.  His 
excellent  and  well-led  army  defeated  the  slowly  gathering 
Austrian  troops.  Other  States  desired  to  take  advantage 
of  Austria's  weakness  and  to  share  in  the  plunder.  France 
was  made  to  play  the  same  part  by  Frederick  the  Second 
which  Austria-Hungary  has  been  made  to  play  by  WiUiam 
the  Second.  In  May  1741  Frederick  concluded  at  Nymphen- 
burg  with  France  and  Bavaria  an  alliance  against  Austria. 
In  June  1742  a  separate  peace  was  made  between  Prussia  and 
Austria  at  Breslau  which  gave  to  Prussia  all  Silesia.  Its 
possession  increased  Prussia's  population  by  no  less  than 
one  half. 

France  and  Bavaria,  Prussia's  Allies,  continued  the 
war  against  Austria.  Gradually  Austria  gathered  strength 
and  defeated  her  two  opponents.  Fearing  that  Austria, 
having  defeated  France  and  Bavaria,  might  retake  Silesia, 
Frederick  resolved  to  recommence  the  war  and  to  attack 
her  before  she  had  become  too  strong.  He  concluded  some 
alhances,  and  in  1744  once  more  acted  as  the  aggressor. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY     81 

Again  he  strove  to  deceive  the  world  as  to  his  motives, 
and  endeavoured  to  justify  his  conduct  in  an  '  Expose  des 
motifs  qui  ont  oblige  le  Eoi  de  donner  des  troupes  auxiliaires 
a  I'Empereur,'  ^  which  concluded  with  the  words  :  *  En 
un  mot,  le  Eoi  ne  demande  rien,  et  il  ne  s'agit  point  de  ses 
interets  personnels  ;  mais  Sa  Majeste  n'a  recours  aux  armes 
que  pour  rendre  la  Hberte  a  TEmpire,  la  dignite  h  I'Empereur, 
et  le  repos  a  I'Europe.' 

Once  more  Frederick  the  Great  was  victorious,  but 
as  his  position  had  become  precarious  he  made  peace  with 
Austria  at  Dresden.  That  peace  merely  confirmed  the  peace 
previously  made.  No  territorial  gain  rewarded  Frederick 
for  the  second  war.  He  was  no  doubt  disappointed, 
for  his  ambitions  were  by  no  means  satisfied  by  the  con- 
quest of  Silesia.  In  1752,  four  years  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  he  wrote  a  pohtical  testament 
in  which  he  urged  upon  his  successors  that  they  should 
conquer  Polish  Prussia,  Swedish  Pomerania,  and  especially 
Saxony,  which  country  he  considered  a  particularly  valu- 
able and  desirable  possession.  In  his  political  testament 
of  1776,  the  '  Expose  du  Gouvernement  Prussien,'  Frederick 
wrote  : 

De  n^cessite  il  faut  s'emparer  de  la  Saxe.  .  .  .  S'il 
s'agit  des  vues  politiques  d'acquisition  qui  conviennent  a 
cette  monarchie,  les  Etats  de  la  Saxe  sont  sans  contredit 
ceux  qui  lui  conviendraient  le  mieux,  en  I'arrondissant  et  lui 
formant  une  barriere  par  les  montagnes  qui  separent  la  Saxe 
de  la  Boheme.  .  .  .  Cette  acquisition  est  d'une  necessite 
indispensable  pour  donner  ^  cet  Etat  la  consistance  dont  il 
manque.  Car,  des  qu'on  est  en  guerre,  I'ennemi  pent 
avancer  de  plain  pied  jusqu'^  Berlin  sans  trouver  la  moindre 
opposition  dans  son  chemin. 

Meanwhile  the  world  had  no  longer  any  illusions  as  to 
the  character  of  Frederick  the  Second.    It  had  recognised 

^  This  Emperor,  who  disputed  Maria  Theresa's  succession,  was  Charles 
the  Seventh,  Elector  of  Bavaria.    He  was  set  up  by  Frederick  the  Great. 

o 


82     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

that  the  King  was  not  merely  a  poet,  a  philosopher,  and 
a  champion  of  all  the  virtues,  but  that  in  him  were  combined 
unscrupulousness  with  craft,  and  craft  with  power.  The 
nations  around  saw  in  Frederick  a  danger  to  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  their  alarm  was  increased  by  the  fact  that 
Frederick's  diplomacy  was  feverishly  active  in  every  quarter, 
and  that  his  army  was  constantly  increasing  in  strength. 

Very  naturally  his  neighbours  wished  to  protect  them- 
selves in  time.  Austria  and  Saxony  concluded  an  alliance 
in  1745,  and  Eussia  joined  it.  Through  the  bribery  of 
some  officials,  Frederick  had  become  acquainted  with 
these  arrangements  which  were  to  restrain  his  aggression. 
He  was  annoyed,  and  in  1756  he  resolved  to  embark  upon 
a  third  war  of  attack,  and  he  began  it  by  invading  coveted 
Saxony  in  August  of  that  year.  As  usual  he  made  a  surprise 
attack.  When,  in  July,  the  Saxon  Court  became  seriously 
concerned  at  Prussia's  military  preparations,  the  King 
wrote  on  the  10th  of  that  month  to  his  Ambassador  at 
Dresden : 

I  find  it  somewhat  extraordinary  that  Saxony  has  become 
alarmed  at  my  so-called  military  preparations,  and  that  I 
should  be  believed  to  be  organising  three  armies  for  war. 
You  must  positively  assure  those  who  speak  to  you  on  the 
subject  that  no  army  is  being  formed,  that  only  some  regi- 
ments are  being  moved  according  to  the  ordinary  routine 
as  they  are  in  other  countries,  such  as  Austria. 

The  following  month  Frederick  invaded  Saxony  with  a 
large  army,  ostensibly  on  the  ground  that  necessity  com- 
pelled him  to  attack  Austria  by  way  of  Saxony,  because 
Austria  intended  to  strike  at  Prussia.  Saxony  was  thus  made 
another  Belgium.  On  August  26  the  King  wrote  to  his 
representative  at  Dresden  in  tones  of  unctuous 
rectitude :  ) 

The  unjust  proceedings  and  dangerous  plans  of  Austria 
are  forcing  me  to  violent  measures,  which  I  should  hke  to 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      83 

have  avoided  out  of  love  of  peace  and  of  public  tranquillity. 
Circumstances  compel  me  to  march  my  army  into  Saxony 
in  order  to  reach  Bohemia.  ...  In  making  this  declaration 
in  a  most  polite  and  tactful  manner  to  the  King,  you  should 
impress  upon  him  the  fact  that  necessity  compels  me,  and 
that  the  Vienna  Court  is  solely  responsible  for  these  hard 
and  disagreeable  consequences. 

The  British  Ambassador  Mitchell  reported  on  August  27 
to  his  Government  a  conversation  with  Frederick  the 
Great  in  which  the  King  had  stated  that  he  was  compelled 
to  forestall  the  Austrians,  and  that '  nothing  but  the  absolute 
necessity  of  his  affiairs  made  him  take  that  step.*  We 
are  reminded  of  the  German  declaration  made  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  war  that  France's  intention  to  attack  Ger- 
many by  way  of  Belgium  compelled  her  to  invade  that 
country  in  self-defence. 

Having  occupied  Dresden,  Frederick  had  the  archives 
searched.  The  defensive  treaties  between  Saxony,  Austria, 
and  Eussia  and  much  correspondence  were  discovered, 
and  these  were  pubHshed  and  described  to  the  world  as  a 
vile  conspiracy  against  Prussia.  WilHam  the  Second 
merely  repeated  at  Brussels  the  performance  of  his  ancestor 
at  Dresden. 

Having  invaded  Saxony,  Frederick  explained  his  conduct 
to  the  world  in  the  usual  way.  The  war  had  been  forced 
upon  him.  Once  more  he  was  the  innocent  victim.  In  his 
celebrated  '  Memoire  Raisonne,'  justifying  the  invasion, 
which  was  distributed  in  thousands  of  copies  in  all  countries, 
and  which  may  be  found  in  Hertzberg's  '  Recueil,'  we  read  : 

Les  raisons,  qui  ont  mis  le  Roi  dans  la  necessity  de 
prendre  les  armes  contre  la  Cour  de  Vienne  et  de  s'assurer 
pendant  cette  guerre  des  Etats  hereditaires  ^  du  Roi  de 
Pologne,  sont  fondees  sur  les  regies  les  plus  exactes  de  I'equit^ 
et  de  la  justice.    Ce  ne  sont  pas  motifs  d'ambition  ni  des 

^  That  is  to  say,  Sayony.  Frederick  Augustus  the  Second,  Elector  of 
Saxony  by  inheritance,  was,  like  his  father,  the  elected  King  of  Poland. 

g2 


84     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

vues  d'aggrandissement.  C'est  une  suite  de  projets,  de 
complots  et  de  trahisons  de  la  part  de  ces  deux  Cours  qui 
ont  oblige  Sa  Majeste  de  songer  a  sa  defense  et  a  sa  surete. 
Les  decouvertes  qu'EUe  a  faites  sur  cette  importante  matiere 
mettent  cette  verite  dans  tout  son  jour  et  forment  une 
espece  de  demonstration  de  la  justice  de  sa  cause  et  des 
mauvais  procedes  de  ceux  qui  I'ont  forcee  d'en  venir  k 
ces  tristes  extremites.  .  .  . 

In  German  and  even  in  English  histories  may  be  read 
the  fable  that  a  European  Coalition  had  been  formed  with 
the  object  of  despoiling  Prussia,  that  Prussia  was  forced 
into  the  Seven  Years'  War.  Yet  Count  Hertzberg,  who 
wrote  the  *  Memoire  Kaisonne '  at  Frederick's  orders,  and  who 
conducted  the  Prussian  Foreign  Office  in  Frederick's  time  dur- 
ing more  than  two  decades,  admitted  himself  in  a  paper  read 
before  the  Berlin  Academy  in  1787,  the  year  after  Frederick's 
death,  that  in  1756  there  had  been  no  conspiracy  against 
Prussia  and  no  plan  to  attack  her ;  that  combined  action 
had  been  planned  by  Austria,  Saxony,  and  Kussia  only 
if  Prussia  should  be  the  aggressor.  A  full  account  of  his 
lecture  may  be  found  in  Schoell's  '  Histoire  Abregee  des 
Trait es  de  Paix.'  The  Prussian  historian  von  Kaumer  more 
recently  stated  that  '  Frederick  had  not  proved,  and  could 
not  prove,  that  a  formal  offensive  alHance  against  him 
had  been  concluded  between  Austria,  Eussia,  and  Saxony.' 

Frederick  the  Great,  hke  Napoleon  the  First,  kept  his 
own  counsel.  We  do  not  know  for  certain  why  he  invaded 
Saxony  in  1756.  As  he  was  not  threatened  by  a  hostile 
coahtion  as  he  alleged,  as  the  second  Silesian  War  had  not 
brought  him  the  hoped-for  territorial  increment,  and  as  in 
1752  ^  he  had,  in  his  political  testament,  urged  his  successors 
to  acquire  Saxony,  one  may  safely  conclude  that  he  went 
to  war  in  the  hope  of  acquiring  that  country. 

Germany's    assertions  that   a   conspiracy  was   formed 

1  As  we  have  seen,  he  also  urged  the  acquisition  of  Saxony  in  his 
later  '  Political  Testament '  of  1776. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      85 

against  her  by  King  Edward  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  finds  its 
exact  counterpart  in  Frederick's  assertions  made  in  1756. 

The  peculiar  attitude  of  modern  Germany  towards 
treaties,  which  are  treated  as  scraps  of  paper  if  they  are 
inconvenient  to  her  and  as  sacred  undertakings  if  she  can 
benefit  by  them,  is  based  on  the  precedents  set  by  Frederick 
the  Great  and  upon  his  teachings.  In  his  '  Anti-Machiavel ' 
the  King  urged  that  honesty  was  the  best  policy,  that  faith 
should  be  kept  by  rulers,  that  treaties  should  be  reUgiously 
observed,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  extracts  given 
at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  These  views  soon  changed 
when  a  change  was  deemed  advantageous.  In  the  Preface 
of  the  '  Histoire  de  mon  Temps  '  we  read  : 

Posterity  will  perhaps  see  with  surprise  in  these  Memoirs 
accounts  of  treaties  which  have  been  concluded  and  broken. 
Although  examples  of  broken  treaties  are  common,  the 
author  of  these  Memoirs  would  require  better  reasons  than 
precedent  for  explaining  his  conduct  in  breaking  treaties. 
A  sovereign  must  be  guided  by  the  interest  of  the  State. 
In  the  following  cases  alliances  may  be  broken  : 

(1)  When  one's  ally  does  not  fulfil  his  engagements  ; 

(2)  When  one's  ally  wishes  to  deceive  one,  and  when  one 
cannot  by  any  other  means  prevent  him ; 

(8)  When  necessity  {force  majeure)  compels  one  ; 
(4)  When  one  lacks  means  to  continue  the  war. 

By  the  will  of  Fate  wealth  influences  everything.  Rulers 
are  slaves  of  their  means.  To  promote  the  interest  of  their 
State  is  a  law  to  them,  a  law  which  is  inviolable.  If  a  ruler 
must  be  ready  to  sacrifice  his  life  for  the  welfare  of  his 
subjects,  he  must  be  still  more  ready  to  sacrifice,  for  the 
benefit  of  his  subjects,  solemn  engagements  which  he  has 
undertaken  if  their  observance  would  be  harmful  to  his 
people.  Cases  of  broken  treaties  may  be  encountered 
everywhere.  It  is  not  our  intention  to  justify  all  breaches 
of  treaty.  Nevertheless,  I  venture  to  assert  that  there  are 
cases  when  necessity  or  wisdom,  prudence  or  consideration 
of  the  welfare  of  the  people,  oblige  sovereigns  to  transgress 


86  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

because  the  violation  of  a  treaty  is  often  the  only  means 
■whereby  complete  ruin  can  be  avoided. 

To  me  it  seems  clear  and  obvious  that  a  private  person 
must  scrupulously  observe  the  given  word,  even  if  he  should 
have  bound  himself  without  sufficient  thought.  If  a  private 
person  breaks  his  contract  the  damaged  person  can  have 
recourse  to  the  protection  of  the  law,  and  however  the 
decision  may  go,  only  an  individual  suffers.  But  to  what 
tribunal  can  a  sovereign  appeal  if  another  sovereign  breaks 
his  treaty  ?  The  word  of  a  private  person  involves  in 
misfortune  only  a  single  human  being,  while  that  of  sove- 
reigns can  create  calamities  for  entire  nations.  The  question 
may  therefore  be  summed  up  thus  :  Is  it  better  that  a  nation 
should  perish,  or  that  a  sovereign  should  break  his  treaty  ? 
Who  can  be  stupid  enough  to  hesitate  in  answering  this 
question  ? 

In  other  words,  advantage  was  to  decide  whether  a 
treaty  was  to  be  kept  or  broken.  Frederick  broke  his 
treaties  shamelessly.  He  abandoned  his  ally,  France, 
because  it  suited  him,  as  he  frankly  admitted  in  his  '  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps.'     The  King  wrote  : 

We  must  now  touch  the  reasons  which  led  to  an  armistice 
between  Prussia  and  Austria.  This  is  a  dehcate  question. 
The  poHcy  of  the  King  was  wrongful  and  shady  (scabreuse). 

The  object  of  the  war,  as  far  as  King  Frederick  was 
concerned,  was  to  conquer  Silesia.  He  concluded  alHances 
with  Bavaria  and  France  only  with  that  object  in  view. 
However,  France  and  her  AlUes  looked  upon  the  object  of 
the  alHance  in  a  different  way.  The  Cabinet  at  Versailles 
was  convinced  that  Austria  had  arrived  at  the  hour  of  her 
destiny,  and  that  her  power  would  be  destroyed  for  all  time. 
The  downfall  of  Austria  was  incompatible  with  the  liberty 
of  Germany,  and  did  in  no  way  suit  the  King  of  Prussia,  who 
worked  for  the  elevation  of  his  dynasty,  and  who  did  not 
intend  to  sacrifice  his  troops^in  order  to  create  new  rivals  to 
himself.  .  .  . 

Had    King   Frederick   too   strenuously   supported   the 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      87 

operations  of  the  French  troops,  their  success  -would  have 
been  dangerous  to  himself.  From  an  Ally  he  would  have 
become  a  subject  of  France.  .  .  . 

Queen  Maria  Theresa  stood  at  the  edge  of  a  precipice. 
An  armistice  gave  her  breathing  time,  and  the  King  could 
break  the  armistice  at  any  moment  convenient  to  himself. 

France  learned  the  meaning  of  the  saying,  '  travailler 
pour  le  Eoi  de  Prusse.* 

In  deserting  France,  Frederick  explained  his  conduct 
in  a  letter  written  June  10,  1742,  to  Cardinal  de  Fleury, 
the  principal  Minister  of  France,  in  which  he  stated  : 

L'avenir  ne  m'offre  que  des  perspectives  funestes,  et  dans 
une  situation  aussi  critique  (quoique  dans  Famertume  de 
mon  coeur)  je  me  suis  vu  dans  la  necessite  de  me  sauver  du 
naufrage  et  de  gagner  un  asile.  Si  des  conjonctures  facheuses 
m'ont  oblige  de  prendre  un  parti  que  la  necessite  justifie, 
vous  me  trouverez  toujours  fidele  a  rempUr  les  engagements 
dont  Texecution  ne  depend  que  de  moi. 

These  mendacious  professions  of  impotence  to  continue 
the  war  glaringly  contrast  with  the  real  reasons  for  abandon- 
ing France  given  by  the  King  in  his  posthumously  published 
history. 

Although  Frederick  readily  broke  treaties  which  were 
not  advantageous  to  himself,  he  condemned  in  the  strongest 
terms  those  nations  which  failed  to  fulfil  their  engage- 
ments towards  Prussia.  To  the  end  of  his  days  he  expressed 
hatred  and  contempt  for  England  because  she  had  broken 
her  treaty  with  Prussia  towards  the  end  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War.  Modem  Germany  tells  us  that  she  was  justified  in 
breaking  her  treaty  regarding  Belgium,  but  that  Italy 
acted  criminally  in  refusing  to  participate  in  the  Belgian 
crime. 

Bismarck  induced  Italy  to  join  the  Austro- German 
AlHance,  as  he  repeatedly  stated,  not  so  much  in  the  hope 
of  obtaining  her  support  in  time  of  need,  but  in  order  to 


88     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

keep  her  neutral  in  case  of  a  great  war.    Herein  he  followed 
Frederick's  teachings,  for  the  King  wrote  in  his  '  Anti-       I 
Machiavel ' : 

It  is  frequently  asserted  that  treaties  are  useless  because 
their  stipulations  are  hardly  ever  fulfilled,  and  that  men  are 
no  more  scrupulous  now  than  they  were  in  former  ages.  To 
those  who  argue  thus  I  would  reply  that  although  both  in 
ancient  and  in  modern  times  rulers  have  failed  to  fulfil  their 
treaty  obligations,  it  is  always  advantageous  to  conclude 
treaties.  An  ally  is  an  enemy  the  less,  and  if  your  ally  does 
not  come  to  your  aid,  you  induce  him  by  means  of  an  alliance 
to  remain  neutral — at  least  for  some  time. 

Sham  alliances  were  highly  valued  by  Frederick.  He 
wrote  to  his  Minister  von  Podewils  on  June  1,  1742  : 

For  the  future  security  of  Prussia's  new  possessions  I 
rely  upon  a  good  and  numerous  army,  a  large  war  treasure, 
strong  fortresses,  and  sham  alliances — that  is,  upon  alHances 
which  at  least  will  make  some  impression  upon  outsiders.  .  . . 

The  easiest  way  to  neutrahse  a  powerful  country  and 
a  possible  future  enemy  seemed  to  the  King  an  alhance 
with  that  very  State.  Therefore  we  read  in  his  '  Expose 
du  Gouvemement  Prussien,'  his  '  PoHtical  Testament '  of 
1776 : 

One  of  the  first  poHtical  principles  is  to  endeavour  to 
become  an  ally  of  that  one  of  one's  neighbours  who  may 
become  most  dangerous  to  one's  State.  For  that  reason 
we  have  an  alliance  with  Kussia,  and  thus  we  have  our 
back  free  as  long  as  the  aUiance  lasts. 

During  the  last  two  centuries  all  the  Eussian  Czars 
except  one  married  German  princesses.  German  princesses — 
the  supply  is  very  large — have  sat  upon  many  foreign 
thrones  and  often  influenced  the  pohcy  of  nations  in  Ger- 
many's favour.  Prusso-Germany's  matrimonial  policy  was 
established  on  a  broad  basis  and  most  highly  developed 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      89 

by  Frederick  the  Great.  In  order  to  influence  Eussia's 
policy  in  Prussia's  favour  he  strove  in  1744  to  direct  Eussia's 
policy  through  German  influence  in  the  ruling  family  as  he 
had  done  in  1740.  The  King  has  told  us  in  his  '  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps  * : 

Nothing  would  have  been  more  opposed  to  Prussia's 
interests  than  to  allow  the  formation  of  a  matrimonial 
alHance  between  Eussia  and  a  Saxony  hostile  to  Prussia. 
At  the  same  time,  nothing  would  have  seemed  more  un- 
natural than  to  sacrifice  a  Prussian  princess  of  the  blood 
royal  in  order  to  dislodge  the  Saxon  princess  whom  the  Saxon 
Court  wished  to  give  to  the  Grand  Duke  to  wife.  Another 
expedient  was  necessary.  Of  all  the  German  princesses  of 
marriageable  age  none  seemed  more  suitable  for  Eussia  and 
none  seemed  more  Hkely  to  serve  the  interests  of  Prussia  at 
the  Eussian  Court  than  the  Princess  of  Zerbst. 

With  the  object  of  supplanting  the  Saxon  princess  by 
the  Princess  of  Zerbst,  compHcated  intrigues  were  entered 
upon,  and  they  proved  completely  successful.  The  Eussian 
Czarina  was  prevailed  upon  to  consent,  and  the  Princess 
of  Zerbst,  known  to  history  as  Catherine  the  Second,  the 
Great,  went  to  Eussia  and  influenced  Eussian  poHcy  in 
Prussia's  favour.  By  making  similar  use  of  family  in- 
fluences, Frederick  the  Great  strove  to  direct,  in  Prussia's 
favour,  the  policy  of  Sweden,  which  then  was  still  a  very 
important  State.  Frederick  has  told  us  in  his  *  Histoire 
de  mon  Temps  '  : 

When  the  Eussian  Czarina  had  agreed  to  it  that  the 
Princess  of  Zerbst  should  marry  the  Grand  Duke,  her  son, 
matters  were  made  easy  for  marrying  Princess  Ulrike  of 
Prussia  to  the  new  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden.  Prussia 
founded  her  security  upon  these  two  family  alhances  with 
Eussia  and  Sweden.  A  Prussian  Princess  close  to  the 
Swedish  throne  could  not  possibly  be  hostile  to  her  brother 
King  Frederick,  and  a  German  Princess  married  to  a  Eussian 
Grand  Duke,  a  Princess  who  had  been  brought  up  and 


90     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

educated  on  Prussian  territory  and  who  owed  her  elevation 
to  the  action  of  the  Prussian  King,  could  not  desert  him 
without  ingratitude. 

Pescribing  the  events  of  the  year  1773,  King  Frederick 
stated  in  his  *  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix  de  Hubertusbourg ' : 

By  careful  management  and  intrigue  the  King  succeeded 
in  inducing  the  Eussian  Czarina  to  choose  the  Princess  of 
Darmstadt,  the  sister  of  the  Princess  of  Prussia,  as  a  wife  for 
her  son  the  Grand  Duke  Paul.  In  order  to  have  influence  in 
Eussia  it  was  necessary  for  Prussia  to  place  there  persons 
who  were  likely  to  favour  Prussia.  It  was  to  be  hoped  that 
the  Prince  of  Prussia,  when  succeeding  King  Frederick, 
would  be  able  to  draw  great  advantage  from  the  fact  that  his 
wife's  sister  had  married  the  Eussian  heir  to  the  throne. 

Bribery,  corruption,  and  spying  have  been  among  the 
most  conspicuous  characteristics  of  the  policy  of  modern 
Germany.  German  money  is  lavishly  spent  abroad  for 
influencing  opinion  and  the  action  of  foreign  Governments, 
and  according  to  apparently  reliable  reports  the  German 
Emperor  himself  has  taken  a  strong  and  personal  interest 
in  the  more  seamy  side  of  the  German  Secret  Service.  If 
these  reports  are  true,  he  has  acted  as  a  faithful  disciple 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  In  his  time  spying,  corruption, 
and  bribery  were  brought  to  the  highest  perfection. 

We  have  seen  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that 
Frederick,  when  intending  to  attack  Austria  for  the  first 
time  in  1740,  sent  to  Eussia  Baron  Winterfeld.  He  was 
to  influence  his  father-in-law,  Field-Marshal  Miinnich,  who 
at  the  time  was  all-powerful  in  Eussia,  and  he  was  to  resort 
freely  to  bribery.  On  December  6,  1740,  Frederick  wrote 
to  his  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  : 

You  must  use  all  your  skill  to  gain  Field-Marshal  Miinnich 
to  my  interests,  and  must  spare  neither  compHments  nor 
promises  of  gratitude.  You  can  assure  him  that  if,  by 
employing  his  authority  and  credit,  he  induces  the  Eegent 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      91 

to  support  me,  I  will  give  him  and  his  posterity  in  perpetuity 
the  estate  of  Biegen,  which  has  a  yearly  income  of  more  than 
6000  thalers,  and  I  shall  give  him  as  well  the  County  of 
Wartenberg  in  Silesia.  .  .  . 

As  both  the  properties  mentioned  were  in  Silesia,  which 
Frederick  was  about  to  overrun  and  conquer,  Miinnich 
was  directly  interested  in  the  success  of  Frederick's  piratical 
expedition. 

Two  days  later  he  wrote  in  the  instructions  for  Count 
Gotter,  who  was  sent  to  Vienna  with  that  celebrated  ulti- 
matum to  Maria  Theresa  which  arrived  two  days  after 
the  Prussian  army  had  invaded  Silesia  : 

If  the  Cabinet  in  Vienna  can  be  gained  to  Prussia's 
interests  by  bribery,  my  Ambassador,  von  Borcke,  had 
instructions  given  him  on  the  7th  of  this  month  to  offer  up 
to  200,000  thalers  to  the  Grand  Chancellor,  Count  Zinzen- 
dorff,  and  100,000  thalers  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Toussaint. 
If  others  have  to  be  bribed.  Count  Gotter  should  let  me  know, 
and  I  will  give  my  orders. 

On  January  11,  1741,  Frederick  wrote  to  his  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd,  von  Mardefeld,  that  if  the  estates  which  were 
to  be  offered  to  Field-Marshal  Miinnich  by  his  son-in-law, 
Count  Winterfeld,  Prussia's  special  envoy,  should  not 
suffice  to  gain  him  over  to  Prussia's  interests,  Winterfeld 
could  dispose  of  100,000  thalers  as  well.  In  1745  Herr 
von  Mardefeld  was  ordered  to  offer  40,000  thalers  to  Count 
Bestucheff  if  Eussia  would  remain  neutral  during  the  second 
Silesian  War. 

When,  in  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  Frederick 
the  Great  became  hard  pressed  by  his  enemies,  it  occurred 
to  him  that  he  might  possibly  detach  France  by  bribing 
Madame  de  Pompadour,  the  all-powerful  mistress  of  King 
Louis  the  Fifteenth.  The  political  correspondence  of  the 
King,  pubhshed  on  behalf  of  the  German  Government  in 
a  large  number  of  volumes,  contains  a  number  of  references 


92     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

to  that  interesting  transaction.    For  instance,  on  July  7, 
1757,  Frederick  wrote  to  his  sister  : 

My  deae  Sister, — It  is  too  kind  of  you  to  take  so  much 
trouble  with  my  affairs.  I  am  ashamed  to  abuse  your 
kindness.  Still,  as  you  are  wilHng  to  promote  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  I  would  ask  you  to  send  M.  de  Mirabeau  to 
France.  I  will  gladly  bear  the  expenses  of  his  journey,  and 
he  may  offer  to  the  King's  favourite  a  sum  up  to  500,000 
thalers  for  the  conclusion  of  a  peace.  He  may  even  increase 
his  offer  far  above  the  sum  named,  if  Madame  de  Pompadour 
should  bind  herself  to  procure  to  Prussia  not  only  peace,  but 
also  some  advantages.  You  understand,  of  course,  that  this 
business  must  be  treated  with  the  greatest  dehcacy,  and  that 
my  name  must  not  be  connected  with  it.  If  the  people  in 
England  should  get  wind  of  this  transaction,  all  would  be 
lost.  .  .  . 

Soon  Frederick  increased  the  bribe  which  he  was  wilHng 
to  offer  to  Madame  de  Pompadour.  On  September  26, 
1767,  he  wrote  to  Colonel  von  Balbi : 

...  I  sincerely  hope  that  the  secret  negotiations  which 
I  have  opened  will  substantiate,  unless  cessions  of  territory 
should  be  required.  As  I  have  been  informed  that  the 
transaction  might  be  soon  concluded  if  I  could  make  up 
my  mind  to  cede  to  Madame  de  Pompadour  the  principality 
of  Neuchatel  and  Valangin  for  life,  I  have  much  pleasure 
in  telhng  you  that  I  shall  raise  no  difficulties,  and  I  authorise 
you  expressly  by  the  present  letter  to  mention  this  offer  to 
your  friends  so  that  they  can  boldly  insinuate  and  promise 
to  Madame  de  Pompadour  on  my  behalf  [that  I  shall  cede  to 
her  the  principality  named  for  life  as  soon  as  peace  is  con- 
cluded between  France  and  Prussia.  The  revenues  of  the 
principality  will  be  hers,  and  I  trust  that  she  will  use  her 
whole  influence  so  that  the  conditions  of  peace  will  be 
advantageous,  or  at  least  little  onerous,  to  Prussia.  .  .  . 

Frederick  the  Great  achieved  his  master  stroke  in 
corruption  during  the  period  of  peace  which  preceded  the 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      93 

Seven  Years'  War,  when  men  in  the  Austrian  and  Saxon 
Diplomatic  Services  whom  he  had  bribed  delivered  to  him 
the  most  important  secrets  of  State.  The  King  tells  u;^ 
in  his  *  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans '  : 

A  man  named  Weingarten,  who  was  secretary  to  La 
Puebla,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  allowed  himself 
to  be  used  by  King  Frederick,  and  furnished  the  King  with 
the  most  secret  correspondence  which  passed  between  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  and  the  Court  of  Vienna  and  the  Court 
of  Petersburg. 

This  man,  whose  services  were  exceedingly  important, 
at  last  became  suspected  by  his  master.  He  was  lucky 
enough  to  notice  it  in  time.  He  escaped  from  the  Embassy 
and  claimed  the  King's  protection.  He  was  withdrawn 
with  difficulty  from  the  prosecution  which  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  set  on  foot,  was  hidden  and  sent  to  Kolberg, 
where  he  changed  his  name. 

Although  that  source  of  information  was  thus  cut  off, 
there  was  another  channel  by  which  the  King  received 
reliable  information  regarding  the  plans  of  his  enemies.  He 
was  well  served  by  an  employee  of  the  Secret  Chancellery 
of  Saxony  at  Dresden.  That  man  handed  every  week  to 
the  Prussian  Minister  to  Saxony  the  despatches  which  the 
Dresden  Court  received  from  Petersburg  and  Vienna,  and 
he  also  supplied  him  with  copies  of  all  the  treaties  deposited 
in  the  Dresden  archives. 

The  employee  of  the  Foreign  Office  at  Dresden  mentioned 
by  the  King  was  the  notorious  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Menzel. 
He  was  engaged,  not  by  one  of  the  King's  underlings  without 
his  knowledge,  but  by  the  direct  orders  of  Frederick  himself, 
and  the  King  settled  all  the  details  regarding  this  man 
in  a  letter  sent  on  April  8,  1752,  to  von  Maltzahn,  his  Am- 
bassador in  Dresden.    We  read  in  it : 

Quant  a  celui  que  le  sieur  Rehnitz  vous  a  amene  [Menzel] 
je  vois,  par  les  echantillons  que  vous  m'avez  marques  de 
son  savoir-faire,  que  ce  sera  un  sujet  bien  utile  et  dont  nous 


94     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

saurions  tirer  des  connaissances  tres  utiles.  C'est  aussi 
pourquoi  vous  devez  vous  arranger  et  prendre  les  concerts 
qu'il  faut  avec  lui. 

J'ai  resolu  de  lui  faire  payer  une  pension  jusqu'^  2000 
ecus  par  an,  selon  que  vous  conviendrez  avec  lui,  et  mon 
conseiller  prive  Eichel  a  mes  ordres  de  vous  faire  parvenir 
cet  argent  en  tels  termes  que  vous  le  desirerez,  soit  par  des 
expres  ou  par  des  remises  en  argent,  tout  comme  vous  le 
jugerez  convenable. 

Pour  vous  mettre  aussi  en  etat  de  faire  d'abord  des 
largesses  a  cet  homme,  j'ai  fait  ordonner  par  le  conseiller 
prive  Eichel  au  banquier  Splitberger  de  vous  remettre  la 
Bomme  de  500  ecus  sous  le  pretexte  d'un  argent  qui  lui 
avait  ete  remis  par  vos  parents,  afin  de  vous  le  faire  payer 
a  Dresde. 

Au  surplus,  vous  vous  garderez  bien  de  ne  rien  communi- 
quer  au  departement  des  affaires  etrangeres  des  avis  que  vous 
tirerez  de  ce  canal,  sans  mes  ordres  expres,  parceque  je 
veux,  pour  etre  d'autant  mieux  assure  du  secret,  que  tout 
ceci  ne  passe  que  par  mes  mains  seules.  C'est  aussi  pourquoi 
vous  ne  me  ferez  autrement  vos  rapports  a  ce  sujet  que  par  le 
chiffre  immediat  dont  vous  etes  en  possession. 

Quant  au  sieur  Kehnitz,  comme  je  crains  tout  comme 
vous  qu'il  ne  gate  par  sa  conduite  imprudente  et  inconsideree 
toute  cette  affaire  vous  tacherez  a  le  disposer  de  partir  le 
plus  tot  possible  de  Dresde  en  I'assurant  que  ses  affaires 
particulieres  qu'il  a  la,  n'en  souffriraient  pas,  et  que  je  lui 
saurais  gre,  s'il  voulait  faire  un  tour  dans  le  pays  de  Saxe 
pour  engager  et  m'amener  ici  quelques  Parchentmacher 
[skilled  artizans]  que  je  voudrais  bien  etablir  dans  ce  pays-ci. 

Je  remets  tout  a  votre  dexterite  et  prudence  et  attendrai 
votre  rapport  sur  la  maniere  que  vous  aurez  tout  arrange. 

Frederic. 

Between  1752  and  1756  Menzel  betrayed  the  diplomatic 
secrets  of  Saxony  and  of  her  AUies  to  Frederick.  How 
greatly  the  King  was  interested  in  Menzel's  activity  will 
be  seen  by  the  fact  that  he  is  mentioned  or  alluded  to  in 
no  les^  than  thirty-six  of  the   King's  published  letters. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      95 

Frederick  cherished  him  Hke  the  apple  of  his  eye,  and 
frequently  had  enjoined  care  upon  him,  sent  him  on  holi- 
days, &c. 

Frederick  was  the  most  thrifty  of  monarchs  in  all  matters 
except  bribery  and  corruption.  Professor  von  Ludewig, 
mentioned  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  chapter,  when  set  to 
work  to  prove  Prussia's  historic  claims  to  Silesia,  was  paid 
three  thalers  (95.)  a  day  for  his  labour,  and  he  was  remuner- 
ated for  his  forty  years'  activity  in  collecting  the  necessary 
material  to  support  the  King's  claim  *  with  a  Httle  wind 
that  costs  nothing,'  in  the  shape  of  a  title,  as  von  Podewils 
put  it. 

Frederick  attached  the  highest  importance  to  the 
possession  of  a  large  fund  of  ready  money  to  be  used  for 
poHtical  purposes  at  the  right  moment.  He  wrote  in  his 
*  Anti-Machiavel ' : 

Cardinal  de  Ketz  stated  rightly  that  in  important  affairs 
money  should  be  regarded  as  of  no  consequence.  A  sove- 
reign should  therefore  always  be  in  the  position  of  controlling 
large  funds  usable  in  case  of  necessity. 

In  his  '  Political  Testament '  of  1776  Frederick  stated  : 

Statesmanship  ought  to  look  as  far  as  possible  into  the 
future  and  calculate  the  chances  and  the  constellations  of 
Europe,  and  make  use  of  them  either  for  concluding  alliances 
or  for  foiling  the  plans  of  Prussia's  enemies. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  it  is  not  possible  to  shape 
the  course  of  history.  However,  opportunities  must  be 
seized  when  they  occur.  Hence  the  finances  of  the  country 
must  always  be  in  order.  Herein  lies  the  reason  that  there 
should  always  be  kept  a  large  reserve  of  ready  money,  for 
then  only  can  the  Government  strike  immediately  when  the 
right  moment  for  action  has  arrived.  War  itself  should  be 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  true  principles  of  states- 
manship. One  must  strike  the  most  sanguinary  blows  at 
one's  enemies. 


96     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Frederick  the  Great,  like  William  the  Second,  en- 
deavoured to  produce  dissension  within  the  Governments 
of  countries  the  activities  of  which  he  desired  to  cripple. 
Immediately  after  his  first  attack  upon  Silesia,  on  January  6, 
1741,  he  wrote  to  his  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  : 

You  will  skilfully  throw  an  apple  of  discord  among  the 
Eussian  ministers  so  that  we  can  carry  out  the  principal  aim 
which  we  have  in  view.  I  leave  you  full  liberty  to  employ 
not  only  flatteries  and  promises,  but  as  much  money  as  you 
think  necessary,  and  Major  von  Winter f eld  can  draw  on 
the  offices  of  the  Company. 

Frederick  the  Great  was  absolutely  unscrupulous. 
He  deliberately  brought  about  three  wars,  and  he  employed 
unhesitatingly  the  worst  methods  of  MachiavelH.  Never- 
theless, hke  Shakespeare's  Eichard  the  Third,  he  posed 
habitually  as  an  injured  innocent.  In  his  '  Guerre  de  Sept 
Ans  *  he  described  his  great  and  good  opponent  as  follows  : 

King  Frederick  had,  in  the  person  of  the  Empress  Maria 
Theresa,  an  ambitious  and  vindictive  enemy,  and  she  was  all 
the  more  dangerous  as  she  was  a  woman  who  stuck  obstin- 
ately to  her  opinions  and  was  implacable.  Devoured  by 
ambition,  Maria  Theresa  wished  to  pursue  glory  in  every 
way. 

When,  soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  France  and  Sweden  joined  Austria,  Eussia,  and  Saxony 
against  Prussia,  and  when  Frederick  began  to  experience 
serious  defeats,  he  cried  to  Heaven  about  the  wickedness 
of  his  opponents.  On  July  13,  1756,  he  wrote  despairingly 
to  his  sister  Wilhelmine  : 

[I  am  in  the  position  of  a  traveller  who  is  surrounded  by  a 
number  of  rascals  and  on  the  point  of  being  murdered 
because  these  robbers  wish  to  divide  his  goods  among  them- 
selves. Since  the  League  of  Cambrai  there  has  never  been 
an  example  of  a  conspiracy  similar  to  that  which  that  criminal 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      97 

triumvirate  has  engineered  against  me.  It  is  infamous,  a 
disgrace  for  mankind,  and  a  crime  against  morality.  Has 
the  world  ever  seen  three  powerful  princes  forming  a  plot 
to  destroy  a  fourth  who  had  done  nothing  to  them  ? 

I  have  never  had  any  differences  with  France  or  with 
Eussia,  and  still  less  with  Sweden.  Three  men  acting  thus 
against  a  neighbour  would  be  condemned  by  the  law.  Never- 
theless, we  see  three  monarchs  giving  such  a  horrible  example 
to  their  subjects.  I  am  a  king,  and  believe  that  I  should 
think  like  a  king. 

It  has  always  been  my  principle  that  to  a  Sovereign  his 
good  name  should  be  more  precious  than  his  life.  A  con- 
spiracy has  been  hatched  against  me.  The  Court  at  Vienna 
has  insulted  me,  and  I  should  have  considered  myself  dis- 
honoured had  I  borne  the  insult.  Thus  the  war  was  begun, 
and  a  band  of  rogues  attacked  me  from  all  sides  That  is 
my  story. 

In  the  introduction  to  his  *  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix  de 
Hubertusbourg,'  the  arch-deceiver  among  kings  protested : 
'  During  my  whole  life  I  have  never  deceived  anyone.  Still 
less  shall  I  deceive  posterity.' 

Modern  Germany,  like  Frederician  Prussia,  loudly 
protests  her  innocence.  Her  alliances  were  legitimate, 
and  were  purely  defensive.  Those  of  her  opponents  were 
meant  for  aggression,  were  a  conspiracy  against  Germany. 
According  to  her  protestations,  Germany  has  never  deceived 
or  attacked  any  Power.  She  is  a  peaceful  State,  and  the 
other  nations  have  fallen  on  her  without  any  cause,  desiring 
to  destroy  Germany  and  German  civilisation. 

Modem  Germany  is  guided  by  the  principles  of  Macht- 
'politik.  It  is  frequently  assumed  that  the  policy  of  using 
power  ruthlessly  has  been  invented  by  Bismarck,  Treitschke, 
Bernhardi,  &c.  In  reaUty,  the  policy  of  using  power  ruth- 
lessly was  evolved  and  brought  to  the  highest  perfection 
by  Frederick  the  Great.  He  wrote  in  his  *  Histoire  de 
mon  Temps ' :  '  Eoyal  crowns  are  won  only  by  means  of 
big  guns.'    Believing  that  all  policy  was  founded  in  the 


98     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

last  resort  upon  power,  upon  force,  life  in  peace  was  for 
Frederick  the  Great  a  constant  preparation  for  war.  He 
wrote  in  his  '  Memoires  depuis  la  Paix  de  Hubertusbourg  ' : 
*  Peace  was  to  the  Prussian  armies  a  school,  and  war  was 
the  practice.' 

Although  Frederick  was  of  opinion  that  States  were 
founded  not  upon  right  but  upon  force,  and  although  he 
believed  that  States  could  be  established,  enlarged,  and  main- 
tained only  by  force,  he  absolutely  disapproved  of  the 
wanton  abuse  of  force.  Like  Cardinal  Kichelieu  and  Prince 
Bismarck,  he  was  absolutely  opposed  to  wars  of  aggression, 
to  wars  of  precaution,  to  wars  of  prestige,  to  rash  inter- 
ference in  international  affairs.  We  read  in  his  preface 
to  the  '  Histoire  de  mon  Temps  ': 

All  who  have  bowels  of  compassion  and  look  at  things  as 
they  are  must  be  deeply  moved  by  the  evils  which  statesmen 
inflict  upon  the  people,  either  through  thoughtlessness  or 
through  their  passions. 

Beason  prescribes  for  us  a  rule  of  conduct  which,  in^my 
opinion,  every  statesman  should  observe.  It  is,  to  make 
use  of  one's  opportunities,  and  to  embark  upon  a  dangerous 
enterprise  only  when  circumstances  are  favourable,  but  not 
to  force  the  pace  and  to  leave  all  to  chance.  There  are 
moments  which  one  should  seize,  when  one  should  act  with 
the  utmost  energy,  and  there  are  others  when  prudence 
compels  us  to  remain  inactive.  This  question  requires  our 
most  profound  thought,  and  we  must  examine  not  only  the 
present  position  of  affairs,  but  also  study  all  the  conse- 
quences to  which  our  enterprise  may  give  rise,  and  weigh  the 
means  possessed  by  ourselves  against  those  of  our  enemies, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  gauge  which  side  is  Hkely  to  prevail. 
If  the  decision  should  not  be  left  to  cold  calculation,  but 
should  be  influenced  or  dictated  by  passion,  a  happy  issue 
of  a  great  enterprise  is  impossible. 

Statesmanship  requires  patience,  and  the  masterpiece  of 
the  skilled^statesman  consists  in  doing  the  right  thing  at  the 
right  moment  and  in^the  right  way. 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY      99 

History  is  the  school  of  princes.  They  should  strive  to 
learn  from  the  mistakes  made  in  past  centuries,  so  as  to 
avoid  them.  Thus  they  may  learn  how  to  map  out  a  wise 
policy,  and  how  to  carry  it  out  step  by  step.  Only  he  who 
has  best  calculated  his  chances  and  who  has  most  carefully 
laid  down  his  line  of  action,  can  hope  to  overcome  men  who 
act  less  logically. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  Frederick  the  Great  recommended 
coupling  energy  with  moderation. 

When,  in  1740-41,  he  had  succeeded  in  wresting  Silesia 
from  Austria,  he  desired  that  Prussia  should  remain  at  peace, 
and  should,  by  a  policy  of  moderation,  reconcile  Europe  to 
the  great  increase  of  Prussia's  power.  On  June  21,  1742, 
he  wrote  to  his  Minister  Podewils  : 

At  the  present  moment  our  task  consists  in  making  the 
capitals  of  Europe  accustomed  to  see  Prussia  occupy  the 
great  position  which  she  has  obtained  by  her  war  with 
Austria,  and  I  believe  that  great  moderation  and  a  concilia- 
tory attitude  towards  our  neighbours  will  help  us  in  this. 

The  pohcy  recommended  in  the  foregoing  letter  singularly 
resembles  that  urged  by  Bismarck  in  the  thirtieth  chapter 
of  his  posthumous  memoirs,  in  which  we  read  : 

We  ought  to  do  all  we  can  to  weaken  the  bad  feeUng 
which  has  been  called  forth  through  our  growth  to  the 
position  of  a  real  Great  Power  by  honourable  and  peaceful 
use  of  our  influence,  and  so  convince  the  world  that  a 
German  hegemony  in  Europe  is  more  useful  and  less  partizan, 
and  also  less  harmful  for  the  freedom  of  others,  than  would 
be  that  of  France,  Eussia,  or  England. 

Frederick  the  Great  and  Bismarck  would  undoubtedly 
have  loudly  disapproved  of  the  war  which  WiUiam  the 
/    Second  so  rashly  began  in  1914. 

Frederick  the  Great,  hke  Bismarck,  spent  the  later  years 
of  his  Hfe  in  Jaying  down  the  principles  of  statesmanship 

h2 


100  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

for  the  benefit  of  future  generations,  and  Frederick,  like 
Bismarck,  looked  with  anxiety  and  pessimism  towards 
the  future.  In  the  concluding  passages  of  his  history  of 
the  Seven  Years'  War  he  stated  : 

Time,  which  heals  everything,  will  no  doubt  give  back 
to  Prussia  her  old  prosperity  and  splendour.  The  other 
Powers  also  will  recover.  However,  in  future  other  ambi- 
tious men  will  bring  about  new  wars  and  new  disasters  to 
mankind,  for  it  is  a  peculiarity  of  men  that  they  will  not 
learn  by  experience.  The  follies  committed  by  the  fathers 
are  not  heeded  by  the  sons.  Every  generation  must  make 
its  own  experiences.  .  .  . 

May  Heaven — supposing  Providence  looks  down  upon  our 
human  miseries — protect  Prussia  and  the  Kings  who  will 
govern  the  State  in  future  against  the  calamities  from  which 
the  country  has  suffered  in  the  troublous  times  which  I  have 
described,  and  may  they  never  be  compelled  to  hav(  recourse 
to  those  terrible  and  violent  measures  which  had  to  be 
employed  to  protect  the  State  against  the  ambitious  hatred 
of  all  Europe,  which  wished  to  destroy  the  House  of  Branden- 
burg and  to  exterminate  for  all  time  the  very  name  of 
Prussia. 

In  many  passages  of  Frederick's  writing  we  find  a 
free  expression  of  his  pessimistic  forebodings  ,which  were 
only  natural  in  view  of  the  worthlessness  of  his  nephew 
and  successor,  Frederick  Wilham  the  Second.  In  his 
*  Histoire  de  mon  Temps  '  we  read  :  '  La  fortune  est  souvent 
plus  funeste  aux  princes  que  I'adversite.  La  premiere 
les  enivre  de  presomption  ;  le  seconde  les  rend  circonspects 
et  modestes.'  Good  fortune  was  indeed  fatal  to  Frederick 
Wilham  the  Second  and  Frederick  William  the  Third. 
It  made  them  presumptuous.  They  neglected  the  State, 
and  allowed  the  army  to  dechne.  The  rule  of  these  two 
princes  led  to  Prussia's  downfall  in  1806. 

Frederick  recommended  that  Prussia  should  follow 
a  cautious,  conservative,  and  moderate  policy.    He  desired 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPIiOMACY    tm 

that  the  country  should  not  lightly  engage  in  war,  that 
Prussia's  sovereigns  should  only  rarely  engage  in  hostihties. 
The  great  King  thought  it  particularly  important  that 
Prussia  should  go  to  war  only  if  the  campaign  was  Hkely 
to  be  highly  profitable  to  the  State.  He  wrote  in  his 
'  Political  Testament '  of  1776  : 

As  Prussia  is  not  rich,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  enter 
into  a  war  where  nothing  can  be  gained.  In  such  a  war  one 
exhausts  one's  strength,  one  can  only  lose,  and  if  later  on 
some  good  opportunity  should  arise,  one  cannot  take 
advantage  of  it. 

All  territories  lying  at  a  distance  from  the  State  are  a 
burden.  A  village  on  the  frontier  is  more  valuable  than  a 
principaHty  sixty  miles  away. 

It  is  necessary  to  hide  with  care,  and  as  much  as'possible, 
one's  ambitious  plans,  and  it  is  advisable  to  awaken  envy 
among  the  European  Powers,  for  their  division  enables 
Prussia  to  strike.  .  .  .  Secrecy  is  a  most  important  virtue 
both  in  statecraft  and  in  war. 

During  the  Seven  Years'  War,  Prussia,  supported  by 
England,  successfully  resisted  the  united  forces  of  Austria, 
Eussia,  France,  Saxony,  and  Sweden.  More  than  once  she 
suffered  serious  defeats.  Yet  she  was  not  overwhelmed. 
The  causes  of  her  successful  resistance  to  nearly  all  Europe 
should  be  of  particular  interest  at  the  present  moment 
when  Germany  is  engaged  in  a  similar  and  apparently 
hopeless  struggle.  In  the  Seven  Years'  War  Prussia  fought 
against  three  Great  Powers.  Now,  Germany  fights  against 
three  races,  the  Latin,  the  Slavonic,  and  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race.  The  highest  authority  on  the  causes  of  Prussia's 
successful  resistance  is  undoubtedly  Frederick  the  Great 
himself.  In  1759  Prussia  suffered  a  number  of  most  dis- 
astrous defeats,  and  the  King's  position  seemed  to  be 
desperate.  In  commenting  on  the  campaign  of  that  year 
the  King  wrote  : 

That  campaign  was  perhaps  the  most  disastrous  of  all, 


10;2       v'THE  ^FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

and  Prussia  would  have  been  lost  if  her  enemies,  who  knew 
how  to  defeat  her,  had  known  equally  well  how  to  take 
advantage  of  their  victories. 

How  Prussia  weathered  her  greatest  defeat  may  be  seen 
from  the  Battle  of  Kunersdorf .  At  that  battle  the  Prussians 
lost  a  large  number  of  guns  to  the  Russians,  and  an  enormous 
number  of  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  At  the  end  of 
the  day  scarcely  10,000  men  of  Frederick's  army  remained, 
and  these  were  a  flying  mob.  Commenting  on  that  dis- 
astrous battle  the  King  wrote  : 

Had  the  Russians  known  how  to  take  advantage  of  their 
victory,  had  they  pursued  the  discouraged  Prussian  troops, 
Prussia  would  have  been  lost.  Owing  to  their  inaction,  they 
gave  King  Frederick  time  to  make  good  his  losses.  Nearly 
all  the  Prussian  generals  were  wounded.  Prussia's  enemies 
had  it  in  their  power  to  end  the  war.  They  need  only  have 
given  their  defeated  enemy  the  cowp  de  grace.  But  they 
stood  still  and,  instead  of  acting  with  vigour  and  energy,  as 
the  occasion  demanded,  congratulated  each  other  on  their 
success  and  praised  their  good  fortune. 

Prince  Soltikoff  explained  the  reason  of  his  inactivity. 
When  Marshal  Daun,  the  Austrian  general,  urged  him  to 
continue  his  operation  with  vigour  he  repHed  :  *  I  have 
done  enough  during  this  year.  I  have  won  two  battles  which 
have  cost  Russia  27,000  men,  and  before  going  into  action 
once  more  I  wish  to  wait  for  a  couple  of  Austrian  victories. 
It  is  not  right  that  the  Russian  troops  should  bear  the 
brunt  and  do  all  the  fighting.'  Only  with  difficulty  could 
the  Austrians  induce  the  victorious  Russians  to  cross  the 
river  Oder. 

Commenting  on  the  campaign  of  1761-62,  Frederick 
the  Great  told  us  : 

At  the  end  of  the  last  campaign  in  the  opinion  of  all 
statesmen  Prussia  was  lost.  She  was  saved  by  the  death  of 
a  woman,  and  was  supported  and  saved  by  the  help  of  that 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY'S  DIPLOMACY    103 

Power  which  had  been  most  eager  to  destroy  her.  In  a 
similar  manner  Madame  Masham  saved  France  in  the  War  of 
Succession  by  her  intrigues  against  Lady  Marlborough, 
How  vain  are  all  our  calculations  !  The  smallest  accident 
influences  and  changes  the  fate  of  empires.  Chance  makes 
a  plaything  of  us,  laughs  at  the  vain  wisdom  of  us  mortals 
elevates  some  and  overthrows  others. 

Frederick  the  Great  was  saved  from  annihilation,  as 
he  himself  admitted,  through  the  mistakes  of  his  opponents, 
and  especially  through  their  lack  of  unity.  When  all 
seemed  lost  Fate  saved  the  King  by  the  death  of  the 
Empress  Ehzabeth  of  Russia.  Her  son,  Peter  the  Third, 
a  blind  admirer  of  Frederick,  not  only  made  peace  with 
Prussia,  but  concluded  an  alHance  with  her. 
•V  ■  When  matters  were  desperate  with  Prussia,  Frederick 
tried  to  divide  the  Allies  against  themselves.  Writing  of  the 
year  1760,  he  told  us  in  his  '  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans '  : 

From  day  to  day  the  war  became  more  difficult,  and  the 
risks  and  dangers  constantly  increased.  Although  the 
Prussians  were  fortunate.  Fortune  betrayed  them  several 
times.  Nothing  could  be  hoped  for  from  Italy,  and  Turkey 
had  so  far  not  seemed  inchned  to  let  it  come  to  a  breach  with 
Austria.  Therefore  the  only  resource  left  consisted  in 
dividing  or  separating  the  Powers  which  had  formed 
the  anti-Prussian  AlHance.  With  this  object  in  view 
negotiations  were  entered  upon  both  in  France  and  in 
Russia. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  negotiations  with  Russia  proved 
successful  in  the  end  through  the  death  of  the  Czarina. 

In  the  '  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans,'  Frederick 
summed  up  the  causes  of  Prussia's  successful  resistance 
as  follows  : 

In  1757,  during  the  second  year  of  the  Seven  Years* 
War,  it  seemed  impossible  that  Prussia  would  be  able  to 
resist  the  attack  of  the  Powers  arrayed  against  her.    If  we 


104    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

carefully  examine  the  causes  which  led  to  so  unexpected  an 
issue,  we  find  that  the  following  reasons  prevented  Prussia's 
downfall : 

(1)  The  lack  of  agreement  and  harmony  among  the 
Powers  which  formed  the  Anti-Prussian  Alliance ;  their 
different  interests,  which  prevented  them  agreeing  with 
regard  to  the  mihtary  operations  which  were  undertaken  ; 
the  lack  of  unity  among  the  Eussian  and  Austrian  generals, 
which  made  them  over-cautious  when  opportunity  demanded 
that  they  should  act  with  energy  and  destroy  Prussia,  as 
they  might  easily  have  done. 

(2)  The  over-artful  policy  of  the  Court  at  Vienna.  That 
Court  made  it  a  principle  to  ask  Austria's  allies  to  undertake 
the  most  difficult  and  the  most  dangerous  operations,  so 
that  at  the  end  of  the  war  Austria  should  possess  a  better 
and  stronger  army  than  that  of  any  of  the  other  Powers. 
The  pursuit  of  this  policy  caused  the  Austrian  generals  to 
act  with  over-great  caution.  Hence  they  abstained  from 
giving  the  coujp  de  grace  to  Prussia  when  Prussia's  position 
was  absolutely  desperate. 

(3)  The  death  of  the  Eussian  Czarina,  with  whose  demise 
the  Eusso-Austrian  Alliance  died  as  well ;  Eussia's  desertion 
of  the  anti-Prussian  AlHance,  and  her  alHance  with  King 
Frederick,  which  was  concluded  by  the  Czarina's  successor, 
Peter  the  Third. 

Frederick  the  Great  summed  up  the  losses  caused  by 
the  Seven  Years'  War  as  follows  : 

Prussia  had  lost  by  the  war  180,000  men,  and  in  addition 
33,000  people  had  died  owing  to  the  ravages  of  the  Eussians. 
According  to  estimates,  the  Eussian  troops  lost  120,000  men. 
The  Austrians  estimated  their  loss  at  140,000  men,  the 
French  theirs  at  200,000  combatants,  the  EngHsh  and  their 
AlHes  lost  160,000  men,  the  Swedes  and  the  troops  of  the 
German  Circles  23,000  men.  The  French  Government  had 
lost  all  credit,  and  the  French  commerce  with  both  Indias 
had  been  destroyed  by  the  EngHsh.  Sweden  was  on  the 
point  of  becoming  bankrupt.  Prussia  had  suffered  most, 
for  the  Austrians,  French,  Eussians,  Swedes,  and  the  troops 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY'S  DIPLOMACY    105 

of  the  Circles  under  the  Duke  of  Wurtemberg  had  ravaged 
the  country. 

Before  his  advent  to  power,  Frederick  the  Great  had 
posed  as  a  philanthropist,  a  lover  of  peace,  and  a  friend 
of  virtue.  Animated  by  insatiable  ambition  and  recognising 
that  he  could  easily  conquer  Silesia,  he  attacked  Austria 
in  1740,  little  heeding  the  consequences.  That  reckless 
and  criminal  attack  led  to  two  further  wars,  and  Prussia 
would  have  been  lost  had  not  chance  saved  her  at  the  most 
critical  moment. 

The  Seven  Years'  War  alone  cost  more  than  a  milUon 
lives ;  and  according  to  Frederick's  own  statement,  *  the 
state  of  Brandenburg,  after  the  Seven  Years'  War,  re- 
sembled that  caused  by  the  Thirty  Years'  War.'  Frederick 
the  Great  had  declared  in  his  '  Anti-Machiavel '  that  his 
model  was  Marcus  Aurehus,  while  that  of  the  admirers 
of  Machiavelli  was  Caesar  Borgia.  Frederick  himself, 
like  his  imitator  William  the  Second,  was  in  many  respects 
another  Borgia ;  but  William  the  Second  has  improved 
upon  his  ancestor  by  using  weapons  which  Frederick  disdained 
and  condemned. 

The  Seven  Years'  War  inflicted  terrible  sufferings  upon 
Prussia  and  all  Europe,  but  it  laid  the  foundation  of  Prussia's 
greatness,  of  modern  Germany.  By  his  conquests  Frederick 
nearly  doubled  the  national  territory,  increased  Prussia's 
population  from  2,250,000  to  5,500,000  inhabitants,  and 
made  her  one  of  the  Great  Powers.  Besides,  Prussia's 
successful  resistance  to  nearly  all  Europe  enormously  in- 
creased her  prestige.  It  enabled  Prussia  to  weather  her 
defeats  of  1806,  and  the  remembrance  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War  is  now  encouraging  Germany  and  inspiring  her  with  a 
firm  hope  of  a  final  victory. 

The  history  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  suffices  to  show 
that  it  will  not  be  an  easy  matter  for  a  great  European 
CoaHtion  to  triumph  over  the  Germanic  combination  of 


106    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Powers.  The  experience  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  and 
of  many  other  wars  proves  that  coahtions  suffer  from  serious 
disadvantages,  that  disunion  is  hable  to  appear  in  their 
ranks,  and  that  a  dictatorship,  such  as  that  which  exists 
permanently  in  Germany,  has  enormous  advantages  over 
Governments  less  well  organised  for  war.  In  the  time 
of  Frederick  the  Great  lack  of  energy  and  of  initiative 
in  warfare  lamed  the  power  of  the  Coahtion. 

After  all,  it  is  only  natural  that  amateurs  who  co-operate 
with  difficulty  are  at  a  disadvantage  in  contending  against 
perfectly  drilled  and  organised  professionals,  that  a  miHtary 
State  which  absolutely  obeys  a  single  will  enjoys  enormous 
advantage  over  several  non-military  States.  Modern  war 
is  conducted  by  armed  nations.  Exactly  as  the  command 
of  an  army  cannot  safely  be  entrusted  to  a  committee, 
but  only  to  a  single  commander-in-chief,  the  guidance 
of  a  nation  at  war  is  best  entrusted  to  a  single  man,  to  a 
dictator.  That  was  clearly  recognised  by  the  ancient 
Eomans,  the  most  fervent  repubhcans  the  world  has  seen, 
and  the  modern  democracies  that  are  fighting  for  their 
liberty  may  do  well  to  learn  from  Home's  example. 

Austria  suffered  grievously  at  Prussia's  hands  in  the 
time  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  of  Prince  Bismarck.  Is 
she  wilHng  to  be  ruined  completely  by  WilHam  the  Second, 
who  has  dragged  her  into  the  present  war,  or  will  she  re- 
member her  sufferings  and  turn  at  the  most  critical  moment 
against  her  ancient  enemy,  as  Bismarck  foreshadowed  ? 
He  wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  ' : 

If  in  Austria  anti-German  tendencies,  whether  national 
or  religious,  were  to  gain  strength,  and  Austria  leagued 
herself  with  Germany's  enemies  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
clean  sweep  of  the  results  of  1866,  no  words  are  needed  to 
show  how  greatly  aggravated  would  then  be  the  peril  of 
Germany.     This  idea  is  pessimistic,  but  no  means  chimerical. 

If,  then,  changes  were  to  occur  in  the  political  situation 
of  Europe  of  such  a  kind  as  to  make  an  anti-German  poHcy 


FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY'S  DIPLOMACY    107 

appear  salus  'publica  for  Austria-Hungary,  public  faith  could 
not  be  expected  to  induce  her  to  make  an  act  of  self-sacrifice. 

In  taking  account  of  Austria  it  is  even  to-day  an  error 
to  exclude  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  poHcy  such  as  was 
pursued  by  Thugut,  Schwarzenberg,  Buol,  Bach,  and  Beust. 
May  not  the  pohcy  which  made  ingratitude  a  duty,  the  policy 
on  which  Schwarzenberg  plumed  himself  in  regard  to  Eussia, 
be  again  pursued  towards  another  Power  ?  .  .  . 

We  cannot  abandon  Austria,  but  neither  can  we  lose 
sight  of  the  possibiHty  that  the  poHcy  of  Vienna  may  willy- 
nilly  abandon  us. 

In  disclosing  the  existence  of  the  Ee-Insurance  Treaty 
with  Eussia,  and  foretelUng  the  present  war,  and  the  break- 
down of  the  Triple  AlHance,  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten 
on  January  24,  1892  (the  full  text  will  be  found  in  another 
chapter  of  this  book),  Bismarck  wrote  : 

No  one  can  tell  whether  Austria's  historic  resentment 
will  not  reawaken  and  endeavour  to  find  satisfaction  at 
Germany's  cost  if  the  pressure  of  European  events  should 
weigh  upon  us.  Notwithstanding  her  fidehty  to  treaty, 
Austria  may  be  disinclined  to  bear  the  supremacy  of  the  new 
German  Empire. 

Germany's  defeat  would  mean  Austria's  annihilation. 
Germany's  victory  would  make  her  a  German  vassal  State. 
It  seems  not  impossible  that  at  the  critical  moment  the 
alHed  Powers  might  approach  Austria  and  offer  her  com- 
pensation for  the  losses  which  she  is  bound  to  suffer  in  the 
east  and  south,  by  giving  Silesia  back  to  her  and  joining 
the  chiefly  Eoman  Cathohc  South  German  States  once  more 
to  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Austria  might  recover  the  great 
position  which  she  held  in  Germany  and  revenge  herself 
upon  Frederick  the  Great  at  the  cost  of  WilHam  the  Second. 
The  present  Emperor  may  have  rashly  destroyed  not 
only  the  lifework  of  Bismarck  but  that  of  his  great  ancestor 
as  well. 


CHAPTEK  III 

THE   POLICY   OF   BISMARCK   AND    OF   WILLIAM   II  * 

Prince  Otto  Eduard  Leopold  von  Bismarck,  Germany's 
greatest  son,  was  born  on  April  1,  1815,  at  Schonhausen. 
He  died  on  July  30,  1898,  at  Friedrichsruh.  Fate  has  its 
ironies.  Apparently  William  the  Second  took  the  terrible 
decision  which  brought  about  the  present  war  at  a  Council 
held  at  the  Neues  Palais  in  Potsdam  on  July  30,  1914,  the 
anniversary  of  Bismarck's  death ;  and  the  celebration  of 
the  centenary  of  Bismarck's  birth  has  taken  place  in  the 
turmoil  of  a  war  which  seems  likely  to  end  in  the  destruction 
of  Bismarck's  life-work  and  of  the  Empire  which  he  had 
laboriously  created. 

To  the  broad  masses  of  the  English-speaking  people, 
and  even  to  most  well-informed  men  in  this  country.  Prince 
Bismarck  is  an  unknown  and  a  sinister  figure,  a  mysterious 
and  terrible  character,  a  man  of  blood  and  iron,  Germany's 
evil  genius,  a  statesman  devoid  of  human  feeling ;  who 
by  diaboHcal  cunning,  unscrupulousness  and  violence, 
by  the  medieval  methods  of  Machiavelli,  united  Germany  ; 
who  imprinted  his  character  deeply,  and  fatally,  upon  the 
new  Empire,  and  forced  it  into  a  path  which  inevitably 
led  to  the  present  catastrophe.  Those,  however,  who  see 
in  Bismarck  a  bloodthirsty  and  unscrupulous  schemer  of 
boundless  ambition,  who  beheve  that  the  Iron  Chancellor 
is  responsible  for  the  present  war,  and  that  William  the 

1  From  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  April  1915. 
108 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    109 

Second  and  his  supporters  have  merely  acted  in  accordance 
with  Bismarck's  teachings,  are  in  error.  The  principal 
characteristic  of  Bismarck's  foreign  policy  was  not  its 
daring  and  miscrupulousness,  but  its  perfect  sanity,  one 
might  almost  say  its  wise  moderation  and  its  cautious 
restraint. 

The  present  war  is  solely  the  work  of  William  the  Second 
and  of  his  entourage.  Had  not  the  Emperor  and  his 
counsellors  deliberately  thrown  to  the  winds  Bismarck's 
pleadings  for  a  sane  policy  and  his  unceasing  admonitions, 
Germany  would  still  be  prosperous  and  at  peace.  Un- 
fortunately, statesmanship  is  little  studied  in  Great  Britain. 
Bismarck,  the  statesman,  is  almost  unknown  even  to  those 
who  are  keenly  interested  in  politics  and  who  have  adopted 
pohtics  or  diplomacy  as  a  profession.  This  is  the  more 
to  be  regretted  as  Bismarck  was  probably  not  only  the 
greatest  diplomat  but  the  greatest  statesman,  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  the  word,  of  whom  we  know.  In  his  social  policy, 
economic  policy,  parliamentary  policy,  and  in  matters  of 
organisation  and  administration  he  was  a  pioneer,  and 
in  all  these  he  was  probably  as  great  as  he  was  in  the 
sphere  of  foreign  policy.  Unfortunately  statesmanship,  the 
greatest  of  all  human  sciences,  is  completely  neglected  at 
the  Anglo-Saxon  Universities  in  both  hemispheres.  If  it 
were  taught,  as  it  ought  to  be,  there  would  be  chairs  of 
Bismarckian  statesmanship  at  every  university. 

The  greatness  of  a  statesman  may  be  seen  not  by  his 
eloquence  and  his  parliamentary  and  electoral  successes, 
but  by  his  national  achievements.  Bismarck  created 
an  empire  and  made  a  nation.  Measured  by  the  positive 
success  of  his  activity  Bismarck  was  undoubtedly  one  of 
the  greatest  statesmen  known  to  history.  In  1862,  when 
Bismarck  became  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia,  Germany 
was  merely  a  geographical  expression,  and  Prussia  was  a 
weak,  poor,  small,  torn,  and  disunited  State.  It  consisted 
of  two  disjointed  halves,  which  were  separated  from  one 


110  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

another  by  the  independent  States  of  Hanover  and  Hesse. 
It  had  only  18,491,220  inhabitants.  It  had  practically  no 
merchant  marine,  no  manufacturing  industries,  and  very 
little  wealth.  The  nation  and  its  Government  were  in 
conflict.  Austria  dominated  and  domineered  over  Prussia. 
The  country  had  been  shaken  to  its  foundations  by  the 
revolution  of  1848.  Another  revolution  seemed  not  im- 
possible. 

Civil  strife  was  so  acute,  and  the  internal  difficulties 
of  Prussia  were  so  great  when  Wilham  the  First  ascended 
the  Prussian  throne,  that  he  had  actually  written  out  in 
his  own  hand  his  act  of  resignation.  With  difficulty 
Bismarck  induced  the  despairing  monarch  to  tear  up  that 
fatal  document. 

King  and  Parliament  were  in  deadly  conflict.  Kingship 
had  fallen  so  low  in  public  esteem  that,  as  Bismarck  has 
told  us,  scarcely  anyone  raised  his  hat  to  the  King  in  Berlin 
except  a  couple  of  Court  hairdressers.  Such  was  the  posi- 
tion when  Bismarck  took  office.  He  resolved  to  break  the 
power  of  the  pugnacious  Prussian  Parliament,  to  strengthen 
to  the  utmost  the  authority  and  power  of  the  Crown,  to  deprive 
Austria  of  her  leadership,  to  conquer  for  weak  and  despised 
Prussia  the  supremacy  in  Germany  and  in  Europe. 

Bismarck  is  unique  among  statesmen.  Gifted  with 
marvellous  foresight,  he  formed  the  full  programme  of 
his  entire  life-work  as  a  comparatively  young  and  quite 
inexperienced  man,  and  was  able  to  carry  it  out  in  every 
particular  in  the  course  of  a  long  and  laborious  Ufe.  In 
manuscript  notes  written  down  in  March  1854,  and  in  a 
long  memorandum  sent  to  Otto  von  Manteuffel,  the  then 
Prime  Minister  of  Prussia,  on  July  25,  1854,  both  of  which 
are  reprinted  in  vol.  ii.  of  the  '  Anhang  zu  den  Gedanken 
und  Erinnerungen  von  Otto  Fiirst  von  Bismarck,'  we  find 
laid  down  the  complete  policy  which  Bismarck  pursued  un- 
swervingly to  the  day  of  his  death.  He  then  advocated, 
for  instance,  that   Prussia  should    follow  not  a   German 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    111 

but  a  purely  Prussian  policy  ;  that  she  should  make  herself 
supreme  in  Germany,  following,  if  necessary,  an  anti- 
Austrian  poHcy ;  that  she  should  cut  herself  off  from 
Austria,  and  should  not  support  that  country  if  the  pursuit 
of  her  Balkan  ambitions  should  involve  the  realm  of  the 
Hapsburgs  in  trouble  with  Eussia. 

As  a  young  student,  Bismarck,  hke  many  men  of  his 
time,  dreamed  of  a  United  Germany.  However,  while  the 
vast  majority  of  Germans  wished  to  unite  all  the  German 
States  and  the  States  of  Austria-Hungary  in  some  loose 
form  of  federation,  Bismarck  aimed  at  creating  a  compact 
and  purely  German  Germany,  a  great  national  and  homo- 
geneous State,  under  Prussia's  leadership,  expelling  Austria 
out  of  Germany  and  leaving  to  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
the  rule  of  the  ahen  nations,  of  the  Slavs,  Magyars,  Eou- 
manians,  and  Italians. 

)^.  In  the  beginning  of  his  official  career  Bismarck  advocated 
the  acquisition  of  Schleswig-Holstein  with  Kiel,  desiring 
to  make  Prussia  a  seafaring  and  naval  Power.  He  recom- 
mended the  construction  of  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea  Canal, 
and  looked  hopefully  forward  to  a  war  with  Napoleon  the 
Third,  who  then  dominated  Europe,  trusting  that  his 
overthrow  would  unite  Germany  and  give  to  Prussia  the 
hegemony  in  Germany  and  Europe. 

Bismarck  became  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  in  1862. 
Supported  by  the  King,  he  immediately  set  to  work  to 
strengthen  the  Prussian  Army  immensely,  for  he  wished 
to  make  Prussia  independent  and  powerful  with  its  help. 
As  the  Prussian  Parliament  absolutely  refused  to  vote 
the  large  funds  required,  he  governed  for  years  without  a 
Parliament  and  without  a  budget,  collecting  the  taxes  by 
force.  Two  years  after,  in  1864,  supported  by  Austria,  he 
made  war  upon  Denmark,  and  took  from  that  country 
Schleswig-Holstein  and  Kiel.  At  that  time,  Austro-Prussian 
co-operation  was  indispensable  for  achieving  Bismarck's 
aims.    As  the  two  Germanic  Powers  seemed  firmly  united, 


112  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

and  as  Russia  and  France  were  not  ready  for  war,  the  States 
of  Europe  only  protested  against  the  seizure  of  the  Danish 
territories,  but  did  not  intervene. 

Austria  had  served  Prussia  well  by  enabling  her  to 
acquire  the  coveted  Danish  territories,  but  the  defeat  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy  was  required  to  make  Prussia  supreme 
in  Germany  and  to  give  her  the  leadership  of  the  other 
German  States,  the  adherence  of  which  would  immensely 
strengthen  her  mihtary  power.  The  Austro-Prussian 
condominium  in  Schleswig-Hol^ein  lent  itself  admirably 
to  the  production  of  the  necessary  casus  belli.  War  was  duly 
brought  about  in  1866.  The  Prussian  people  and  their 
parHamentary  representatives,  who  had  dreamt  of  a  Greater 
Germany,  embracing  Prussia,  Austria,  and  all  the  smaller 
States,  and  who  detested  Bismarck  as  an  enemy  of  liberalism 
and  of  representative  government,  protested  passionately, 
but  in  vain,  against  the  Bruderkrieg,  the  fratricidal  war. 
Owing  to  the  great  increase  of  the  Army,  made  against  the 
will  of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  Prussia  had  become 
exceedingly  strong.  She  defeated  Austria,  and  that  country 
lost  her  supremacy  both  in  Germany  and  in  Italy.  By  arms 
Prussia  had  established  her  paramountcy  in  Germany. 

Austria's  defeat  had  freed  Prussia  from  Austria's  leader- 
ship, had  made  her  independent,  had  greatly  increased  her 
power  and  prestige,  and  had  loosely  attached  to  Prussia 
the  Central  and  South  German  States,  who  naturally  in- 
clined towards  the  victor.  To  weld  Prussia  and  the  South 
German  States  into  a  firmly  united  body,  to  give  Prussia 
for  all  time  the  leadership  in  Germany,  and  to  reconquer 
the  formerly  German  Alsace-Lorraine,  Bismarck  required 
a  successful  war  with  France,  the  hereditary  enemy.  He 
clearly  recognised  that  only  a  victory  over  France  could 
arouse  among  all  the  German  States  and  peoples  an 
enthusiasm  sufi&ciently  strong  to  overcome  the  petty 
jealousies  which  had  divided  Germany  since  the  dawn  of 
her  history. 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    113 

In  six  yearf,  from  1864  to  1870,  Prussia  had,  under 
Bismarck's  leadership,  fought  three  most  successful  wars. 
She  had  acquired  free  access  to  the  sea.  She  had  created 
an  organic  connection  between  the  detached  eastern  and 
western  halves  of  the  Monarchy  by  incorporating  Hanover 
and  Hesse  as  a  result  of  the  war  of  1866.  She  had  acquired 
vast  German  territories,  and  had  firmly  joined  to  herself 
the  purely  German  South  German  States.  She  had  re- 
conquered Alsace-Lorraine,  and  had  won  for  the  King  of 
Prussia  the  Imperial  Crown.  Thus,  Bismarck  had  at  the 
same  time  made  Prussia  great,  had  united  Germany,  and 
had  firmly  established  the  authority  of  the  King.  He  had 
achieved  all  this  against  the  will  of  the  people  and  against 
that  of  the  most  influential  circles.  Even  the  King  himself 
had  always  to  be  persuaded  and  convinced,  cajoled  and 
threatened,  to  follow  Bismarck's  lead. 

Government  against  the  will  of  the  people,  as  carried 
on  by  Bismarck,  had  proved  marvellously  successful.  The 
King-Emperor  was  given  the  full  credit  of  Bismarck's 
achievements.  Hence,  Bismarck's  successes  had  steadily 
increased  the  authority  of  the  monarch.  The  people  had 
been  taught  to  trust  their  rulers  bhndly  and  unquestioningly, 
and  to  treat  their  shortsighted  parliamentary  represent- 
atives almost  with  contempt.  The  behef  in  authority 
among  the  people  was  greatly  strengthened  by  a  patriotic 
education  in  the  elementary  schools,  and  by  making  the 
formerly  free  universities  of  Germany  and  the  Press  instru- 
ments of  the  Government  and  of  the  Imperial  will.  Thus, 
the  Hberal  and  democratic  Germany  of  former  times  was 
destroyed. 

Having  created  Prusso-Germany's  greatness,  Bismarck 
wished  to  estabhsh  the  country's  security  for  all  time.  By 
an  economic  policy  which  at  the  same  time  was  wise  and 
daring,  he  created  a  wonderful  system  of  State  railways, 
and  a  powerful  and  efficient  merchant  marine.  He  con- 
verted Germany  from  a  poor  and  almost  purely  agricultural 


114  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

State  into  a  wealthy  industrial  country.  He  introduced  a 
system  of  State  Insurance  which  has  been  copied  by  many 
countries,  and  secured  Germany's  position  among  the 
Powers  by  the  most  wonderful  system  of  alHances  which 
the  world  has  seen. 

By  sparing  Austria  after  her  defeat  of  1866,  Bismarck 
made  possible  her  reconciliation  with  Germany.  By 
placing  the  Dual  Monarchy  into  opposition  with  Kussia  at 
the  time  of  the  Eusso-Turkish  War,  he  raised  the  spectre 
of  a  Russo-Austrian  War.  It  alarmed  Vienna  very  greatly, 
and  made  an  Austro- German  AUiance  not  only  possible 
but  necessary. 

Fearing  the  abiding  resentment  and  hostiUty  of  defeated 
and  humiliated  France,  Bismarck  wished  to  isolate  that 
country.  The  German-Austrian  AUiance  did  not  seem  to 
afford  a  sufficient  guarantee  against  the  formation  of  an 
anti- German  coalition,  in  which  France  would,  of  course, 
be  the  moving  spirit. 

To  alienate  France  and  Italy,  Bismarck  gave  to  France 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  Tunis,  to  which  Italy  had  by  far 
the  stronger  claim,  and  thus  he  involved  these  two  countries 
in  bitter  hostility,  and  a  ten  years'  Customs  war.  He 
prompted  France  to  acquire  colonies  in  opposition  to 
England,  and  at  the  same  time  encouraged  England  to 
occupy  Egypt,  to  the  possession  of  which  France  considered 
herself  entitled.  Thus,  he  estranged  France  and  England. 
Furthermore,  England  and  Russia  were  made  to  quarrel 
over  Constantinople  and  Asia. 

France's  hostility,  combined  with  Austro- German  pres- 
sure, forced  Italy  to  join  the  German-Austrian  AUiance. 
The  Triple  Alliance  was  created.  Germany  could  rely  on 
the  support  of  two  Great  Powers,  while  France,  Russia, 
and  England  were  isolated.  Germany's  security  seemed 
throughly  established.  Nevertheless,  Bismarck  still  feared 
the  formation  of  a  coalition  hostile  to  Germany.  It  is  true 
the   Triple   Alliance  was   a  purely   defensive  instrument. 


POLICY  OF  BISMAECK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    115 

Still,  Kussia  might  conceivably  feel  threatened  by  that 
combination  and  endeavour  to  protect  herself  by  a  counter- 
alliance  with  France,  Germany's  natural  enemy. 

To  prevent  Eussia  and  France  combining,  Bismarck 
not  only  demonstrated  to  Eussia  Germany's  sincere  friend- 
ship whenever  an  opportunity  offered,  but  he  concluded 
with  that  country  a  secret  but  purely  defensive  alliance 
which  assured  Eussia  that  Germany  would  not  aid  Austria- 
Hungary  if  that  country  should  attack  Eussia,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  observe  towards  Eussia  an  attitude  of  bene- 
volent neutrality.  The  two  treaties  completely  shackled 
Austria's  freedom  of  action,  and  tied  that  country  to  the 
German  car  of  State.  They  made  Austria-Hungary  a 
junior  partner  in  the  AHiance.  With  the  two  alternative 
Alliances  Bismarck  could  always  play  off  Austria-Hungary 
against  Eussia,  or  Eussia  against  Austria-Hungary.  The 
initiative  in  the  Triple  AlHance  was  reserved  to  Germany. 

As  England  was  hard  pressed  by  France  in  Africa,  and 
by  Eussia  in  Asia,  she  naturally  inclined  towards  German}'-, 
and  would  probably  have  assisted  that  country  in  a  war 
with  France  and  Eussia.  She  was  considered  to  be  an 
imofficial,  a  semi-detached,  member  of  the  Triple  AHiance. 
In  addition,  Eoumania,  ruled  by  a  Hohenzollern  Prince, 
was  attached  to  the  Triple  AHiance  by  a  secret  treaty,  and 
Turkey  could  be  relied  upon  to  support  Germany  against 
Eussia  in  time  of  need.  As  Eussia  and  England  were 
friendly  to  Germany,  France  was  isolated  and  unable  to 
find  an  ally.  By  this  wonderful  system  of  alliances,  con- 
cluded with  all  the  important  European  nations,  which 
were  encouraged  to  quarrel  among  themselves,  Bismarck 
dominated  and  directed  all  Europe.  An  anti- German 
coalition  was  unthinkable.    Germany  ruled  Europe. 

Bismarck  pursued  not  an  ambitious  policy  of  domination, 
but  a  purely  nationalist  and  a  conservative  poHcy.  He  did 
not  aim  at  ruHng  the  world.  The  wars  which  he  had  brought 
about  were  in  truth  wars  of  nationahty.     They  were  under- 

i2 


116  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

taken  solely  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  the  divided  German 
nation.  They  were  means  to  an  end,  and  they  were  neces- 
sary for  Germany's  unification.  Ever  since  his  youth, 
Bismarck  had  wished  to  see  all  Germans,  except  the  Roman 
Catholic  Austro- Germans,  united  in  a  single  State,  ruled 
by  the  Hohenzollerns.  In  1871  he  had  achieved  his  ideal. 
When,  by  three  successful  wars,  he  had  accompHshed  his 
aim,  he  considered  his  work  completed.  He  had  created 
a  great  German  Empire,  and  he  desired  the  new  Empire 
to  keep  the  peace  and  to  remain  a  purely  German  State. 
Ever  since  1871  Bismarck  strove  to  avoid  war.  It  has 
often  been  asserted,  but  it  has  not  been  sufficiently  proved, 
that  Bismarck  intended  to  attack  France  in  1875.  He 
denied  that  intention  to  the  day  of  his  death,  unceasingly 
condemning  wars  of  ambition  or  precaution,  such  as  that 
brought  about  by  William  the  Second. 

The  future  historians  of  Germany  may  tell  their  readers 
that  Bismarck  created  the  German  Empire  and  that  William 
the  Second  destroyed  it.  It  seems  exceedingly  strange 
that  Bismarck's  successors  proved  unable  to  continue 
Bismarck's  work,  for  their  task  was  simple  and  easy.  At 
the  time  when  the  Iron  Chancellor  was  dismissed  the  position 
of  the  German  Empire  was  impregnable.  The  Triple 
Alliance  was  a  rock  of  strength,  and  as  Austria  was  kept 
in  check  by  the  German-Russian  secret  treaty  of  alliance 
Berlin  retained  the  initiative.  England,  Russia,  Turkey, 
and  Roumania  were  firm  friends  of  Germany,  and  were 
likely  to  support  that  country  in  case  of  need.  Isolated 
France  was  Germany's  only  enemy. 

It  is  true  Bismarck  had  no  great  successor.  He  has 
often  been  reproached  for  not  having  trained  a  statesman 
to  take  his  place.  However,  great  statesmen,  hke  great 
poets,  are  born,  not  made.  Besides,  Germany  no  longer 
required  a  great  statesman  to  continue  Bismarck's  work, 
for  that  far-seeing  statesman  had  left  to  his  successors  the 
fullest  and  the  most  detailed  instructions  for  their  guidance. 


POLICY  OF  BISMAECK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    117 

His  policy,  like  that  of  every  truly  great  statesman,  was 
distinguished  by  its  simplicity  and  by  its  absence  of  secrecy. 
No  statesman  has  ever  taken  his  contemporaries  more 
freely  and  more  fully  into  his  confidence  than  has  Prince 
Bismarck.  He  laid  his  policy  open  to  all  Germany,  and 
the  Germans  showed  their  gratitude  and  admiration  for 
the  founder  of  the  Empire  by  publishing  in  full  Bismarck's 
innumerable  speeches  and  addresses,  despatches.  State 
papers,  newspaper  articles,  confidential  and  private  corre- 
spondence, and  his  conversations  and  table-talk  in  many 
hundreds  of  volumes.  Modern  Germany  gave  itself  over 
to  a  veritable  Bismarck  cult.  The  Bismarck  Hterature  of 
Germany  is  about  as  copious  as  is  the  Napolc?onic  literature 
of  France.  Bismarck's  views  on  every  subject  and  on 
every  question  were  studied,  not  merely  by  the  elect,  but 
by  the  masses.  His  *  Memoirs,'  his  political  testament, 
were  and  are  probably  as  widely  read  and  as  frequently 
quoted  in  Germany  as  the  Bible  and  Goethe's  *  Faust.' 

Under  Bismarck's  guidance  Germany  had  grown  great 
by  three  victorious  wars.  Having  created  Germany's 
unity  and  firmly  estabhshed  the  State,  Bismarck  desired  to 
estabhsh  its  permanence  and  security  by  pursuing  a  peace- 
ful, prudent,  moderate  and  conciliatory  foreign  policy, 
rightly  fearing  that  a  policy  of  dash  and  adventure,  of 
interference,  provocation  and  bluster,  would  raise  dangerous 
enemies  to  the  new  State.  In  one  of  the  concluding  chapters 
of  his  *  Memoirs,'  his  pohtical  testament,  .that  great  states- 
man laid  down  on  large  lines  the  policy  which  Germany 
ought  to  pursue  in  ^he  future,  in  the  following  phrases  :~  - 

In  the  future  not  only  sufficient  mihtary  equipment, 
but  also  a  correct  political  eye,  will  be  required  to  guide  the 
German  ship  of  State  through  the  currents  of  coalition  to 
which,  in  consequence  of  our  geographical  position  and  our 
previous  history,  we  are  exposed.  .  .  . 

We  ought  to  do  all  we  can  to  weaken  the  bad  feeHng 
among  the  nations,  which  has  been  called  forth  through  our 


118    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

growth  to  the  position  of  a  real  Great  Power,  by  honourable 
and  peaceful  use  of  our  influence,  and  so  convince  the  world 
that  a  German  hegemony  in  Europe  is  more  useful  and  less 
partizan,  and  also  less  harmful  to  the  freedom  of  other 
nations,  than  would  be  the  hegemony  of  France,  Russia  or 
England.  .  .  . 

In  order  to  produce  this  confidence,  it  is  above  everything 
necessary  that  we  should  act  honourably  and  openly,  and  be 
easily  reconciled  in  case  of  friction  or  untoward  events. 

William  the  Second  came  to  the  throne  on  June  15, 
1888.  He  disagreed  with  Bismarck  on  important  questions 
of  domestic  and  foreign  poHcy.  He  dismissed  the  founder 
of  Modern  Germany  on  March  22, 1890.  After  his  dismissal, 
Bismarck  watched  with  concern  and  anxiety  the  unceasing, 
reckless,  and  neurotic  activity  of  the  young  Emperor.  He 
feared  that  the  youthful  monarch,  encouraged  by  Court 
flatterers,  place-hunters,  and  adventurers,  might  endanger, 
or  even  destroy,  the  newly  created  Empire,  and  deep 
pessimism  took  hold  of  him.  Hoping  to  save  his  country, 
Bismarck  devoted  the  remaining  eight  years  of  his  life 
entirely  to  political  teaching.  He  laid  down  the  principles 
of  his  foreign  and  domestic  policy  in  a  large  number  of  news- 
paper articles  and  speeches,  he  criticised  freely  and  fearlessly 
the  mistakes  of  his  successors,  and  he  gave  to  his  country 
the  essence  of  his  statesmanship,  the  arcana  imperii,  in 
his  '  Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen,*  his  '  Memoirs,'  which 
may  be  found  in  every  German  house. 

Bismarck's  pessimism  as  to  Germany's  future,  which 
impressed  numerous  Germans  who  paid  him  homage  in 
his  retirement,  was  chiefly  caused  by  the  unstable,  rash, 
overweening  and  domineering  character  of  WilHam  the 
Second,  by  his  vanity  and  by  his  susceptibihty  to  flattery. 
I  have  already  quoted  in  this  book  the  following  two  para- 
graphs from  Bismarck's  *  Memoirs,'  obviously  comparing 
William  the  Second  with  his  grandfather,  but  they  will 
bear  repetition  : 


POLICY  OF  BISMARCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    119 

The  Emperor  William  I  was  completely  free  from  vanity 
of  this  kind  ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  had  in  a  high  degree  a 
peculiar  fear  of  the  legitimate  criticism  of  his  contemporaries 
and  of  posterity.  ...  No  one  would  have  dared  to  flatter 
him  openly  to  his  face.  In  his  feeling  of  royal  dignity, 
he  would  have  thought  '  If  anyone  has  the  right  of  praising 
me  to  my  face,  he  has  also  the  right  of  blaming  me  to  my 
face.'    He  would  not  admit  either.  .  .  . 

What  I  fear  is  that  by  following  the  road  in  which  we  are 
walking  our  future  will  be  sacrificed  to  the  impulses  of  the 
moment.  Former  rulers  looked  more  to  the  capacity  than 
the  obedience  of  their  advisers  ;  if  obedience  alone  is  the 
qualification,  then  demands  will  be  made  on  the  general 
ability  of  the  monarch  which  even  a  Frederick  the  Great 
could  not  satisfy,  although  in  his  time  politics,  both  in  war 
and  peace,  were  less  difficult  than  they  are  to-day. 

Referring  to  the  misrule  of  former  Prussian  kings, 
Bismarck  significantly  wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  ' : 

In  an  absolute  monarchy  no  one  except  the  sovereign 
can  be  proved  to  have  any  definite  share  of  responsibility 
for  its  policy.  If  the  King  comes  to  any  unfortunate  deci- 
sions, no  one  can  judge  whether  they  are  due  to  his  own  will 
or  to  the  influence  which  various  personalities  of  male  and 
female  gender — aides-de-camp,  courtiers  and  political  in- 
triguers, flatterers,  chatterboxes,  and  tell-tales — may  have 
upon  the  monarch.  In  the  last  resort  the  royal  signature 
covers  everything ;  how  it  has  been  obtained  no  one  ever 
knows. 

William  the  Second  dismissed  Bismarck  because  he 
thought  his  own  pohcy  wiser  than  that  of  his  experienced 
Chancellor.  BeHeving  himself  a  genius,  he  wished  to  be 
his  own  Chancellor.  He  had  no  use  for  statesmen,  for  men 
of  genius  and  of  character  such  as  Bismarck,  but  only  for 
time-serving  nonentities,  for  men  without  backbone,  who 
were  ready  to  execute  without  question  the  Imperial  will 


120  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

and  every  Imperial  whim,  regardless  of  the  consequences 
to  the  comitry.  On  July  1,  1897,  Bismarck  commented  on 
the  impending  retirement  of  Herr  Marschall  von  Bieberstein 
from  the  German  Foreign  Office.  He  discreetly  pointed 
out  that  not  Herr  von  Marschall,  but  the  Emperor  himself 
was  to  blame  for  the  mistakes  of  Germany's  foreign  policy 
made  since  Bismarck's  dismissal.  He  wrote  in  the  Ham- 
burger NacJiricMen  : 

A  number  of  papers,  especially  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  give 
a  good  character  to  Herr  von  Marschall  at  the  occasion  of  his 
impending  resignation.  .  .  . 

We  have  not  noticed  that  Herr  von  Marschall  has  been 
guided  by  any  political  views  and  principles  of  his  own  in 
carrying  out  the  Imperial  orders.  We  are  convinced  that 
he  possessed  certain  principles  when  he  entered  the  Foreign 
Office,  but  we  do  not  believe  that  he  had  any  opportunity 
to  apply  them  during  his  seven  years  of  office.  We  believe 
that  he  has  merely  done  his  official  duties  by  carrying  out  the 
instructions  which  he  received  from  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor on  behalf  of  the  Emperor.  .  .  . 

We  do  not  intend  to  criticise  Germany's  policy  during 
the  last  seven  years,  but  we  should  be  acting  unjustly  in 
holding  him  responsible  for  that  policy.  We  consider  that 
he  had  no  part  in  shaping  it,  that  he  merely  did  what  he 
was  told. 

William  the  Second  has  made  numerous  absolute  pro- 
nouncements, such  as  *  You  Germans  have  only  one  will, 
and  that  is  My  will ;  there  is  only  one  law,  and  that  is 
My  law^'  *  Sic  volo,  sic  juheo.^  '  Only  one  master  in  this 
country.  That  is  I,  and  who  opposes  Me  I  shall  crush 
to  pieces.'  Like  another  Louis  the  Fourteenth,  WilHam 
the  Second  taught  the  people  '  UStat  c'est  moi.'  Bismarck 
dreaded  the  Emperor's  inclination  tow^ards  absolutism. 
He  considered  his  recklessness  to  be  doubly  dangerous  in 
view  of  the  great  power  possessed  by  the  monarch,  and  the 
abject  flattery  and  servility  prevailing  in  German  Court 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    121 

circles,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  view  of  the  extreme  docility 
of  the  well-drilled  German  nation  on  the  other.  Hence, 
Bismarck  strove  with  all  his  might  to  create  a  counter- 
poise to  the  Emperor  in  an  enlightened  public  opinion,  in 
an  independent  Parliament,  and  in  frank  public  criticism 
of  the  Emperor's  policy.    He  wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  '  : 

Absolutism  would  be  the  ideal  form  of  Government  for  a 
European  State  were  not  the  King  and  his  officials  as  other 
men  to  whom  it  is  not  given  to  reign  with  superhuman 
wisdom,  insight,  and  justice.  The  most  experienced  and 
well-meaning  absolute  rulers  are  subject  to  human  imper- 
fections, such  as  an  over-estimation  of  their  own  wisdom, 
the  influence  and  eloquence  of  favourites,  not  to  mention 
petticoat  influences,  both  legitimate  and  illegitimate. 
Monarchy  and  the  most  ideal  monarch,  if  in  his  idealism 
he  is  not  to  be  a  common  danger,  stand  in  need  of  criticism  ; 
the  thorns  of  criticism  set  him  right  when  he  runs  the  risk 
of  losing  his  way. 

Criticism  can  only  be  exercised  through  the  medium  of  a 
free  Press  and  of  Parliaments  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term. 

After  his  dismissal,  Bismarck  settled  in  Friedrichsruh, 
his  country  seat,  close  to  Hamburg,  and  the  Hamburger 
Nachrichten  became  the  principal  organ  in  which  he 
stated  his  views,  in  numerous  anonymous  articles  which 
betray  his  authorship  by  their  style.  They  will  be  found 
collected  in  the  seven- volume  work  of  Penzler,  and  in  the 
two-volume  work  of  Hermann  Hofmann,  two  journalists 
who  edited  them,  and  in  the  pubhcations  of  Poschinger, 
Horst  Kohl,  Liman,  Blum,  and  other  writers  on  Bismarck. 
It  should  be  added  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  extracts 
given  in  this  chapter  have  not  been  published  in  the  English 
language.  Their  authenticity  may  be  seen  by  the  fact 
that  Bismarck  did  not  repudiate  their  authorship  when, 
during  his  lifetime,  they  were  collected  and  pubHshed  by 
Penzler  and  described  as  articles  emanating  from  the  great 
Chancellor. 


122  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

In  the  Hamburger  NachricMen  of  November  24,  1891, 
Bismarck  commented  severely  on  the  Emperor's  pronounce- 
ment *  Suyrema  lex  regis  voluntas.''  He  contrasted  it 
with  his  first  speech  from  the  throne,  on  June  27,  1888, 
in  which  the  Emperor  had  promised  that  he  would  maintain 
the  existing  constitution,  and  had  stated  that  he  was  satisfied 
with  his  position  as  established  by  it. 

On  December  11,  1891,  Bismarck  received  the  editor 
of  the  Eisenhahn  Zeitung,  Referring  to  the  Emperor's 
pronouncement  *  Sic  volo,  sic  juheo,'  he  told  the  journahst 
that  he  saw  Germany's  salvation  in  the  possession  of  a 
strong  monarchy  and  of  a  Parhament  which  defended 
the  rights  of  the  people.  On  the  following  day,  Decem- 
ber 12,  1891,  receiving  a  deputation  of  the  town  of  Siegen, 
Bismarck  said  : 

The  most  disquieting  feature  for  me  is  that  the  Reichstag 
has  abdicated  its  position.  We  suffer  everywhere  from  the 
bureaucracy.  .  .  .  The  Reichstag  is  the  indispensable 
cement  of  Germany's  national  unity.  If  its  authority 
declines,  the  bonds  which  hold  Germany  together  are 
weakened. 

On  July  24, 1892,  Bismarck,  addressing  a  South  German 
deputation  at  Kissingen,  said  : 

I  would  have  gladly  continued  my  wbrk,  but  our  young 
Emperor  will  do  everything  himself.  .  .  .  The  German 
Reichstag  is  the  focus  of  our  national  life.  To  strengthen 
the  Reichstag,  the  responsibility  of  Ministers  should  be  in- 
creased. Anyone  can  become  Imperial  Chancellor,  whether 
he  is  fitted  for  the  office  or  not,  and  the  Chancellor's  post  may 
be  abused  to  such  an  extent  that  he  becomes  a  mere  secre- 
tary, and  that  his  responsibility  is  limited  to  executing 
the  orders  he  receives.  ...  If  ministerial  responsibility 
were  established  by  law,  a  man  who  does  not  possess  the 
necessary  qualifications  would  not  take  office.  .  .  . 

When  I  became  Minister,  the  Crown  was  threatened  by 
the  people.    The  King  was  discouraged  because  he  could  no 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II     123 

longer  rely  on  his  Ministers,  and  he  wished  to  abdicate. 
Hence  I  strove  to  strengthen  the  Crown  against  Parliament. 
Perhaps  I  have  gone  too  far  in  that  direction.  We  now 
require  a  balance  of  power  within  Germany,  and  I  believe 
that  free  criticism  is  indispensable  to  the  monarchy.  Other- 
wise we  fall  a  prey  to  official  absolutism.  We  require  the 
bracing  air  of  public  criticism.  Our  entire  constitution  is 
based  on  it.  If  Parliament  becomes  powerless,  becomes 
a  mere  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  Government,  we  return  to 
the  regime  of  absolutism. 

Bismarck  was  particularly  dismayed  at  the  Emperor's 
unceasing  and  exasperating  interference  in  foreign  poKtics 
which  threatened  to  create  everywhere  enemies  to  Germany. 
On  July  30,  1892,  he  stated  in  his  speech  at  Jena  that  in 
foreign  poHcy  the  most  important  thing  was  not  activity 
but  patience,  and  he  attributed  much  of  his  success  to  the 
fact  that  he  had  learned  patience  when  stalking  deer  or 
fishing.     Continuing,  he  said  : 

The  basis  of  a  constitutional  monarchy  is  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  monarchical  will  with  the  convictions  of  the 
governed  people.  .  .  . 

It  is  a  dangerous  experiment  nowadays  to  strive  after 
absolutism  in  the  centre  of  Europe.  Henceforward  we  must 
aim  at  strengthening  independent  pohtical  thought  and 
pohtical  conviction  in  our  ParHament  and  among  the  German 
people.  .  .  . 

The  wars  which  united  Germany  were  necessary,  but 
there  is  no  need  for  further  wars.  Our  wishes  are  fulfilled. 
We  should  be  frivolous  or  clumsy  if  we  allowed  ourselves 
to  be  involved  in  further  wars  without  need.  If  we  follow 
a  conservative  poHcy  we  shall  be  able  to  hold  our  own  against 
all  comers,  although  we  are  in  the  centre  of  Europe.  Ger- 
many cannot  conduct  aggressive  cabinet  wars.  Besides,  a 
nation  which  can  be  forced  into  such  wars  does  not  possess 
the  right  constitution.  .  .  . 

Since  1870  we  have  avoided  further  wars  and  have  striven 
to  strengthen  Germany.    In  building  up  the  empire  some 


124  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

kind  of  dictatorship  was  necessary,  but  that  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  permanent  feature.  Our  task  can  be  com- 
pleted only  when  Germany  possesses  a  powerful  Parliament 
which  embodies  our  sense  of  unity. 

As  Bismarck's  appeals  to  the  German  Parliament  and 
to  the  German  people  to  assert  themselves  proved  fruitless, 
he  endeavoured  to  find  a  counterpoise  to  the  Emperor  in 
the  minor  States  of  Germany,  which  are  represented  in  the 
Federal  Council.  He  wrote,  on  June  11,  1897,  in  the  Le^p- 
ziger  Neueste  NacJiricJiten : 

According  to  Article  8  of  the  German  Constitution,  there 
exists  within  the  Federal  Council  a  committee  on  foreign 
affairs,  formed  by  representatives  of  the  Kingdoms  of 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wiirtemberg,  and  by  two  representa- 
tives elected  by  the  other  Federal  States.  That  Committee 
is  entitled  to  demand  information  from  the  Government 
regarding  diplomatic  affairs.  Formerly,  a  meeting  of  the 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Federal  Council  was  of 
the  greatest  rarity.  Prince  Bismarck  guided  Germany's 
foreign  poHcy,  and  no  one  felt  the  necessity  of  controlling 
him.     Now  matters  are  different. 

Although  we  do  not  wish  to  criticise  the  achievements  of 
Prince  Hohenlohe  or  Herr  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  we 
feel  that  it  is  necessary  to  remind  the  country  of  the  existence 
of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Federal  Council. 
We  are  of  opinion  that  the  German  people  are  entitled  to 
know  the  character  of  the  '  changes  '  which  have  taken 
place  in  the  relations  between  Vienna  and  Berlin,  about 
which  inspired  Austrian  papers  have  been  writing,  and  we 
hope  that  these  '  changes  '  have  not  taken  place  at  Ger- 
many's cost,  that  they  will  neither  lead  to  Germany's  isola- 
tion nor  to  Germany's  dependence  upon  Austria  and  Eussia. 

The  watchword  of  modern  Germany  is  *  Machtpolitik.' 
Unrestrained  violence  is  advocated  as  a  policy.  During 
recent  years,  and  especially  since  Bismarck's  death,  many 
leading  'Germans  have  advocated  a  ruthless  policy  devoid 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    125 

of  morality  and  based  exclusively  on  brute  force.  Modem 
Germany  has  paid  lip-worship  to  Bismarck,  but  has  dis- 
regarded his  teachings,  for  that  great  statesman  endeavoured, 
in  the  main,  to  follow  an  honest,  moderate,  and  straight- 
forward poKcy,  and  he  attached  the  greatest  value  to 
pohtical  morality.  On  July  21, 1893,  addressing  a  thousand 
people  from  Brunswick,  Bismarck  said  : 

The  possession  of  moral  authority  is  a  very  important 
factor  in  pohtical  hfe.  To  avoid  wars,  something  more  is 
needed  than  the  possession  of  a  powerful  army.  I  attach 
value  to  the  respect  and  the  prestige  which  Germany  enjoys 
among  the  non-German  nations.  Eespect  and  prestige 
are  desirable  not  merely  to  satisfy  national  vanity  and 
ambition.  They  are  valuable  and  extremely  useful  assets 
which  carry  with  them  great  advantages,  and  we  suffer  when 
Germany's  prestige  and  respect  are  diminished. 

Contemplating  with  concern  the  Chauvinistic  tendencies 
which  had  become  noticeable  in  Germany  imder  the  govern- 
ment of  WilHam  the  Second,  Bismarck,  after  his  retirement, 
unceasingly  urged  that  Germany  should  follow  a  poHcy  of 
peace,  of  moderation,  of  good  faith,  and  of  good  fellowship 
towards  other  nations.    He  wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  ' : 

We  ought  to  do  all  we  can  to  weaken  the  bad  feehng 
which  has  been  called  forth  through  our  growth  to  the 
position  of  a  real  Great  Power  by  the  honourable  and  peace- 
ful use  of  our  influence,  and  so  convince  the  world  that  a 
German  hegemony  in  Europe  is  more  useful  and  less  partisan, 
and  also  less  harmful  for  the  freedom  of  others,  than  would 
be  the  hegemony  of  France,  Kussia,  or  England. 

It  has  always  been  my  ideal  aim,  after  we  had  estabhshed 
our  unity  within  the  possible  hmits,  to  win  the  confidence  not 
only  of  the  smaller  European  States,  but  also  of  the  Great 
Powers,  and  to  convince  them  that  German  poHcy  will  be 
just  and  peaceful  now  that  it  has  repaired  the  injuria 
tem'porum,  the  disintegration  of  the  nation.  In  order  to 
produce  this  confidence  it  is  above  everything  necessary 


126    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

that  we  should  be  honourable,  open,  and  easily  reconciled 
in  case  of  friction  or  untoward  events. 

In  most  cases  an  open  and  honourable  policy  succeeds 
better  than  the  subtlety  of  earlier  ages. 

Advocating  a  peaceful,  honourable,  and  straightforward 
policy,  Bismarck  was  absolutely  opposed  to  unnecessary 
wars,  and  especially  to  preventive  wars.  Hence,  he  would 
not  allow  the  military  men,  who  easily  incline  towards 
war,  to  exercise  any  influence  upon  statesmanship.  He 
wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  ' : 

Even  victorious  wars  cannot  be  justified  unless  they  are 
forced  upon  one.  Besides,  one  cannot  read  the  cards  of 
Providence  far  enough  ahead  to  anticipate  historical  develop- 
ment and  make  one's  own  calculations  accordingly.  It  is 
natural  that  in  the  staff  of  the  army  not  only  young,  active 
officers,  but  experienced  strategists  also  should  feel  the  need 
of  turning  to  account  the  efficiency  of  their  troops  and  their 
own  capacity  to  lead,  and  should  wish  to  make  themselves 
renowned  in  history.  It  would  be  a  matter  of  regret  if  that 
feeling  did  not  exist  in  the  army.  However,  the  task  of 
keeping  that  feeling  within  such  limits  as  the  nation's  need 
of  peace  can  justly  claim  is  the  duty  of  the  poHtical,  not  the 
mihtary,  heads  of  the  State. 

That  feeling  becomes  dangerous  only  under  a  monarch 
whose  policy  lacks  sense  of  proportion  and  power  to  resist 
one-sided  and  constitutionally  unjustifiable  influences. 

How  peaceful  Bismarck's  views  were  may  be  seen  from 
the  following  New  Year  article  which  appeared  in  the 
Munchener  Allgemeine  Zeitung  on  January  4,  1892.  We 
read  : 

The  indisputable  predominance  of  Germany  in  European 
policy  from  the  end  of  the  Franco- German  War  to  the  end 
of  the  'eighties  was  due,  before  aU,  to  the  superiority  of  the 
German  army  and  to  the  great  personal  prestige  and  influence 
enjoyed  by  the  Emperor  William  I  and  Prince  Bismarck. 
Since  then  other  nations  have  increased  their  readiness  for 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    127 

war,  and  since  the  disappearance  of  the  old  Emperor  and  of 
his  Chancellor,  Germany's  authoritative  position  has  natur- 
ally diminished,  for  only  fresh  successes  can  give  Germany 
that  prestige  and  influence  which  she  acquired  in  the  times 
of  these  men.  However,  successes  similar  to  those  achieved 
in  the  time  of  William  I  do  not  often  recur. 

The  German  Empire,  as  left  by  its  founders,  does  not 
require  new  foreign  wars,  for  nothing  can  be  gained  by  them. 
On  the  contrary,  Germany's  principal  aim  must  be  to  increase 
its  internal  strength,  so  that  the  Empire  may  be  able  to 
weather  future  storms.  In  the  time  of  William  I  it  was 
necessary  to  bring  about  appeals  to  arms,  because  the 
foundations  of  Germany's  national  life  had  to  be  laid.  Now 
it  is  Germany's  task  to  avoid  these  decisions  as  far  as  possible, 
for  by  war  nothing  can  be  gained,  and  only  that  which  has 
been  won  can  be  lost.  That  has  been  Prince  Bismarck's 
leading  political  idea  ever  since  the  Peace  of  Frankfort  in 
1871.  ... 

In  entering  upon  the  New  Year  we  express  the  wish 
that  German  statesmanship  may  not  abandon  the  funda- 
mental directions  which  have  been  laid  down  for  its  guid- 
ance, that  Germany  may,  at  least  in  the  domain  of  foreign 
policy,  continue  to  pursue  the  old  course. 

After  dismissing  Bismarck,  WilHam  the  Second  an- 
nounced to  the  world  that  he  would  henceforth  steer  the 
ship  of  State  over  a  new  course,  and  that  he  would  lead 
Germany  towards  a  great  and  glorious  future.  FiUed 
with  anxiety  lest  the  reckless  ambition  of  the  Emperor 
would  involve  the  young  Empire  in  unnecessary  and  perilous 
wars,  Bismarck  wrote,  in  a  series  of  articles  pubhshed  in 
the  Milnchener  Allgemeine  Zeitung  between  May  12 
and  18,  1892  : 

Prince  Bismarck  had  created  Germany  on  a  broad 
national  basis.  When  that  task  had  been  fulfilled  he  and 
his  successors  had  only  to  preserve  Germany's  position,  the 
creation  of  which  had  demanded  such  heavy  sacrifices. 
This  being  his  fundamental  maxim,  it  was  necessary  for 


128  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Germany  to  be  as  strong  as  possible.  At  the  same  time,  it 
was  necessary  to  avoid,  as  long  as  possible,  all  appeals  to 
arms  in  which  Germany  could  win  nothing,  but  could  only 
lose.  His  leading  view  was  that  every  extension  of  territory 
beyond  the  limits  of  1871  would  be  a  misfortune.  .  .  . 

Bismarck's  entire  foreign  policy  culminated  in  the  idea 
of  isolating  France  and  of  placing  the  new  frontiers  which 
he  had  given  to  Europe  under  the  protection  of  all  the  other 
Powers.  .  .  . 

Germany's  position  and  activity  will  always  largely 
depend  upon  her  Allies.  On  the  day  when  the  leading 
German  statesmen  have  to  decide  on  peace  or  war  they 
should  inquire  conscientiously  whether  the  prize  is  worthy 
the  sacrifice,  and  whether  the  desired  result  cannot  be  equally 
well  obtained  without  a  war,  the  issue  of  which  no  one  can 
guarantee.  War  is  made  only  for  the  sake  of  peace.  It  is 
made  only  in  order  to  obtain  those  conditions  in  which  we 
wish  to  live  with  our  opponent  when  the  war  is  over.  .  .  . 

Is  it  really  necessary  to  pursue  a  new  course  ?  The  new 
pilot  is,  perhaps,  not  able  to  steer  the  German  ship  of  State 
with  the  knowledge  and  determination  of  his  predecessor, 
but  is  it  therefore  necessary  to  abandon  altogether  the  course 
that  had  been  steered  in  the  past  ? 

Wishing  to  avoid  unnecessary  and  ruinous  wars,  Bismarck 
desired  before  all  to  avoid  a  war  with  Kussia,  Germany's 
traditional  ally,  who  had  saved  Prussia  from  extinction 
in  the  time  of  Napoleon,  and  who  had  supported  her  in 
the  wars  of  1866  and  1870,  and  had  thus  enabled  Germany 
to  achieve  her  national  unity.  Besides,  Germany  and 
Kussia  had  no  conflicting  interests,  and  neither  Power  had 
reason  to  covet  any  territory  possessed  by  the  other. 

Desiring  that  Germany  should  develop  in  peace,  and 
fearing  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  attack,  Bismarck  had 
concluded  a  purely  defensive  alHance  with  Austria-Hungary 
and  Italy.  It  seemed,  therefore,  not  Hkely  that  Kussia 
would  attack  either  Germany  or  Austria.  Hence  a  war 
with   Kussia   seemed   to   be   possible  only  if  an  Austro- 


POLICY  OF  BISMAECK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    129 

Eussian  quarrel  should  break  out  about  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula and  if  Austria  was  the  aggressor. 

Bismarck  was  determined  that  Germany  should  not  be 
drawn  unnecessarily  into  a  purely  Austrian  quarrel.  Hence 
he  had  concluded  with  Eussia  a  secret  defensive  Treaty 
which,  as  has  previously  been  stated,  assured  that  country 
^f  Tjermany's  "Ibenevolent  neutrality  in  the  event  of  an 
Austrian  attack. 

As  long  as  Eussia  felt  sure  of  Germany's  benevolent 
neutrality  if  attacked  by  Austria,  she  had  no  cause  to  ally 
herself  with  France.  Thus  France  remained  isolated, 
and  Austria  could  not  venture  to  attack  Eussia  unless 
with  Berlin's  approval.  Hence  she  was  compelled  to  be 
guided  in  her  Balkan  policy  by  Germany.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  Eusso- German  relations  should  become  bad,  it  was 
clear  that  Eussia  would  turn  to  France  for  support,  and 
that  Austria  would  be  able  to  drag  Germany  into  her  Balkan 
adventures.    Bismarck  wrote  in  his  *  Memoirs  '  : 

After  the  conclusion  of  our  defensive  alliance  with  Austria 
I  considered  it  as  necessary  to  cultivate  neighbourly  relations 
with  Eussia  as  before.  .  .  . 

If,  however,  Germany  should  quarrel  with  Eussia,  if  an 
irremediable  estrangement  should  take  place  between  the 
two  countries,  Austria  would  certainly  begin  to  enlarge  her 
claims  to  the  services  of  her  German  ally,  first  by  insisting 
on  an  extension  of  the  casus  foederis,  which  so  far,  accord- 
ing to  the  published  text,  provides  only  for  the  measures 
necessary  to  repel  a  Eussian  attack  upon  Austria  ;  then  by 
requiring  the  casus  foederis  to  be  replaced  by  some  provision 
safeguarding  the  Austrian  interests  in  the  Balkans  and  the 
East,  an  idea  to  which  the  Press  has  already  succeeded  in 
giving  practical  shape. 

The  wants  and  the  plans  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  basin 
of  the  Danube  naturally  reach  far  beyond  the  present  limits 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  The  German  Imperial 
Constitution  points  out  the  way  by  which  Austria  may  ad- 
vance and  reconcile  her  political  and  material  interests,  so 


130    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

far  as  they  lie  between  the  eastern  frontier  of  the  Koumanian 
population  and  the  Gulf  of  Cattaro.  It  is,  however,  no  part 
of  the  policy  of  the  German  Empire  to  lend  its  subjects, 
and  to  expend  their  blood  and  treasure,  for  the  purpose  of 
realising  the  designs  of  a  neighbouring  Power. 

In  the  interest  of  the  European  political  equihbrium 
the  maintenance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  as  a 
strong  independent  Great  Power  is  for  Germany  an  object 
for  which  she  might,  in  case  of  need,  stake  her  own  peace 
with  a  good  conscience.  But  Vienna  should  abstain  from 
going  outside  this  security,  and  should  not  deduce  from  the 
alUance  claims  which  it  was  not  concluded  to  support.  .  .  . 

After  Bismarck's  dismissal  the  defensive  Eusso- German 
Treaty,  the  so-called  Ee-Insurance  Treaty,  was  not  renewed. 
Prince  Hohenlohe  wrote  in  his  diary  on  March  31,  1890  : 

It  seems  more  and  more  clear  that  differences  regarding 
Eussia  between  the  Emperor  and  Bismarck  have  brought 
about  the  breach.  Bismarck  intended  to  leave  Austria  in 
the  lurch,  while  the  Emperor  wished  to  support  Austria, 
even  if  his  policy  should  involve  him  in  war  with  Eussia 
and  France.  That  is  made  plain  by  Bismarck's  words  that 
the  Emperor  carried  on  his  policy  like  Frederick  William 
the  Fourth.    Herein  lies  the  danger  of  the  future. 

In  another  part  of  his  '  Memoirs,'  Prince  Hohenlohe 
wrote  that  the  Emperor's  refusal  to  renew  the  Eusso- German 
Treaty  was  the  principal  cause  of  Bismarck's  dismissal. 

The  old  Emperor  was  so  strongly  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  Germany  keeping  peace  with  Eussia  that  on 
his  death-bed,  addressing  WilHam  the  Second,  he  said, 
according  to  Bismarck  :  '  Thou  must  always  keep  in  touch 
with  the  Eussian  Emperor  ;  there  no  conflict  is  necessary.' 
These  were  some  of  his  last  words. 

Bismarck  had  been  dismissed  largely  because  the 
Emperor  wished  to  reverse  Bismarck's  poHcy  towards 
Eussia  and  Austria-Hungary.  Foreseeing  that  a  discon- 
tinuance of  the  Eusso- German  Treaty  would  ultimately. 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    131 

and  almost  inevitably,  involve  Germany  in  an  Austro- 
Eussian  war  about  the  Balkans,  where  Germany  had  no 
direct  interests,  Bismarck  wrote  in  the  Hamburger 
Nachrichten  on  April  26,  1890,  only  five  weeks  after  his 
dismissal : 

Austria  cannot  hope  to  obtain  Germany's  support  for 
promoting  her  ambitious  plans  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
These  Austrian  plans  have  never  been  encouraged  by  Ger- 
many as  long  as  Germany's  foreign  policy  was  directed  by 
Prince  Bismarck.  On  the  contrary,  the  Prince  has,  at  every 
opportunity,  particularly  at  the  time  of  the  Bulgarian 
incident,  shown  with  the  utmost  clearness  that  he  is  very 
far  from  wishing  to  promote  Austria's  special  interests  in  the 
Balkans  in  antagonism  to  Eussia.  Such  a  policy  would  not 
be  in  harmony  with  the  stipulations  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
That  Alliance  views  only  the  damnum  emergens,  not  the 
lucrum  cessans,  of  the  signatory  Powers. 

Least  of  all  is  it  Germany's  business  to  support  Austria's 
ambitions  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  If  such  ambitions 
exist,  and  are  to  be  promoted  with  the  assistance  of  other 
nations,  Austria-Hungary  will  have  to  address  herself  not 
to  Germany,  but  to  the  nations  interested  in  Balkan  poHtics. 
These  are  all  the  Great  Powers  except  Germany.  They  are 
(apart  from  Eussia)  England,  France,  and  Italy.  Austria 
can  always  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  these  Powers 
if  she  wishes  to  further  her  interests  in  the  Balkans,  and 
Germany  need  not  concern  herself  about  them.  Germany's 
point  of  view  is  this  :  that  she  has  no  interests  in  Balkan 
affairs. 

Five  months  later,  on  September  29,  1890,  Bismarck 
renewed  his  warning  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten  : 

In  the  past,  when  the  relations  between  Germany  and 
Austria  and  between  Germany  and  Eussia  were  discussed, 
there  were  two  points  of  danger  :  Firstly,  that  German 
policy — or,  what  would  be  worse,  the  German  Army — 
should  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  purely  Austrian  interests 
in  the  Balkans  against  Eussia  ;   secondly,  that  ^Germany's 

k2 


132  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

relations  with  Eussia  should  be  endangered  and  brought 
to  the  breaking-point  by  unnecessary  Press  attacks. 

We  have  always  warned  against  this  twofold  danger, 
but  we  have  never  advised  a  breach  of  treaty  faith  towards 
Austria.  The  Austro- German  alliance  does  not  demand 
that  Germany  should  support  Austria's  Balkan  interests 
against  Eussia.  It  only  demands  that  Germany  should  assist 
Austria  if  her  territories  should  be  attacked  by  Eussia.  .  .  . 

We  attach  the  greatest  value  to  the  preservation  of  good 
and  cordial  relations  between  Germany  and  Eussia.  If 
Austria  and  Eussia  should  differ,  Germany  can  mediate  most 
successfully  if  she  is  trusted  in  St.  Petersburg.  Besides,  a 
breach  with  Eussia  would,  according  to  our  inmost  conviction, 
make  Germany  dependent  upon  Austria.  .  .  . 

No  one  can  object  if  Austria  succeeds  in  her  Balkan  policy 
without  a  war  with  Eussia  which  would  demand  enormous 
sacrifices  in  blood  and  treasure.  The  Balkans  do  not 
concern  Germany.  We  are  interested  in  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  and  we  do  not  care  how  Austria  and  Eussia  arrange 
their  spheres  of  interest  in  the  Balkans.  .  .  . 

Being  anxious  that  good  relations  should  exist  between 
Germany  and  Austria,  and  that  Austria's  power  and  position 
should  be  preserved,  we  have  opposed  mistaken  views  as 
to  the  scope  of  the  Austro-German  Treaty,  and  have  en- 
deavoured to  show  that  that  Treaty  does  not  oblige  Germany 
to  support  Austria  in  the  Balkans. 

Hinting  at  the  so-called  Ee-Insurance  Treaty  with 
Eussia  which  WilHam  the  Second  had  refused  to  renew, 
under  the  provisions  of  which  Germany  was  to  support 
Eussia  in  case  of  an  unprovoked  attack  upon  her  by 
Austria,  Bismarck  wrote  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten  of 
January  24,  1892  : 

The  Austro-German  Treaty  of  Alliance  of  1879  contem- 
plated, as  far  as  Eussia  was  concerned,  only  mutual  defence 
against  a  possible  attack.  Hence  Germany  always  pointed 
out  in  Vienna  that  the  Austro-German  Alliance  protected 
only  the  Dual  Monarchy  itself,  but  not  its  Balkan  policy, 


POLICY  OF  BISMAECK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    133 

against  Eussia.  With  regard  to  the  Balkans,  Germany  had 
unceasingly  advised  Austria  to  find  protection  by  means  of 
a  separate  Treaty  with  the  States  interested  in  the  Balkans, 
such  as  England  and  Italy.  Belying  on  the  unaggressive 
character  of  the  Austro- German  Treaty,  Germany  was 
always  able  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  Eussia,  and  to  influence 
Austria  if  the  Eastern  policy  of  that  country  seemed  likely 
to  take  an  undesirable  turn. 

This  advantageous  position,  the  maintenance  of  which 
made  considerable  claims  upon  the  skill  of  Germany's 
diplomacy,  was  later  on  believed  to  be  too  complicated. 
Besides,  personal  misunderstandings  [between  the  Emperor 
and  the  Czar]  impaired  the  good  relations  between  BerHn 
and  St.  Petersburg,  and  led  to  the  Eusso-French  rapproche- 
ment. Thus  the  position  has  changed  to  Germany's  dis- 
advantage. Formerly  it  was  in  Germany's  power  to  arrive 
at  any  moment  at  an  understanding  with  Eussia,  in  con- 
sequence of  treaty  arrangements  which  existed  side  by  side 
with  the  Austro- German  Treaty,  but  which  exist  no  longer. 
In  consequence  of  the  estrangement  between  Germany  and 
Eussia,  Austria  has  been  enabled  to  exercise  considerable 
pressure  upon  Germany. 

ForetelHng  the  present  war  and  the  breakdown  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  Bismarck  continued  : 

Apparently  German  statesmanship  no  longer  observes  a 
disinterested  attitude  in  Eastern  affairs.  By  following  the 
path  upon  which  she  has  entered,  Germany  is  in  danger  of 
gradually  becoming  dependent  upon  Austria,  and  in  the 
end  she  may  have  to  pay  with  her  blood  and  treasure  for 
the  Balkan  policy  of  Vienna.  In  view  of  that  possibiHty, 
it  will  be  readily  understood  that  Prince  Bismarck  again  and 
ever  again  gave  warning  that  Germany  should  not  break 
with  Eussia.  .  .  . 

The  change  in  the  European  situation  to  Germany's 
disadvantage  cannot  be  excused  by  extolling  the  power  of 
the  Triple  AlHance.  Formerly  the  Triple  Alhance  existed 
as  it  does  now,  and  its  importance  was  increased  by  the  fact 
that  Germany  had  a  free  hand,  directed  it,  and  dominated 


134  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Europe.    We   fear  that   since  then  the   strength  of  the 
Alliance  has  not  increased.  .  .  . 

A  crisis  in  Italy,  a  change  of  sovereign  in  Austria  or  the 
like  may  shake  its  foundations  so  greatly  that  in  spite  of  all 
written  engagements  it  will  be  impossible  to  maintain  it. 
In  that  case  Germany's  position  would  become  extremely 
serious,  for  in  order  not  to  become  entirely  isolated  she  would 
be  compelled  to  follow  Austria's  policy  in  the  Balkans 
without  reserve.  Germany  might  get  into  the  leading- 
strings  of  another  Power  which,  it  is  true,  has  accepted  the 
new  position  of  Germany.  However,  no  one  can  tell  whether 
Austria's  historic  resentment  will  not  reawaken  and 
endeavour  to  find  satisfaction  at  Germany's  cost  if  the 
fortune  of  war  should  no  longer  favour  Germany  or  if  the 
pressure  of  European  events  should  weigh  upon  us.  Not- 
withstanding her  fideUty  to  treaty,  Austria  may  be  dis- 
inclined to  bear  the  supremacy  of  the  new  German  Empire. 

Considering  good  relations  between  Eussia  and  Germany 
absolutely  essential  for  Germany's  security,  and  desiring 
to  bring  about  a  renewal  of  the  Eusso-German  Ee-Insurance 
Treaty,  Bismarck  at  last  embarked  upon  a  great  Press 
campaign.  He  revealed  to  Germany  and  the  world  the  fact 
that  there  had  formerly  existed  a  secret  treaty  with  Eussia 
in  the  plainest  language  in  his  celebrated  article  which 
appeared  on  October  24,  1896,  in  the  Hamburger  Nach- 
richten.    We  read  in  it : 

Eusso-German  relations  remained  good  until  1890. 
Up  to  that  date  both  States  were  fully  agreed  that  if  one  of 
them  were  attacked  the  other  would  observe  a  benevolent 
neutrality.  For  instance,  if  Germany  were  attacked  by 
France  she  would  be  sure  of  Eussia's  benevolent  neutrality, 
and  Eussia  would  be  sure  of  Germany's  benevolent  neutrality 
if  she  was  attacked  without  cause.  That  agreement  has  not 
been  renewed  since  the  time  when  Prince  Bismarck  left  office, 
and  if  we  are  rightly  informed  about  the  occurrences  which 
have  taken  place  in  BerHn  it  appears  that  the  failure  to  renew 
the  treaty  was  not  due  to  Eussia  being  dissatisfied  at  the 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    135 

change  of  Chancellors.  It  was  Count  Caprivi  who  refused 
to  renew  the  mutual  insurance  of  Eussia  and  Germany, 
although  Bussia  was  ready  to  renew  it.  As  at  the  same 
time  Germany  pursued  a  philo-Pohsh  policy,  it  was  only 
natural  that  the  Eussian  Government  should  ask  itself: 
What  can  be  the  object  of  Prussia's  PoHsh  poHcy,  which 
stands  in  flagrant  opposition  to  the  friendly  relations 
established  at  the  time  of  the  Emperor  Wilham  the  First  ? 
We  need  not  mention  other  anti-Eussian  indications 
at  the  German  Foreign  Office.  Caprivi's  attitude  in  the 
general  European  policy  and  in  Germany's  Pohsh  pohcy 
was  such  that  Eussia,  notwithstanding  her  great  power,  had 
seriously  to  consider  the  future.  During  the  Crimean  War 
all  Europe,  Prussia  excepted,  had  been  hostile  to  Eussia. 
We  do  not  intend  to  assert  that  a  similar  position  will  return. 
Still,  it  is  only  natural  if  a  powerful  State  like  the  Eussian 
Empire  says  to  itself :  '  We  must  have  at  least  one  reHable 
Ally  in  Europe.  Formerly  we  could  reckon  with  the  three 
Emperors  Alliance.  Afterwards  we  could  depend  upon  the 
House  of  Hohenzollem.  If,  however,  in  times  of  difficulty, 
we  should  meet  with  an  anti-Eussian  poHcy,  we  must  en- 
deavour to  arrange  for  support  elsewhere.'  The  Kronstadt 
meeting  and  the  first  rapprochement  between  Absolute 
Eussia  and  Eepublican  France  was  solely  brought  about  by 
Caprivi's  poKtical  mistakes.  Hence,  Eussia  was  forced  to 
find  in  France  that  security  which  of  course  her  statesmen 
desired  to  obtain. 


This  article  created  an  immense  sensation  not  only  in 
the  entire  German  Press  but  in  the  Press  of  the  world. 

The  Government -inspired  Press  accused  Bismarck  of 
high  treason  in  divulging  secrets  of  State,  and  threatened 
him  with  the  pubHc  prosecutor  and  with  imprisonment. 
The  disclosure  led  to  a  prolonged  Press  campaign  in  the 
course  of  which  Bismarck  defended  the  Ee-Insurance  Treaty 
with  great  vigour  in  numerous  articles.  With  wonderful 
energy  Bismarck,  who  was  then  eighty-two  years  old,  en- 
deavoured once  more  to  direct  the  poHcy  of  Europe  with 


186    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

his  indefatigable  pen.  He  not  merely  criticised  Germany's 
foreign  policy  and  pointed  out  the  dangerous  mistake  which 
had  been  made  in  destroying  the  intimate  relations  which 
existed  formerly  between  Russia  and  Germany ;  he  en- 
deavoured at  the  same  time  to  bring  about  a  re-grouping 
of  the  Powers  and  to  create  differences  between  Russia 
and  France  likely  to  destroy  their  recent  intimacy.  This 
may  be  seen  from  many  articles  of  Bismarck's,  pubhshed 
at  the  time  in  various  journals. 

In  his  *  Memoirs  '  Bismarck  summarised  his  views  as 
to  the  attitude  of  Russia  and  France  in  this  blunt  phrase  : 
*  With  France  we  shall  never  have  peace  ;  with  Russia 
never  the  necessity  for  war,  unless  Liberal  stupidities  or 
dynastic  blunders  falsify  the  situation.' 

'  Dynastic  blunders  '  have  done  what  Liberal  stupidities 
failed  to  achieve. 

In  his  articles  and  in  his  *  Memoirs  '  Bismarck  repeatedly 
pointed  out  that  Austria-Hungary  might  not  only  abandon 
Germany  in  the  hour  of  need,  but,  remembering  the  loss 
of  Silesia  to  Prussia  and  the  Battle  of  Koniggratz,  turn 
against  Germany. 

Unceasingly  Bismarck  pointed  out  in  the  clearest 
language  that  Germany  was  under  no  obHgation  whatever 
to  support  Austria  in  the  Balkans,  and  that,  in  case  of 
serious  Austro-Russian  differences,  such  as  those  which 
arose  in  July  1914  about  Serbia,  Germany  should  not  act 
as  Austria's  unconditional  supporter  but  as  a  mediator 
between  the  two  States.  Bismarck  wrote  in  the  Hamburger 
NachricMen  on  January  15,  1893  : 

The  Austro-German  Treaty  of  Alliance  provides  only 
against  an  attack  on  Austrian  and  German  territory  on  the 
part  of  Russia.  Being  thus  limited,  the  possibihty  is  excluded 
that  the  Treaty  may  serve  Austria's  special  interests  in  the 
Balkans.  The  purpose  of  the  AlHance  is  exclusively  to 
prevent  a  Russian  war  of  aggression.  Its  purpose  is  in  no 
way  to  strengthen  Austria  in  the  pursuit  of  a  purely  Austrian 


POLICY  OF  BISMAECK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    137 

policy  in  the  East.  Germany  has  no  interests  in  the  East. 
Besides,  if  she  supported  Austria's  Balkan  poUcy  she  would 
defeat  the  purpose  of  the  Treaty,  which  is  to  preserve  the 
peace. 

If  Austria  was  entitled  to  the  support  of  Germany's 
bayonets  if  engaged  in  the  East,  a  coUision  with  Eussia 
would  become  probable.  Hence  the  casus  foederis  is  limited 
to  the  possibihty  of  a  Eussian  attack  upon  one  of  the  two 
Alhes.  The  task  of  Germany,  as  Austria's  Ally,  consists 
in  acting  as  a  mediator  between  the  two  Powers  in  case 
of  differences  in  tjhe  Balkans.  If  Austria  wishes  to  further 
her  individual  interests  in  the  Balkans  she  must  seek 
support  not  in  Germany,  but  among  those  countries 
which  are  interested  in  the  East — England,  France,  and 
Italy. 

Bismarck  spoke  and  wrote  in  vain.  His  shallow 
successors  treated  his  advice  with  contempt.  The  great 
German  statesman  not  only  pointed  out  the  mistake  which 
the  Emperor  had  made  in  breaking  with  Eussia  but  he 
tried  to  recreate  the  intimate  relations  which  formerly 
existed  between  Germany  and  Eussia.  His  exertions 
proved  unavailing,  and  he  wrote  despairingly  in  the  West- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  in  June  1892  : 

The  worst  that  has  happened  under  the  Chancellorship 
of  Caprivi  is  that  all  the  threads  connecting  Germany  with 
Eussia  were  suddenly  broken.  The  German  Emperor  tried 
to  win  over  the  Eussian  s  with  amiable  advances.  However, 
busy  intermediaries  reported  to  him  expressions  from  the 
Czar's  entourage  which  proved  that  his  intended  visit  to 
Eussia  would  be  poUtically  unsuccessful.  Then  WilHam 
the  Second  immediately  went  to  England  and  concluded 
with  England  the  Treaty  relating  to  Zanzibar  and  Hehgo- 
land,  and  that  anti-Eussian  demonstration  was  followed  by 
his  philo-Pohsh  poHcy,  which  was  hurtful  to  Eussia.  Ger- 
many's foreign  poHcy  could  not  have  taken  a  more  fatal 
step  than  to  threaten  Eussia  with  the  re-establishment  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland  in  case  of  a  Eussian  defeat.    That 


138  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

was  bound  to  lead  to  the  Franco-Kussian  rapprochement 
and  to  Kronstadt. 

Bismarck  clearly  recognised  that  the  alliance  between 
Italy  and  Austria  was  an  unnatural  one,  and  that  Italy's 
fidelity  to  her  two  partners  would  depend  partly  on  the 
character  of  Germany's  poHcy,  partly  on  England's  relations 
with  Germany.  In  view  of  Italy's  long  and  exposed  sea- 
border  and  of  her  vulnerability  in  case  of  an  attack  from 
the  sea,  Italy  could  obviously  not  be  expected  to  support 
Germany  and  Austria  if  such  support  would  involve  her 
in  hostilities  with  the  strongest  naval  Power.  For  this 
reason,  among  others,  Bismarck  was  anxious  that  Germany 
and  England  should  be  firm  friends.  He  wrote  in  the 
Hamburger  Nachrichten  on  June  13,  1890  : 

The  co-operation  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy 
threatens  no  one.  The  Triple  AlHance  does  not  involve 
dangers  which  would  become  fatal  to  the  co-operation  of 
these  three  States.  On  the  contrary,  the  AlHance  is  designed 
to  strengthen  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  casus  foederis 
towards  Eussia  arises  only  if  Eussia  attacks  the  territory  of 
one  of  the  two  AlHes.  This  limitation  deprives  the  Alliance  of 
all  aggressive  tendencies,  and  excludes  the  possibility  that 
it  may  serve  the  special  interests  of  Austria  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  thus  threaten  the  preservation  of  peace.  .  .  . 

The  Austro-Itahan  AlHance  is  not  equally  favourable. 
Between  Austria  and  Italy  there  are  unadjusted  differences, 
which  are  to  be  found  particularly  on  the  side  of  Italy,  such 
as  the  anti- Austrian  aspirations  of  the  Irredentists.  Besides, 
the  Italian  Eadicals  are  opposed  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
sympathise  with  France.  .  .  . 

In  view  of  France's  aspirations,  Italy  must  be  able  to 
rely  on  the  assistance  of  the  English  fleet,  for  the  Triple 
Alliance  cannot  protect  the  ItaHan  coasts.  Hence,  Italy 
has  to  think  of  England,  and  consideration  of  England  may 
conceivably  Hmit  Italy's  freedom  of  action.  The  mainten- 
ance of  the  present  relations  between  Austria  and  Italy 
must  be  the  principal  care  of  the  diplomats,  especially  as, 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    139 

if  Italy  for  some  reason  or  other  should  abandon  the  Triple 
Alliance,  the  Austrian  Army  would  be  compelled  to  protect 
the  Dual  Monarchy  against  Italy.  Hence  it  would  no  longer 
be  able  to  fulfil  Article  1  of  its  AlUance  with  Germany, 
according  to  which  it  should  assist  Germany  *  with  its  entire 
armed  power.'  By  the  detachment  of  Italy,  the  Austro- 
German  Alliance  would  miHtarily  lose  so  much  that  its 
value  would  become  very  problematical.  .  .  . 

If  we  sum  up  the  considerations  developed  we  find  that 
the  present  position  is  quite  satisfactory.  As  long  as 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy  are  united  in  the 
Triple  AlHance,  and  as  long  as  these  three  States  may 
reckon  on  the  assistance  of  the  Enghsh  sea-power,  the  peace 
of  Europe  will  not  be  broken.  We  must  take  care  that 
friendly  relations  between  Austria  and  Italy  and  between 
Italy  and  England  shall  be  maintained.  Besides,  we 
must  see  that  the  Triple  AUiance  is  restricted  to  its  original 
scope,  and  that  it  is  not  allowed  to  serve  those  special 
interests  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  We  therefore 
firmly  trust  that,  as  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the  *  old 
course '  will  be  preserved  with  particular  care. 

Bismarck  died  on  July  30,  1898.  We  know  from  his 
speeches  that  he  attached  the  greatest  value  to  good  rela- 
tions between  England  and  Germany,  that  he  saw  in  England 
'  Germany's  natural  and  traditional  ally.' 

The  greater  part  of  the  German  colonies  was  acquired 
by  Bismarck.  His  principal  care  was  to  ensure  Germany's 
security  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  and  he  attached  the 
greatest  value  to  Great  Britain's  good  will  and  support  in 
view  of  the  possibihty  of  Continental  comphcations.  Con- 
sidering Germany's  Continental  interests  infinitely  more 
important  than  her  transoceanic  ones,  he  absolutely  refused 
to  pursue  a  transmaritime  and  colonial  poHcy  in  opposition 
to  England,  fearing  that  an  anti-British  policy  would  drive 
England  into  the  arms  of  France  and  Eussia.  Even  when 
diplomatic  differences  had  arisen  between  the  two  countries, 
Bismarck  wished  to  remain  on  cordial  terms  with  Great 


140  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Britain.     On  March  2,  1884,  for  instance,  he  stated  in  the 
Keiehstag  with  reference  to   an   Anglo- German  dispute : 

I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power  in  order,  sine  ird  et 
studio,  and  in  the  most  concihatory  manner,  to  settle  this 
matter  in  accordance  with  that  quiet  and  friendly  inter- 
course which  has  at  all  times  existed  between  England  and 
Germany,  a  quiet  and  friendly  intercourse,  which  is  most 
natural  because  neither  Power  possesses  vital  interests 
which  conflict  with  the  vital  interests  of  the  other  Power. 
I  can  see  only  an  error  in  the  opinion  that  England  envies 
us  our  modest  attempts  at  colonising. 

He  laid  down  at  greater  length  his  guiding  principles 
in  his  intercourse  with  Great  Britain  on  January  10,  1885, 
when  he  stated  in  the  Reichstag : 

The  last  speaker  has  told  us  that  we  must  either  abandon 
our  colonial  policy  or  increase  our  naval  strength  to  such 
an  extent  that  we  need  not  fear  any  naval  Power,  or  to  speak 
more  clearly,  that  our  navy  should  rival  that  of  England 
herself.  However,  even  if  we  should  succeed  in  building  up 
a  navy  as  strong  as  that  of  England,  we  should  still  have 
to  fear  an  alliance  of  England  and  Prance.  These  Powers 
are  stronger  than  any  single  Power  in  Europe  is  or  ever  can 
be.  It  follows  that  the  policy  indicated  by  the  last  speaker 
is  one  which  should  never  be  striven  after. 

I  would  also  ask  the  last  speaker  not  to  make  any  at- 
tempts to  disturb  the  peace  between  England  and  Germany 
or  to  diminish  the  confidence  that  peace  between  these  two 
Powers  will  be  maintained  by  hinting  that  some  day  we  may 
find  ourselves  in  an  armed  conflict  with  England.  I  ab- 
solutely deny  that  possibiHty.  It  does  not  exist,  and  all  the 
questions  which  are  at  present  being  discussed  between 
England  and  Germany  are  not  of  sufficient  importance  to 
justify  a  breach  of  the  peace  on  either  side  of  the  North 
Sea.  Besides,  I  really  do  not  know  what  disputes  could 
arise  between  England  and  Germany.  There  never  have 
been  disputes  between  the  two  countries.  From  my  diplo- 
matic experience,  I  cannot  see  any  reasons  which  can  make 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    341 

hostilities  possible  between  them,  unless  a  cabinet  of  incon- 
ceivable character  should  be  in  power  in  England,  a  cabinet 
which  neither  exists  nor  which  is  ever  likely  to  exist,  and 
which  criminally  attacks  us. 

Four  years  later,  on  January  26,  1889,  only  a  short  time 
before  his  dismissal,  he  stated  with  reference  to  the  Anglo- 
German  Zanzibar  dispute  in  the  Eeichstag : 

I  absolutely  refuse  to  act  towards  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar 
in  opposition  to  England.  As  soon  as  we  have  arrived 
at  an  understanding  with  England,  we  shall  take  the  neces- 
sary measures  in  Zanzibar  in  agreement  with  that  country. 
I  do  not  intend  either  actively  to  oppose  England  or  even  to 
take  note  of  those  steps  which  subordinate  British  individuals 
have  taken  against  us.  In  Zanzibar  and  in  Samoa  we  act 
in  perfect  harmony  with  the  British  Government.  We  are 
marching  hand  in  hand,  and  I  am  firmly  resolved  that  our 
relations  shall  preserve  their  present  character. 

English  colonial  interests  compete  with  ours  in  numerous 
places,  and  subordinate  colonial  officials  are  occasionally 
hostile  to  German  interests.  Nevertheless,  we  are  acting 
in  perfect  unison  with  the  British  Government.  We  are 
absolutely  united,  and  I  am  firmly  resolved  to  preserve 
Anglo-German  harmony  and  to  continue  working  in  co- 
operation with  that  country. 

The  preservation  of  Anglo-German  good-will  is,  after  all, 
the  most  important  thing.  I  see  in  England  an  old  and 
traditional  ally.  No  differences  exist  between  England  and 
Germany.  I  am  not  using  a  diplomatic  term,  if  I  speak  of 
England  as  our  ally.  We  have  no  aUiance  with  England. 
However,  I  wish  to  remain  in  close  contact  with  England 
also  in  colonial  questions.  The  two  nations  have  marched 
side  by  side  during  at  least  a  hundred  and  fifty  years,  and  if 
I  should  discover  that  we  might  lose  touch  with  England 
I  should  act  cautiously  and  endeavour  to  avoid  losing 
England's  good-will. 

Modern  Germany  has  erected  to  Bismarck  countless 
statues.    Bismarck's    speeches,    Bismarck's    letters,    and 


142    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Bismarck's  memoirs  have  been  printed  in  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  copies,  and  they  are  found  on  the  book-shelves 
of  the  German  people  by  the  side  of  Schiller  and  Goethe. 
But  Modern  Germany  has  forgotten,  or  she  deUberately  has 
disregarded,  Bismarck's  policy,  and  Bismarck's  warnings. 

Bismarck  saw  in  England  '  an  old  and  traditional  ally.' 
Hence  he  never  thought  an  Anglo- German  war  possible. 
To  him  such  a  war  was,  as  he  said,  unthinkable. 

As  long  as  the  great  Chancellor  hved  Wilham  the  Second 
did  not  venture  upon  pursuing  a  violently  anti-British 
poHcy  which  was  bound  to  drive  this  country  into  the  arms 
of  France  and  Kussia.  Although  WilHam  the  Second  was 
hostile  to  England,  he  was  probably  restrained  by  the  fear 
of  Bismarck's  criticism  during  the  Chancellor's  lifetime. 
Soon  after  Bismarck's  death  WilHam  the  Second  began  his 
naval  campaign. 

When  Bismarck  had  closed  his  eyes  a  violent  anti- 
British  agitation,  financed  by  Krupp  and  carried  on  by 
hundreds  of  generals  and  professors,  was  started  throughout 
Germany,  and  in  1900  was  pubhshed  the  great  German  Navy 
Bill,  in  the  introduction  of  which  we  read  the  ominous 
and  oft-quoted  words  :  *  Germany  requires  a  fleet  of  such 
strength  that  a  war  with  the  mightiest  naval  Power  would 
jeopardise  the  supremacy  of  that  Power.' 

Bismarck  had  observed  the  Emperor's  Anglophobia 
in  its  more  modified  form  with  alarm,  fearing  its  effect 
upon  Italy.  He  had  written  in  a  series  of  articles  on  the 
European  situation,  pubhshed  in  the  Milnchener  Allgemeine 
Zeitung  from  May  12  to  18,  1892  : 

In  discussing  Anglophobia  in  Germany  we  must  remem- 
ber that  the  principal  Anglophobe  is  supposed  to  be  the 
Emperor  WilHam  the  Second,  who  was  hostile  to  England 
not  only  as  Crown  Prince,  but  even  during  the  first  years  of 
his  rule. 

England's  attitude  towards  :the  Triple  AlHance  depends 
not  upon  the  HeHgoland  Treaty,  but  on  Italy.    If  England 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    143 

is  opposed  to  Germany  we  can  never  reckon  upon  Italy's 
help.  .  .  . 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Army  is  at  Germany's  disposal 
only  if  the  Dual  Monarchy  does  not  require  its  use  against 
Italy.  Otherwise,  one-haK  of  the  Austrian  army  would  be 
lost  to  Germany.  .  .  .  Italy  is  therefore  a  very  important 
factor  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  even  if  she  limits  her  action 
to  abstaining  from  attacking  Austria.  .  .  . 

The  idea  that  Eussia  may  make  a  surprise  attack  upon 
Germany  is  Utopian.  Only  moderate  diplomatic  skill  on 
Germany's  part  is  required  to  avoid  a  war  with  Eussia  for 
generations.  The  tension  among  the  nations  would  be 
greatly  diminished  if  we  should  succeed  in  recreating  in 
leading  Eussian  circles  the  faith  in  Germany's  neighbourly 
honesty  which  has  disappeared  since  Bismarck's  resignation. 

A  Eussian  war  is  a  calamity  which  must  not  be  brought 
upon  the  population  of  the  Eastern  Provinces  of  Germany 
without  pressing  necessity.  The  seriousness  of  a  Eusso- 
German  war  is  particularly  great,  because  it  would  im- 
mediately lead  to  a  Franco- German  war,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  Franco-German  war  need  not  lead  to  Eussian  inter- 
vention. Besides,  the  impossibiHty  of  obtaining  adequate 
compensation  for  such  a  war  must  be  borne  in  mind.  What 
can  Germany  obtain  from  Eussia  ?  ...  At  best  she  would 
obtain  a  second  neighbour- State  thirsting  for  revenge. 
Germany  would  be  in  an  uncomfortable  position  created 
by  her  own  rashness. 

!r^  Bismarck  did  not  consider  England's  support  as  a  matter 
admitting  of  doubt.  He  reckoned  upon  it  as  a  matter  of 
course.  Commenting  upon  an  important  colonial  debate 
in  the  Eeichstag,  he  wrote  in  the  Munchener  Allgemeine 
Zeitung  on  February  8,  1891 : 

The  value  of  England's  friendship  consists  in  this  :  that 
in  case  of  a  war  she  protects  the  ItaHan  coasts  or,  which  is 
perhaps  more  uncertain,  helps  in  protecting  the  German 
shores.  By  doing  this,  England  would  largely  act  in  her 
own  interest.  .  .  . 


144  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Three  days  later  he  wrote  in  the  Hamburger  Nach- 
richten : 

In  decisive  moments  our  co-operation  with  Italy  would 
be  influenced  by  England's  attitude.  The  greater  or  lesser 
measure  of  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany  is 
not  without  influence  upon  Italy's  poHcy,  and  it  is  certainly 
questionable  how  Germany's  relations  with  Italy  would 
shape  themselves  if  Italy  should  no  longer  be  in  the  position 
of  being  attached  by  an  equal  friendship  to  England  and  to 
Germany. 

On  May  19, 1892,  he  wrote  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten : 

We  have  repeatedly  had  occasion  to  point  out  that  Italy's 
faithfulness  to  the  Triple  Alliance  depends  largely  upon 
the  relations  existing  between  England  and  that  country. 
Italy  cannot  run  the  risk  of  being  isolated  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  of  being  defeated  by  France.  Hence  she  must 
be  certain  of  the  protection  of  the  Enghsh  fleet  in  case  of 
need. 

The  agitation  for  strengthening  the  German  navy  began 
in  a  mild  way  soon  after  WiUiam  the  Second  came  to  the 
throne.  Bismarck,  observing  that  dangerous  development 
with  concern,  warned  Germany  against  frittering  away  her 
strength  and  competing  on  the  sea  with  the  French  or 
English  fleets.  Addressing  3000  people  from  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  Bismarck  said  on  May  26,  1895  : 

I  wished  to  acquire  Schleswig-Holstein,  because  unless 
we  had  that  province  we  could  not  hope  to  have  a  German 
fleet.  It  was  a  question  of  national  dignity  that  in  case  of 
need  Germany  should  be  able  to  hold  her  own  against  a 
second-rate  navy.  Formerly  we  had  no  fleet.  I  should 
consider  it  an  exaggeration  for  Germany  to  compete  with 
the  French  or  the  English  navy.  However,  we  must  be 
strong  enough  on  the  sea  to  be  able  to  deal  with  those  second- 
rate  Powers  which  we  cannot  get  at  by  land. 


POLICY  OF  BISMARCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    145 

Two  years  later  Bismarck  warned  Germany  more 
emphatically  against  creating  a  fleet  strong  enough  to 
challenge  England.  On  September  4,  1897,  Mr.  Maximilian 
Harden  published  in  the  Zukunft  the  following  pronounce- 
ment of  Prince  Bismarck : 

The  papers  are  discussing  unceasingly  whether  the 
German  fleet  should  be  increased.  Of  course,  all  that  is 
required  in  the  opinion  of  sober-minded  experts  should  be 
voted.  I  have  never  been  in  favour  of  a  colonial  policy  of 
conquest  similar  to  that  pursued  by  France.  As  far  as  one 
can  see,  the  most  important  thing  for  Germany  is  a  strong 
and  reliable  army  provided  with  the  best  weapons.  I  am 
of  Moltke's  opinion — that  we  shall  have  to  fight  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  for  the  possession  of  colonies.  We 
must  beware  of  undue  economy  in  naval  matters,  but  we 
must  also  guard  ourselves  against  fantastical  plans  which 
might  cause  us  to  quarrel  with  people  who  are  important 
for  our  position  in  Europe.    Qui  trop  emhrasse.  .  .  . 

In  December  1897  Bismarck  stated  his  views  on 
Germany's  transmaritime  pohcy  as  follows  in  the  Leifziger 
Neueste  Nachrichten  : 

The  German  Government  should  not  embark  on  under- 
takings unless  they  are  absolutely  required,  or  at  least  justi- 
fied, by  the  material  interests  of  the  State.  .  .  .  Nothing 
would  be  more  strongly  opposed  to  Germany's  interests 
than  to  enter  upon  more  or  less  daring  and  adventurous 
enterprises  guided  merely  by  the  desire  to  have  a  finger  in 
every  pie,  to  flatter  the  vanity  of  the  nation  or  to  please  the 
ambitions  of  those  who  rule  it.  To  carry  on  a  policy  of 
prestige  would  be  more  in  accordance  with  the  French  than 
the  German  character.  In  order  to  acquire  prestige,  France 
has  gone  to  Algiers,  Tunis,  Mexico,  and  Madagascar.  If 
Germany  should  ever  follow  a  similar  policy,  she  would 
not  promote  any  German  interests,  but  would  endanger  the 
welfare  of  the  Empire  and  its  position  in  Europe. 

Bismarck  clearly  foresaw  that  by  embarking  recklessly 


146    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

upon  a  policy  of  adventure  in  the  colonial  sphere,  Germany 
might  endanger  her  relations  with  Great  Britain.  Besides, 
he  foresaw  that  by  wresting  Port  Arthur  from  victorious 
Japan  in  company  with  Eussia  and  France,  and  occupying 
Kiaoohow,  she  might  later  on  be  exposed  to  Japan's  hostihty. 
He  did  not  understand  why  Germany  should  have  gone 
out  of  her  way  to  drive  Japan  out  of  Port  Arthur  with  the 
help  of  France  and  Eussia.  Therefore  he  wrote  on  May  7, 
1895,  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten  : 

It  appears  that  Japan,  following  the  friendly  advice  of 
Germany,  Eussia,  and  France,  has  abandoned  the  Liao- 
tung  Peninsula.  Germany  has  no  interest  whether  the 
district  in  question  remains  in  China's  possession  or  not.  If 
she  has  nevertheless  exerted  pressure  upon  Japan  she  might 
have  had  reasons  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted.  Pos- 
sibly the  pohcy  made  in  BerHn  may  have  been  due  to  the 
persuasiveness  of  people  who  were  in  favour  of  a  poHcy  of 
prestige  similar  to  that  pursued  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  the 
Third. 

If  Germany's  action  at  Tokio  was  intended  to  do  a  service 
to  Eussia,  it  might  perhaps  be  approved  of.  However, 
Eussia  might  have  been  supported  by  an  attitude  of  bene- 
volent neutrahty  without  active  interference.  .  .  . 

For  the  present  we  beheve  that  Germany's  initiative  in 
East  Asia  was  not  timely,  and  we  doubt  whether  that  pohcy 
and  the  extraordinary  change  of  attitude  towards  England 
can  be  justified.  We  cannot  help  fearing  that  Germany's 
initiative  in  East  Asia  is  merely  a  symptom  of  a  defect  from 
which  our  foreign  pohcy  suffers  :  that  it  springs  from  the 
inability  to  sit  still  and  wait.  We  do  not  see  why  it  was 
necessary  to  run  any  risks.  .  .  . 

Germany's  action  has  diminished  the  sympathies  for 
Germany  which  hitherto  existed  in  Japan.  That  loss  was 
perhaps  unnecessary.  The  loss  incurred  on  the  one  side 
may  perhaps  be  balanced  by  gains,  but  only  the  future  can 
show  whether  there  are  any  gains. 

Eeverting  to  Germany's  East  Asiatic  pohcy,  Bismarck 


POLICY  OF  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    147 

wrote     in    the     Hamburger    Nachrichten     on     May     23, 
1895  : 

Germany's  action  against  Japan  can  only  be  explained 
by  a  desire  to  regain  good  relations  with  Kussia,  which  have 
lately  been  lost.  If  that  is  the  case,  the  Government  should 
be  careful  not  to  fall  between  two  stools.  Kussia  desires  to 
obtain  ice-free  harbours  in  the  East,  and  Germany  has  no 
reason  either  to  support  or  to  oppose  her.  During  decades 
we  have  endeavoured  to  encourage  France  to  develop  and 
expand  in  every  direction — except  in  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
We  have  encouraged  her  to  expand  in  Tunis,  in  India,  and  in 
Africa,  and  we  have  a  similar  interest  as  regards  Eussia  in 
the  East.  Germany  has  Kttle  interest  in  the  Black  Sea,  but 
still  less  in  the  Sea  of  Japan.  .  .  . 

As  we  said  before,  we  do  not  know  the  intentions  of  the 
Government,  but  we  can  only  recommend  that  Germany, 
after  having  once  more  grasped  Kussia 's  hand,  should  hold  it 
firmly  and  stand  by  Kussia  as  long  as  Germany's  own  inter- 
ests are  not  hurt  thereby.  If  the  contrary  poUcy  is  followed, 
the  result  would  be  that  we  should  offend  Kussia  as  much  as 
we  have  already  offended  Japan  by  our  interference. 

Bismarck  gave  two  most  impressive  warnings  regarding 
mistakes  in  foreign  poHcy  in  general  and  regarding  a  German 
attack  on  France,  such  as  that  which  took  place  in  1914, 
in  particular.  In  chapter  xxviii  of  his  *  Memoirs '  the  great 
statesman  wrote : 

Errors  in  the  poHcy  of  the  cabinets  of  the  Great  Powers 
bring  no  immediate  punishment,  either  in  St.  Petersburg  or  in 
BerHn,  but  they  are  never  harmless.  The  logic  of  history  is 
even  more  exact  in  its  revisions  than  the  chief  Audit  Office  of 
Prussia. 

In    chapter    xxix,     entitled    *  The    Triple    Alliance,' 
^^    Bismarck  wrote  regarding  a  German  attack  upon  France  : 

It  is  explicable  that  for  Kussian  poHcy  there  is  a  limit 
beyond  which  the  importance  of  France  must  not  be  dimin- 
ished.   That  limit  was  reached,  I  beheve,  at  the  Peace  of 

l2 


148  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Frankfort,  a  fact  which,  in  1870  and  1871,  was  not  so  com- 
pletely realised  at  St.  Petersburg  as  five  years  later.  I 
hardly  think  that  during  the  Franco- German  War  the 
Eussian  Cabinet  clearly  foresaw  that,  when  it  was  over, 
Eussia  would  have  for  neighbour  so  strong  and  so  united  a 
Germany. 

Bismarck  was  a  most  loyal  citizen.  He  never 
endeavoured  to  revenge  himself  on  the  Emperor  for  the 
disgraceful  way  in  which  he  was  dismissed,  and  for  the 
persecution  which,  after  his  dismissal,  he  suffered  at  the 
hands  of  the  bureaucracy,  no  doubt  by  the  Emperor's 
orders.  Although  he  distrusted  the  Emperor's  reckless 
and  adventurous  personal  policy,  he  never  attacked  him 
or  reproached  him  personally.  He  merely  criticised  his 
advisers  and  their  action,  and  laid  down  the  broad  principles 
of  Germany's  poUcy  in  his  posthumous  *  Memoirs '  and  in 
numerous  speeches  and  articles. 

Bismarck's  worst  fears  have  been  realised.  The  German 
nation,  as  I  stated  before,  has  paid  hp-service  to  Bismarck, 
but  has  utterly  disregarded  his  warnings  and  advice. 
William  the  Second  and  his  courtier-statesmen  have  ap- 
parently destroyed  Bismarck's  creation.  They  cannot  plead 
that  they  were  not  warned,  for  Bismarck  foretold  unceasingly 
that  the  Emperor's  rash  interference  would  lead  to  the 
break-up  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  make  Germany  subservient 
to  Austria-Hungary,  involve  her  in  war  with  Eussia  about 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  where  Germany  possesses  no  interests, 
detach  Italy,  bring  about  Japan's  hostility,  and  end  in 
Germany's  isolation  in  Europe. 

The  official  and  non-official  spokesmen  of  Germany 
have  asserted  unceasingly  that  a  world  conspiracy  had 
been  formed  against  their  country,  that  Eussia,  or  England, 
is  to  blame  for  the  present  war.  Those  who  are  acquainted 
with  Bismarck's  writings  know  that  the  present  war 
has  not  been  caused  by  England's  jealousy  or  Eussia's 
ambitions,  or  France's  thirst  for  revenge,  but  only  by 


POLICY  OP  BISMAKCK  AND  OF  WILLIAM  II    149 

Germany's  own  folly,  and  especially  by  the  action  of  her 
Emperor,  who  dismissed  Bismarck,  disregarded  his  warnings, 
and  plmiged  the  nation  into  a  war  which  may  end  in 
Germany's  destruction. 

Bismarck  died  at  the  ripe  age  of  eighty-two.  During 
no  less  than  thirty-nine  years  he  was  in  the  service  of  the 
Government,  first  as  Ambassador  and  then  as  Prime  Minister 
and  Chancellor.  As  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  and  Chan- 
cellor of  Germany  he  was  uninterruptedly  in  of&ce  during 
twenty-eight  years,  and  during  the  whole  of  that  long 
period  he  laboured  and  fought  unceasingly  with  the  single 
object  of  establishing  the  German  Empire  and  of  con- 
solidating it.  Bismarck  scarcely  knew  the  meaning  of 
pleasure  or  of  relaxation.  He  laboured  day  and  night. 
Frequently  in  the  course  of  the  night  he  called  one  of  his 
secretaries  to  his  bedside  and  dictated  to  him.  The  great 
Chancellor  gave  all  his  time,  in  fact  his  whole  life,  to  his 
country.  After  his  dismissal  in  1890  he  spent  the  last  eight 
years,  not  in  resting  from  his  labours,  but  in  fighting  for  his 
country.  He  fought  not  against  the  Emperor,  as  his 
enemies  and  enviers  have  often  asserted,  but  against  the 
pernicious  policy,  the  incompetent  statesmen,  and  the 
dangerous  influences  which,  he  feared,  would  cause  Ger- 
many's downfall.  Bismarck  laboured  and  fought  in  vain. 
A  century  after  his  birth  the  wonderful  edifice  which  he 
erected  almost  single-handed  seems  to  be  crumbling.  One 
man  created  the  German  Empire,  and  another  one  is 
apparently  destroying  it. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    FOUNDATIONS    OF    GERMAN    EDUCATION    AND    OF 
THE    NATIONAL    CHARACTER^ 

There  is  a  vast  literature  on  German  Education.  Innu- 
merable books,  pamphlets,  and  articles  give  us  the  fullest 
details  of  the  German  school  system  in  all  its  branches. 
Enthusiastic  British  and  American  educationalists  have 
explored  the  great  education  machine  of  Germany  in  every 
aspect,  and  have  bidden  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  to  copy 
it.  However,  most  writers  on  German  Education  have 
considered  only  its  outward  aspects  and  its  present  state. 
They  have  failed  to  explain  to  us  the  secret  of  Germany's 
education.  An  educational  system,  like  a  national  consti- 
tution, cannot  be  copied.  It  is  a  thing  that  has  been 
evolved  in  the  course  of  centuries.  We  can  understand 
German  education  and  the  German  character  only  if  we 
go  back  to  the  foundations,  if  we  consider  the  way  by 
which  the  German  educational  system  has  been  created. 

The  Germans,  and  particularly  the  North  Germans, 
the"  Prussians,  were  until  comparatively  recent  times  a 
nation  of  ignorant  boors.  To-day  they  are  the  best  educated, 
or  at  least  the  most  educated,  people  in  the  world.  They 
have  been  made  what  they  are  by  their  great  rulers,  es- 
pecially by  Frederick  WiUiam,  the  Great  Elector,  King 
Frederick  William  the  First,  and  King  Frederick  the  Great. 

It  would,  perhaps,  lead  too  far  to  study  the  government 

1  From  The  Contemporary  Review,  January  1916. 
150 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAEACTER    151 

and  the  influence  of  the  Great  Elector.  He  ruled  from 
1640  to  1688.  It  requires  some  mental  effort  to  appreciate 
his  educational  activities  at  the  present  day.  It  will 
perhaps  suffice  to  say  that  he  introduced  in  Prussia  the 
regime  of  enlightened  absolutism  as  has  been  shown  in  the 
beginning  of  this  book.  He  destroyed  the  independence 
of  the  nobility,  of  the  towns,  and  of  the  estates,  and  made 
the  whole  people  a  willing  instrument  in  the  hands  of  their 
ruler. 

The  Great  Elector  died,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son, 
Frederick,  who  became  the  first  King  of  Prussia.  The 
son  was  a  worthless  monarch.  He  sacrificed  the  welfare 
of  his  country  to  his  vanity  and  his  lust.  Under  his  rule 
Prussia  declined  and  decayed.  He  was  succeeded  by  his 
son.  King  Frederick  William  the  First,  a  coarse-mannered, 
ignorant  brute.  Frederick  William  was  as  uncultured  as 
was  President  Kruger.  At  the  same  time  he  possessed, 
like  Kruger,  great  natural  abilities.  He  allowed  himself 
to  be  guided  by  his  instincts.  He  ruled  Prussia  absolutely 
in  accordance  with  his  will,  in  accordance  with  the  precedent 
which  the  Great  Elector  had  created.  Frederick  William 
loved  the  army.  He  was  fond  of  order  and  cleanliness, 
and  he  was  extremely  thrifty  and  parsimonious.  He 
founded  in  Prussia  a  model  administration  and  a  model 
army,  and  he  moulded  the  character  of  the  people  upon 
his  own. 

Frederick  the  First  had  tried  to  imitate  Louis  the  Four- 
teenth of  France.  He  spent  the  money  of  the  citizens 
lavishly  and  almost  ruined  the  country.  His  son  was  out- 
raged by  the  outlandish  elegance  and  luxury,  the  waste 
and  immorality,  which  his  father  had  introduced  in  Prussia. 
His  instinct  rebelled  against  his  surroundings  in  his  early 
childhood.  When,  as  a  small  boy,  he  was  given  a  dress  of 
the  most  precious  brocade,  he  refused  to  wear  it.  At  great 
trouble  he  was  prevailed  upon  to  put  it  on.  However, 
before  joining  the  company  he  crept  into  a  chimney,  covered 


152  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

himself  with  soot,  and  entered  the  royal  presence  looking 
like  a  sweep.  He  hated  the  full-bottomed  powdered  wigs 
with  enormous  flowing  curls  which  Louis  the  Fourteenth  had 
made  popular.  One  day  the  little  prince  was  sitting  among 
a  number  of  pompous  old  courtiers  ornamented  with  the 
largest  and  costhest  French  wigs.  He  himself  wore  only  a 
Httle  one.  Suddenly,  the  Crown  Prince  exclaimed  that 
it  was  too  hot  for  wearing  wigs.  The  courtiers  of  course 
agreed.  In  a  moment  Frederick  WilHam  threw  his  own 
wig  into  the  blazing  fire,  exclaiming,  '  He  is  a  rascal  who 
does  not  follow  the  Crown  Prince's  example  !  *  All  the 
courtiers  regretfully,  but  obediently,  followed  suit. 

When  Frederick  William  the  First  came  to  the  throne 
his  first  action  consisted  in  inspecting  the  royal  accounts 
and  in  reducing  the  royal  expenditure  to  one-fifth.  Without 
a  moment's  delay,  all  the  superfluous  courtiers  and  servants 
were  dismissed  or  pensioned.  All  unduly  high  salaries 
were  reduced.  The  superfluous  royal  buildings  and  groimds 
were  sold  or  let  to  the  best  advantage.  Eoyal  parks  and 
ornamental  gardens  were  converted  into  ploughed  fields 
and  into  drill  grounds  for  the  army.  The  unnecessary 
jewellery  which  his  father  had  accumulated,  vast  quantities 
of  costly  wines,  and  many  horses  and  carriages  were  sold. 
Innumerable  objects  of  silver  and  gold  were  sent  to  the 
Mint  and  turned  into  coin.  While  in  his  father's  time  the 
characteristic  of  the  Prussian  Court  had  been  elegance 
and  luxury,  its  characteristic  feature  under  Frederick 
William  the  First  became  simpHcity  and  thrift.  The  King 
hved  Hke  a  simple  private  citizen.  Upholstered  furniture, 
carpets,  and  rich  hangings  were  banished  from  the  royal 
rooms.  The  new  King  preferred  plain  wooden  floors  and 
plain  wooden  tables  and  chairs.  Simplicity  and  cleanliness 
became  the  predominant  note  of  the  royal  residence. 

The  impetuous  King  hated  luxury.  He  would  tolerate 
luxury  neither  in  his  own  family  nor  among  others.  By 
legislative  enactments,  profusion  in  dress  and  wastefulness 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAEACTEK    153 

of  expenditure  were  checked.  The  King  hated  the  French 
fashions,  and  tried  to  make  them  ridiculous.  With  this 
object  in  view  he  caused  the  most  despised  men  in  his  army, 
the  provosts,  who  acted  as  mihtary  poHce  and  as  execu- 
tioners, to  be  dressed  at  parade  in  the  richest  French  fashions 
and  in  flowing  wigs.  The  ladies  at  Court  were  not  allowed 
to  use  paint  or  powder.  Elaborate  French  cooking  was 
banished  from  the  royal  kitchens.  The  royal  table  was 
suppHed  with  the  plainest  viands.  When  the  King  on 
his  walks  noticed  an  attractive  smell  of  cooking  emanating 
from  the  house  of  a  peasant  or  of  a  citizen  of  small  means, 
he  would  not  hesitate  to  enter  and  to  invite  himself  to  dinner. 
He  would  ask  after  the  price  of  the  food,  and  then  insist 
that  the  royal  cook  should  provide  him  with  a  meal  of 
the  same  kind  at  the  identical  price. 

In  his  personal  expenditure  the  King  was  the  thriftiest 
of  men.  For  the  sake  of  economy  he  always  wore  oversleeves 
and  an  apron  when  working  at  his  desk.  He  checked  the 
accounts  of  the  royal  household  down  to  the  smallest  sums, 
and  woe  betide  a  dishonest  servant  or  one  who  through 
ignorance  or  carelessness  had  spent  too  much  in  supplying 
the  royal  family.  The  same  economy  which  the  King 
practised  in  his  person  and  his  family  he  required  from  all 
the  officials  and  from  the  private  citizens  as  well.  Every 
penny  had  to  be  carefully  accounted  for.  Ministers  of 
State  were  told  that  common  paper,  which  was  cheaper 
than  white  paper,  was  good  enough  for  their  use.  In  large 
matters  the  King  was  economical  as  in  small  ones.  Every 
year  considerable  sums  of  money  were  saved.  Officials 
who  wished  to  acquire  the  King's  favour  had  to  produce 
large  surpluses.  Vast  sums  thus  saved  were  employed  for 
strengthening  the  army  and  for  improving  the  country  by 
building  canals  and  high  roads,  by  draining  marshes  and 
irrigating  dry  land,  by  settling  large  numbers  of  foreigners 
on  reclaimed  waste  lands  in  Prussia,  and  by  accumulating 
a  fund  in  ready  money  in  the  cellars  of  the  royal  castle. 


154    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Frederick  William  the  First  educated  the  Prussians  not 
only  to  habits  of  frugality,  economy,  and  order,  but  to 
industry  and  thoroughness  as  well.  In  his  father's  time 
the  Government  business  had  been  left  to  underlings,  who 
had  abused  their  position.  Frederick  William  resolved 
to  take  the  whole  national  business  in  his  own  hands  and 
to  become  the  principal  official  of  the  State.  He  fulfilled 
his  duties  most  conscientiously.  Thoughts  of  the  national 
business  disturbed  his  sleep.  He  rose  at  the  break  of  dawn 
and  worked  indefatigably  till  far  into  the  night.  He  was 
no  doubt  the  most  industrious  man  in  his  kingdom.  On 
every  walk  and  every  ride  he  acted  as  general  inspector  to 
the  nation,  supervising,  admonishing,  helping  or  punishing 
the  people  on  the  spot.  When  he  saw  working-men  idling 
at  their  work  he  accelerated  their  movements  with  his  stick. 
Once  on  one  of  his  early  morning  walks  the  King  approached 
one  of  the  Potsdam  gates  and  noticed  that  a  traveller  who 
had  arrived  by  the  night  mail  from  Hamburg  was  knocking 
in  vain  at  the  gate.  The  enraged  King  had  the  gate  opened, 
rushed  into  the  gatekeeper's  house,  and  with  his  stick  drove 
him  out  of  bed  and  out  of  office.  Then,  returning  to  the 
astonished  traveller  he  apologised  to  him,  and  expressed 
his  deep  regret  that  a  Prussian  official  should  have  been  so 
neglectful  of  his  duties.  Frederick  William  hstened  to  all 
complaints,  and  investigated  them  in  person  if  possible. 
While  he  insisted  that  all  the  citizens  should  be  industrious 
and  thrifty,  he  was  always  pleased  when  he  saw  hard-working 
men  enjoying  innocent  amusements.  Once  he  came,  on 
one  of  his  walks,  to  an  inn  where  people  were  playing  at 
ninepins.  He  watched  their  game  and  praised  them  for 
spending  their  leisure  hours  in  such  a  healthy  way.  The 
players  told  their  friends,  and  when  the  King  happened  to 
pass  the  ninepin-alley  a  few  days  later  there  was  a  crowd 
of  loafers  who  waited  for  the  King's  applause.  Immediately 
the  King  grew  red  in  the  face,  rushed  among  them,  and 
drove  them  to  their  business  with  his  stick. 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAKACTEK    155 

Frederick  William  the  First  died  in  1740,  and  was 
succeeded  by  his  son,  Frederick  the  Great.  Frederick  the 
Great  is  known  to  the  world  chiefly  as  a  soldier  and  as  a 
diplomat.  Like  Napoleon  the  First,  he  was  his  own  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Minister  of  War,  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  It  is  not  so  much  known 
that  Frederick  the  Great,  hke  his  father,  administered  in 
person  all  the  principal  offices  of  State,  that  he  was  a  great 
administrator  and,  before  all,  a  great  educator  in  the  widest 
sense  of  the  word.  He  was  an  indefatigable  worker.  He 
rose  in  summer  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  in  winter 
at  four  o'clock,  and  his  servants  had  instructions  to  get  him 
out  of  bed  by  force  if  he  did  not  rise  immediately  when 
called.  A  quarter  of  an  hour  after  having  been  awakened, 
Frederick  was  at  his  desk,  reading  his  correspondence 
and  dictating  replies.  He,  Hke  his  father,  became  to  the 
Prussian  people  a  model  of  industry,  thoroughness,  and 
economy. 

Frederick  the  Great  left  numerous  hitherto  unpublished 
writings  for  the  guidance  of  his  successors,  as  well  as  printed 
essays  and  books  scarcely  known  to  the  English-speaking 
peoples,  in  which  he  explained  the  principles  which  guided 
his  numerous  activities.  His  enlightened  views  as  to 
education  in  the  narrower  sense  are  extremely  interesting 
and  valuable,  especially  as  they  have  had  the  greatest 
influence  upon  Prusso- German  educational  policy.  He  wrote 
in  his  *  Memoir es  depuis  la  Paix ' : 

Custom,  which  rules  the  world,  holds  imperious  sway 
over  the  narrow-minded.  Still,  a  Government  must  not 
restrict  its  activities  to  a  single  aim.  It  must  be  prompted 
to  action  not  only  by  the  consideration  whether  action  is 
profitable.  The  public  welfare  has  numerous  aspects,  and 
the  Government  should  interest  itseK  in  all.  Among  the 
objects  which  the  Government  should  further  with  particular 
care,  the  education  of  youth  is  one  of  the  most  important.  .  .  . 
Unfortunately  teachers  strive  merely  to  fill  the  memory  of 


156    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

their  pupils  with  facts  and  dates,  and  omit  to  strengthen  their 
intelHgence  and  their  judgment. 

Frederick  the  Great  beKeved  that  by  a  wisely  directed 
education  a  nation  might  be  raised  rivalling  the  ancient 
Greeks  and  Komans  in  bravery  and  general  abiHty.  He  stated 
in  his  pamphlet,  *  Lettre  sur  T Education,'  written  in  1769 : 

The  vast  number  of  great  men  which  Kome  and  Greece 
have  produced  have  influenced  me  in  favour  of  the  education 
of  the  ancients.  I  am  convinced  that  by  following  their 
methods  one  can  create  a  nation  superior  in  character  and 
abihty  to  the  generahty  of  modern  nations. 

The  education  given  to  the  children  of  the  nobility 
throughout  Europe  is  extremely  bad.  In  Prussia  they  are  J 
given  their  first  education  in  the  parental  house,  and  an  1 
intermediate  and  higher  education  at  the  schools  and  the 
universities.  In  the  house  of  the  parents,  blind  parental 
love  prevents  them  giving  their  children  the  necessary 
correction.  Mothers  particularly,  even  if  they  rule  their 
husbands  with  despotic  severity,  have  a  boundless  indul- 
gence for  their  children.  These  are  handed  over  to  servants, 
who  flatter  and  spoil  them,  who  inspire  them  with  pernicious 
ideas,  and  who  thus  fatally  influence  minds  so  tender.  The 
educators  who  are  generally  chosen  for  the  children  when 
they  are  a  little  older  are,  as  a  rule,  either  clergymen  or 
young  lawyers  who  often  themselves  need  educating.  .  .  . 

Children  are  trained  to  habits  of  idleness  by  being  allowed 
to  be  idle.  Men  who  wish  to  get  on  in  the  world  require  a 
hard  and  laborious  education.  Boys  should  be  given  work 
of  composition,  which  should  be  corrected  and  recorrected. 
By  forcing  them  to  rewrite  and  to  improve  their  work,  they 
will  be  taught  to  think  correctly  and  to  express  their  ideas 
with  facility.  Instead  of  following  this  method,  teachers 
cram  the  brains  of  the  young  with  facts  and  allow  the  working 
intelHgence  of  their  pupils  to  remain  inactive  and  un- 
developed and  to  become  atrophied.  Children  are  forced 
to  accumulate  knowledge,  but  are  prevented  from  acquiring 
that  discriminating  intelligence  with  which  alone  they  can 
make  good  use  of  the  knowledge  which  they  have  acquired. 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAEACTEE    157 

The  softness  of  their  first  education  makes  boys  effemi- 
nate, comfort-loving,  lazy,  and  cowardly.  Thus,  instead  of 
rearing  a  hardy  race  resembhng  the  ancients,  a  race  of 
pleasure-loving  sybarites  is  created.  Hence  young  men 
lead  Hves  of  idleness  and  of  self-indulgence.  They  believe 
that  they  have  been  born  to  enjoy  comfort  and  pleasure,  and 
that  men  of  their  position  are  under  no  obligation  to  be  useful 
members  of  society.  Consequently,  they  will  commit 
follies  of  every  kind,  run  into  debt,  drink  and  gamble,  and 
ruin  their  famihes. 

Young  men  cannot  be  too  well  educated.  They  cannot 
possess  too  much  knowledge,  whatever  their  calling  may  be. 
The  profession  of  arms,  for  instance,  requires  very  vast 
knowledge.  Nevertheless,  one  often  hears  people  say : 
*  My  boy  will  not  learn.  I  shall  therefore  make  him 
a  soldier.*  He  may  become  a  private,  but  not  an  officer 
qualified  to  fill  the  highest  posts. 

In  the  administration  of  justice  and  of  the  national 
finances,  in  the  diplomatic  service  and  in  the  army,  illustri- 
ous birth  is  an  advantage.  However,  all  would  be  lost  if 
birth  should  become  more  potent  than  merit.  A  Govern- 
ment which  would  exalt  birth  above  merit  would  no  doubt 
experience  fatal  consequences.  ...  It  is  an  error  to  beHeve 
that  the  arts  and  sciences  soften  the  national  character. 
All  that  serves  to  enhghten  the  mind  and  to  extend  the  range 
of  knowledge,  elevates  the  national  spirit. 

In  Frederick's  opinion,  education  should  improve  the 
character  and  increase  the  abihties  of  the  people.  It 
should  be  practical  and  useful  rather  than  ornamental  and 
showy.  These  principles  should  apply  to  the  education  of 
girls  as  well.    He  wrote  in  his  *  Lettre  sur  I'Education  ' : 

I  must  confess  that  I  am  surprised  to  see  that  people  of 
the  highest  position  bring  up  their  daughters  Hke  chorus 
girls.  They  chiefly  wish  that  their  daughters  should  be 
admired,  that  they  should  please  by  their  appearance. 
Apparently  it  is  considered  unnecessary  that  they  should 
be  esteemed,  and  it  is  forgotten  that  their  business  in  life 
consists  in  raising  families.    Their   education   should   be 


158  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

directed  towards  their  principal  object  in  life.  They 
should  be  taught  to  detest  everything  that  is  dishonourable. 
They  ought  to  learn  wisdom  and  be  made  to  acquire  useful 
and  lasting  quaUties.  Instead  of  this,  parents  endeavour 
to  cultivate  their  beauty  and  grace,  attractions  which  are 
evanescent.  Example  is  more  precious  than  precept. 
How  then  can  parents  teach  their  daughters  wisdom  and  virtue 
if  they  themselves  lead  idle  and  frivolous  Hves  and  devote 
themselves  to  luxury  and  to  other  scandalous  practices  ? 

Frederick  the  Great  clearly  recognised  that  the  sciences 
and  arts  are  apt  to  increase  the  prestige  and  the  power  of  a 
nation.  He  regretted  that  the  Prussians  were  a  nation 
of  boors,  and  he  wished  to  create  culture  among  them  by  a 
suitable  education.  He  therefore  encouraged  all  the 
sciences  and  arts,  estabhshed  learned  institutions,  and 
promoted  study  and  investigation  in  every  way.  He  wrote 
in  his  *  Discours  de  I'Utilite  des  Sciences  ' : 

The  inborn  gifts  of  men  are  small.  Men  possess  tenden- 
cies which  education  may  develop.  Men's  knowledge  must 
be  increased  so  as  to  widen  their  horizon.  Their  memories 
must  be  filled  with  facts,  so  that  their  imagination  will  have 
sufficient  material  with  which  it  can  work.  The  critical 
faculties  of  men  must  be  sharpened  so  as  to  enable  them  to 
discriminate  between  the  valuable  and  the  worthless.  The 
greatest  genius  among  men,  if  devoid  of  knowledge,  is  like 
an  uncut  diamond.  How  many  geniuses  have  been  lost  to 
society,  and  how  many  truly  great  men  have  lived  and  died 
in  obscurity,  because  their  great  natural  gifts  remained  un- 
developed either  through  lack  of  education  or  through  lack 
of  opportunity !  The  welfare  and  the  glory  of  the  State 
require  that  the  people  should  be  as  well  educated  and  as 
enlightened  as  possible,  for  then  only  can  the  nation  produce 
men  of  the  highest  abiHty  in  every  walk  of  life  for  the  good 
of  the  country.  .  .  . 

All  enhghtened  rulers  have  patronised  and  encouraged 
those  learned  men  whose  labours  are  useful  to  society,  and 
now  matters  have  come  to  such  a  pitch  that  a  State  will 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAKACTEE    169 

soon  be  a  century  behind  its  neighbours  if  it  neglects  to 
encourage  the  sciences.  In  this  respect  Poland  furnishes  us 
with  a  warning  example. 

Very  interesting  are  Frederick's  own  instructions  for 
the  Academie  des  Nobles  in  Berlin,  where  sons  of  the  nobility 
were  to  be  educated.    Frederick  the  Great  wrote  : 

The  professor  of  law  should  draw  upon  Hugo  Grotius. 
The  pupils  should  not  be  turned  into  juridical  experts.  '  Well- 
brought-up  men  should  possess  some  sound  general  ideas 
about  the  law,  but  need  not  have  profound  legal  knowledge. 
The  law  professor  shall  therefore  limit  himself  to  giving  to 
his  pupils  some  knowledge  of  the  rights  of  the  citizens,  of 
the  rights  of  the  people,  and  of  the  rights  of  the  monarch. 
They  should  have  some  idea  of  international  law.  At  the 
same  time  they  should  be  told  that  international  law  lacks 
that  authority  and  compelling  power  which  are  possessed 
by  the  ordinary  law,  and  that  it  is  therefore  a  phantom  to 
which  sovereigns  appeal  even  when  they  are  violating  it. 
The  lessons  will  be  wound  up  by  the  study  of  the  Frederician 
code,  which,  being  the  body  of  the  national  laws,  should  be 
known  by  all  the  citizens. 

If  the  pupils  should  do  wrong,  they  must  be  punished.  If 
they  do  not  know  their  lessons,  they  should  be  made  to  wear 
a  donkey's  head.  If  they  are  lazy,  they  should  be  given  only 
bread  and  water.  If  they  are  ignorant  through  ill-will, 
they  should  be  locked  up,  deprived  of  food,  scolded,  served 
last  at  table,  not  be  allowed  to  carry  their  sword  in  pubhc, 
and  be  compelled  to  ask  pardon  in  public.  Obstinate  pupils 
should  be  allowed  to  carry  only  an  empty  scabbard  until 
they  repent  of  their  obstinacy.  But  under  pain  of  imprison- 
ment the  governors  of  the  academy  are  prohibited  from 
beating  their  pupils.  As  they  are  young  men  of  position, 
they  should  possess  greatness  of  soul  and  a  keen  sense  of 
honour.  The  punishments  inflicted  on  them  should  awaken 
their  ambitions  but  should  not  humihate  them. 

Law  is  an  important  part  of  the  national  education. 
Frederick  the  Great  was  eminent  not  only  as  an  educa- 


160  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

tionalist,  but  also  as  a  law-giver.  He  considered  that  the 
citizens  were  entitled  to  obtain  justice  quickly  and  cheaply, 
that  the  confusion  and  the  multiplicity  of  laws  prevented  the 
poor  obtaining  justice,  and  enabled  the  rich  and  cunning  to 
oppress  the  poor  and  the  weak.  He  laid  down  his  principles 
regarding  the  laws  in  various  writings.  In  his  *  Dissertation 
sur  les  Kaisons  d'fitablir  ou  d'Abroger  les  Lois  '  he  wrote  : 

Few  and  wise  laws  make  the  people  happy,  while  the 
multiplicity  of  laws  embarrasses  jurisprudence.  A  good 
doctor  does  not  overdose  his  patients  with  medicines,  nor 
does  a  skilful  legislator  overdose  the  public  with  super- 
fluous laws.  Too  many  medicines  are  harmful.  They 
neutralise  one  another.  Too  many  laws  create  a  maze,  in 
which  the  lawyers  and  justice  itself  become  lost. 

England  has  a  law  against  bigamy.  Once  a  man  was 
accused  of  having  married  five  wives.  As  the  law  had  to  be 
interpreted  literally,  he  could  not  be  punished  for  bigamy. 
To  make  the  law  clear  it  ought  to  have  stated ;  '  Whoever 
marries  more  than  one  woman  will  be  punished.'  The  vaguely 
worded  laws  of  England,  which  are  Uterally  interpreted, 
have  given  rise  to  the  most  ridiculous  abuses. 

Carefully  worded  laws  leave  no  room  for  chicanery. 
When  they  are  vaguely  and  obscurely  expressed,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  discuss  and  to  determine  the  intention  of  the 
law-givers,  and  judges,  instead  of  adjudicating  on  the  facts, 
have  to  waste  their  time  in  expounding  and  interpreting 
the  law. 

One  can  limit  the  addresses  of  lawyers  to  the  recital 
of  facts  which  can  be  supported  by  proofs,  and  their  addresses 
may  be  concluded  with  a  short  recapitulation.  Nothing 
is  more  powerful  and  more  moving  than  an  appeal  to  the 
passions,  to  sentiment,  made  by  a  man  gifted  with  eloquence. 
An  eloquent  advocate  can  move  his  hearers  in  any  way  he 
Hkes,  and  can  thus  obscure  the  truth.  Lycurgus  and  Solon 
prohibited  the  use  of  eloquence  in  the  law  courts.  .  .  . 
Prussia  has  followed  that  wise  custom  of  Greece.  Eloquence 
is  banished  from  our  pleadings. 

When  the  laws  of  a  State  have  not  been  collected  in  a 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAEACTER    161 

code  it  is  only  natural  that  the  existing  laws  frequently 
contradict  each  other.  As  they  have  been  made  by  different 
legislators  at  different  times,  they  lack  that  unity  which  is 
essential  in  all  important  matters. 

In  his  *  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvernement '  Frederick 
wrote : 

Good  laws  must  be  clearly  expressed.  Otherwise 
trickery  can  evade  them,  and  cunning  take  advantage  of 
them,  and  then  the  weak  will  become  a  prey  to  the  powerful 
and  the  cunning.  Legal  procedure  should  be  as  short  as 
possible.  Otherwise  the  people  will  be  ruined  by  protracted 
law  suits.  They  should  not  have  to  spend  vast  sums  in 
litigation,  for  they  are  entitled  to  justice.  The  Law  Depart- 
ment of  the  Government  cannot  be  too  watchful  in  pro- 
tecting the  people  against  the  grasping  greed  of  the  lawyers. 
The  whole  legal  apparatus  should  be  kept  in  order  by 
periodical  inspections,  when  those  who  believe  that  they 
have  been  wronged  by  the  law  can  place  their  complaints 
before  the  visiting  Commission. 

Punishments  should  never  be  excessive.  Violence  should 
never  displace  the  laws.  It  is  better  that  a  sovereign  should 
be  too  mild  than  too  severe.  Laws  must  be  devised  in 
accordance  with  the  national  character.  A  docile  people 
does  not  require  severe  laws. 

More  than  150  years  ago  Frederick  the  Great  endeavoured 
to  make  the  laws  plain  and  clear  to  all  by  compiling  a  code. 
Great  Britain  is  still  devoid  of  a  code.  Contradictory 
laws  and  all  the  evils  described  by  Frederick  the  Great 
abound.  The  law  in  England,  and  in  America  too,  is  a 
scandal,  and  the  lawyers  oppose  the  compilation  of  the  laws 
in  a  code  in  their  own  interest. 

The  old  Prussian  Code,  which  was  inspired  by  the  ideas 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  is  a  model  of  clearness  and  brevity. 
It  is  interesting  not  only  because  it  shows  how  plain  and 
simple  the  law  can  be  made  by  a  government  which  has 
the  will  to  simplify  it,  but  also  because  it  shows  how  powerful 


162  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

an  educational  instrument  legislation  can  become  in  the 
hands  of  a  wise  government.  The  old  Prussian  Code 
established  clearly  the  rights  and  duties  of  ruler  and  ruled, 
of  the  State  and  of  the  citizen.  While  England  and  the 
United  States  are  swayed  by  individuaHsm,  while  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries  the  interests  of  the  individual  are 
placed  above  those  of  the  community  as  a  whole,  Frederick 
the  Great  impressed  upon  his  people  throughout  his  Code 
the  fact  that  the  whole  is  more  important  than  the  part, 
that  the  State  is  more  important  than  the  individual.  In 
the  Introduction  to  the  Code  we  read,  in  the  beautifully 
clear  and  brief  language  which  makes  it  a  model  of  style  : 

Every  citizen  is  obliged  to  promote  the  welfare  and 
security  of  the  community  in  accordance  with  his  position 
and  means.  If  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  individual  should 
come  into  collision  with  the  promotion  of  the  general  welfare, 
the  rights  and  advantages  of  the  individual  citizen  must 
range  after  the  interests  of  the  community.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  State  is  obliged  to  make  good  the  damage  which 
individuals  may  suffer  by  sacrificing  their  rights  and  interests 
to  the  general  welfare. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  State,  the  community,  was 
given  enormous  powers  over  the  individual,  powers  which 
might  be  abused.  To  prevent  their  abuse,  the  citizens 
were  enabled  to  proceed  at  law  against  the  State  with  the 
same  ease  with  which  they  could  proceed  against  one  another. 
The  Code  stated : 

Differences  between  the  head  of  the  State  and  his  sub- 
jects will  be  settled  before  the  ordinary  law  courts,  in 
accordance  with  the  law,  and  will  be  decided  by  them. 

That  was  not  an  empty  assertion.  While  in  England  and 
in  the  United  States  the  popular  representation  is  all- 
powerful,  and  can,  with  impunity,  act  unjustly  towards 
the  citizens,  the  Prussian  people  were  enabled  by  law  to 
place  their  differences  with  Government   and  ruler  before 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAEACTER    163 

the  law  courts.  When  Frederick  the  Great  had  built 
the  chdteau  of  Sansouci  he  found  that  a  windmill  close 
by  disturbed  him  at  his  work.  He  offered  to  buy  the  mill, 
but  the  miller  refused  to  part  with  it  at  any  price.  Annoyed 
by  his  refusal,  the  King  threatened  to  seize  the  mill,  paying 
the  miller  compensation,  whereupon  the  proprietor  fear- 
lessly repHed  that  the  King  could  not  act  against  the  law, 
that  he  would  take  the  matter  to  the  law  courts  if  Frederick 
used  violence,  and  the  result  was  that  the  miller  remained 
in  undisturbed  possession  of  his  property. 

By  the  action  of  the  Great  Elector,  of  Frederick  WilHam 
the  First,  and  of  Frederick  the  Great,  the  ruler  and  the 
Government  of  Prussia  had  been  given  the  greatest  powers. 
Frederick  the  Great  was  no  doubt  a  despot,  but  he  was 
an  enlightened  despot.  He  claimed  for  the  State  the  most 
far-reaching  rights,  but  he  insisted  that  ruler  and  Govern- 
ment, being  endowed  with  the  greatest  power,  were  obliged 
to  fulfil  their  duty  towards  the  citizens,  that  they  should 
act  towards  them  the  part  of  Providence.  The  old  Prussian 
Code  lays  down : 

All  rights  and  duties  of  the  State  towards  the  citizens 
are  united  in  the  sovereign. 

The  principal  duty  of  the  ruler  of  the  State  consists 
in  maintaining  peace  and  security  towards  other  nations 
and  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  in  protecting  every 
citizen  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  life  and  property  against 
violence  and  against  disturbance. 

The  duties  before  mentioned  were  generally  recognised 
by  conscientious  sovereigns.  However,  Frederick  the  Great 
went  farther.  He  was  of  opinion  that  the  Government 
should  not  only  protect  the  citizens,  but  should  also  promote 
their  prosperity  by  wise  interference,  and  come  to  their 
aid  when  in  distress.    The  Code  states  ; 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  ruler  to  provide  measures  and 
create  institutions  whereby  the  citizens  will  obtain  means 

m2 


164  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

and  opportunities  for  developing  their  abilities  and  powers, 
for  using  them  and  for  increasing  their  prosperity. 

Hence,  the  head  of  the  State  is  possessed  of  all  the 
privileges  and  powers  which  are  required  in  order  to  obtain 
this  object. 

The  State  is  obliged  to  maintain  the  security  of  the 
subjects  and  to  defend  their  person,  their  honour,  their 
rights,  and  their  property. 

Hence,  the  State  is  obliged  to  take  the  measures  and 
to  create  the  institutions  necessary  for  providing  justice, 
for  taking  care  of  those  who  cannot  help  themselves,  and 
for  preventing  and  punishing  transgressions  and  crimes. 

Germany  was  the  first  State  to  introduce  a  system  of 
National  Insurance.  As  Bismarck  inaugurated  the  first 
national  insurance  laws,  it  is  often  believed  that  he  originated 
Germany's  social  policy.  In  reality  he  merely  carried  out 
the  duties  which  Frederick  the  Great  had  recommended, 
and  which  were  laid  down  in  the  old  Code.  The  old  Prussian 
Code  distinctly  states  that  those  citizens  who  are  in  need 
are  entitled  to  employment,  and  that  they  are  entitled  to 
support  if  employment  cannot  be  found  for  them,  or  if 
they  are  unable  to  work.  On  the  other  hand,  citizens  were 
not  allowed  to  live  in  idleness  by  begging,  and  institutions 
which  encouraged  idleness  and  dissipation,  even  if  they 
were  charitable  institutions,  were  not  to  be  tolerated.  The 
Code  states : 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  provide  for  the  maintenance 
of  those  citizens  who  cannot  provide  for  themselves,  and 
who  cannot  obtain  maintenance  from  those  private  persons 
who,  according  to  the  law,  are  obliged  to  provide  for  them. 

Those  who  lack  means  and  opportunities  to  earn  a  living 
for  themselves  and  their  dependents,  are  to  be  supplied 
with  work  suitable  to  their  powers  and  capacities. 

Those  who  will  not  work,  owing  to  laziness,  love  of 
idleness,  or  other  disorderly  inclinations,  shall  be  made  to 
do  useful  work  by  compulsion  and  punishment.  '   ' 

Foreign  beggars  must  neither  be  allowed  to  enter  the 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHARACTEE    165 

country  nor  to  remain  in  it  if  they  have  entered  it,  and  if 
they  should  have  succeeded  in  entering  it  by  stealth,  they 
must  be  sent  back  across  the  frontier. 

The  native  poor  must  not  beg.  They  must  be  sent 
back  to  the  place  to  which  they  belong,  and  must  there  be 
provided  for  in  accordance  with  the  law.  The  State  is 
entitled  and  obHged  to  create  institutions  and  to  take 
measures  which  prevent  destitution  among  the  citizens,  and 
which  prevent  exaggerated  expenditure  and  waste. 

Arrangements  and  institutions  which  promote  idleness, 
especially  among  the  masses  of  the  people,  and  which  are 
harmful  to  diligence  and  industry,  must  not  be  tolerated 
within  the  State. 

Charitable  and  other  institutions  which  favour  and 
promote  incHnation  towards  idleness,  may  be  dissolved 
by  the  State,  and  their  income  may  be  used  for  the  benefit 
of  the  poor. 

Those  who  deliberately  live  by  begging,  such  as  tramps 
and  idlers  of  every  kind,  must  be  made  to  work  ;  and  when 
they  are  useless  they  must  either  be  cheaply  provided  for 
or  be  expelled  from  the  country  as  strangers. 

Thieves  and  other  criminals  who,  owing  to  their  evil 
inclinations,  may  become  dangerous  to  the  community, 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  leave  prison  after  they  have  served 
their  sentence  unless  they  have  shown  that  they  are  able 
to  make  an  honest  living. 

Authorities  and  officials  who  neglect  the  preventive 
measures  outlined  will  be  held  responsible  for  themselves 
and  for  their  subordinates,  according  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  case. 

Germany  does  not  swarm  with  tramps,  touts,  and  idlers 
of  every  kind  who  Hve  by  defrauding  charitable  organisations 
and  kindly  disposed  private  people,  because  the  nation  has 
been  trained  to  habits  of  industry  and  thrift  during  the 
last  two  hundred  years.  The  Prussian  sovereigns  themselves 
have  given  an  example  of  industry  and  thrift  to  their  people , 
and  they  have,  in  addition,  endeavoured  to  make  the  people 
industrious  and  thrifty  by  wise  legislation,  for  the  principles 


166    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

contained  in  the  old  Code  still  guide  the  German  Government 
and  the  local  authorities  of  the  country. 

On  his  journeys,  Frederick  the  Great,  like  his  father 
Frederick  WilUam  the  First,  lent  a  wilHng  ear  to  the  com- 
plaints of  all  his  citizens.  Eeferring  to  his  activity  when 
travelling,  he  wrote  to  Voltaire  : 

I  endeavour  to  prevent  that  in  Prussia  the  strong  oppress 
the  weak,  and  I  try  to  mitigate  sentences  which  appear  to 
me  to  be  too  severe.  That  is  part  of  my  occupation  when 
travelling  through  my  provinces.  Every  citizen  can  ap- 
proach me  without  let  or  hindrance,  and  his  complaints 
are  investigated  either  by  myself  or  by  others.  Hence  I 
am  able  to  help  numerous  people  who  were  unknown  to 
me  until  they  handed  to  me  their  petitions  or  complaints. 
As  I  am  apt  to  revise  sentences  the  judges  are  careful  and 
cautious,  and  are  not  likely  to  proceed  with  over-great 
harshness. 

Frederick  the  Great  endeavoured  by  law  not  only  to 
promote  industry  and  to  discourage  idleness  among  the  lower 
classes,  but  among  the  middle  and  upper  classes  as  well. 
Peasants  and  farmers  who  cultivated  their  land  badly  could 
be  compelled  to  cede  it  to  others  unless  they  improved  its 
cultivation.  By  careful  Government  regulation  efficiency 
was  enforced  in  every  direction.  Officials  could  only  be 
appointed  if  they  had  given  satisfactory  proof  of  their 
abihty,  and  people  of  the  middle  classes  were  allowed  to 
engage  in  industrial  and  professional  pursuits  only  if  they 
had  shown  their  capacity.  Quacks,  humbugs,  and  frauds 
of  every  kind,  who  flourish  so  greatly  among  Anglo-Saxon 
nations,  were  not  allowed  to  make  a  living  in  Prussia.  In 
all  professions,  in  all  callings,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest, 
efficiency  and  competence,  thoroughness  and  industry,  were 
required  and  were  enforced  by  appropriate  regulations  and 
laws.  The  nobility  were  given  great  privileges,  but  corre- 
sponding duties  were  required  of  them.  Appointments  were 
to  be  made  only  according  to  abihty  and  merit,  and  noble- 


EDUCATION  AND  NATIONAL  CHAKACTEE    167 

men  who  had  disgraced  themselves  or  had  not  done  their 
duty  towards  the  State,  could  be  deprived  of  their  title  and 
position  either  by  the  sovereign  or  by  the  law  courts.  Full 
rehgious  Hberty  was  granted,  but  no  rehgious  body  was 
allowed  to  encourage  hostility  to  the  State  or  to  promote 
immorahty,  for  the  Code  stated  : 

Every  citizen  must  be  allowed  complete  freedom  of 
religion  and  of  conscience. 

On  the  other  hand,  every  religious  body  is  obliged  to 
teach  its  members  fear  of  God,  obedience  to  the  laws, 
loyalty  towards  the  State,  and  moral  behaviour  towards 
the  citizens. 

Two  centuries  ago  the  Germans  were  a  nation  of  boors. 
They  were  poor,  ignorant,  backward,  and  undiscipHned. 
They  have  become  a  cultivated  and  a  powerful  nation  by 
the  training  which  they  received  from  their  ruler-statesmen, 
who  have  been  the  most  successful  educators,  in  the  widest 
sense  of  the  word,  which  the  world  has  seen.  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  may  learn  from  their  example. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  GERMAN  ARMY  AND  THE  GENERAL  STAFF 

The  success  of  an  army,  like  that  of  any  individual,  depends, 
in  the  first  place,  not  upon  its  brute  strength,  but  upon  its 
brain.  The  General  Staff  is  the  brain  of  an  army.  A 
General  Staff  in  some  form  or  other  has  existed  in  armies 
since  time  immemorial.  Cromwell  had  an  excellent 
General  Staff,  although  it  bore  a  different  name.  However, 
the  General  Staff  in  its  modern  and  most  perfect  form  is  a 
German  invention.  Count  von  Moltke's  greatest  merit 
consists  in  having  created  the  German  General  Staff  upon 
foundations  which  promised  to  ensure  its  permanent  use- 
fulness and  value. 

Unfortunately  no  English  books  on  military  affairs 
give  a  true  inside  view  of  the  wonderful  organisation  of  the 
German  General  Staff.  The  existing  military  literature 
deals  exclusively  with  its  outward  activities.  The  most 
valuable  account  existing  is  contained  in  the  confidential 
reports  which  Colonel  Stoffel,  who  was  the  military  attach^ 
of  France  in  Berlin  from  1866  to  1870,  sent  to  his  Govern- 
ment. As  that  book  has  not  been  translated  into  English, 
I  would  herewith  give  some  extracts  from  it  which  describe 
the  organisation  and  activities  of  the  German  General 
Staff: 

The  Great  General  Staff  in  Berlin  is  perfectly  organised 
for  the  training  of  oflBicers  and  for  serving  as  a  brain  to  the 
army.    At  its  headquarters  may  be  found  all  the  documents 

168 


GEEMAN  AEMY  AND  THE  GENEKAL  STAFF    169 

necessary  for  studying  the  different  European  armies  and 
the  countries  which  may  become  theatres  of  war.  All 
books,  military  journals,  pamphlets,  and  other  publications, 
maps,  charts,  &c.,  which  appear  anywhere  in  Europe  are 
collected  and  classified.  It  possesses  particularly  the  most 
complete  investigations  regarding  the  countries  bordering 
upon  Prussia.  A  special  feature  is  a  collection  of  the  most 
detailed  studies  regarding  the  resources  of  the  various 
countries,  their  geographical  features,  their  roads,  towns, 
and  villages,  their  population,  their  revenues,  their  water- 
courses, the  volume,  depth,  and  width  of  streams,  their 
points  of  passage,  &c.  Nothing  similarly  complete  exists 
in  France. 

It  must  be  proclaimed  very  loudly,  and  as  an  incontro 
vertible  truth,  that  the  Prussian  General  Staff  is  the  first 
and  foremost  in  Europe.  The  French  Staff  cannot  be  com- 
pared with  it.  I  have  unceasingly  pointed  this  out,  being 
convinced  that  if  there  should  be  an  early  war;  the  North 
German  Federation  would  derive  the  very  greatest  advan- 
tages from  its  General  Staff,  while  the  French  would  terribly 
regret  the  inferiority  of  theirs.  This  question  seems  to  me  to 
be  the  gravest  of  all.  I  do  not  wish  to  disguise  it,  and  my 
conviction  is  so  strong  that  I  raise  a  cry  of  alarm.  Caveant 
consules  !  I  should  not  do  my  duty  did  I  act  differently.  .  .  . 

General  von  Moltke  is  the  chief  of  the  staff,  and  he 
possesses  almost  absolute  powers.  He  chooses  the  ofi&cers 
who  are  to  be  admitted  and  to  be  employed  by  the  General 
Staff.  He  makes  the  promotions,  which  the  War  Minister 
merely  ratifies,  and  he  distributes  staff  officers  throughout 
the  army.  His  power  is  practically  unlimited,  and  his 
position,  which  would  appear  incomprehensible  in  France, 
appears  in  Prussia  only  natural,  because  the  integrity  and 
merit  of  von  Moltke  are  generally  recognised  in  that  country. 

Any  Heutenant  in  the  army,  after  three  years'  service 
with  his  regiment,  may  enter  the  War  Academy  (Kriegs- 
Akademie)  at  Berlin.  This  is  an  important  military  high 
school.  It  is  the  foremost  military  school  in  Europe  by 
the  character  of  the  teachers  and  by  that  of  the  tuition. 
It  is  not  merely  a  staff  school,  for  it  has  a  larger  aim.    Its 


170  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

object  is  to  familiarise  chosen  and  ambitious  officers  with 
the  higher  aspects  of  the  art  of  war  by  giving  them  a  training 
which  will  develop  their  intellectual  faculties,  and  which  wiU 
enable  them  to  become  good  staff  officers  and  prepare  them 
for  obtaining  a  high  command.  .  .  . 

Of  the  120  Heutenants  who  on  an  average  wish  to  join 
the  academy  every  year,  only  the  40  who  show  most 
abiHty  are  admitted.  They  are  selected  by  severe  examina- 
tions from  the  120  who  have  come  forward.  The  course  of 
the  study  extends  over  three  years;  and  it  continues  during 
nine  months  of  every  year.  During  the  remaining  three 
months  the  officers  rejoin  their  regiments  and  take  part 
in  the  autumn  manoeuvres.  In  the  third  year  the  pupils 
receive  their  training  in  actual  staff  duties  and  travel  during 
a  month  through  varied  country  under  the  guidance  of 
their  professors.  During  that  month  they  occupy  themselves 
with  reconnaissances,  practical  studies  of  the  ground,  mihtary 
map-making,  placing  camps  for  troops,  and  other  practical 
mihtary  problems.  .  .  . 

When  these  three  years  of  training  have  passed,  all  the 
lieutenants  are  sent  back  to  their  regiments,  and  the  professors 
and  the  director  of  the  academy  point  out  to  General  von 
Moltke  the  most  promising  and  the  most  zealous  pupils. 
Now  of  the  forty  officers  the  twelve  ablest  are  chosen,  and 
these  are  transferred  for  six  or  nine  months  to  a  regiment 
belonging  to  another  arm  than  that  with  which  they  have 
hitherto  been  acquainted.  Those  men  who  during  that 
new  stage  have  shown  the  necessary  zeal  and  ability  in 
their  new  surroundings  are  then  called  by  General  von 
Moltke  to  Berlin  to  serve  their  apprenticeship  on  the  General 
Staff.  However,  they  work  there  not  in  staff  officer's 
uniform,  but  in  their  regimental  uniform.  The  distinction 
of  being  allowed  to  wear  a  staff  officer's  uniform  is  not 
easily  obtained.  .  .  . 

The  one  or  two  years  which  the  officers  chosen  spend 
at  the  General  Staff  headquarters  in  Berlin,  learning  the 
practical  staff  business,  are  of  the  greatest  importance  to 
their  future  career,  for  they  attend  the  highest  mihtary 
training  school  of  the  country,  which  is  directed  by  General 


GEKMAN  AEMY  AND  THE  GENEEAL  STAFF  171 

von  Moltke  in  person.  By  personally  supervising  the 
training  of  the  young  officers,  von  Moltke  becomes  acquainted 
with  their  character,^  and  is  able  to  judge  of  their  abiHties. 
He  carefully  introduces  these  young  men  to  the  work  of 
each  of  the  departments  of  the  General  Staff,  and  in  addition 
he  deHvers  lectures  to  them.  He  orders  them  to  write 
essays  on  subjects  which  he  chooses  himself,  and  he  reads 
and  criticises  these  essays  before  the  assembled  officers. 
However,  in  doing  so  he  never  mentions  the  name  of  the 
author,  in  order  neither  to  hurt  the  feelings  of  the  unsuccessful 
nor  to  arouse  a  spirit  of  vanity  among  the  successful   .  .  . 

When  this  temporary  service  at  the  headquarters  of 
the  General  Staff,  which  is  a  kind  of  apprenticeship,  has 
been  completed.  General  von]  Moltke  chooses  secretly  those 
officers  with  whom  he  has  been  working  who  are  to  be 
appointed  to  the  General  Staff.  He  could,  of  course, 
immediately  appoint  those  Jwhom' he  considers  to  be  the 
most  competent.  However,  in  order  not  to  hurt  |the  feelings 
of  the  unsuccessful  men,  all  the  officers  who  have  served 
their  apprenticeship  are  indiscriminately  sent  back  to 
their  regiments,  where  they  resume  their  former  duties. 
The  less  gifted  are  left  there,  but  the  most  promising  ones 
are,  after  several  months'  practical  service,  promoted 
captains  over  the  heads  of  their  fellows,  and  are  given  the 
distinguishing  and  much-coveted  uniform  of  the  General 
Staff.  ... 

h  General  von  Moltke  employs  the  captains  who  have 
thus  been  chosen  according  to  his  discretion.  He  gives 
them  work  for  which  they  have  shown  particular  aptitude, 
and  he  sends  the  majority  of  the  men  to  the  staffs  of  the 
different  army  corps  in  the  provinces,  where  they  become 
acquainted  with  the  corps  duties.  The  Prussian  staff 
officers,  unhke  the  French,  are  not  permanently  tied  to 
their  desks.  They  are  not  occupied  all  the  time  with 
clerical  work,  for  all  this  is  left  to  non-commissioned  officers 
and  privates. 

In  being  chosen  for  the  General  Staff  the  officers  gain 
not  only  prestige,  but  obtain  at  the  same  time  substantial 
material  advantage,  for  by  being  promoted  captains,  they 


in         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

obtain  that  grade  from  six  to  eight  years  earlier  than  they 
would  have  obtained  it  in  the  ordinary  way.  .  .  . 

Out  of  the  120  promising  ofi&cers  who  on  an  average 
come  forward  every  year,  desiring  to  join  the  War  Academy, 
only  the  forty  ablest  are  admitted  after  severe  examinations, 
as  has  been  pointed  out,  and  of  these  forty  only  the  twelve 
most  capable  men  are  finally  chosen,  as  has  been  shown. 
However,  among  the  officers  who  have  not  come  forward 
to  study  at  the  War  Academy,  and  among  those  who  have 
attended  the  War  Academy  and  who  have  been  rejected, 
there  may  of  course  be  men  of  very  great  ability.  In  order 
that  these  should  be  discovered  and  employed  on  the  General 
Staff,  the  regimental  commanders  are  invited  to  propose 
every  year,  through  the  generals  commanding,  to  von  Moltke 
those  officers  who  have  shown  the  greatest  professional 
knowledge,  zeal,  and  aptitude.  The  commanders  of  regiments 
and  corps  are  of  course  anxious  to  discover  as  many  able 
officers  as  possible  in  their  commands,  and  to  recommend 
them  to  von  Moltke.  To  the  officers  who  have  thus  been 
recommended  to  him.  General  von  Moltke  sends  problems 
to  solve  and  questions  to  answer.  If  they  show  signs  of 
talent  and  of  abihty  in  carrying  out  the  tasks  which  von 
Moltke  gives  them,  he  calls  them  to  the  General  Staff  and 
employs  them  tentatively.  If  they  give  satisfaction,  they 
receive  permanent  appointments.  If  they  disappoint  him, 
they  are  sent  back  to  their  regiments.  .  .  . 

All  the  mechanical  staff  work  is  left  to  underlings. 
The  staff  officers  themselves  are  occupied  solely  with  the 
study  of  important  military  questions,  with  brain  work  of 
the  highest  importance.  Every  year  the  chief  of  the  staff 
of  each  army  corps  makes  with  all  the  staff  officers  a  so-called 
staff  journey  in  order  to  extend  their  knowledge.  On  that 
journey  practical  problems  of  war  are  treated.  The  officers 
of  the  Great  General  Staff  of  Berlin  make  every  year  a  simi- 
lar staff  journey,  which  is  conducted  by  General  von  Moltke 
himself  and  which  lasts  from  two  to  three  weeks.  .  .  . 

As  shown  by  the  details  given  in  the  foregoing,  the 
superiority  of  the  Prussian  General  Staff  over  the  staffs  of 
other  nations  is  due  firstly  to  the  careful  selection  of  the 


GEKMAN  AKMY  AND  THE  GENEEAL  STAFF  173 

staff  officers  from  all  the  officers  of  the  army,  for  all  officers 
may  compete  for  staff  appointments,  as  has  been  shown.  Its 
superiority  is  due,  in  the  second  place,  to  the  fact  that  only 
ambitious,  capable,  and  industrious  officers  will  come  forward, 
for  they  know  that  they  can  hope  to  succeed  in  obtaining 
a  staff  appointment  only  if  they  work  earnestly  and  with 
the  greatest  concentration,  for  they  are  aware  that  only  the 
ablest  will  be  selected — that  appointments  are  made  exclu- 
sively by  merit.  By  this  most  careful  selection;  and  by  the 
highest  professional  training  of  the  staff  officers,  Prussia 
has  secured  for  herself  the  foremost  body  of  staff  officers 
in  the  world.  The  more  frequently  I  compare  the  German 
staff  officers  with  the  French  staff  officers,  the  more  I  am 
struck  with  the  superiority  of  the  former. 

It  has  been  said  that  genius  is  an  infinite  capacity  of 
taking  pains.  Count  von  Moltke  was  a  most  painstaking 
and  conscientious  worker.  By  infinite  application  and  by 
unremitting  labour,  he  succeeded  by  the  means  described 
to  select  from  the  large  body  of  the  German  officers 
practically  all  the  best  men  and  training  them  in  their 
duties.  The  great  successes  which  the  German  army  has 
obtained  in  1866,  in  1870-71,  in  the  present  war,  are  chiefly 
attributable  to  the  General  Staff,  which  has  been  the  brain 
of  the  army  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  which  has  trained 
the  commanders.  Other  nations  may  learn  from  Germany's 
example.  The  methods  practised  by  von  Moltke  are  of 
course  applicable  not  only  to  the  army,  but  to  every  Govern- 
ment department  and  to  every  large  commercial 
organisation. 


CHAPTEE  VI 

THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR^ 

Wars  are  due  to  direct  and  indirect  causes,  and,  as  a  rule, 
the  latter  are  far  more  potent  than  the  former.    Hence; 
incidents  which  are  small,  if  not  trivial,  in  themselves  often 
bring  about  a  long  and  universally  expected  outbreak  of 
hostilities.      The    Franco-German    War    of    1870-71,    for 
instance,  was  not  caused  by  Bismarck's  alteration  of  the 
Ems  telegram,  but  by  the  pent-up  and  century-old  hatred 
existing  between  France  and  Germany,  by  the  passionate 
desire  of  the  German  States  to  form  a  united  Empire,  and 
by  the  determination  of  Napoleon  the  Third  to  prevent  such 
a  union  and  to  dominate  and  rule  the  continent  of  Europe. 
The   aims   of   France   and   Germany   were   incompatible. 
The  deep-seated  Franco-German  differences  had  produced 
a  state  of  tension  and  bitterness  between  the  two  nations 
which  made  war  inevitable,  and  the  blustering,  blundering, 
and  interfering  policy  of  Napoleon  the  Third  had  intensi- 
fied and  accelerated  matters  and  brought  them  to  a  crisis. 
The  Ems  telegram  was  merely  the  last  straw.    The  outbreak 
of  the  present  war  had  been  expected  for  a  long  time.    It 
was  overdue,  and  it  did  not  take  the  world  by  surprise. 
The  tension  among  the  Great  Powers  had  increased  during 
many  years.    Long  ago  the  breaking-point  had  been  reached, 
and  when  it  was  seen  that  the  dreaded  hour  had  actually 
arrived,  many  people  exclaimed,  almost  with  rehef  :  At  last ! 

1  From  The  Fortnightly  Review,  September  1914. 
174 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAK  175 

Exactly  as  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco- German  War  of 
1870-71  was  rather  due  to  Napoleon's  folly  than  to  Bis- 
marck's genius,  even  so  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war 
is  due  chiefly  to  the  ambition,  the  self-confidence,  and  the 
insufficient  capacity  of  the  German  Emperor,  who  has 
played  the  part  of  Napoleon  the  Third  in  almost  every 
particular. 

When  William  the  Second  came  to  the  throne  Germany 
dominated  the  continent  of  Europe,  and  her  preponderant 
position  was  willingly  borne,  because  she  was  believed  to 
be  peaceful  and  contented.  With  the  advent  of  WilHam 
the  Second  the  character  of  her  foreign  policy  changed 
completely.  He  dismissed  his  Chancellor,  undertook  the 
direction  of  Germany's  foreign  policy,  and  announced 
that  he  would  steer  the  ship  of  State  over  a  new  course, 
his  own  course.  He  imparted  to  Germany's  policy  his  own 
nervous  restlessness.  Germany  began  to  interfere  in  every 
quarter  of  the  world,  and  to  pick  unnecessary  quarrels, 
not  only  with  her  great  neighbour-States,  but  with  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  as  well.  Even  the  small 
States  bordering  upon  Germany  and  Germany's  own  allies 
became  uneasy  and  alarmed  at  the  Emperor's  unceasing, 
neurotic,  and  dangerous  activity.  Everywhere  Germany's 
policy  became  disliked  and  suspected. 

During  the  reign  of  William  the  Second  one  great  crisis 
in  the  affairs  of  Europe  followed  another.  Owing  to  his 
feverish  interference  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  the  great 
nations  were  dragged  repeatedly  to  the  very  brink  of  a 
world-war.  Since  1888  the  mihtary  and  naval  forces  of 
Germany  were  increased  at  an  unprecedented  rate,  and  all 
Europe  and  the  United  States  had  to  follow  suit.  Year 
by  year  the  armament  race  became  more  furious,  more 
exasperating,  and  more  unbearable,  and  even  the  small 
and  peaceful  neutral  States,  feeling  alarmed  at  Germany's 
diplomatic  and  military  activities,  felt  compelled  to  arm  to 
the  utmost.    In  Bismarck's  time,  Germany  had  been  the 


176    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

nucleus  of  a  great  peace  group  of  nations,  and  Germany's 
probable  opponents  were  isolated.  Under  the  regime  of 
William  the  Second  the  grouping  of  Europe  changed  com- 
pletely. The  nations  threatened  by  the  Emperor's  un- 
ceasing activity  felt  insecure  in  their  isolation.  A  strong 
group  of  Powers  opposed  to  Germany's  expansion,  or 
rather  to  the  Emperor's  policy,  arose.  Germany  became 
virtually  isolated. 

Bismarck  had  wisely  followed  a  policy  of  concentration, 
a  purely  continental  policy.  He  was  anxious  to  be  able 
to  rely  on  British  support  in  case  of  a  great  national  emer- 
gency. WiUiam  the  Second  threw  Bismarck's  wise  caution 
rashly  to  the  wind.  Not  being  satisfied  with  Germany's 
great  position,  not  being  satisfied  with  the  fact  that  Germany 
dominated  the  land,  he  wished  her  to  dominate  the  sea 
as  well.  In  resounding  phrases,  such  as  '  Germany's 
future  hes  upon  the  water,'  '  The  trident  must  be  in  our 
fist,'  and  many  similar  ones,  he  announced  his  determination 
to  his  people  and  to  the  world. 

Encouraged  by  the  most  influential  circles,  and  aided 
by  the  official  apparatus,  an  anti-British  agitation  was 
created  throughout  Germany.  In  1895  the  Kruger  telegram 
and  the  diplomatic  campaign  connected  with  it  clearly 
revealed  Germany's  intentions.  In  autumn  1899  the 
Boer  War  broke  out,  and  the  German  Government  con- 
firmed by  its  action  its  anti-British  attitude.  The  occasion 
of  the  Boer  War  and  of  England's  initial  defeats  was  used 
for  denouncing  this  country  by  an  unscrupulous  campaign 
of  vituperation  and  calumny,  and  for  demanding  an  enormous 
increase  of  the  German  fleet.  Many  Germans  beUeved 
that  the  sun  of  Great  Britain  had  begun  to  set,  and  they 
wished  Germany  to  become  her  successor.  On  the  day  of 
the  disaster  of  Magersfontein,  on  December  11,  1899,  Prince 
Billow,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
significantly  said  in  the  Keichstag,  in  support  of  an  immensely 
increased  naval  programme : 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAE  177 

The  necessity  to  strengthen  our  fleet  arises  out  of  the 
present  state  of  the  world,  and  out  of  the  circumstances 
of  our  oversea  policy.  Only  two  years  ago  no  one  would 
have  been  able  to  foresee  the  way  in  which  things  have  begun 
to  move.  It  is  urgent  to  define  the  attitude  which  we  have 
to  take  up  in  view  of  what  is  happening.  .  .  .  We  must 
create  a  fleet  strong  enough  to  exclude  attack  from  any 
Power. 

A  fortnight  after  the  disaster  at  Spionkop,  Admiral 
Tirpitz,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Imperial  Navy, 
stated  :  *  We  do  not  know  what  adversary  we  may  have 
to  face.  We  must  therefore  arm  ourselves  with  a  view  to 
meeting  the  most  dangerous  naval  conflict  possible.' 

In  spring  1900,  while  the  Boer  War  was  still  in  progress, 
and  its  issue  extremely  doubtful,  the  German  Government 
brought  out  an  enormous  navy  bill.  In  its  preamble  the 
German  Government  clearly  showed  that  it  desired  to 
challenge  Great  Britain's  naval  supremacy,  for  in  it  we 
read  the  ominous  words  : — 

Germany  requires  a  fleet  of  such  strength  that  a  war 
with  the  mightiest  naval  Power  would  involve  risks  jeo- 
pardising the  supremacy  of  that  Power. 

It  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that  the  German  fleet 
should  be  as  strong  as  that  of  the  greatest  sea  Power, 
because,  generally,  a  great  sea  Power  will  not  be  able  to 
concentrate  all  its  forces  against  Germany.  But  even  if 
it  should  succeed  in  confronting  us  in  superior  force,  the 
enemy  would  be  so  very  much  weakened  in  overcoming  the 
resistance  of  a  strong  German  fleet  that,  notwithstanding 
the  victory  gained,  the  enemy's  naval  supremacy  would 
no  longer  be  secured  by  the  possession  of  a  sufficient  fleet. 

The  German  Press  is  largely  controlled,  or  inspired, 
by  the  German  Government,  and  the  Government  is  so 
powerful  that  it  is  able  to  exercise,  in  various  ways,  control 
over  German  hterature  and  over  the  activity  of  public 
speakers  and  lecturers.    With  the  evident  approval  of  the 


178  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Government,  the  old  anti-British  campaign  was  extended 
to  the  utmost.  Hundreds  of  University  professors,  generals, 
and  admirals  were  encouraged  to  preach  on  public  platforms 
and  in  countless  books,  pamphlets,  and  articles,  Britanniam 
esse  delendam.  They  preached  that  Great  Britain  was  a 
faithless  and  a  decaying  nation  and  Germany's  hereditary 
enemy,  that  Germany  was  destined  to  rule  the  sea  and  to 
rule  the  world.  Mr.  Eisenhart  wrote  in  his  book,  '  Deutsch- 
land  beim  Beginn  des  Zwanzigsten  Jahrhunderts,'  Berlin, 
1900: 

We  consider  a  great  war  with  England  in  the  twentieth 
century  as  quite  inevitable,  and  must  strain  every  fibre 
in  order  to  be  prepared  to  fight  that  war  single-handed. 
The  experience  of  all  time  shows  that  colonial  empires 
are  more  fragile  and  less  enduring  than  continental  ones. 
We  do  not  require  a  fleet  against  France  or  Kussia.  Let 
them  ravage  our  coasts  in  case  of  war.  We  require  a  fleet 
only  against  England. 

The  Koloniale  Zeitschrift  wrote  on  January  18,  1900  : 

The  old  century  saw  a  German  Europe.  The  new  one 
shall  see  a  German  world.  To  attain  that  consummation 
two  duties  are  required  from  the  present  German  genera- 
tion :  to  keep  its  own  counsel  and  to  create  a  powerful 
fleet. 

Field-Marshal  General  Colmar  von  der  Goltz,  a  leading 
German  soldier,  wrote  in  the  Deutsche  Bundschau  of 
March  1900 : 

We  must  contradict  the  frequently  expressed  opinion 
that  a  war  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain  is  impos- 
sible. Great  Britain  is  forced  to  distribute  her  fleets  over 
many  seas  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  In  that  necessary 
distribution  lies  her  weakness.  Germany  is  in  a  better 
position.  .  .  . 

As  places  are  not  wanting  where  the  English  defences 
are  weak,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  consider  a  landing  in 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAK  179 

England  a  chimera.  The  distance  is  short  enough  if  a 
daring  admiral  succeeds  in  securing  supremacy  on  the  sea 
for  a  short  time.  The  material  basis  of  our  power  is  large 
enough  to  enable  us  to  destroy  the  present  superiority  of 
Great  Britain. 

I  ^^  Innumerable  quotations  of  similar  character  could 
easily  be  given.^ 

When,  after  various  diplomatic  defeats  and  the 
humihating  issue  of  the  Mexican  adventure,  the  prestige 
of  Napoleon  the  Third  and  of  Imperial  France  had  dechned 
to  the  utmost,  when  the  Emperor  of  the  French  had  ahenated 
all  Europe  and  the  majority  of  the  French  people,  he  desired 
to  strengthen  his  position  by  a  successful  war,  and  he  rushed 
into  Bismarck's  trap.  In  case  of  a  war  with  Prussia  he  had 
counted  upon  the  support  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Denmark, 
whom  the  Prussians  had  defeated  and  despoiled,  and  upon 
that  of  Italy,  who  owed  her  freedom  to  France.  However, 
Napoleon  the  Third,  hke  William  the  Second,  was  his  own 
Foreign  Minister,  and  was  unable  to  pursue  a  consistent 
policy.  Guiding  the  poUcy  of  the  State  over  the  heads, 
or  behind  the  backs,  of  his  Ministers,  he  had  managed 
France's  foreign  poHcy  so  badly  that  none  of  the  three 
Powers  upon  whose  support  he  had  firmly  counted  was 
wilUng  to  help  him.  The  hour  of  need  found  him  without 
a  friend. 

At  the  beginning  of  his  reign,  when  WilHam  the  Second 
promised  that  he  would  steer  the  German  ship  of  State  on  a 
new  course,  that  his  course  was  the  right  one,  and  that  he 
would  lead  Germany  towards  a  great  and  glorious  future, 
he  was  beheved  in  by  all  German  patriots.  But  when 
failure  followed  failure,  when  it  was  seen  that  England, 
France,  and  Italy  greatly  increased  their  possessions  while 
Germany  merely  retained  her  old  territories,  and  when 
opportunity  after  opportunity  for  Germany's  expansion 
was  allowed  to  go  by  unused,  the  people  surrounding  the 
Monarch  became  exasperated.    In  the  highest  mihtary  and 

n2 


180  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

aristocratic  circles  William  the  Second  was  spoken  of  with 
contempt  as  a  bungling  braggart.  After  the  second  Morocco 
crisis  the  Post,  an  ultra-patriotic  Berhn  journal,  actually- 
referred  to  the  Emperor  as  a  *  foltron  miserable,'  quoting 
with  approval  a  French  journal.  Even  the  Crown  Prince 
revolted  against  his  father  and  his  father's  policy,  and  he 
openly  showed  his  contempt  for  it.  It  is  conceivable, 
and  indeed  probable,  that  the  state  of  mind  of  Wilham  the 
Second  in  1914  was  similar  to  that  of  Napoleon  the  Third 
in  1870.    Humiliated  and  ambitious  rulers  are  dangerous. 

During  more  than  a  century  Austria-Hungary  has 
striven  to  prevent  Russia  seizing  Constantinople  and  to 
acquire  Salonica  for  herself.  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
allowed  the  Balkan  War  to  break  out  in  the  firm  expecta- 
tion that  it  would  result  in  the  victory  of  Turkey  and  the 
defeat  of  the  Slavonic  Balkan  States,  to  the  great  advantage 
of  the  two  Germanic  States,  which  were  Turkey's  protectors, 
and  which  reckoned  upon  Turkey's  support  against  Russia 
in  case  of  a  great  war.  The  victories  of  the  AlHes  caused 
consternation  and  dismay  in  Berlin,  and  especially  in 
Vienna,  which  is  more  directly  interested  in  Balkan  affairs. 
Hence  Austrian  diplomacy  endeavoured  to  weaken  the 
Balkan  States  by  sowing  dissension  among  them.  With 
this  object  in  view,  Austria-Hungary  forbade  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  to  acquire  a  harbour  on  the  Adriatic,  created 
an  independent  State  of  Albania  out  of  the  territory  acquired 
by  the  Allies,  brought  about  the  second  Balkan  War,  and 
repeatedly  threatened  Montenegro  and  Serbia  with  war, 
although  she  knew  that  Russia  would  never  tolerate  an 
Austrian  attack  upon  Serbia.  From  a  despatch  of  Sir 
G.  Buchanan,  the  British  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg, 
published  in  the  '  Correspondence  respecting  the  European 
Crisis,'  No.  6  (1914),  we  learn :  *  During  the  Balkan  crisis 
M.  Sazonoff  had  made  it  clear  to  the  Austrian  Government 
that  war  with  Russia  must  immediately  follow  an  Austrian 
attack  on  Serbia.    It  was  clear  that  Austrian  domination 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR  181 

of  Serbia  was  as  intolerable  to  Russia  as  the  dependence 
of  the  Netherlands  on  Germany  would  be  to  Great  Britain. 
It  was,  in  fact,  for  Russia  a  question  of  life  and  death.' 
When,  during  the  Balkan  settlement,  Austria  was  on  the 
point  of  attacking  Serbia,  the  late  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand,  who  was  in  favour  of  a  vigorous  foreign  policy, 
went  on  a  flying  visit  to  Springe  to  plead  for  the  German 
Emperor's  support  in  case  of  a  collision  with  Russia,  but, 
to  the  disgust  and  sorrow  of  the  German  mihtary  party,  the 
Emperor  declined  to  help  him. 

The  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  the  foremost 
statesmen  of  Austria-Hungary  were  foiled  for  a  time,  but 
they  hoped  to  find  an  opportunity  for  crushing  Serbia; 
acquiring  Albania,  and  opening  to  the  Dual  Monarchy  a 
road  to  the  coveted  port  of  Salonica.  A  few  weeks  before 
the  Archduke's  murder,  William  the  Second  visited  him 
at  his  castle  of  Konopischt  in  Bohemia.  Ostensibly  the 
Emperor  visited  the  Archduke  merely  in  order  to  see  his 
celebrated  rose-gardens.  However,  it  soon  leaked  out  that 
at  Konopischt  a  secret  treaty  had  been  concluded  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and  it  seemed  highly 
probable  that  at  that  castle  the  German  Emperor  reversed 
his  former  policy,  and  pledged  himself  unconditionally  to 
support  Austria-Hungary  with  Germany's  entire  strength 
if  Austria-Hungary  should  attack  Serbia  and  should  in 
turn  be  attacked  by  Russia. 

What  was  the  reason  of  the  Emperor's  change  of  poHcy  ? 
The  morbid  instability  of  the  German  Emperor's 
character  is  perhaps  a  sufficient  explanation  for  his  change 
of  front.  Under  William  the  Second  Germany's  policy 
has  been  as  incalculable  and  as  unstable  as  was  the  poHcy 
of  France  under  Napoleon  the  Third.  Besides,  during  the 
last  few  years  many  of  the  most  eminent  German  soldiers 
and  thinkers  had  taught  that  Germany  required  elbow-room  ; 
that  the  European  balance  of  power  hampered  her  expan- 
sion ;   that  a  war  between  the  Triple  AUiance  on  the  one 


182    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

hand  and  France  and  Eussia  on  the  other  was  inevitable ; 
that  the  moment  was  favourable ;  that  Germany  should 
strike  before  Eussia  had  entirely  recovered  from  her  defeats 
in  Asia,  and  had  completed  her  great  army  reorganisation. 

In  the  event  of  a  war  with  France  and  Eussia,  the  atti- 
tude of  Great  Britain  was,  of  course,  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance to  Germany.  Her  action  might  prove  to  be  the  decisive 
factor  in  such  a  war.  Italy  is  most  vuhierable  by  sea,  for 
her  principal  towns  lie  on  the  seashore,  and  afford  ideal 
targets  to  naval  gunners.  She  has  an  immense  coast-line, 
and  her  principal  railroads  run  close  to  the  sea  over  countless 
viaducts  and  bridges,  and  through  hundreds  of  tunnels 
which  may  be  destroyed  from  the  sea  by  a  few  carefully 
aimed  twelve-inch  shells.  Last,  but  not  least,  Italy  is 
economically  at  least  as  dependent  upon  her  maritime  trade 
as  is  Great  Britain.  It  was,  therefore,  obvious  that  Germany 
and  Austria  could  expect  Italy's  support  in  case  of  war 
only  if  Great  Britain  was  friendly  or  neutral.  In  these 
circumstances  it  was  obviously  essential  that  a  war  should 
break  out  in  respect  of  an  object  in  which  Great  Britain 
had  no  direct  interest.  As  there  was  no  defensive  alliance 
between  Great  Britain  on  the  one  side,  and  France  and 
Eussia  on  the  other,  but  only  a  loose  Entente,  it  was  firmly 
expected  that  Great  Britain  would  remain  neutral  as  long 
as  her  own  interests  were  not  touched.  This  was  beheved 
all  the  more  strongly  as  Great  Britain  was  generally  thought 
to  be  an  unreliable  Power  in  case  of  war.  Very  likely  the 
Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  the  supporters  of  his  policy 
persuaded  the  German  Emperor  that  Great  Britain  might 
conceivably  not  lift  a  hand  in  the  defence  of  Serbia.  The 
problem,  therefore,  was  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  Serbia  in 
which  Serbia  would  appear  to  be  in  the  wrong.  If  Great 
Britain  should  not  assist  France  and  Eussia,  Italy  could 
safely  aid  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and  would 
probably  do  so  in  the  hope  of  territorial  aggrandisement. 
^An  attack  of  Austria-Hungary  upon  Serbia  might  lead 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAE  183 

to  a  war  between  the  Central  European  Powers  on  the  one 
side,  and  France  and  Eussia  on  the  other.  However,  it 
was  not  certain  whether  Kussia  was  willing  to  take  Serbia's 
part.  Conceivably,  Kussia  had  only  been  bluffing  when  she 
informed  Austria  that  an  attack  on  Serbia  would  be  equiva- 
lent to  an  attack  on  Kussia  herself.  If  Austria-Hungary 
should  succeed  in  smashing  Serbia  without  being  involved 
in  a  war  with  Kussia,  the  position  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
would  be  immensely  strengthened,  for  Russia's  prestige 
among  the  Balkan  Slavs  and  among  the  Slavs  of  Austria- 
Hungary  would  have  received  a  most  deadly  blow.  With 
very  little  bloodshed  the  Triple  Alliance  would  have  firmly 
established  its  supremacy  on  the  Continent.  If  Kussia, 
after  all  her  threats,  was  not  ready  to  go  to  war  for  Serbia, 
she  would  probably  also  not  go  to  war  if  Salonica  was  taken 
by  easy  stages.  If  Kussia  was  merely  bluffing,  the  two 
Germanic  Powers  had  a  chance  of  establishing  their  hege- 
mony over  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  over  Constantinople 
itself.  Much  evidence  goes  to  show  that  the  leaders  of 
Germany's  foreign  policy,  and  especially  the  Emperor, 
firmly  calculated  upon  Kussia's  unreadiness.  Their  hopes 
were  apparently  imparted  to  the  Ambassadors,  and  the 
German  Ambassadors,  considering  themselves  rather  the 
Emperor's  servants  than  the  servants  of  their  country; 
humoured  the  Imperial  views  as  to  Kussia's  unreadiness, 
as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  pages. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  Konopischt  interview  the  Arch- 
duke was  murdered  by  Austrian  citizens  of  Servian  race. 
Austria-Hungary  took  the  blow  surprisingly  quietly. 
Inquirers  demanding  to  know  what  the  Government  pro- 
posed to  do  were  merely  told  that  a  judicial  inquiry  was 
taking  place,  and  that,  of  course,  nothing  could  be  done 
until  the  mystery  surrounding  the  crime  had  been  cleared 
up.  Nobody  in  authority  in  Austria-Hungary  seemed 
seriously  concerned,  nobody  seemed  to  expect  that  dangerous 
complications  might  follow.    On  July  10  a  well-informed 


184         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Austrian  diplomat  casually  told  an  English  acquaintance 
that  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  would  cause  no  trouble 
with  Serbia,  and  certainly  no  war.  On  July  20  Sir  Edward 
Grey  wrote  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Berlin  :  *  I  asked  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  if  he 
had  any  news  of  what  was  going  on  in  Vienna  with  regard 
to  Serbia.  He  said  he  had  not,  but  Austria  was  certainly 
going  to  take  some  step,  and  he  regarded  the  situation  as 
very  uncomfortable.  I  said  that  I  had  not  heard  anything 
recently  except  that  Count  Berchtold,  in  speaking  to  the 
Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  had  deprecated  the  suggestion 
that  the  situation  was  grave,  but  had  said  that  it  should  be 
cleared  up.'  Three  days  later,  on  July  23,  Austria-Hungary 
addressed  to  Serbia  an  unacceptable  ultimatum,  which 
brought  on  the  present  war ! 

What  had  happened  in  the  meantime  ? 

The  Times  of  July  25  contained  side  by  side  two  equally 
startling  articles,  one  concerning  the  breakdown  of  the 
Buckingham  Palace  Conference,  and  the  other  giving 
the  astonishing  demands  addressed  by  Austria-Hungary  to 
Serbia.  There  is  apparently  some  connection  between  the 
two.  It  has  been  shown  before  that  Great  Britain's  attitude 
was  of  the  very  greatest  importance  to  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary,  in  case  the  Austro-Serbian  trouble  should 
lead  to  a  war  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  France  and 
Kuissia.  A  few  days  before  the  Serbian  ultimatum  was 
despatched,  when  Count  Berchtold  told  the  Italian  Ambas- 
sador that  the  situation  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Serbia  was  not  grave,  there  was  reason  to  hope  that  the 
Buckingham  Palace  Conference  might  lead  to  a  settlement 
by  consent,  and  to  a  lasting  peace,  in  Ireland.  By  July  23 
all  hope  of  such  a  settlement  was  abandoned.  Civil  war 
in  Ireland,  and  perhaps  in  Great  Britain  as  well,  laming  the 
power  of  the  United  Kingdom  for  action  abroad,  seemed 
imminent  and  unavoidable. 

Austria's  ultimatum  was  couched  in  the  most  abrupt 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAK  185 

and  threatening  language.  Without  offering  a  scrap  of 
evidence  that  the  Serbian  Government  was  directly  or 
indirectly  responsible  for  the  Archduke's  murder,  it  requested 
within  forty-eight  hours  the  fulfilment  of  absolutely  impos- 
sible demands.  Within  forty-eight  hours  Serbia  was  to 
destroy  both  her  national  independence  and  her  constitution. 
Even  if  Serbia  had  been  willing  to  concede  all  Austria  asked 
for,  she  could  have  done  so  only  by  passing  legislation  for 
which  forty-eight  hours  would  have  been  totally  insulB&cient. 
Austria's  demands  were  obviously  meant  to  be  unacceptable, 
and  to  make  war  inevitable.  On  July  25  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  from  Vienna  :  '  Language 
of  Press  this  morning  leaves  the  impression  that  the  surrender 
of  Serbia  is  neither  expected  nor  really  desired.'  On  July  27 
he  wired  :  *  The  impression  left  on  my  mind  is  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Note  was  so  drawn  up  as  to  make  war 
inevitable.' 

Austria  has  for  many  decades  followed  a  timorous  and 
hesitating  policy,  a  policy  of  inaction  and  of  surrender. 
During  the  recent  crisis  she  has  acted  with  energy  for  the 
first  time  since  Francis  Joseph  came  to  the  throne.  That 
unusual  and  positively  reckless  energy  was  imdoubtedly 
caused  by  the  knowledge  that  she  coiQd  absolutely  rely  on 
Germany's  aid,  should  an  attack  on  Serbia  be  followed 
by  complications  with  Eussia.  It  is  perfectly  clear  that 
Austria  acted  not  by  her  own  volition,  but  as  Germany's 
agent.  In  the  words  of  M.  Sazonoff,  reported  by  the 
British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg :  *  Austria  would 
never  have  taken  such  action  unless  Germany  had  first 
been  consulted.'  The  Kussian  Ambassador  in  Vienna 
stated  that  '  any  action  taken  by  Austria  to  humiliate 
Serbia  could  not  leave  Eussia  indifferent.'  *  If  actual  war 
broke  out  with  Serbia  it  would  be  impossible  to  locahse  it, 
for  Eussia  was  not  prepared  to  give  way  again  as  she  had 
done  on  previous  occasions,  especially  during  the  annexation 
crisis  of  1909.'    The  Eussian  charge  d'affaires  remarked 


186  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

to  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  '  the 
Austrian  Note  was  drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering  it  im- 
possible of  acceptance  as  it  stood.'  Austria-Hungary 
evidently  sought  a  war  with  Serbia,  knowing  full  well  that 
it  might  lead  to  a  war  with  Kussia.  Her  action  was  fully 
understood  in  St.  Petersburg.  On  July  25  Sir  G.  Buchanan 
reported  by  telegram  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  conversation 
which  he  had  with  the  Eussian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
In  the  course  of  it  the  Minister  stated  :  '  Austria's  action 
was  in  reality  directed  against  Kussia.  She  aimed  at 
overthrowing  the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  and 
establishing  her  hegemony  there.' 

Austria  evidently  did  not  intend  to  restrict  herself 
to  punishing  Serbia  for  her  unproved  complicity  in  the 
Archduke's  murder.  On  July  25  Sir  E.  Eodd  reported 
from  Eome  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  by  telegram :  *  There  is 
reliable  information  that  Austria  intends  to  seize  the  Salonica 
railway.'  That  view  prevailed  not  only  in  Italy.  A  few 
days  later  Mr.  Beaumont  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
from  Constantinople  :  *  I  understand  that  the  designs  of 
Austria  may  extend  considerably  beyond  the  Sanjak  and 
a  punitive  occupation  of  Serbian  territory.  I  gathered 
this  from  a  remark  let  fall  by  fche  Austrian  Ambassador 
here,  who  spoke  of  the  deplorable  economic  situation  of 
Salonica  under  Greek  administration  and  of  the  assistance 
on  which  the  Austrian  Army  could  count  from  Mussulman 
population  discontented  with  Serbian  rule.' 

Fate  seemed  to  favour  Austria  and  her  partner  Germany. 
The  Austrian  ultimatum  expired  on  Saturday  the  25th 
at  6  o'clock  in  the  evening.  On  Sunday,  July  26,  a  collision 
occurred  in  Dubhn  between  Nationalist  gun-runners  and 
British  soldiers.  Several  Nationalists  were  killed  and  many 
wounded.  The  sensation  was  enormous.  In  Nationalist 
Ireland  a  spirit  of  fierce  hatred  arose  against  England 
and  against  Ulster.  Conciliation  between  Nationalists  and 
Orangemen  seemed  out  of  the  question.    The  outlook  for 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAK  187 

the"^ Amending  Bill,  which  was  intended  to  pacify  Ulster  by 
securing  her  independence  from  Dublin,  seemed  hopeless. 
Great  Britain  was  simultaneously  threatened  with  civil 
war,  with  a  revolt  of  the  Nationalists  against  the  Govern- 
ment, and  with  a  split  in  the  Cabinet.  England's  right 
arm  seemed  paralysed. 

P'  On  the  very  day  of  the  Dublin  bloodshed,  the  German 
Emperor  suddenly  returned  from  his  cruise.  In  document 
No.  33  of  the  White  Book,  from  which  the  numerous  quota- 
tions given  in  this  chapter  have  been  taken,  we  read  a 
telegram  from  Sir  H.  Rumbold  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  stating  : 
*  Emperor  returned  suddenly  to-night,  and  Under-Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  says  that  Foreign  Office  regrets 
this  step  which  was  taken  on  His  Majesty's  own  initiative.' 
The  high  officials  of  the  German  Foreign  Office  regretted 
the  Emperor's  arrival  apparently  because  they  did  not 
approve  of  the  policy  which  William  the  Second,  as,  before 
him,  Napoleon  the  Third,  carried  on  over  the  heads  of  the 
responsible  officials.  Careful  study  of  the  White  Book 
reveals  the  fact  that  the  policy  which  led  to  the  war  was 
carried  on  by  the  Emperor  at  the  instigation,  and  with  the 
assistance  of,  the  military  war  party,  and  of  certain  Am- 
bassadors against  the  opinion  of  the  leading  men  at  the 
German  Foreign  Office  who,  despairingly  but  unsuccessfully, 
endeavoured  to  prevent  the  worst. 

Throughout  the  White  Book  we  find  evidence  that  the 
German  Chancellor  and  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  did  their  utmost  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
Europe,  but  that  their  action  was  overruled  by  the  rashness 
of  their  master.  To  start  with,  the  deadly  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, which  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  war,  was 
apparently  known  and  approved  of  by  the  Emperor,  but 
was  quite  unknown  to  the  Foreign  Office.  On  July  25  Sir 
H.  Rumbold  telegraphed  from  Berlin  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
that  he  had  seen  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,    who    had    *  confessed    privately   that    the    Note 


188  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

(presented  to  Serbia)  left  much  to  be  desired  as  a  diplomatic 
document.    He  repeated  very  earnestly  that,  though  he 
had  been  accused  of  knowing  all  about  the  contents  of  that 
Note,  he  had,  in  fact,  had  no  such  knowledge.'     On  the 
same  day  Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  H.  Kumbold  : 
*  The  German  Ambassador  read  me  a  telegram  from  the 
German  Foreign  Office  saying  that  his  Government  had 
not  known  beforehand,  and  had  no  more  than  other  Powers 
to  do  with  the  stiff  terms  of  the  Austrian  Note  to  Serbia.* 
Five  days  later,  on  July  30,  Sir  M.  de  Bimsen  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  from  Vienna  :    '  Although  I  am  not 
able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  information  that  the  German 
Ambassador  (in  Vienna)  knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  before  it  was  despatched   and  tele- 
graphed it  to  the  German  Emperor.    1  know  from  the 
German  Ambassador  himself  that  he  endorses  every  line 
of  it.'    Apparently  the  fatal  ultimatum  was  drafted  by  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Office  with  the  collaboration  of  the  German 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  and  of  the  German  Emperor,  but 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Foreign  Office  in  Berhn  and 
of  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  ! 

Unfortunately,  the  German  Emperor  is  his  own  Chan- 
cellor and  his  own  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
He  has  very  frequently  appointed  favourites  to  high  posi- 
tions and  dismissed  able  men,  because  they  lacked  the 
courtier's  qualifications.  The  German  Ambassadors  are 
appointed  by  the  Emperor,  and  it  is  not  unnatural  that 
men  who  owe  their  position  to  the  Emperor's  good- will,  and 
who  know  his  character,  rather  report  what  is  Hkely  to  please 
their  master  than  what  is  true  and  useful  to  Germany. 
William  the  Second  has  been  extremely  unfortunate  in 
the  choice  of  his  Ambassadors,  and  herein  Hes  the  reason 
that  Germany  has  habitually  been  completely  misinformed 
as  to  the  policy  of  foreign  countries,  and  as  to  their  attitude 
in  certain  contingencies.  Owing  to  the  insufficient  capacity 
of  her  Ambassadors,  Germany  was  totally  misinformed  as 


THE  CAUSES  OP  THE  WAB  189 

to  the  attitude  which  Eussia,  France,  and  Great  Britain 
were  likely  to  adopt  if  Austria  should  make  war  on  Serbia. 
Owing  to  false  but  pleasing  reports  sent  to  BerUn,  the 
leaders  of  Germany's  foreign  policy  believed  that  Eussia 
would  keep  quiet  if  Serbia  was  struck  down,  that  France 
was  not  ready,  and  that,  in  any  case.  Great  Britain  would 
remain  neutral.  On  July  26  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Vienna  reported  to  Sir  Edward  Grey :  *  According  to  con- 
fident behef  of  German  Ambassador,  Eussia  will  keep  quiet 
during  chastisement  of  Serbia,  which  Austria-Hungary  is 
resolved  to  inflict.  .  .  .  France,  too,  was  not  at  all  in  a 
condition  for  facing  a  war.  ...  As  for  Germany,  she  knew 
very  well  what  she  was  about  in  backing  up  Austria-Hungary 
in  this  matter.'  On  July  30  he  telegraphed  :  *  Unfortu- 
nately, the  German  Ambassador  is  himself  so  identified 
with  extreme  anti-Eussian  and  anti-Serbian  feeling  pre- 
valent in  Vienna  that  he  is  unlikely  to  plead  the  cause  of 
peace  with  entire  sincerity.'  On  August  1  the  British 
Ambassador  wired  :  *  I  agree  with  His  Excellency .  (the 
Eussian  Ambassador  in  Vienna)  that  the  German  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna  desired  war  from  the  first,  and  that  his 
strong  personal  bias  probably  coloured  his  action  here.' 

Similar  incapacity  was  shown  by  the  German  repre- 
sentative in  St.  Petersburg.  On  July  29,  Sir  G.  Buchanan 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  :  *  I  fear  that  the  German 
Ambassador  will  not  help  to  smooth  matters  over,  if  he 
uses  to  his  own  Government  the  same  language  as  he  did 
to  me  to-day.  He  accused  the  Eussian  Government  of 
endangering  the  peace  of  Europe  by  their  mobihsation, 
and  said,  when  I  referred  to  all  that  had  been  recently 
done  by  Austria,  that  he  could  not  discuss  such  matters.' 
M.  Sazonoff  remarked  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan  on  August  1  : 
'  Germany  was  unfortunate  in  her  representatives  in  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburg :  the  former  was  a  violent  Eussophobe 
who  had  urged  Austria  on,  the  latter  had  reported  to  his 
Government  that  Eussia  would  never  go  to  war.' 


190  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

When  the  German  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  found 
that  by  his  folly  he  had  been  largely  responsible  for 
Germany's  fatal  decision,  he  completely  broke  down  with 
despair  and  remorse.  Sir  G.  Buchanan  telegraphed,  on 
July  30,  describing  the  decisive  interview  between  the 
German  Ambassador  and  M.  Sazonoff  :  '  German  Am- 
bassador had  a  second  interview  with  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  2  a.m.,  when  former  completely  broke  down  on 
seeing  that  war  was  inevitable.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonoff 
to  make  some  suggestion  which  he  could  telegraph  to  Berlin.' 
The  Times  of  August  1  describes  the  closing  scene  as 
follows : 

Seeing  that  Kussia  had  not  replied  to  Germany's  ulti- 
matum. Count  Pourtales  called  at  the  Kussian  Foreign  Office 
and  insisted  on  seeing  M.  Sazonoff.  In  a  voice  trembling 
with  emotion  he  asked  if  Eussia  agreed  to  Germany's 
demand  (to  demobilise).  M.  Sazonoff  answered  that  the 
silence  of  the  Eussian  Government  meant  refusal.  Count 
Pourtales  repeated  his  question  a  second  time.  M.  Sazonoff 
reiterated  his  refusal.  Count  Pourtales  asked  a  third  and 
last  time,  and  again  the  Minister  repKed  with  a  firm  refusal. 
Thereupon  the  Ambassador  took  his  leave  crestfallen, 
handing  in  the  text  of  a  verbal  Note.  In  the  hurry  it  was 
not  noticed  that  the  paper  contained  alternative  replies, 
one  recording  Germany's  satisfaction  with  Eussia's  hypo- 
thetical surrender. 

Germany  seems  to  have  been  equally  badly  informed  as 
to  Great  Britain's  attitude.  From  many  passages  in  the 
White  Book  we  learn  that  she  counted  firmly  on  British 
neutrahty. 

While  the  German  Chancellor  and  his  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreiga  Affairs  desired  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
the  Serbian  difficulty,  the  Emperor,  supported  by  his 
Ambassadors  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  pushed 
on  by  the  mihtary  party,  evidently  thought  the  moment 
favourable  for  risking  a  war  between  Germany  and  Austria- 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR  191 

Hungary  on  the  one  side,  and  France  and  Russia  on  the 
other,  especially  as  Great  Britain  seemed  likely  to  remain 
neutral,  being  not  interested  in  Serbia  and  having  her  hands 
full  with  her  domestic  troubles.  According  to  a  telegram 
sent  by  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London,  Germany's  military  pre- 
parations began  on  Saturday,  July  25,  the  very  day 
when  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Serbia  expired.  On  July 
28,  two  days  after  the  Dublin  massacre,  the  Militdr 
Wochenblatt,  the  official  German  army  weekly,  endeavoured 
to  strengthen  the  hands  of  those  who  were  determined 
on  war  by  printing  a  remarkable  article  depreciating 
the  Russian  army,  and  stating  that  its  fighting  power 
was  hugely  overestimated,  that  numbers  were  less  im- 
portant than  moral,  ability  of  the  higher  officers,  the 
national  spirit,  railways,  geographical  factors,  etc.  '  In 
Germany,  all  military  preparations  for  war,'  the  journal 
added,  '  have  been  taken  with  that  attention  to  all 
details  which  is  characteristic  of  Germany.  It  can,  there- 
fore, be  said,  without  exaggeration,  that  Germany  can 
face  the  advent  of  grave  events  with  complete  equani- 
mity, trusting  to  God  and  her  own  might.'  On  the  same 
day  the  Austrian  Emperor  pubhshed  a  manifesto  to  his 
people,  in  which  he  intimated,  in  no  uncertain  language, 
that  he  was  prepared  for  a  war  with  Russia.  He 
stated  : 

...  In  this  solemn  hour  I  am  fully  convinced  of  the 
whole  significance  of  my  resolve  and  my  responsibility 
towards  the  Almighty.  I  have  examined  and  weighed 
everything,  and  with  a  serene  conscience  I  set  out  on  the 
path  to  which  my  duty  points.  ...  I  trust  in  Austria- 
Hungary's  brave  and  devoted  forces,  and  I  trust  in  the 
Almighty  to  give  the  victory  to  my  arms. 

This  sonorous  manifesto  would  obviously  have  been 
very  much  out  of  place  if  Austria-Hungary  had  contem- 


192  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

plated  only  a  war  with  little  Serbia,  which  was  completely 
exhausted  by  two  previous  wars. 

Austria's  determination  to  challenge  Eussia,  and  her 
readiness  to  fight  that  country,  feeling  sure  of  Germany's 
support,  was  demonstrated  still  more  clearly  by  the  ofi&cial 
and  inspired  Press  of  the  country.  The  Pester  Lloyd,  for 
instance,  had  an  article  in  leaded  type  on  July  28,  the  day 
when  the  Emperor's  proclamation  was  pubUshed,  in  which 
we  read  : 

The  remotest  consequences  of  the  action  against  Serbia 
have  been  fully  thought  out  and  tested,  and  accordingly 
the  people  can  set  its  mind  at  rest  that  the  Dual  Monarchy, 
having  decided  on  this  step,  is  in  a  position  to  meet  each 
of  its  consequences  with  arms  in  its  hands.  .  .  .  We  possess 
the  strength  to  make  our  vital  interests  respected  in  all 
circumstances.  This  is  doubtless  no  secret  to  other  States, 
which  are  certainly .  very  exactly  informed  as  to  the  forces 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  If,  nevertheless, 
we  support  the  localisation  of  the  conflict  with  Serbia, 
we  only  give  a  new  proof  that  our  care  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  peace  of  the  world  is  not  less  than  that  of  any  other 
Power  in  Europe. 

Germany  alone  could  restrain  Austria  at  the  critical 
moment  by  refusing  to  follow  her  into  a  dangerous 
adventure,  provided  her  hands  were  not  tied.  However, 
while  the  German  Foreign  Office  seemed  inclined  to  promote 
a  peaceful  solution,  the  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment remained  absolutely  unshaken,  for  reasons  which  will 
become  apparent  only  in  the  future.  The  German  Foreign 
Office  apparently  was  not  only  ignorant  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum,  but  worked  for  peace  up  to  the  last  moment. 
Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphed  on  July  28  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  :  *  At  invitation  of  Imperial  Chancellor  I  called  upon 
his  Excellency  this  evening.  He  said  that  he  wished  me 
to  tell  you  that  he  was  most  anxious  that  Germany  should 
work  together  with  England  for  maintenance  of  general 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAE  193 

peace,  as  they  had  done  successfully  in  the  last  European 
crisis.'  On  July  29  Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphed 
from  Berlin  :  '  I  found  Secretary  of  State  very  depressed 
to-day.'  On  the  same  day  M.  Sazonoff  telegraphed  to 
Count  Benckendorff  in  London  :  *  The  German  Ambassador 
informs  me,  in  the  name  of  the  Chancellor,  that  Germany 
has  not  ceased  to  exercise  a  moderating  influence  at  Vienna, 
and  that  she  will  continue  to  do  so,  even  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war.'  The  last  telegrams  received  from  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  show  that  the  German  Chancellor  was  absolutely 
stunned  by  the  course  which  events  had  taken.  According 
to  newspaper  reports,  his  face  was  so  much  distorted  by 
terror  and  grief  that  the  people  did  not  recognise  him  when 
he  drove  with  the  Emperor  from  Potsdam  to  Berlin. 

On  July  28  the  tone  of  the  German  and  Austrian  Press 
was  confident  and  warhke,  because  Great  Britain  seemed 
to  be  incapable  of  energetic  action.  The  Dubhn  massacre 
seemed  to  continental  observers  to  be  the  beginning  of 
civil  war.  They  were  promptly  disillusioned.  On  July  30 
Mr.  Asquith  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  :  '  It  is  of 
vital  importance,  in  the  interests  of  the  whole  world,  that 
this  country,  which  has  no  interests  of  its  own  directly  at 
stake,  should  present  a  united  front  and  be  able  to  speak 
and  act  with  the  authority  of  an  undivided  nation.'  The 
second  reading  of  the  Amending  Bill  relating  to  Ireland 
was  postponed  indefinitely.  Suddenly  Great  Britain  was 
seen  to  present  a  united  front,  and  to  be  ready  for  action. 
When  it  was  too  late,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
recognised  their  miscalculation.  Great  Britain  was  Hkely 
to  stand  on  the  side  of  France  and  Kussia,  and  if  Great 
Britain  should  support  France  and  Eussia,  Italy  would 
obviously  desert  her  alHes.  Suddenly  and  unexpectedly 
the  position  had  become  extremely  perilous  to  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  These  two  countries  were  hkely 
at  the  same  time  to  incur  unexpectedly  the  active  hostihty 
of  Great  Britain  and  to  lose  the  support  of   Italy.     In 


194  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

case  of  war  their  chances  had  suddenly  very   seriously 
deteriorated. 

Up  to  July  30,  the  day  when  all  British  party  differences 
disappeared  as  by  magic,  in  consequence  of  Mr.  Asquith's 
appeal,  Austria-Hungary  unconditionally  declined  all  sug- 
gestions of  negotiation,  mediation,  or  conference  in  order  to 
settle  peacefully  her  differences  with  Serbia.  That  is  shown 
by  perusal  of  Documents  61,  62,  81,  and  93,  pubHshed  in 
the  White  Book.  As  late  as  July  28  Count  Berchtold  said 
to  the  Eussian  Ambassador  that  *  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  could  no  longer  recede,  nor  enter  into  any 
discussion  about  the  terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Note.' 
That  haughty  and  irreconcilable  attitude  disappeared  when, 
two  days  later,  on  July  30,  Great  Britain  had  settled  her 
domestic  differences  in  ParHament.  On  July  30  Sir  E. 
Eodd,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Eome,  telegraphed  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey : 

I  learned  from  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  sent 
for  me  this  evening,  that  the  Austrian  Government  had 
declined  to  continue  the  direct  exchange  of  views  with  the 
Eussian  Government.  But  he  had  reason  to  believe  that 
Germany  was  now  disposed  to  give  more  conciliatory  advice 
to  Austria,  as  she  seemed  convinced  that  we  (the  British) 
should  act  with  France  and  Eussia,  and  was  most  anxious 
to  avoid  issue  with  us. 

On  July  30  Germany  became  evidently  nervous  about 
Great  Britain,  while  Austria's  attitude  was  still  unchanged. 
However,  on  the  following  day  Austria-Hungary  also  became 
aware  that  her  Serbian  policy,  if  persisted  in,  might  have 
the  most  disastrous  consequences  to  the  Dual  Monarchy, 
for  M.  Sazonoff  telegraphed  to  the  Eussian  Ambassador  in 
London : 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  declared  the  readi- 
ness of  his  Government  to  discuss  the  substance  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia.     M.  Sazonoff   replied  by 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAK  195 

expressing  his  satisfaction,  and  said  it  was  desirable  that 
the  discussion  should  take  place  in  London  with  the  partici- 
pation of  the  Great  Powers. 

M.  Sazonoff  hoped  that  the  British  Government  would 
assume  the  direction  of  these  discussions.  The  whole  of 
Europe  would  be  thankful  to  them.  It  would  be  very- 
important  that  Austria  should  meanwhile  put  a  stop  pro- 
visionally to  her  mihtary  action  on  Serbian  territory. 

On  the  following  day,  August  1,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
wired  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Vienna : 

Count  Mensdorff  called  again  later  at  the  Foreign  Office. 
He  informed  me  of  a  telegram  sent  yesterday  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  by  Count 
Berchtold,  and  gave  me  the  substance. 

It  states  that  Count  Berchtold  begged  the  Kussian 
Ambassador,  whom  he  sent  for  yesterday,  to  do  his  best 
to  remove  the  wholly  erroneous  impression  in  St.  Peters- 
burg that  the  *  door  had  been  banged  '  by  Austria-Hungary 
on  all  further  conversations.  The  Kussian  Ambassador 
promised  to  do  this.  Count  Berchtold  repeated  on  this 
occasion  to  the  Kussian  Ambassador  the  assurance  which 
had  already  been  given  at  St.  Petersburg,  to  the  effect 
that  neither  an  infraction  of  Serbian  sovereign  rights, 
nor  the  acquisition  of  Serbian  territory  was  being  contem- 
plated by  Austria-Hungary. 

The  sudden  and  complete  volte  face  of  Austria-Hungary 
showed  that  that  country  had  become  alarmed,  and  was 
anxious  to  climb  down.  Apparently  the  war  would  not 
have  taken  place  had  not  the  German  Emperor  sent  his 
ultimatum  to  Kussia  on  the  very  day  when  Austria-Hungary 
declared  herself  ready  to  discuss  matters  regarding  Serbia. 
Study  of  the  White  Book  reveals  the  fact  that  Kussia 
strove  earnestly,  and  with  all  her  might,  to  avoid  the  war 
into  which  she  was  reluctantly  forced.  On  July  30  Kussia 
was  ready  to  stop  all  her  mihtary  preparations,  for  on  that 

o2 


196    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

day  M.  Sazonoff  handed  to  the  German  Ambassador  the 
following  proposal,  capable  of  secm*ing  peace  : 

If  Austria,  recognising  that  the  conflict  with  Serbia 
has  assumed  character  of  question  of  European  interest, 
declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate  from  her  ultimatum 
points  which  violate  principle  of  sovereignty  of  Serbia, 
Kussia  engages  to  stop  all  military  preparations. 

Unfortunately,  the  German  Emperor  would  not  wait. 
It  seems  that,  at  the  last  moment,  the  German  Emperor 
could  have  preserved  the  peace  had  he  cared  to  do  so. 
Possibly  he  chose  to  go  to  war,  because  he  feared  that  a 
peaceful  settlement,  after  the  previous  demonstration  of 
Germany's  determination,  would  be  condemned  by  his  own 
subjects  as  another  and  a  crowning  failure  of  his  blustering 
policy.  Eemembering  the  reproaches  which  had  been 
levelled  against  him  for  having  twice  given  way  to  France 
over  Morocco,  he  thought  it,  perhaps,  incumbent  upon 
himself  to  avoid  another  and  a  greater  diplomatic  failure 
which  would  have  been  fatal  to  his  prestige.  At  the  moment 
when  peace  and  war  were  in  his  hands,  William  the  Second 
acted  exactly  as  did  Napoleon  the  Third,  when  at  that 
fatal  hour  he  would  not  be  satisfied  when  the  Prince  of 
HohenzoUern  withdrew  his  candidature  to  the  Spanish 
throno  which  had  caused  the  differences  between  France 
and  Prussia.  Striving  to  maintain  his  prestige  at  the  cost 
of  the  greatest  war  which  the  world  has  seen,  William  the 
Second  may  well  have  ruined  both  his  country  and  his 
dynasty. 


CHAPTER  VII 

GERMANY    AND    TURKEY  ^ 

At  Germany's  bidding,  Turkey  has  attacked  the  Entente 
Powers.  If,  as  appears  probable,  the  present  war  should 
end  in  the  defeat  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  we 
may  take  it  that  Turkey  has  committed  suicide,  or  rather, 
has  been  compelled  to  do  so. 

Financially,  miUtarily,  and  morally,  Turkey  is  exhausted. 
She  has  recently  lost  two  great  wars.  In  her  campaign  with 
Italy  she  lost  Tripoli,  and  in  her  struggle  with  the  Balkan 
States  she  lost  the  bulk  of  her  European  possessions.  As 
the  latter  are  far  more  valuable  than  the  former,  it  was 
only  natural  that  many  Turks  desired  to  regain  at  least 
part  of  the  lost  Balkan  territories  if  a  good  opportunity 
should  arise.  Immediately  upon  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  Turkey  began  a  general  mobilisation.  In  view 
of  her  recent  losses  in  Europe,  it  was  permissible  to  assume 
that  her  preparations  aimed  at  the  reconquest  of  the 
provinces  which  had  been  conquered  by  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
Greece,  and  Montenegro.  As  Bulgaria  is  Turkey's  most 
immediate  neighbour,  her  mihtary  preparations  might 
conceivably  be  aimed  at  that  State.  Indeed,  official  Turkey 
explained  that  she  was  making  ready  for  war  in  order  to 
meet  a  possible  attack  from  Bulgaria,  which  at  the  end  of 
the  Balkan  War  had  lost  Adrianople  to  the  Turks.  On 
August  4,  the  day  when  Great  Britain  declared  war  on 

^  From  The  Fortnightly  Review,  December  1914; 
197 


198    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Germany,   Mr.   Beaumont,  who  at  the  time  represented 
Sir  L.  Mallet,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey : 

Grand  Vizier  to-day  renewed  assurances  that  Turkey 
intends  to  observe  strict  neutraUty.  Mobilisation  has 
been  decided  upon  only  because  it  would  take  months  to 
complete,  and  because  the  Government  wished  not  to  be 
taken  by  surprise  in  case  of  aggression  by  Bulgaria,  though 
they  had  also  been  alarmed  by  rumours  of  action  by  Eussia 
— ^attributable,  I  think,  to  German  Ambassador.  Eetention 
of  German  military  mission  meant  nothing  and  had  no 
poHtical  significance.  He  regarded  them  as  Turkish 
employees  who  were  doing  good  work,  and  as  they  had 
offered  to  remain,  it  would  have  been  ungracious  to  refuse. 

This  communication,  and  those  which  are  given  in  the 
following  pages,  are  taken  from  the  White  Book,  '  Events 
Leading  to  the  Eupture  of  Eelations  with  Turkey  '  (Cd. 
7268).  According  to  a  statement  made  by  the  Grand  Vizier, 
the  Turkish  Prime  Minister,  to  the  British  representative 
in  Constantinople,  Turkey's  mobilisation  was  merely  a 
measure  of  precaution,  a  defensive  step  directed  principally 
against  Bulgaria.  The  unveracity  of  this  assertion  was 
obvious.  Far  from  fearing  a  Bulgarian  attack,  Turkey 
had  apparently  been  negotiating  with  Bulgaria  with  a 
view  to  obtaining  that  country's  aid  in  a  war  of  revenge 
and  of  aggression.  Soon  afterwards  it  became  clear  that 
Turkey  was  mobilising  at  Germany's  bidding  against 
Eussia,  and  perhaps  against  England  as  well.  The  Goeben 
and  Breslau  arrived  at  the  Golden  Horn  on  August  10. 
On  the  21st  of  that  month  Sir  L.  Mallet  telegraphed  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey : 

.  .  .  Marshal  Liman  (von  Sanders)  and  the  German 
Ambassador  are  recklessly  striving  to  force  the  Turks 
into  declaring  war  on  Eussia,  in  which  case  the  Goeben 
and  Breslau  would  presumably  sail  for  the  Black  Sea. 
They  are  prepared  to  achieve  this  object  if  necessary  by  a 
cowp  d'etat,  making  the  Minister  of  War  dictator. 


GEKMANY  AND  TUKKEY  199 

Six  days  later,  on  August  27,  Sir  L.  Mallet  sent  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  a  most  remarkable  forecast.  He  tele- 
graphed : 

German  ships.  There  are  grounds  for  thinking  that 
Germans  are  urging  Turks  to  send  Goehen  into  Black  Sea, 
where  they  would  argue  that  she  has  a  right  to  go  as  a 
Turkish  ship.  The  Germans  would  count  upon  Eussian 
warship  attacking  her,  and  war  would  ensue,  seemingly 
provoked  by  Kussia.  Object  of  Germans  is  to  create  a 
diversion  here,  draw  off  some  Eussian  troops  and  enemies 
from  Austria  and  embroil  us  at  the  same  time. 

Two  months  and  two  days  after  the  despatch  of  this 
telegram,  on  October  29,  the  event  predicted  took  place. 
The  Turks  chose  the  anticipated  pretext  for  their  naval 
attack  upon  Eussia.  Earely  has  a  diplomatic  forecast 
been  more  timely  or  more  correct. 

While,  on  August  27,  Sir  L.  Mallet  thought  that  the 
Germans,  while  planning  a  Turkish  attack  upon  Eussia, 
only  intended  *  to  embroil  us  at  the  same  time,'  the  Enghsh 
representative  in  Egypt  recognised  that  Turkey  was 
preparing  to  attack  England  in  Egypt.  On  August  28, 
Mr.  Cheetham,  the  British  Agent  in  Cairo,  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  following  ominous  news  : 

Ottoman  forces  are  being  mobilised  in  Hedjaz  and 
farther  south,  and  existing  mihtary  activity  in  Eed  Sea 
may  thus  be  explained.  About  sixty  Turkish  officers 
arrived  at  Alexandria  recently  and  passed  through  Egypt 
down  Eed  Sea.  Their  destination  was  the  Yemen.  Twelve 
thousand  Turkish  troops  are  reported  in  Jeddah  region. 
Signs  are  not  lacking  that,  in  case  of  war,  an  attack  on 
Egypt  is  contemplated  by  Turkey.  A  few  Turkish  officers 
are  now  in  the  Delta.  Steps  have  been  taken  to  watch  all 
those  that  are  known.  I  learn  from  a  good  source  that 
all  information  of  Turkish  mobihsation  reported  from 
Constantinople  is  correct.  Meanwhile,  emissaries  are  being 
sent  to  India,  the  Yemen,  Senoussi,  and  Egypt  to  stir  up 


200  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

feeling  against  Great  Britain.  Activity  at  Gaza  is  reported, 
but  it  is  uncertain  whether  this  is  more  than  raising  of 
levies  to  replace  regulars  withdrawn  from  the  north  by 
mobilisation. 

Simultaneously  with  this  telegram,  which  showed  that 
a  position  very  threatening  to  Great  Britain  in  Egypt 
and  beyond  had  suddenly  arisen,  there  arrived  in  London 
a  very  disquieting  telegram  from  Sir  L.  Mallet,  dated 
hkewise  August  28,  which  informed  Sir  Edward  Grey : 

.  .  .  Consignments  of  gold  from  Germany  have  arrived 
(at  Constantinople)  for  German  and  Austrian  banks.  Private 
German  residents  have  sent  away  their  wives,  and  quantities 
of  medical  stores  have  been  purchased  and  put  on  board 
German  ships.  I  hear  that  German  Ambassador  is  adopting 
tone  of  friendly  commiseration  for  Great  Britain,  who,  he 
asserts,  will  never  assist  Kussia  in  any  movement  against 
Turkey.  He  has  made  the  remarkable  statement  that  his 
Government  will  now  offer  favourable  terms  to  France, 
which  she  will  certainly  accept ;  that  Germany  will  then 
wage  a  platonic  war  with  England,  whose  heart  is  not  in 
the  struggle,  and  who  will  make  terms  to  save  her  Fleet  ; 
and  that  Germany  and  England  will  then  combine  against 
Eussia. 

Day  by  day  information  received  by  the  Foreign  Office 
showed  that  Germany  intrigued  to  involve  Turkey  simul- 
taneously in  a  war  with  Eussia  and  with  England,  and  that 
an  ever-growing  stream  of  German  arms  and  ammunition 
and  of  German  gold  was  flowing  towards  the  Golden  Horn. 
On  October  17  the  British  Ambassador  telegraphed  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey  : 

Since  end  of  September  following  have  reached  Constanti- 
nople :  Six  thousand  nine  hundred  cases  of  Mauser  ammuni- 
tion ;  540  cases  of  Mauser  rifles ;  thirteen  trucks  of  war 
material;  and  about  £800,000  in  bar  gold.  Arrival  of  a 
submarine  in  sections  is  expected  shortly,  and  I  am  informed 
that  such  a  consignment,  together  with  two  aeroplanes. 


GEKMANY  AND  TUEKEY  201 

left  Eustchuk  on  8th  October.  Two  German  ships  were 
recently  escorted  from  Sulina  by  Breslau,  and  are  reported 
to  have  brought  submarine.  But  there  is  no  evidence  at 
present  to  prove  this. 

From  day  to  day  the  position  of  affairs  became  more 
ominous  and  more  threatening.  While  the  Grand  Vizier 
unceasingly  assured  the  British  Ambassador  that  only 
precautionary  measures  were  taken,  that  Turkey  contem- 
plated no  aggression,  and  that  he  had  the  situation  perfectly 
under  control,  the  mobilisation  of  the  Turkish  troops  and 
their  concentration  on  the  Eussian  and  Egyptian  borders 
clearly  showed  that  Turkey  prepared  everything  for  an 
early  attack  upon  Eussia  in  the  Black  Sea  and  upon  Great 
Britain  in  Egypt.  The  Grand  Vizier  was  either  playing  a 
double  game  or  he  was  ignorant  of  the  development  of 
affairs.  At  any  rate,  it  was  obvious  that  his  nominal 
subordinate,  the  notoriously  philo- German  War  Minister, 
Enver  Pasha,  had  taken  matters  into  his  own  hands — that 
he  was  practically  all-powerful.  In  view  of  the  great  and 
rapidly-increasing  peril.  Sir  L.  Mallet  addressed,  on  Sep- 
tember 23,  the  following  most  remarkable  note  of  protest 
to  the  Grand  Vizier  : — 

CoNSTAirrrNOPLE,  September,  23,  1914. 

YouB  Highness, — 

In  the  course  of  our  interview  of  yesterday  morning, 
I  had  the  honour  to  inform  your  Highness  of  the  anxiety 
that  the  news  which  reached  me  from  Syria  in  regard  to 
the  miHtary  preparations  and  plots  against  Egypt  now  going 
on  in  that  province  was  causing  me.  So  long  as  it  was  a 
question  of  preparations  similar  to  those  made  in  other 
parts  of  the  Empire  as  a  consequence  of  the  general  mobihsa- 
tion,  I  did  not  mention  the  matter  to  your  Highness,  although 
special  importance  might  attach  to  aU  such  doings  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Egyptian  frontier.  Similarly,  I  have 
been  able  up  to  the  present  to  reject,  as  improbable  tales, 
the  rumours  which  have  reached  me  from  more  than  one 


202         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

source,  according  to  which  a  sudden  blow  directed  against 
the  Suez  Canal  was  being  planned  with  the  object  of  ren- 
dering it  impassable,  although  I  am  aware  that  the  enemies 
of  Great  Britain  are  intriguing  with  the  object  of  leading 
your  Highness's  Government  into  adventures  as  insensate 
and  even  more  insensate,  than  this.  I  should,  however,  fail 
in  my  duty  towards  my  Government,  and,  I  may  add  also 
towards  the  Government  of  your  Highness,  if  I  did  not 
bring  to  your  Highness's  knowledge  the  latest  reports 
which  have  reached  me.  It  appears  from  these  reports 
that  the  minds  of  the  Bedouins  are  being  excited  by  pro- 
fessional agitators,  who,  encouraged  by  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment, are  desirous  of  inflaming  them  against  England. 
The  military  preparations  which  up  to  a  certain  moment 
bore  a  similar  character  to  those  in  the  other  provinces 
of  the  Empire,  have  lately  changed  into  a  converging  move- 
ment towards  the  south.  Troops  are  being  brought  from 
such  distant  centres  as  Mosul.  General  activity  reigns 
everywhere  from  Damascus  to  Maan,  and  cumulative 
evidence  leads  my  consul  at  Jerusalem  to  the  belief  that 
an  organised  expedition  against  Egypt  is  in  project  for 
the  next  few  days. 

I  trust  that  the  reports,  the  contents  of  which  I  have 
just  summed  up  to  your  Highness,  put  a  wrong  interpreta- 
tion on  facts  which,  as  such,  cannot  be  discussed.  But  I 
repeat  that  I  should  fail  in  my  duty  if  I  did  not  bring  to 
your  Highness's  knowledge  the  grave  pre-occupation  which 
they  cause  me,  and  the  impression  which  they  make  upon 
his  Britannic  Majesty's  Government,  and  if  I  did  not  place 
you  on  your  guard  against  the  disastrous  consequences 
which  would  ensue  for  your  Highness's  Government,  if 
they  were  to  follow  a  course  so  contrary  to  their  own  interests 
as  that  of  becoming  the  accomplice  of  Germany  in  an  attack 
upon  Egypt. 

Your  Highness  will  remember  that,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  present  war.  Sir  E.  Grey  instructed  Mr.  Beaumont  to 
give  you  the  assurance  that,  provided  that  Turkey  main- 
tained strict  and  absolute  neutrality  during  the  war,  and 
so   long   as   unforeseen   circumstances   did   not   arise,   his 


GEKMANY  AND  TUEKEY  203 

Britannic  Majesty's  Government  had  no  desire  nor  intention 
of  annexing  Egypt,  nor  of  modifying  her  regime  in  any  way 
whatsoever.  I  had  the  honour  to  confirm  this  assurance 
to  your  Highness  shortly  after  my  return  to  Constantinople. 
Since  then,  being  desirous  of  avoiding  any  possibility  of 
misunderstanding  with  the  Imperial  Government,  I  have 
repeatedly  called  your  Highnesses  attention  to  the  condi- 
tional character  of  the  assurances  given  by  Sir  E.  Grey, 
Now,  I  hold  it  to  be  my  duty  to  declare  once  more  to  your 
Highness  that  my  Government  take  the  most  serious  view 
of  the  unprecedented  violations  of  neutrality  already  com- 
mitted by  the  Turkish  Government  in  retaining  German 
ofi&cers  and  men  on  board  the  German  warships,  and  by 
subsequently  taking  in  their  service  numerous  other  Germans 
in  a  similar  military  capacity. 

It  does  not  seem  to  me  necessary  at  this  moment  to 
recapitulate  the  details  of  still  further  departures  from 
neutrality  committed  by  Turkey  in  favour  of  the  enemies 
of  Great  Britain.  Nor  need  I  insist  on  the  consequences 
which  might  ensue  if,  to  add  the  last  touch  to  so  grave  a 
situation,  my  Government  were  to  become  convinced  that 
the  Imperial  Government  were  seriously  meditating  an 
attack  against  Egypt,  or  that  they  were  a  party  to  disloyal 
intrigues  against  the  security  of  the  Suez  Canal,  or  against 
the  present  regime  in  Egypt.  Your  Highness  can  judge  of 
the  whole  importance  and  possible  extent  of  these  conse- 
quences. 

I  enclose  in  this  note  a  memorandum  enumerating  in 
detail  the  facts  which  can  be  considered  as  indications  of 
a  forthcoming  attack  upon  Egypt. 

This  dignified,  powerful,  impressive,  and  statesmanlike 
protest,  which  may  serve  as  a  model  to  future  generations 
of  diplomats,  met  with  the  dilatoriness  and  the  evasions 
usual  in  Turkey.  The  British  Ambassador's  solemn  warning 
remained  unheeded.  A  month  later,  on  October  23,  Sir 
L.  Mallet  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey : 

I  have  seen  the  Kussian  Ambassador  again  this  morning. 
He  is  sure  that  unless  Turks  mean  to  betray  Germans,  the 


204    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

possibility  of  which  he  does  not  exclude,  they  will  make 
war  on  Kussia  on  receipt  of  first  half  of  the  sum  of  £4,000,000 
which  Germany  is  providing.  It  is  concurrently  reported 
about  £1,000,000  has  already  arrived. 

While  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  it  seemed  possible 
that  Germany  might  take  Paris  with  a  rush  and  defeat 
France  and  Eussia  on  land,  it  must,  by  the  end  of  October, 
have  become  obvious  to  every  Turk  endowed  with  common 
sense  that  the  tide  was  turning,  that  Germany  and  Austria 
were  Hkely  to  lose  the  war  which  they  had  so  rashly 
begun. 

It  is  true  that  the  Turkish  papers  were  day  by  day 
reporting  glorious  German  and  Austrian  victories  in  the 
East  and  West.  However,  these  mendacious  reports  could 
deceive  only  the  ignorant  populace  of  Constantinople.  The 
Turkish  Government,  being  kept  constantly  informed 
by  its  diplomatic  and  military  representatives  in  Eussia, 
Prance,  and  England  about  the  position  of  affairs,  knew  no 
doubt  that  Fate  was  no  longer  favouring  Germany  and 
Austria- Hungary,  that  in  a  war  of  attrition  the  Entente 
Powers  were  likely  to  win.  The  fortune  of  war  had  visibly 
begun  to  turn.  The  German  army  had  been  defeated  near 
Paris,  and  had  hastily  retreated  towards  the  Belgian  frontier, 
and  the  combined  German  aud  Austrian  armies  had  been 
defeated  in  front  of  Warsaw,  and  were  rapidly  withdrawing 
towards  the  West.  Several  official  telegrams  informed  us 
that  the  Germans  were  at  the  time  sending  enormous 
amounts  of  gold  to  Constantinople.  Of  course,  the  Turks 
required  money  for  paying  their  troops.  Still,  the  un- 
scrupulous and  lavish  way  with  which  the  representatives 
of  Germany  have  endeavoured  to  bribe  the  officials  and  the 
Press  in  other  countries,  justifies  one  in  concluding  that 
Turkey's  support  of  Germany  at  a  moment  when  Germany's 
position  had  become  compromised  was  due,  perhaps,  not  so 
much  to  the  blindness,  the  rashness,  and  the  fanatic  zeal 


GEKMANY  AND  TUEKEY  205 

of  some  leading  Turks,  such  as  Enver  Pasha,  but  to  bribery. 
That  only  can  explain  what  is  otherwise  inexplicable. 

At  a  time  when  Turkey  was  nominally  at  peace  with 
Kussia  and  Great  Britain,  her  army  was  mobilised  and 
concentrated  upon  the  Kussian  and  Egyptian  frontiers. 
Spies  in  Germany's  pay  swarmed  through  Egypt.  Egyptian 
officers  and  civil  servants  were  bribed.  Endeavours  were 
made  to  smuggle  large  quantities  of  explosives  into  Egypt. 
Enterprising  parties  for  blowing  up  the  Suez  Canal  were 
sent  out  by  the  Germans.  All  these  preparations  were 
undertaken  in  time  of  peace,  and  they  were  known  not 
only  to  the  British  Foreign  Office,  but  to  various  neutral 
Governments  as  well.  Hence,  it  seems  most  regrettable 
and  unfortunate  that  Eoumania  allowed  vast  quantities 
of  German  explosives,  ammunition,  arms,  and  other  war- 
like stores,  and  numerous  German  military  and  naval 
officers  and  men,  to  pass  unhindered  through  that  country 
into  Turkey. 

Under  Germany's  guidance  Turkey  endeavoured  to 
provoke  Eussia  and  England  into  an  attack,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  appeal  to  the  Mohammedans  throughout  the  world 
for  help  against  the  aggressors.  From  many  of  the  best- 
informed  German  writers  we  know  that  it  was  Germany's 
intention,  in  case  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  to  raise  the 
Mohammedans  throughout  the  world  against  this  country. 
The  fact  that  that  intention  was  to  be  found  among  the 
leaders  of  Germanj^'s  foreign  policy  may  be  seen  from  the 
statement  which  the  German  Emperor  made  at  Damascus 
at  the  time  of  his  pilgrimage  to  Jerusalem.  At  the  occa- 
sion of  a  banquet  in  that  town  he  solenmly  assured  '  the 
300,000,000  Mohammedans  throughout  the  world  who 
venerate  in  the  Turkish  Sultan  their  Caliph,  that  the 
German  Emperor  would  be  their  friend  and  protector  for 
all  time.' 

As  Turkey  had  not  succeeded  in  provoking  Eussia  and 
England  into  an  attack  by  taking  over  the  Goehen  and 


206  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Breslau  by  means  of  a  sham  purchase,  by  vexing  their 
trade,  by  concentrating  large  bodies  of  troops,  transport 
animals,  vehicles,  and  guns  on  the  Kussian  and  Egyptian 
frontiers,  by  engaging  in  the  most  reckless  conspiracies 
directed  against  Kussia  and  England,  and  by  abolishing  the 
capitulations  and  the  foreign  post  offices  established  in 
Turkey,  a  final  attempt  was  made  upon  Great  Britain's 
patience  by  requesting  her  to  withdraw  from  Egypt.  The 
British  Government  was  apprised  of  this  incredible  request 
in  a  telegram  from  Sir  L.  Mallet  despatched  on  October  23, 
in  which  we  read  : 

.  .  .  My  French  colleague  inquired  (from  the  Minister 
of  Marine)  what  was  the  meaning  of  preparations  in  Syria 
and  of  all  the  violent  talk  about  Egypt.  Minister  of  Marine 
replied  that  England  was  treating  Egypt  as  if  it  belonged 
to  her,  whereas  it  formed  part  of  Ottoman  Dominions. 
Turks  were  indifferent  about  India,  Tripoli,  and  Tunis, 
&c.,  but  Egypt  was  on  their  frontier,  and  they  felt  about  it 
as  French  did  about  Alsace-Lorraine.  They  would  do 
nothing  officially,  but  would  shut  their  eyes  to  any  agitation 
which  was  directed  against  English  occupation  of  Egypt. 
Continuing,  he  referred  to  a  proposal  which  he  had  made 
me  a  fortnight  ago,  to  the  effect  that  England  and  Turkey 
should  now  sign  convention  on  lines  of  Drummond- Wolff 
Convention,  providing  for  evacuation  of  Egypt  by  British 
troops  at  end  of  war.  It  is  quite  true  he  made  this  sugges- 
tion. I  did  not  report  it  at  the  time  because  it  was  so 
entirely  unpractical.  This  shows  that  Germans  are  turning 
all  their  attention  to  Egypt,  and  are  inciting  the  Turks 
against  us,  so  that  we  must  expect  to  have  a  considerable 
amount  of  trouble  on  frontier.  Turkish  newspapers  are 
full  of  Egypt  just  now,  and  of  our  high-handed  proceed- 
ings. It  is,  e.g.,  announced  to-day  that  we  have  closed 
El  Azhar  mosque.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Germans  are 
at  bottom  of  this,  and  are  inciting  religious  fanaticism  of 
Turks  against  us. 

We  can  scarcely  wonder  that  the  Turks  were  anxious  to 


GEEMANY  AND  TUKKEY  207 

regain  Egypt.  Under  England's  administration  Egypt  has 
once  more  become  a  wealthy  country,  and  the  Tm:k  is  a 
famous  plunderer. 

Nominally,  Egypt  was  still  a  Turkish  tributary  State,  and 
legally  Turkey  was  perhaps  entitled  to  regain  full  control 
of  that  country.  However,  morally  Turkey  had  lost  the 
right  to  rule  Egypt,  or  indeed  any  other  alien  nation.  The 
history  of  Turkey  is  a  history  of  destruction  and  devastation. 
Wherever  the  Turk  has  gone  he  has  ruined  and  ravaged. 
He  has  created  nothing.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  Turks 
succeeded  in  conquering  the  most  flourishing  lands  of 
antiquity.  The  glorious  empires  of  Babylonia,  Assyria, 
Egypt,  Phoenicia,  Carthage,  Persia,  Greece,  Palestine,  and 
the  Arab  Empire,  with  the  wonderful  towns  of  Nineveh; 
Babylon,  Cairo,  Alexandria,  Susa,  Bagdad,  Basra,  Damascus, 
Athens,  Jerusalem,  &c.,  were  one  by  one  conquered  by  the 
Turks,  and  were  uniformly  converted  into  a  wilderness.  In 
antiquity,  and  even  during  part  of  the  Middle  Ages,  Greece, 
Asia  Minor,  and  the  lands  on  the  southern  shore  of  the 
Mediterranean  were  the  most  densely  populated  countries 
in  the  world.  As  they  have  an  excellent  soil  and  climate, 
they  ought  to  be  still  densely  populated  and  flourishing. 
However,  with  the  advent  of  the  Turks  a  blight  has  fallen 
upon  them.  The  great  characteristic  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
is  its  desolation.  How  desolate  it  is  may  be  seen  from  the 
fact  that  the  wealthy  lands  ruled  by  the  Turk  contain 
per  square  mile  only  30  inhabitants,  while  France  has 
per  square  mile  189*5  inhabitants  and  Germany  310*4  inhabi- 
tants. In  the  times  of  antiquity  the  territory  which  is 
now  under  Turkey's  sway  supported  probably  from  five  to 
ten  times  as  many  people  as  it  does  at  present.  In  ancient 
times  and  in  the  early  Middle  Ages  Mesopotamia  was  the 
granary  of  the  world.  It  was  a  most  fruitful  and  most 
densely  populated  land.  Bagdad  had  2,000,000  inhabitants. 
Arts  and  sciences  flourished.  A  most  wonderful  system 
of  canals  irrigated  that  naturally  dry  country,  but  the 


208    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Turks  destroyed  the  canal  system,  which  had  painfully 
been  built  up  during  thousands  of  years.  At  present  the 
former  granary  of  the  world  is  a  desert  and  a  wilderness. 
Per  square  mile  there  are  only  fourteen  people  in  Mesopotamia. 
If,  under  a  civilised  government,  Mesopotamia  should  once 
more  be  provided  with  an  efficient  irrigation  system — ^it  can 
easily  be  re-created — it  will  probably  once  more  have  room 
for  very  many  millions  of  people. 

The  Turks  have  exterminated  civilised  nations  by  the 
sword,  by  the  neglect  and  destruction  of  public  works, 
and  by  confiscation.  The  ancient  centres  of  civilisation 
where  the  Turks  settled  declined  and  became  mere  sites 
covered  with  ruins,  upon  which  sordid  villages  arose.  It 
is  difficult  to  realise  nowadays  that  in  the  Middle  Ages 
Bagdad  was  by  far  the  largest,  the  wealthiest,  and  the  most 
highly  civilised  town  in  the  world,  the  greatest  centre  of 
commerce,  industry,  art,  science,  and  learning ;  or  that 
Athens,  Belgrade,  Bucharest,  and  Sofia  were  only  recently, 
when  under  Turkish  rule,  dirty  and  poverty-stricken  villages. 
Those  Turkish  towns  which  are  flourishing  owe  their  pros- 
perity solely  to  the  non-Turkish  population.  Constantinople 
is  prosperous  owing  to  its  unrivalled  geographical  position, 
which  even  Turkish  misgovemment  cannot  destroy,  and  to 
West  European,  Greek,  and  Armenian  business  men. 
Smyrna  is  a  purely  Greek  town.  As  the  Turks  have  invari- 
ably brought  ruin  and  misery  to  the  most  prosperous  coun- 
tries which  they  had  conquered,  and  as  misgovemment 
and  cruelty  have  been  characteristic  of  their  rule  over  all 
ahen  nations  which  had  the  misfortune  to  fall  under  their 
sway,  from  the  time  of  Sultan  Othman  to  the  present  day; 
Turkey  has  no  moral  right  either  to  rule  over  foreign 
nations  or  to  retain  any  longer  naturally  wealthy  districts 
which  can  nourish  a  large  and  happy  population.  They 
have  misused  their  trust.  These  barbarians  have  no  right 
to  retain  any  longer  the  holy  places  of  three  leading  religions 
and  most  of  the  ancient  centres  of  European  civilisation. 


GEEMANY  AND  TUKKEY  209 

In  the  past  Great  Britain  has  been  Turkey's'^best  friend. 
While  Eussia  and  Austria-Hungary  attacked  the  Turks 
and  wrested  from  them  their  territories  piece  by  piece, 
Great  Britain  consistently  endeavoured  to  preserve  Turkey's 
independence  and  integrity  and  to  bring  at  the  same  time 
justice  and  good  government  to  the  unhappy  peoples  hving 
under  Turkish  rule.  With  this  twofold  object  in  view  she 
defended  Turkey  diplomatically  and  by  force  of  arms.  At 
the  same  time,  she  urged  Turkey  unceasingly  to  reform 
her  methods  of  government.  Turkey  has  shown,  like  an 
old  and  hardened  criminal,  that  she  is  not  reformable. 
She  has  lately  changed  her  constitution,  but  the  character 
of  her  blood-stained  Government  has  remained  the  same. 
She  has  been,  and  is  still,  governed  by  a  cruel  and  unUmited 
despotism  which  acts  without  faith,  without  conscience,  and 
without  pity.     Turkey's  hour  has  struck. 

The  present  war  is  a  war  against  German  militarism 
and  a  war  of  hberation.  If  it  should  end  in  a  victory  for 
the  Allied  Powers,  it  should  not  merely  lead  to  the  freeing 
of  the  subjected  and  oppressed  Poles,  Southern  Slavs, 
Eoumanians,  &c.,  in  Europe,  but  also  to  the  freeing  of  the 
nationahties  who  Hve  under  Turkish  tyranny  in  Asia.  The 
Turkish  Empire  resembles  Austria-Hungary.  It  is  inhabited 
by  people  of  numerous  races  and  of  ten  religions,  and  the 
non-Turkish  races  are  fearfully  misgoverned  and  cruelly 
ill-treated.  Near  the  Eussian  border  dwell  large  numbers 
of  Armenians,  among  whom  the  Turks  have  perpetrated 
numerous  massacres  in  the  time  of  Abdul  Hamid.  The 
coastal  districts  of  Asia  Minor  are  inhabited  by  millions  of 
Greeks,  who  dwell  in  dense  masses  along  the  shore  of  the 
^gean  Sea.  They  are  the  descendants  of  the  ancient  Greeks 
who  settled  in  Asia  Minor  in  the  time  of  ancient  Troy.  They 
are  the  most  industrious  and  most  prosperous  inhabitants 
of  Asiatic  Turkey.  After  the  Balkan  War  the  Turks  began 
to  drive  scores  of  thousands  of  these  Greeks  from  their 
prosperous  homes  by  violence  and  massacre.    The  Greeks 


210  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

and  Armenians  are  anxious  to  rid  themselves  of  the  Turkish 
yoke.  Greece  wishes  to  expand  and  to  join  to  the  mother- 
land the  ancient  Greek  colonies  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor 
sung  by  Homer. 

Among  the  dissatisfied  nationalities  dwelling  in  Asiatic 
Turkey  the  Arabs  occupy  a  most  important  position.  They 
have  had  a  great  past.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  under  the 
Ommiades  and  Abbasides,  they  ruled  a  world  empire. 
Their  sway  extended  from  the  Persian  Gulf  through  Southern 
Europe  and  North  Africa  into  Morocco  and  Spain.  They 
were  not  merely  a  nation  of  conquerors.  They  were  by 
far  the  most  civilised  nation  of  the  period.  They  were 
most  advanced  in  philosophy,  literature,  mathematics, 
architecture,  engineering,  medicine,  chemistry,  the  manu- 
facturing industries,  commerce,  shipping,  &c.  The  Turks 
adopted  the  Arab  religion,  but  they  destroyed  the  civilisation 
of  the  creators  of  the  Alhambra.  The  12,000,000  Arabs 
are  no  longer  willing  to  bear  the  Turkish  yoke  and  to  provide 
the  bulk  of  the  taxes  and  the  majority  of  Turkey's  soldiers. 
They  have  begun  to  demand  freedom  for  themselves. 
They,  and  many  non- Turkish  Mohammedans,  are  no  longer 
wilhng  to  see  the  holy  places  of  Islam  exploited  and  defiled 
by  a  band  of  usurpers.  The  Arab  nation  may  once  more 
attain  independence,  if  not  greatness.  Some  years  ago 
Negib-Azourg  Bey  published  a  book,  *  Le  Eeveil  de  la 
Nation  Arabe  dans  I'Asie  Turque.'  It  contains  a  manifesto 
to  the  enUghtened  nations  of  Europe  and  America,  in  which 
the  National  Committee  of  Turkish  Arabs  accuses  the  Turks 
of  the  devastation  of  the  glorious  countries  ruled  by  the 
Ommiades  and  Abbasides,  and  asks  the  world  for  sympathy 
and  support.  The  Alhed  Powers  should  support  the  claims 
to  freedom  of  the  oppressed  Armenians,  Greeks,  and  Arabs. 
Among  the  direct  descendants  of  the  Prophet  there  are 
no  doubt  men  of  non-Turkish  nationality  who  have  a 
stronger  claim  to  be  the  protectors  of  the  holy  places  of 
Islam  than  has  the  Sultan  of  Turkey. 


GEEMANY  AND  TUEKEY  211 

As  the  Turks  have  had  three  months  to  prepare  for 
their  aggression,  their  defeat  may  not  be  easy.  At  the 
same  time,  Turkey's  power  of  resistance  should  not  be 
over-estimated.  Turkey  is,  after  all,  only  a  small  country. 
She  has  21,273,900  inhabitants.  She  is  very  poor.  Most  of 
her  citizens  are  profoundly  dissatisfied.  In  her  last  wars 
she  has  lost  vast  quantities  of  arms  and  ammunition,  and 
enormous  numbers  of  men,  and  as  she  has  only  a  few 
railways  and  scarcely  any  roads,  she  has  to  overcome  very 
great  difficulties  in  raising,  concentrating,  equipping,  and 
arming  large  bodies  of  men.  Besides,  Turkey  is  vulnerable 
in  many  parts. 

The  downfall  of  Turkey  may  raise  the  question  of 
Constantinople.  Very  possibly  the  Germans  induced  Turkey 
to  attack  England  and  Eussia,  not  only  for  strategical,  but 
also  for  diplomatic  reasons.  They  hoped,  no  doubt,  that 
the  question  of  Constantinople  would  lead  to  disagreement 
among  the  Allies. 


»2 


CHAPTEE  VIII 

THE    GERMAN    COLONIAL   EMPIRE  ^ 

Many  people  who  are  insufficiently  acquainted  with  the 
German  colonies  have  in  the  past  described  them  as  small 
and  valueless.  They  are  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 
Small  and  large,  valuable  and  valueless  are  terms  of  com- 
parison. Comparatively  speaking,  the  German  colonies  are 
not  small,  and  they  are  not  without  actual  and  prospective 
value. 

The  extent  of  the  German  Colonial  Empire  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  figures  : 


Square  Miles. 

Togo     .... 

.     33,700 

Kamerun 

.    292,000 

South- West  Africa  . 

.    322,450 

East  Africa    . 

.    384,180 

1,032,330 

Kiauchau 200 

New  Guinea  and  Pacific  Islands       .      96,160 


1,128,690 


The  German  Empire  embraces  208,780  square  miles, 
France  extends  to  207,076  square  miles,  Austria-Hungary 
has  261,030  square  miles,  Italy  110,623  square  miles,  Spain 
196,173   square  miles  and  the  United   Kingdom  121,633 

1  From  The  Fortnightly  Review,  August  1915. 
212 


THE  GEKMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIEE  213 

square  miles.  The  German  Colonial  Empire  is  more  than 
nine  times  as  large  as  the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  a  little 
larger  than  Germany,  France,  Austria-Hmigary,  Italy, 
Spain,  and  Great  Britain  combined,  and  it  is  somewhat 
larger  than  the  whole  of  Argentina.  The  Union  of  South 
Africa  contains  473,100  square  miles  and  Khodesia  439,575 
square  miles.  Germany's  African  possessions  alone  are 
therefore  considerably  larger  than  the  Cape  Province, 
Natal,  the  Transvaal,  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  Ehodesia 
combined. 

The  value  of  land  of  all  kinds,  and  especially  of  very 
extensive  land,  of  vast  colonies,  cannot  be  ascertained 
by  ordinary  commercial  principles,  by  the  question  what 
wiU  it  fetch  in  the  market,  what  does  it  produce,  what 
profits  does  it  yield  ?  The  value  of  land  is  actual  and 
potential.  Lands  possessed  by  a  nation  have,  furthermore, 
not  only  an  actual  and  prospective  economic  value,  but  a 
strategic  value  as  well.  Economically,  Gibraltar,  Malta, 
and  many  other  important  points  are  worth  very  Httle,  or 
are  a  positive  burden,  to  the  Empire,  because  the  cost  of 
their  upkeep  is  greater  than  the  income  which  they  yield. 
Nevertheless  other  nations  would  gladly  purchase  from 
Great  Britain  some  of  her  economically  valueless  possessions 
at  a  very  high  price. 

Let  us  first  of  all  consider  the  economic  value  of  the 
German  Colonial  Empire. 

Land  of  all  kinds  has  an  actual  and  prospective  value. 
An  unwholesome  morass  near  a  large  town  may  become 
invaluable  building  land  some  years  hence  after  having 
been  drained.  Arid  desert  territories  in  Arizona  and 
New  Mexico,  which  a  few  years  ago  were  valueless  and 
were  considered  unusable  for  any  purpose,  have  been 
turned  into  bounteous  agricultural  land  and  orchards  by 
means  of  irrigation.  A  few  decades  ago,  the  ground  con- 
taining the  Kimberley  diamond  mines  and  the  gold  mines 
of  the  Eand   could   be  bought   at   the   price  of  inferior 


214  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

agricultural  and  pastoral  land.  A  century  and  a  half  ago, 
when  France  lost  Canada  to  England,  Voltaire  wondered  that 
great  and  intelHgent  nations  should  go  to  war  for  '  quelques 
arpents  de  neige.'  At  present  Canada  contains  many  more 
inhabitants  than  the  three  greatest  departments  of  France, 
the  departement  de  la  Seine  with  Paris,  the  departement 
du  Nord  with  Lille  and  Roubaix,  and  the  departement 
Pas  de  Calais.  When  France  evacuated  Canada  a  few 
thousand  Frenchmen  were  left  behind.  Their  number 
has  increased  to  more  than  three  millions.  At  the  present 
moment  there  are  actually  more  Frenchmen  of  Canadian 
extraction  than  Hve  in  Paris  itself.  The  time  will  probably 
come  when  the  population  of  Canada  will  be  very  much 
greater  than  that  of  France  within  its  present  limits, 
t  One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  modern  times 
has  been  the  expansion  of  the  European  race.  In  1800 
less  than  10,000,000  white  men  lived  outside  Europe.  At 
present  the  number  of  white  men  outside  Europe  approaches 
150,000,000.  The  time  undoubtedly  will  come  when  the 
majority  of  people  of  the  white  race  will  live  on  the  spacious 
continents  across  the  sea.  In  1800  the  United  States  had 
only  4,300,000  white  inhabitants,  Canada  was  peopled  by 
about  200,000  white  men,  and  the  Australian  continent 
contained  only  6500  whites.  Steam,  steel,  and  electricity 
have  reduced  to  a  minimum  the  enormous  distances  of 
the  past.  It  is  now  easier  to  go  to  Canada  or  Africa  than 
it  was  formerly  to  go  to  Scotland  or  Ireland.  Improved 
communications  have  opened  up  continents  which  formerly 
were  inaccessible  and  were  believed  to  be  closed  to  civihsation 
for  all  time.  The  opening  up  of  the  extra-European  con- 
tinents has  only  begun.  The  time  will  come  when  vast 
territories  which  are  still  inaccessible  can  be  as  easily 
reached  as  Toronto  and  Vancouver. 

Formerly  people  were  deterred  from  emigrating  not  only 
through  distances  but  also  through  the  rigour  of  an  in- 
hospitable cHmate  and  through  the  strange  and  fearful 


THE  GEEMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIKE  215 

diseases  which  are  usually  found  in  countries  uninhabited 
by  white  men.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  advent  of 
civilisation  leads  not  only  to  a  great  improvement  in  sanita- 
tion, but  to  an  improvement  of  climate  as  well.  In  the 
time  of  Juhus  Caesar,  Switzerland,  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  England  were  considered  to  possess  so  in- 
hospitable a  chmate  that  they  were  thought  fit  only  for 
savages.  The  cHmate  of  these  countries  has  been  enormously 
improved  by  the  labour  of  man,  by  the  cutting  down  of 
forests,  by  the  draining  of  swamps,  and  especially  by 
agriculture.  The  countries  of  northern  Europe  possess 
undoubtedly  a  far  more  genial  climate  than  they  did  in 
olden  times.  The  meteorological  departments  of  California 
and  Utah  have  found  that  from  year  to  year  the  rainfall 
in  these  drought-stricken  territories  increases  and  that 
it  increases  particularly  in  those  portions  where  agriculture 
is  most  actively  pursued.  Europe  and  Asia  are  in  large 
parts  greatly  overcrowded.  The  population  of  the  world 
continues,  rapidly  increasing.  Consequently,  land  suitable 
for  the  settlement  of  white  men  becomes  from  year  to  year 
more  precious,  especially  as  the  improvement  of  com- 
munications makes  colonial  land  from  year  to  year  more 
accessible,  and  as  the  advances  of  civilisation  and  of  sanita- 
tion make  Hfe  in  the  far-off  colonies  more  healthful  and 
more  pleasant. 

The  German  colonies  He,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
show,  in  the  tropical  and  sub-tropical  zones.  They  lie  on 
latitudes  which  are  usually  considered  unfit  for  the  habitation 
of  white  men.  However,  large  portions  of  German  South- 
West  Africa  and  of  German  East  Africa  lie  at  so  high  an 
altitude  above  the  sea  that  the  cHmate  is  moderate,  bracing, 
and  extremely  healthful.  Although  German  East  Africa 
lies  on  the  equator,  the  table  lands  in  the  interior,  Hke  those 
of  neighbouring  Uganda,  are  perfectly  suitable  for  the 
settlement  of  white  men.  According  to  German  Govern- 
ment memoirs  a  territory  as  large  as  Prussia  in  that  colony 


216  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

is  fit  for  the  permanent  habitation  of  white  men.  German 
South- West  Africa,  which  is  German  no  longer,  lies  on  the 
same  latitude  as  the  Orange  Free  State,  the  Transvaal, 
Northern  Natal,  and  Southern  Ehodesia.  Large  portions  of 
that  colony  lie  also  at  a  high  altitude  and  are  chmatically 
susceptible  to  dense  settlement  by  white  men.  The  white 
men  of  the  Empire  will  undoubtedly  find  a  large  additional 
outlet  in  German  Africa.  The  time  may  come  when  the 
superabundant  inhabitants  of  the  South  African  Union 
will  overflow  into  Ehodesia  and  into  South-West  Africa 
and  eventually  into  German  East  Africa  as  well. 

The  German  colonies  are  frequently  considered  value- 
less by  those  who  regard  merely  present  values.  Land 
is  always  a  speculative  purchase.  Men  who  buy  land 
look  to  future  prices.  With  the  progress  of  civilisation, 
with  the  increase  of  population,  land  will  become  more  and 
more  valuable,  not  only  in  the  moderate  zones,  but  in  the 
tropical  and  sub-tropical  zones  as  well.  From  year  to 
year  the  over-populated  territories  of  Europe  and  of  Asia 
are  less  able  to  support  themselves  with  the  produce  of 
their  own  territories.  From  year  to  year  they  have 
to  go  further  afield  in  search  of  foreign  food  and  raw 
materials,  and  with  the  improvement  of  communica- 
tions and  the  lowering  of  freights,  countries  which 
formerly  exported  Httle  are  becoming  more  and  mor§ 
important  factors  in  the  household  of  over-populated 
Europe  and  of  over-populated  Asia.  When  inland  com- 
munication in  colonial  countries  was  Hmited  to  transport 
by  human  carriers  and  pack  animals,  and  when  shipping 
freights  were  very  high,  only  the  most  valuable  and  the 
least  bulky  produce  could  be  despatched  from  the  far-off 
colonies  to  Europe  and  from  Europe  to  far-off  lands.  At 
that  time  the  most  valuable  articles  of  commerce  were 
spices,  precious  stones,  pearls,  gold,  silver,  silk,  and  to  these 
were  added  later  on  tea,  coffee,  cocoa,  tobacco,  sugar,  and 
other  luxuries.    In  these  times  the  spice  islands  and  the 


THE  GEEMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIRE  'ZlT 

sugar  islands  were  considered  the  most  valuable  possessions. 
Countries  which  produced  timber,  ore,  and  grain,  such  as 
Canada,  the  northern  States  of  America,  and  Argentina 
were  considered  worthless.  From  year  to  year  the  tropics 
are  yielding  larger  quantities  of  food  and  raw  materials  to 
the  over-populated  districts  of  the  world.  Vast  quantities 
of  timber,  ores  and  metals,  of  animal  and  vegetable  fats, 
of  cotton,  coffee,  cocoa,  rubber,  &c.,  are  exported  thence. 
The  tropics  possess  an  inexhaustible  soil.  They  are  nature's 
hothouse.  The  exploitation  of  the  tropical  and  sub-tropical 
countries  has  scarcely  begun.  The  marvellous  develop- 
ments of  the  rubber  industry  shows  how  wonderfully  the 
productivity  of  these  countries  can  be  increased. 

Hitherto  the  German  colonies  have  produced  Httle,  not 
because  they  are  naturally  poor,  but  because  they  were  new 
colonies  and  because  they  were  unskilfully  exploited  by 
a  Government  which  did  not  understand  the  management 
of  colonies.  A  nation  which  desires  to  develop  new  colonies 
must  open  them  up.  It  can  open  them  up  either  by  private 
enterprise,  as  is  done  in  this  country,  or  by  State  action. 
The  German  Government  did  neither.  It  distrusted  private 
enterprise.  It  feared  that  private  men  might  corner  or 
squander  the  natural  resources  of  the  colonies.  Conse- 
quently it  did  not  throw  open  its  colonies  to  the  business 
men  of  the  world,  and  not  even  to  the  German  business  men. 
Everything  had  to  be  done  methodically.  Regulations 
for  every  possible  contingency  were  drafted.  The  land 
was  measured,  explored,  and  described.  Colonial  statistics 
and  colonial  law  codes  were  produced.  The  activities  of 
all  desiring  to  exploit  the  colonies  had  to  be  minutely 
regulated.  The  direction  of  all  the  colonial  activities  was 
jealously  retained  by  the  officials  in  Berlin.  If  a  business 
man  went  to  the  colonies  he  found  that  he  could  not  begin 
operations.  If  he  wished  to  trade  with  the  natives,  to 
build  railways  and  roads,  to  prospect  for  gold  or  copper, 
to  farm,  to  grow  rubber  or  cotton,  he  had  to  apply  for 


218 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 


official  permission.  Months  and  years  had  to  be  spent  in 
disheartening  endeavours  to  convince  the  authorities  of 
the  necessity  of  giving  men  a  free  scope,  of  allowing  them 
to  go  ahead.  Many  Germans  spent  their  all  endeavouring 
to  get  to  work,  and,  being  constantly  hampered  by  insur- 
mountable regulations,  at  last  gave  up  in  despair  and 
returned  to  Germany  heartbroken  and  ruined. 

As  the  Government  did  not  allow  private  men  to  go 
ahead,  and  as  the  Eeichstag  refused  to  vote  sufficient  funds 
for  railway  construction,  &c.,  the  colonies  languished  for 
a  long  time,  stifled  by  red  tape.  At  last,  about  a  decade 
ago,  a  new  spirit  arose.  The  Government  still  refused 
private  people  permission  to  open  up  and  exploit  the  colonies 
in  the  English  style,  but  it  began  opening  them  up  by  means 
of  State  roads  and  railways.  The  progress  made  during 
the  last  few  years  may  be  visualised  by  the  following 
table : 


Kailways  in  the  Geeman  Colonies 


Kilometres 

In  1894 14 

In  1896  . 

40 

In  1898  . 

102 

In  1900  . 

234 

In  1902  . 

466 

In  1904  . 

.   479 

In  1906  . 

1,350 

In  1908  . 

1,988 

In  1910  . 

2,721 

In  1912  . 

•  1 

A 

t 

3,867 

1  /-in  J              1    -4  r\ 

Germany  acquired  her  African  colonies  in  1884  and  1885. 
Within  ten  years  she  had  constructed  only  fourteen  kilo- 
metres, or  eight  miles,  of  railway  for  a  territory  many  times 
larger  than  the  whole  of  Germany  !  The  railway  mileage 
continued  increasing  in  a  ridiculously  slow  and  inadequate 
manner  up  to  the  time  when  a  great  rising  in  the  South- West 


THE  GEKMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIEE 


219 


African  colony  clearly  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  more 
railways,  and  until  Herr  Dernburg,  an  able  and  energetic 
business  man,  became  Colonial  Secretary.  La  1912  the 
gigantic  African  possessions  of  Germany  combined  did  not 
have  as  many  miles  of  railway  as  had  Httle  Switzerland  or 
Western  Australia  or  Ehodesia. 

Absence  of  railways  has  been  largely  responsible  for 
the  unsatisfactory  position  of  the  German  colonies.  With 
the  increase  of  railway  construction  these  colonies  have 
rapidly  advanced,  and  their  progress  shows  that  they  possess 
great  possibihties.  The  progress  of  the  German  colonies 
may  best  be  seen  by  two  tests :  by  their  income  from 
taxation  and  by  their  exports.  Between  1903  and  1913 
the  yield  of  the  taxes  of  East  Africa  has  increased  in  round 
figures  from  £180,000  to  £690,000 ;  that  of  Kamerun 
from  £100,000  to  £450,000  ;  that  of  Togo  from  £55,000  to 
£170,000  ;  that  of  South- West  Africa  from  £110,000  to 
£795,000.  The  increase  in  the  income  furnished  by  the 
German  colonies  is  very  gratifying.  During  the  last  ten 
years,  during  which  the  Government  has  begun  building 
railways  with  some  energy,  the  taxes  provided  by  the 
colonies  have  grown  between  four-  and  five-fold.  Since 
1903  the  exports  of  the  German  African  and  of  the  Pacific 
colonies  have  grown  as  follows  : 


Exports  from 

Exports  from 

German  African 

German  Pacific 

Colonies. 

Colonies. 

1903          ....     £1,084,000 

£194,000 

1904 
1905 

.      £1,041,000 

.     £1,172,000 

£196,000 
£220,000 

1906 

.     £1,276,000 

£282,000 

1907 

.     £1,796,000 

£262,000 

1908 

.     £1,886,000 

£436,000 

1909 

.     £2,913,000 

£567,000 

1910 

.     £4,132,000 

£910,000 

1911 

.     £4,075,000 

£821,000 

220  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

If  we  wish  to  estimate  correctly  the  economic  value  of 
the  German  colonies  we  must  not  only  consider  their  present 
value  but  their  future  possibilities.  We  must  bear  in  mind 
that  the  development  of  these  vast  territories  has  only 
begun  and  has  been  badly  begun. 

The  official  export  statistics  will  tell  us  something  of  the 
productions  of  the  various  colonies.  East  Africa  exports 
chiefly  rubber,  hides  and  skins,  sisal  hemp,  copra,  ivory, 
and  gold  ore.  Kamerun  exports  chiefly  rubber,  palm 
kernels  and  palm  oil,  cocoa,  ivory,  and  timber.  Togo 
exports  chiefly  palm  kernels  and  palm  oil,  rubber,  raw 
cotton,  and  cocoa.  South- West  Africa  exports  chiefly 
diamonds,  copper  ore,  lead,  and  hides  and  skins.  The 
development  of  plantations  has  only  begun,  but  already 
highly  gratifying  results  have  been  achieved.  Experiments 
on  a  considerable  scale  have  shown  that  the  German  African 
colonies  can  furnish  vast  quantities  of  excellent  cotton, 
cocoa,  coffee,  tobacco,  bananas,  rubber,  &c.  Herr  Dern- 
burg  repeatedly  stated  that  he  believed  that  ultimately 
Germany  might  draw  the  bulk  of  the  cotton,  coffee,  cocoa, 
rice,  tobacco,  palm  oil  and  palm  kernels  which  she  needs 
from  her  colonies.  The  German  planters  were  certainly 
extremely  optimistic  as  to  the  possibilities  of  their  industries, 
provided  the  Government  created  the  necessary  facilities 
and  gave  them  a  free  hand. 

How  much  the  German  colonies  have  been  held  back 
by  Government  red  tape  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that 
South- West  Africa's  mineral  production  is  extremely  small, 
although  it  is  a  highly  mineralised  country.  The  diamonds 
which  are  found  there  are  very  small,  but  they  are  of  excellent 
quality.  They  do  not  occur  in  pipes  as  at  Kimberley  and 
elsewhere,  but  are  picked  up  in  the  sand.  Prospectors 
have  tried  to  locate  the  pipe  or  pipes  from  which  they  came, 
but  they  have  not  yet  succeeded  in  finding  their  origin. 
The  small  but  precious  diamonds  are  found  in  an  extensive 
territory.    Consequently  theft  is  easy  and  supervision  is 


THE  GEEMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIKE  221 

difficult.  Nevertheless  the  Government  in  its  wisdom  im- 
posed so  heavy  a  tax  on  diamonds  that  smuggKng  on  a 
large  scale  is  known  to  have  taken  place.  According  to 
the  official  figures  the  diamond  exports  from  South- West 
Africa  come  to  about  £1,300,000  per  year.  Very  possibly 
the  illicit  exports  are  equally  large,  if  not  larger.  The  copper 
and  lead  mines  of  the  country  have  hitherto  yielded  little, 
owing  to  the  Government's  misplaced  economy  on  the 
one  hand  and  to  its  policy  of  strangulation  on  the  other. 
As  soon  as  South- West  Africa  and  the  other  German  colonies 
are  thrown  open  to  the  enterprising  and  the  industrious, 
and  are  administered  in  a  reasonable  and  generous  manner 
as  are  the  other  English  colonies,  a  wonderful  development 
will  take  place.  Their  production  will  increase  many  fold 
in^a  few  years. 

The  German  bureaucracy  has  not  only  hampered  the 
colonists  with  innumerable  vexatious  restrictions,  but  has  at 
the  same  time  overburdened  them  with  taxes.  Animated 
by  the  ambition  to  create  model  colonies,  to  show  the  world 
how  to  colonise,  German  officials  have  tried  to  create  another 
Germany  in  the  wilds.  Magnificent  and  substantial  but 
empty  towns  have  been  laid  out,  huge  schools  and  pubhc 
buildings  have  been  erected,  monuments  and  statues  have 
been  raised,  parks  and  public  gardens  have  been  created. 
Money  was  wasted  in  every  direction  on  unnecessary  osten- 
tation, and  a  huge  body  of  officials  was  maintained  so  that 
everybody  should  be  registered  and  labelled,  that  everything 
in  the  German  colonies  should  be  exactly  as  in  Germany. 
The  pubhc  buildings  in  the  budding  German  colonies  are 
among  the  finest  in  the  world. 

To  develop  colonies  two  factors  are  required  :  accessi- 
bihty  and  labour.  The  German  Government,  until  recently, 
did  not  understand  the  importance  of  either.  It  neglected 
the  building  of  railways  and  at  the  same  time  exterminated 
the  natives.  The  German  Government  embarked  somewhat 
half-heartedly  upon  colonisation.    Men  who  had  disgraced 


222  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

themselves  in  Germany  and  who  had  become  impossible 
in  their  own  comitry  were  given  official  positions  in  the 
colonies.  Many  of  the  early  administrators  were  brutes 
and  drunkards  who  disgraced  themselves  by  the  most 
infamous  illtreatment  of  the  natives.  Several  of  these  men, 
such  as  Messrs.  Leist,  Wehlan,  Peters,  and  Prince  Arenberg, 
have  acquired  European  notoriety.  The  Imperial  Govern- 
ment winked  at  the  misdeeds  of  its  official  representatives. 
Peters  was  dismissed  in  1897  for  fearful  cruelty,  but  was 
reinstated  in  1905.  German  barbarity  and  inhumanity 
naturally  led  to  the  revolt  of  the  natives  and  this  to  their 
slaughter  by  their  taskmasters.  In  all  colonies  great 
massacres  occurred.  That  poHcy  was  particularly  fatal 
to  South- West  Africa,  Germany's  richest  colony.  There, 
as  in  other  parts  of  Africa,  German  representatives  found 
quarrelUng  negro  tribes,  and  they  insinuated  themselves 
by  offering  to  some  of  the  chiefs  protection  against  their 
enemies.  Treaties  of  protection  were  concluded.  Pro- 
tection was  paid  for  by  the  cession  of  vast  stretches  of 
valuable  land,  but  when  the  natives  asked  for  protection 
in  accordance  with  the  wording  of  the  treaty  it  was  often 
refused  to  them.  Treaties  between  Germany  and  the  natives 
were  amended  by  new  paragraphs  whereby  further  stretches 
of  land  were  taken  from  them  without  their  consent.  In- 
stead of  protecting  them  against  their  enemies  as  they  had 
promised,  the  Germans  sometimes  furnished  the  natives 
with  arms  and  afterwards  demanded  that  these  arms  should 
be  given  up  again.  When  the  natives  resisted,  as  was  only 
natural,  war  was  made  on  them  without  mercy,  and  their 
property  was  taken.  In  consequence  of  that  policy  and  of 
the  cruelties  and  extortions  practised  with  impunity  by 
numerous  individual  traders.  South- West  Africa  was  fre- 
quently in  a  state  of  war.  In  1893  and  1894  Germany 
was  at  war  with  the  Hottentots  under  Hendrik  Witboi. 
In  1896  the  Khauas  Hottentots  and  Hereros  revolted. 
During  1897  and    1898   Germany  fought   the   Zwartbooi 


THE  GEEMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIEE  223 

Hottentots.  La  1903  the  Bondelzwarts  rose.  In  1904  a 
great  rising  of  the  Hereros  occurred.  It  took  the  German 
Government  three  years  to  subdue  them  by  a  miHtary  force 
which  at  one  time  approximated  20,000,  and  the  campaign 
cost  about  £20,000,000.  Before  this  terrible  campaign 
South- West  Africa,  which  is  more  than  50  per  cent,  larger 
than  the  whole  German  Empire,  was,  according  to  official 
estimates,  inhabited  by  200,000  natives.  According  to  the 
latest  official  figures  there  are  at  present  in  South- West 
Africa  only  82,000  natives.  During  three  years  of  war  more 
than  half  the  natives  were  exterminated.  As  some  of  the 
native  tribes  did  not  rise,  the  Hereros  were  the  chief  sufferers. 
They  almost  disappeared.  Men  of  all  ages,  women  and 
children  were  slaughtered  or  driven  into  the  waterless 
desert,  where  they  died  of  thirst.  The  character  of 
Germany's  campaign  will  become  apparent  from  a  pro- 
clamation of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  General  von  Trotha, 
issued  on  October  2,  1904,  which  was  worded  as  follows  : 

I,  the  great  General  of  the  German  soldiers,  send  this 
letter  to  the  Herero  nation.  The  Hereros  are  no  longer 
German  subjects.  They  have  murdered  and  robbed,  they 
have  cut  ofi  the  ears  and  noses  and  other  members  of 
wounded  soldiers,  and  now  they  are  too  cowardly  to  fight. 
Therefore,  I  say  to  the  people  :  Whosoever  brings  one  of 
the  chiefs  as  a  prisoner  to  one  of  my  stations  shall  receive 
1000  marks,  and  for  Samuel  Maherero  I  will  pay  5000 
marks.  The  Herero  nation  must  now  leave  the  country. 
If  the  people  do  it  not,  I  will  compel  them  with  the  big 
gun.  Within  the  German  frontier,  every  Herero  with  or 
without  a  rifle,  with  or  without  cattle,  will  be  shot.  I 
will  not  take  over  any  more  women  and  children,  but  I 
will  either  drive  them  back  to  their  people  or  have  them 
fired  on.    These  are  my  words  to  the  nation  of  the  Hereros. 

The  great  General  of  the  mighty  Emperor, 

VoN  Trotha. 


224  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Owing  to  the  cruelty  and  folly  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment and  its  colonial  representatives  innumerable  natives 
have  been  killed,  and  South- West  Africa  has  suffered  par- 
ticularly through  the  reduction  of  native  workers.  After 
the  war  the  Germans  endeavoured  to  increase  the  popula- 
tion from  the  neighbouring  countries.  Many  Boers  were 
attracted  to  South- West  Africa  by  lavish  promises,  but  they 
did  not  like  the  dictatorial  ways  of  the  officials  and  the 
bureaucratic  restrictions  which  circumscribed  their  activities 
in  every  direction,  and  they  left  very  soon.  The  Germans 
had  acquired  so  bad  a  reputation  through  their  ill-treatment 
of  natives  that  many  natives  left  South- West  Africa,  and 
the  natives  of  the  surrounding  countries  refused  to  work 
on  German  territory. 

South- West  Africa  is  an  ideal  country  for  raising  sheep, 
goats,   and   cattle.     According  to   a   statement   made   by 
Professor  Hahn,  of  Capetown  University,  before  the  German 
Budget    Commission,    South- West    Africa    had    2,000,000 
cattle,  but  their  number  was  greatly  reduced  by  the  rinder- 
pest.   According  to  him  the  south  of  the  colony  is  as 
favourable  for  raising  sheep  and  goats  as  is  Cape  Colony. 
The  animals   kept  in   South- West  Africa  have  increased 
during  the  last  few  years  at  a  remarkabiy  rapid  rate.    Be- 
tween 1907  and  1912  cattle  have  increased  from  52,531  to 
171,784,  wool  sheep  from  3526  to  46,901,  other  sheep  from 
98,069  to  440,000,  goats  from  99,663  to  448,279.    Lately 
the  raising  of  ostriches  has  been  begun.    However,  farming, 
the  raising  of  animals,  and  the  pursuit  of  mining  have  been 
severely  hampered  by  the  absence  of  native  workers.     The 
fact  that  notwithstanding  the  scarcity  of  native  labour, 
numerous    devastating    wars,    absence    of    railways,    and 
innumerable  governmental   restrictions.  South- West  Africa 
has  developed  as  rapidly  as  it  has  done,  that  taxation 
and  exports  have  enormously  increased  in  a  short  number 
of  years,  proves  that  the  country  is  a  valuable  one,  and  that 
its  possibiHties  are  very  great.    That  impression  is  con- 


THE  GEKMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIEE  226 

firmed  by  the  emigration  of  Germans  to  South- West  Africa. 
South- West  Africa  contained  on  January  1,  1912,  12,135 
Germans,  of  whom  2533  were  mihtary  and  police.  In  other 
words,  it  had  almost  10,000  bona  fide  German  inhabitants, 
or  more  than  twice  as  many  as  all  the  other  German  colonies 
combined. 

The  absence  of  natives  has  great  disadvantages,  but 
it  has  also  great  compensating  advantages.  The  scarcity 
of  natives  compelled  the  Germans  to  treat  South- West 
Africa  more  or  less  as  a  white  man's  land.  The  German 
farmers  who  have  settled  in  the  country  have  shown  that 
white  men  can  work  there.  Possibly  South- West  Africa 
may  remain  a  white  man's  land,  containing  a  few  thousand 
natives,  possibly  numerous  native  labourers  will  be  intro- 
duced. At  any  rate,  the  authorities  will  have  the  great 
advantage  of  an  almost  empty  country,  where  they  can  do 
more  or  less  what  they  like  without  fear  of  race  friction 
and  of  native  risings.  That  is  a  very  unusual  position  in 
South  Africa,  and  it  may  lead  to  some  exceedingly  valuable 
experiments. 

The  present  value  of  the  German  colonies  may  be  small. 
They  have  caused  a  yearly  loss  to  Germany  because  the 
home  Government  simultaneously  stifled  private  enterprise 
and  spent  money  lavishly  in  the  colonies  on  unnecessary 
of&cials,  on  costly  buildings,  and  on  railways  and  other 
undertakings  which  private  capital  might  have  provided. 
As  soon  as  the  German  colonies  are  freed  from  their  German 
shackles  and  as  soon  as  peace  has  returned  they  will  be 
self-supporting,  and  before  long  they  should  be  exceedingly 
flourishing.  After  all,  one  must  look  at  colonies  and 
possessions,  not  from  the  narrow  point  of  the  individual, 
who  hves  only  for  a  short  number  of  years,  but  from  that 
of  the  nation  and  the  race  which  should  Hve  for  ever, 
Canada,  Australia,  and  South  Africa,  which  were  almost 
worthless  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  are  now  the  most  valuable 
assets  of  the  British  race.    It  would  have  been  the  greatest 

Q 


226  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

calamity  to  the  race  if  these  vast  territories  had  fallen 
into  other  hands.  The  German  colonies  may  appear  to 
be  of  little  value  at  the  moment,  and  their  present  com- 
mercial value  may  be  small,  but  a  century  and  a  half  hence 
they  also  may  become  priceless  assets  of  the  nation  and 
the  race.  Statesmen,  in  considering  values,  must  not 
apply  to  them  the  short-sighted  views  of  a  private  man, 
who  desires  that  he  and  his  children  should  financially 
benefit  by  his  acquisitions.  They  must  look  at  territories 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  nation  and  race,  which  should 
be  immortal. 

The  German  colonies  possess  not  only  a  substantial 
immediate  and  a  very  large  future  economic  value.  They 
are  at  the  same  time  exceedingly  important  from  the 
strategical  point  of  view.  Modem  Germany  has  not  grown 
naturally,  almost  automatically,  like  a  tree,  like  the  British 
Empire.  It  has  been  made  by  great  warrior-monarchs ; 
it  has  grown  by  conquest.  Modem  Germany  has  been 
created,  not  by  statesmen,  but  by  soldiers.  Bismarck 
had  high  military  talents.  His  policy  was  a  military  policy, 
He  pursued  his  diplomatic  campaigns  from  the  military 
point  of  view,  and  military  considerations  largely  influenced 
his  colonial  policy  as  well.  He  was  a  conqueror.  His 
aim  and  that  of  his  successors  was  not  merely  to  create 
and  maintain  struggling  colonies  on  the  west  coast  and 
the  east  coast  of  Africa,  but  to  acquire  all  South  Africa  for 
Germany.  From  Bismarck's  conversations  and  numerous 
confidential  letters  we  know  that  he  wished  Germany  to 
stretch  out  a  hand  towards  the  Boers,  and  to  expel  the 
British  from  South  Africa  with  their  assistance.  His 
attempts  at  effecting  military  settlements  in  Africa  began 
soon  after  the  Franco-German  War  and  many  years  before 
Germany  acquired  her  first  colony. 

It  was  Germany's  plan  to  link  up  her  colonies  in  West 
Africa  and  in  East  Africa,  and  thus  to  isolate  the  Cape 
and  to  get  into  direct  contact  with  the  Transvaal.    That 


THE  GEKMAN  COLONIAL  EMPIEE  227 

attempt  was  prevented  by  Cecil  Ehodes.  Ehodesia 
was  made  to  separate  German  South- West  Africa  from 
German  East  Africa.  The  development  of  Ehodesia  and 
of  the  other  British  territories  lying  east  of  German  South- 
West  Africa  was  greatly  hampered,  because  no  direct  outlet 
to  the  sea  could  be  secured  by  way  of  the  German  territory. 
The  expulsion  of  Germany  from  her  African  colonies  will 
stimulate  and  facilitate  the  development  of  the  neighbouring 
English  and  other  colonies.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  German  colonies  will  free  the  British  possessions 
of  great  dangers.  From  South- West  Africa  the  neigh- 
bouring British  possessions  could  be  threatened.  For 
many  years  intrigues  were  carried  on  in  which  South- West 
Africa  was  to  serve  as  a  German  base  of  attack.  Strategical 
railways  were  built  suitable  for  an  attack  on  the  Cape ; 
troops  were  demonstratively  collected ;  the  soldiers  who 
had  fought  against  the  Hereros  were  settled  in  the  country. 
Germany's  occupation  of  South- West  Africa  was  no  doubt 
in  part  responsible  for  the  Boer  War. 

If  South- West  Africa  had  remained  German,  a  prosperous 
and  populous  colony  would  have  arisen.  Another  Germany, 
another  nation  in  arms,  would  have  been  created  close  to 
Cape  Colony.  All  South  Africa  would  have  become  an 
armed  camp.  Germany  would  have  endeavoured  to 
accumulate  in  South- West  Africa  vast  stores  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  which,  in  case  of  war,  might  have  been  handed 
over  either  to  German  reservists  from  South  America 
and  elsewhere  who  might  have  been  sent  to  that  colony 
or  to  the  natives  for  use  against  the  British  settlers.  That 
danger  is  gone.  General  Botha's  campaign  was  extremely 
difi&cult  and  very  glorious.  In  future  years  it  would  have 
been  infinitely  more  difi&cult,  and  it  would  have  cost  untold 
lives  and  hundreds  of  millions.  The  successful  campaign 
against  South- West  Africa  is  extremely  valuable,  because 
General  Botha's  victory  has  destroyed  a  centre  of  intrigue 
and  unrest  whence  mischief  might  have  been  done,  not  only 

Q2 


228    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

in  South  Africa,  but  in  all  parts  of  the  British  and  of  the 
French  colonial  empires.  Had  South- West  Africa  not  been 
taken  the  natives  in  Asia  and  in  Africa  would  have  been 
told  that  Germany  was  dominating  Africa  ;  that  she  would 
drive  the  English  and  French  out  of  the  country ;  that,  at  any 
rate,  France  and  England  were  there  by  Germany's  per- 
mission. The  conflagration  might  have  spread  much  farther. 


CHAPTER  IX 

EXPOSE  DU  GOUVEKNEMENT  PRUSSIEN  DES  PRINCIPES  STJR 
LESQUELS  IL  ROULE,  AVEC  QUELQUES  REFLEXIONS 
POLITIQUES  ^ 

Pour  se  faire  une  idee  generale  de  ce  gouvemement  il 
faut  examiner  en  detail  toutes  les  branches  du  gouveme- 
ment, et  puis  les  combiner  ensemble. 

Je  commence  par  les  finances,  qui  sont  comme  les  nerfs 
dans  le  corps  humain,  qui  font  mouvoir  tous  les  membres. 

Depuis  la  guerre,  les  revenus  de  I'Etat  ont  ete  pro- 
digieusement  augmentes,  savoir:  d'un  million  deux  cent 
mille  ecus  par  I'acquisition  de  la  Pomerellie,  un  million 
de  tabac,  cent  mille  de  la  banque,  cinquante  mille  du  bois, 
quatre  cent  mille  des  accises  et  peages,  cent  trente  mille  du 
sel  de  Schonebeck,  cinquante-six  mille  du  loto,  au  dela  de 
deux  cent  mille  ecus  par  les  nouveaux  taux  des  bailliages, 
cent  mille  ecus  des  bois ;  de  sorte  qu'a  present  le  total 
des  revenus  monte  a  vingt  et  un  millions  sept  cent  mille 
ecus,  dont,  outre  toutes  les  autres  depenses  de  I'Etat  ac- 
quittees,  cent  quatre- vingt-sept  mille  soldats  sont  entretenus. 
Les  depenses  decomptees,  il  reste  tous  les  ans  cinq  milKons 
sept  cent  mille  ecus,  dont  jusqu'ici  deux  millions  ont  ete 
annuellement  deposes  dans  le  tresor,  et  trois  millions  sept 
cent  mille  ecus  ont  ete  employes,  soit  aux  fortifications,  soit 
aux  ameliorations  du  pays,  soit  pour  reparer  des  malheurs, 
ainsi  qu'en  subsides  pour  les  Busses  et  en  batiments.    Mais 

1  This  is  the  famous  political  testament  of  1776* 


230  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

la  destination  de  ces  cinq  millions  sept  cent  mille,  en  temps 
de  guerre,  est  pour  payer  les  extraordinaires  des  campagnes, 
qui  montent  chaque  annee  k  onze  millions,  de  sorte  que, 
cinq  millions  sept  cent  mille  decomptes,  reste  a  ajouter 
annuellement  la  somme  de  cinq  millions  trois  cent  mille 
ecus.  Cette  somme  doit  etre  prise  du  tresor,  qui  est  fourni 
de  dix-neuf  millions  trois  cent  mille  ecus,  outre  quatre 
milKons  trois  cent  mille  ecus,  ce  qu'on  appelle  le  petit 
tresor  destine  k  rendre  I'armee  mobile.  Nous  avons  encore, 
d'ailleurs,  quatre  millions  deux  cent  mille  a  Breslau,  tout 
prets  pour  acheter  et  ammasser  les  fourrages  pour  une 
armee  de  soixante  mille  hommes,  et  neuf  cent  mille  dans 
la  banque  pour  acheter  du  fourrage  pour  six  semaines  k 
Magdebourg ;  en  outre,  la  caisse  de  guerre  doit  avoir  onze 
millions  pour  pouvoir  payer  en  temps  de  guerre  les  regiments 
d'avance ;  quatre  millions  s'y  trouvent  dej4,  les  autres 
y  seront  dans  trois  ans.  Mais  il  faut  remarquer  que  si 
Ton  veut  puiser  tous  les  extraordinaires  de  guerre  du  tresor, 
on  ne  pourra  durer  que  quatre  campagnes,  ce  qui  fait  que 
de  necessite  il  faut  s'emparer  de  la  Saxe,  menager  le  plus 
que  Ton  pent  le  tresor,  qui  ne  doit  servir  proprement  qu'a 
remplir  le  vide  de  quelques  provinces  envahies  par  I'ennemi. 
Voil^  le  fond  des  choses,  qui  demontre  qu'il  faut  user  de 
la  plus  grande  economie  pour  avoir  le  dernier  ecu  en  poche 
lorsqu'on  negocie  la  paix.  Get  argent,  ces  deux  millions 
qui  sortent  tous  les  ans  de  la  circulation  en  entrant  dans 
le  tresor,  paraitront  une  somme  tres- considerable ;  mais 
ce  qui  justifie  cette  operation,  c'est  que  la  balance  de  com- 
merce est  en  faveur  de  I'Etat  de  quatre  millions  quatre 
cent  mille  ecus,  de  sorte  que  la  circulation  des  especes 
augmente  encore  dans  le  public  annuellement  de  deux 
millions  quatre  cent  mille  ecus.  Cette  balance  etait  contre 
la  Prusse  a  la  mort  du  feu  roi,  oil  la  monarchie  perdait 
annuellement  cinq  cent  mille  ecus  par  les  importations. 
J'ai  trouve  moyen,  en  etablissant  beaucoup  de  manu- 
factures, et  surtout  a  I'aide  de  la  Silesie,  de  la  mettre  sur 


EXPOSE  DES  PEINCIPES  231 

I'etat  que  je  viens  d'annoncer.  C'est  pourquoi  il  ne  faut 
pas  perdre  les  manufactures  de  vue ;  par  leur  moyen, 
cette  balance  peut  encore  s'augmenter  dans  nos  possessions 
actuelles  de  quelques  cent  mille  ecus.  Mais  ce  qui  importe 
surtout,  c'est  de  conserver  le  bon  ordre  etabli  maintenant 
pour  la  regie  des  deniers  publics  et  la  surveillance  sur 
toutes  les  caisses;  sans  quoi  le  peuple  paye  beaucoup 
et  le  souverain  est  vole. 

Des  Magasins 

II  y  a  ici  un  magasin  de  trente  six  mille  winspels,  dont 
on  peut  nourrir  un  an  une  armee  de  soixante  mille  hommes  ; 
il  y  a  un  magasin  pareil  en  Silesie  pour  le  meme  nombre 
de  troupes,  et  d'ailleurs  un  fonds  de  deux  millions  pour 
acheter  des  grains  de  la  Pologne ;  ce  qui  pourra  foumir 
cent  vingt  mille  winspels,  par  le  moyen  desquels  le  pays 
sera  k  I'abri  de  toute  famine,  et,  en  cas  de  guerre,  avec  le 
ble  qu'il  y  a  deja,  on  aura  de  quoi  faire  trois  campagnes. 

De  Waetenberg 

Wartenberg  a  tous  les  ans  quatre  cent  quarante  mille 
6cus  d'epargne,  qui  sont  employes  en  partie  pour  les 
armes,  pour  augmenter  son  dep6t,  en  partie  pour  I'artillerie, 
dont  on  a  construit  les  canons  pour  la  nouvelle  forteresse 
de  Silesie,  et  une  reserve,  a  laquelle  on  travaille  encore 
^  present,  de  quatre  cents  canons  de  reserve  pour  la 
campagne. 

De  l'Armee 

La  situation  de  cet  Etat  nous  oblige  d'entretenir  beau- 
coup  de  troupes,  car  nos  voisins  sont  TAutriche,  la  Eussie, 
la  France  et  la  Suede.  Le  pied  de  guerre  est  de  deux  cent 
vingt  mille  hommes,  y  compris  les  bataillons  francs  et 
r augmentation  dans  la  cavalerie.    De  ce  nombre  on  pourra 


232    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

mettre  en  campagne  cent  quatre-vingt  mille  hommes ; 
mais  des  qu'il  faut  former  trois  armees,  il  saute  aux  yeux 
que  nous  n'en  avons  pas  trop  en  comparaison  de  nos  voisins. 
Je  crois  que  la  discipline  doit  rester  sur  le  pied  ou  elle  se 
trouve,  ainsi  que  les  evolutions  introduites,  a  moins  que 
la  guerre  ne  change,  car  alors  il  n'y  a  de  parti  qu'a  se  plier 
aux  circonstances  et  a  changer  avec  elles  ;  mais  pour  egaler 
les  enemies  ou  les  surpasser  il  faut  que  ce  soit  par  I'ordre  et 
par  la  discipline,  encourager  les  officiers  et  les  distinguer, 
pour  qu'une  noble  emulation  les  porte  k  surpasser  leurs 
adversaires  qu'il  ont  k  combattre.  Si  le  souverain  ne 
se  mele  pas  lui-meme  du  militaire,  et  s'il  n'en  donne  pas 
I'exemple,  tout  est  fini.  Si  Ton  prefere  les  faineants  de 
cour  au  miUtaire,  on  verra  que  tout  le  monde  preferera 
cette  faineantise  au  laborieux  metier  des  armes,  et  alors,  au 
lieu  que  nos  officiers  sont  nobles,  il  faudra  avoir  recours 
aux  roturiers,  ce  qui  serait  le  premier  pas  vers  la  decad- 
ence et  la  chute  de  I'armee.  Nous  n'avons  a  present  que 
soixante-dix  citoyens  par  compagnie ;  il  ne  faut  point 
s'ecarter  de  ce  principe,  pour  menager  le  pays,  qui,  par 
I'augmentation  de  la  population,  pourra  fournir  des  res- 
sources  ou  recrues,  si  la  guerre  le  rend  necessaire.  Les 
forteresses  sont  en  bon  etat,  a  1' exception  de  Stettin,  dont 
le  plan  est  tout  fait.  II  faudrait  miner  toute  I'enceinte  de 
Magdebourg.  La  partie  dans  laquelle  nous  sommes  le 
plus  faibles  est  celle  du  genie.  II  nous  faudrait  encore  trente 
bons  officiers  ingenieurs  ;  mais  la  difficulte  est  de  les  trouver. 
Les  mineurs  sont  bons.  II  faudrait  egalement  augmenter 
le  nombre  des  quartiers-maitres,  parce  que,  suppose  trois 
armees,  leur  service  demande  plus  d'habiles  gens  que  nous 
n'en  avons.  Notre  population  est  de  cinq  millions  deux 
cent  mille  ames,  dont  quatre-vingt- dix  mille  a  peu  pres 
sont  soldats.  Cette  proportion  pent  aller ;  mais  il  ne  faut 
pas  que  Ton  prenne  des  cantons  plus  de  huit  cent  quarante 
par  regiment  d'infanterie  et  quatre  cents  par  regiment 
de  cavalerie. 


EXPOSE  DES  PRINCIPES  233 

Db  la  Politique 

Un  des  premiers  principes  de  la  politique  est  de  tacher 
de  s'allier  a  celui  de  ses  voisins  qui  peut  porter  a  I'Etat 
les  coups  les  plus  dangereux.  C'est  par  cette  raison  que 
nous  sommes  en  alliance  avec  la  Eussie,  parce  qu'elle 
nous  rend  le  dos  libre  de  c6te  de  la  Prusse,  et  que,  tant 
que  cette  liaison  dure,  nous  n'avons  pas  a  craindre  que 
la  Suede  ose  nous  attaquer  en  Pomeranie.  Les  temps 
peuvent  changer,  et  la  bizarrerie  des  conjonctures  peut 
obliger  a  prendre  d'autres  engagements ;  mais  jamais  on 
ne  trouvera  avec  les  autres  puissances  1' equivalent  des 
avantages  que  Ton  trouve  avec  la  Eussie.  Les  troupes 
fran9aises  ne  valent  rien,  et  les  Frangais  sont  accoutumes 
a  ne  secourir  que  faiblement  leurs  allies ;  et  les  Anglais, 
faits  pour  payer  des  subsides,  sacrifient  leurs  allies,  a  la  paix, 
pour  favoriser  leurs  propres  interets.  Je  ne  parle  point 
de  la  maison  d'Autriche,  avec  laquelle  il  parait  presque 
impossible  que  des  liens  solides  se  forment.  S'il  s'agit 
des  vues  politiques  d'acquisition  qui  conviennent  a  cette 
monarchie,  les  Etats  de  la  Saxe  sont  sans  contredit 
ceux  qui  lui  conviendraient  le  mieux,  en  I'arrondissant  et 
lui  formant  une  barriere  par  les  montagnes  qui  separent  la 
Saxe  de  la  Boheme,  et  qu'il  faudrait  fortifier.  II  est  difficile 
de  prevoir  comment  cette  acquisition  pourrait  se  faire. 
La  maniere  la  plus  sure  serait  de  conquerir  la  Boheme 
et  la  Moravie,  et  de  les  troquer  avec  la  Saxe ;  soit  enfin 
que  cela  put  s'operer  par  d'autres  trocs  ou  des  possessions 
du  Ehin,  en  y  ajoutant  Juliers  ou  Berg,  ou  de  quelque 
fagon  que  cela  se  fasse.  Cette  acquisition  est  d'une  necessite 
indispensable  pour  donner  a  cet  Etat  la  consistance  dont 
il  manque.  Car,  des  qu'on  est  en  guerre,  I'ennemi  peut 
avancer  de  plain  pied  jusqu'a  Berlin  sans  trouver  la  moindre 
opposition  dans  son  chemin.  Je  ne  parle  pas,  d'ailleurs, 
de  nos  droits  de  succession  au  pays  d'Ansbach,  JuHers  et 
Berg,  et  le  Mecklenbourg,  parce  que  ce  sont  des  pretentions 


234  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

connues,  et  dont  il  faut  attendre  revenement.  Comme 
I'Etat  n'est  pas  riche,  il  faut  se  garder  sur  toute  chose  de 
se  meler  dans  des  guerres  ou  il  n'y  a  rien  a  gagner,  parce 
qu'on  s'epuise  k  pure  perte,  et  qu'une  bonne  occasion 
arrivant  ensuite,  on  n'en  saurait  pas  profiter.  Toutes  les 
acquisitions  eloignees  sont  k  charge  a  un  Etat.  Un  village 
sur  la  frontiere  vaut  mieux  qu'une  principaute  k  soixante 
lieues.  C'est  une  attention  necessaire  de  cacher  autant 
qu'il  est  possible  ses  desseins  d'ambition,  et,  si  Ton  peut, 
de  reveiller  I'envie  de  I'Europe  contre  d'autres  puissances, 
a  la  faveur  de  quoi  Ton  frappe  son  coup.  Cela  peut  arriver, 
et  la  maison  d'Autriche,  dont  I'ambition  va  le  visage 
demasque,  s'attirera  de  reste  I'envie  et  la  jalousie  des 
grandes  puissances.  Le  secret  est  une  vertu  essentielle  pour 
la  pohtique  aussi  bien  que  pour  I'art  de  la  guerre. 

De  la  Justice 

Les  lois  sont  assez  sagement  faites  dans  ce  pays.  Je 
ne  crois  pas  qu'on  ait  besoin  d'y  retoucher  ;  mais  il  faut  que 
tous  les  trois  ans  il  se  fasse  une  visite  des  tribunaux  des 
provinces,  pour  qu'il  y  ait  des  surveillants  qui  s'informent 
de  la  conduite  des  juges  et  des  avocats,  que  Ton  punit 
quand  on  les  trouve  en  defaut.  Mais  comme  les  parties  et 
les  avocats  tachent  d'eluder  les  meilleures  lois,  il  est  necessaire 
que  tous  les  vingt  ans  on  examine  par  quel  raf&nement  ils 
allongent  les  proces,  et  qu'on  leur  mette  des  barrieres,  comme 
on  a  fait  a  present,  pour  ne  pas  prolonger  les  proems,  ce 
qui  ruine  les  parties. 

Combination  du  Total  du  Gouveknement 

Comme  le  pays  est  pauvre,  et  qu'il  n'a  gufere  de  res- 
sources,  c'est  une  chose  necessaire  que  le  Souverain  ait 
toujours  un  tresor  bien  muni,  pour  soutenir  au  moins 
quelques    campagnes.    Les    seules    ressources    qu'il   peut 


EXPOSE  DES  PEINCIPES  235 

trouver  dans  le  besoin  consistent  dans  un  emprunt  de  cinq 
millions  de  la  Landschaft,  et  a  pen  pres  quatre  millions 
qu'il  pourra  tirer  du  credit  de  la  ban  que ;  mais  voila  tout. 
II  a  a  la  verite  en  temps  de  paix  cinq  millions  sept  cent 
mille  dont  il  pent  disposer ;  mais  la  plupart  de  cet  argent 
doit,  ou  entrer  dans  le  tresor,  ou  etre  employe  a  des  usages 
publics,  comme  forteresses,  ameliorations,  manufactures, 
canaux,  defrichements,  forteresses,  batisses  de  villes  dont  on 
fait  en  pierre  les  maisons  qui  sont  en  bois,  le  tout  pour  rendre 
la  constitution  de  I'Etat  plus  solide.  Ces  raisons  que  je  viens 
d'alleguer  exigent  que  le  souverain  de  ce  pays  soit  econome 
et  homme  qui  tienne  le  plus  grand  ordre  dans  ses  affaires. 
Une  raison  aussi  valable  que  la  premiere  s'y  joint  encore ; 
c'est  que  s'il  donne  I'exemple  de  la  profusion,  ses  sujets, 
qui  sont  pauvres,  veulent  Fimiter  et  se  ruinent.  II  faut 
surtout,  pour  le  soutien  des  mceurs,  que  les  distinctions  soient 
uniquement  pour  le  merite  et  non  pas  pour  les  richesses  ; 
ce  principe  mal  observe  en  France  a  perdu  les  moeurs  de 
la  nation,  qui  autrefois  ne  connaissait  que  le  chemin  de 
I'honneur  pour  parvenir  k  la  gloire,  et  qui  croit  a  present 
qu'il  suffit  d'etre  riche  pour  etre  honore.  Comme  les 
guerres  sont  un  gouffre  ou  les  hommes  s'abiment,  il  faut 
avoir  I'ceil  a  ce  que  le  pays  se  peuple  autant  que  possible, 
d'ou  il  resulte  encore  un  autre  bien,  c'est  que  les  campagnes 
en  sont  mieux  cultivees  et  les  possesseurs  mieux  a  leur 
aise.  Je  ne  crois  point  que  dans  ce  pays  on  doive  jamais 
se  laisser  persuader  de  former  une  marine  militaire.  En 
voici  les  raisons.  II  y  a  en  Europe  de  grandes  marines, 
savoir :  celle  d'Angleterre,  celle  de  France,  d'Espagne, 
de  Danemark  et  de  la  Kussie.  Jamais  nous  ne  pourrons 
les  egaler ;  ainsi,  avec  quelques  vaisseaux,  demeurant 
toujours  inferieurs  a  d'autres  nations,  la  depense  serait 
inutile.  Ajoutez  que,  pour  tenir  une  flotte,  I'argent  qu'elle 
couterait  nous  obligerait  de  reformer  des  troupes  de  terre ; 
que  le  pays  n'est  pas  assez  peuple  pour  fournir  des  recrues 
a  Tarmee  et  des  matelots  pour  les  vaisseaux,  et  enfin  que 


236  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

les  batailles  de  mer  sont  rarement  decisives  ;  d'ou  je  conclus 
qu'il  vaut  mieux  avoir  la  premiere  armee  de  I'Europe  que 
la  plus  mauvaise  flotte  des  puissances  maritimes. 

La  politique  doit  porter  ses  vues  aussi  loin  qu'elle  peut 
dans  I'avenir,  et  juger  des  conjonctures  de  I'Europe,  soit 
pour  former  des  alliances,  soit  pour  contrecarrer  les  projets 
de  ses  ennemis.  II  ne  faut  pas  croire  qu'elle  peut  amener 
les  evenements ;  mais  quand  ils  se  presentent,  elle  doit  les 
saisir  pour  en  profiter.  Voila  pourquoi  les  finances  doivent 
etre  en  ordre.  C'est  par  cette  raison  que  de  I'argent  doit 
etre  en  reserve  pour  que  le  gouvernement  soit  pret  d'agir 
sitdt  que  les  raisons  politiques  lui  en  indiquent  le  moment. 
La  guerre  meme  doit  etre  conduite  sur  les  principes  de 
la  politique,  pour  porter  les  coups  les  plus  sanglants  ^ 
ses  ennemis.  C'etait  sur  ces  principes  qu'agissait  le  prince 
Eugene  qui  a  rendu  son  nom  immortel  par  la  marche  et 
la  bataille  de  Turin,  par  celles  de  Hochstadt  et  de  Belgrad. 
Les  grands  projects  de  campagne  ne  reussissent  pas  tous ; 
mais  quand  ils  sont  vastes,  il  en  resulte  toujours  plus 
d'avantages  que  par  ces  petits  projets  ou  Ton  se  borne  a 
la  prise  d'une  bicoque  sur  les  frontieres.  Voil^  comma 
le  comte  de  Saxe  ne  donna  la  bataille  de  Kocoux  que  pour 
pouvoir  executer  I'hiver  d'apres  son  dessein  sur  Bruxelles, 
qui  lui  reussit. 

II  est  evident,  par  tout  ce  que  je  viens  de  dire,  que  la 
politique,  le  militaire  et  les  finances  sont  des  branches  si 
etroitement  liees  ensemble,  qu'elles  ne  sauraient  etre  separees. 
II  faut  les  mener  de  front,  et  de  leur  combinaison,  assujettie 
aux  regies  de  la  bonne  politique,  resultent  les  plus  grand 
avantages  pour  les  Etats.  En  France,  il  y  a  un  roi  qui 
dirige  chaque  branche  a  part.  C'est  le  ministre  qui  preside, 
soit  aux  finances,  soit  a  la  guerre,  soit  aux  affaires  etrangeres. 
Mais  le  point  de  ralliement  manque  et  ces  branches,  n'etant 
pas  reunies,  divergent,  et  les  ministres  ne  sont  chacun 
occupes  que  des  details  de  leur  departement,  sans  que 
personne  reunisse  a  un  but  fixe  I'objet  de  leurs  travaux. 


EXPOSE  DES  PKINCIPES  237 

Si  pareille  chose  arrivait  dans  cet  Etat,  il  serrait  perdu, 
parce  que  les  grandes  monarchies  vont  malgre  les  abus, 
et  se  soutiennent  par  leur  poids  et  leur  force  intrinseque, 
et  que  les  petits  Etats  sont  vite  ecrases,  si  tout  en  eux 
n'est  force,  nerf  et  vigueur. 

Voila  quelques  reflexions  et  mes  idees  sur  le  gouveme- 
ment  de  ce  pays,  qui,  tant  qu'il  n'aura  pas  pris  une  plus 
grande  consistance  et  de  meilleures  frontieres,  doit  etre 
gouveme  par  des  princes  qui  soient  toujours  en  vedette, 
les  oreilles  dressees,  pour  veiller  sur  leurs  voisins,  et  prets 
k  se  defendre  d'un  jour  a  I'autre  contre  les  projets  pemicieux 
de  leurs  ennemis. 

(Signe)    Frederic. 


CHAPTEK  X 

HISTOIBB   DE   MON   TEMPS 
AVANT-PROPOS.      1775 

La  plupart  des  histoires  que  nous  avons  sont  des  com- 
pilations de  mensonges  meles  de  quelques  verites.  De 
ce  nombre  prodigieux  de  faits  qui  nous  ont  ete  transmis, 
on  ne  pent  compter  pour  averes  que  ceux  qui  ont  fait 
epoque  soit  de  I'elevation  ou  de  la  chute  des  empires.  H 
parait  indubitable  que  la  bataille  de  Salamine  s'est  donnee 
et  que  les  Perses  ont  ete  vaincus  par  les  Grecs.  II  n'y  a 
aucun  doute  qu'Alexandre  le  Grand  n'ait  subjugue  Tempire 
de  Darius,  que  les  Eomains  n'aient  vaincu  les  Carthaginois, 
Antiochus  et  Persee ;  cela  est  d'autant  plus  evident  qu'ila 
ont  possede  tous  ces  Etats.  L'histoire  acquiert  plus  de 
foi  dans  ce  qu'elle  rapporte  des  guerres  civiles  de  Marius 
et  de  Sylla,  de  Pompee  et  de  Cesar,  d'Auguste  et  d'Antoine, 
par  I'authenticite  des  auteurs  contemporains  qui  nous 
ont  decrit  ces  evenements.  On  n'a  point  de  doute  sur 
le  bouleversement  de  I'empire  d' Occident  et  sur  celui 
d' Orient,  car  on  voit  naitre  et  se  former  des  royaumes  du 
demembrement  de  I'empire  romain ;  mais  lorsque  la 
curiosite  nous  invite  a  descendre  dans  le  detail  des  faits 
de  ces  temps  recules,  nous  nous  precipitous  dans  un  laby- 
rinthe  plein  d'obscurites  et  de  contradictions,  et  nous  n'avons 
point  de  fil  pour  en  trouver  Tissue.  L 'amour  du  merveilleux, 
le  prejuge  des  historiens,  le  zele  malentendu  pour  leur  patrie, 


HISTOIEE  DE  MON  TEMPS  239 

leur  haine  pour  les  nations  qui  leur  etaient  opposees,  toutea 
ces  differentes  passions  qui  ont  guide  leur  plume  et  les 
temps  de  beaucoup  posterieurs  aux  evenements  ou  ils 
ont  ecrits,  ont  si  fort  altere  les  faits  en  les  deguisant,  qu'aveo 
des  yeux  de  lynx  meme  on  ne  parviendrait  a  les  devoiler 
k  present. 

Cependant,  dans  la  foule  d'auteurs  de  Tantiquite  Ton 
distingue  avec  satisfaction  la  description  que  Xenophon 
fait  de  la  retraite  des  dix  mille  qu'il  avait  commandes  et 
ramenes  lui-meme  en  Grece.  Thucydide  jouit  ^  peu  pres 
de  memes  avantages.  Nous  sommes  charmes  des  trouver 
dans  les  fragments  qui  nous  restent  de  Polybe,  Tami  et  le 
compagnon  de  Scipion  I'Africain,  les  faits  qu'il  nous  raconte, 
dont  lui-meme  a  ete  le  temoin.  Les  lettres  de  Ciceron 
a  son  ami  Atticus  portent  le  meme  caractere ;  c'est  un  des 
acteurs  de  ces  grandes  scenes  qui  parle.  Je  n'oubKerai 
point  les  Commentaires  de  Cesar,  ecrits  avec  la  noble  sim- 
plicity d'un  grand  homme  ;  et,  quoi  qu'en  ait  dit  Hirtius, 
les  relations  des  autres  historiens  sont  en  tout  conformes 
aux  evenements  decrits  dans  ces  Commentaires ;  mais 
depuis  Cesar  I'histoire  ne  contient  que  des  panegyriques  ou 
des  satires.  La  barbarie  des  temps  suivants  a  fait  un  chaos 
de  I'histoire  du  Bas-Empire,  et  Ton  ne  trouve  d'interessant 
que  les  Memoires  ecrits  par  la  fille  de  I'empereur  Alexius 
Conm^ne,  parce  que  cette  princesse  rapporte  ce  qu'elle  a  vu. 
Depuis,  les  moines,  qui  seuls  avaient  quelque  connaissance, 
ont  laisse  des  annales  trouvees  dans  leurs  convents,  qui 
ont  servi  a  I'histoire  d'Allemagne ;  mais  quels  materiaux 
pour  I'histoire  ! 

Les  Fran^ais  ont  eu  un  eveque  de  Tours,  un  Joinville  et  le 
Journal  de  I'Etoile,  faibles  ouvrages  de  compilateurs  qui 
ecrivaient  ce  qu'ils  apprenaient  auh  asard,  mais  qui  difficile- 
ment  pouvaient  etre  bien  instruits.  Depuis  la  renaissance 
des  lettres,  la  passion  d'ecrire  s'est  changee  en  fureur.  Nous 
n'avons  que  trop  de  memoires,  d'anecdotes  et  de  relations, 
parmi  lesquelles  il  faut  s'en  tenir  au  petit  nombre  d'auteurs 


240    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEBMANY 

qui  ont  eu  des  charges,  qui  ont  ete  eux-memes  acteurs,  qui  ont 
ete  attaches  k  la  cour  ou  qui  ont  eu  la  permission  des  souve- 
rains  de  fouiller  dans  les  archives,  tels  que  le  sage  president 
de  Thou,  Phillippe  de  Comines,  Vargas,  fiscal  de  concile 
de  Trente,  mademoiselle  d'Orleans,  le  Cardinal  du  Retz, 
etc.  Ajoutons-y  les  Lettres  de  M.  d'Estrades,  les  Memoires  de 
M.  de  Torcy,  monuments  curieux,  surtout  ce  dernier,  qui 
nous  developpe  la  verite  de  ce  testament  de  Charles  II, 
roi  d'Espagne,  sur  lequel  les  sentiments  ont  ete  si  partages. 

Ces  reflexions  sur  Tincertitude  de  I'histoire,  dont  je  me 
suis  souvent  occupe,  m'ont  fait  naitre  I'idee  de  transmettre 
k  la  posterite  les  faits  principaux  auxquels  j'ai  eu  part  ou 
dont  j'ai  ete  temoin,  afin  que  ceux  qui  a  I'avenir  gouveme- 
ront  cet  Etat  puissent  connaitre  la  vraie  situation  des  choses 
lorsque  je  parvins  k  la  regence,  les  causes  quim'ont  fait  agir, 
mes  moyens,  les  trames  de  nos  ennemis,  les  negociations,  les 
guerres,  et  surtout  les  belles  actions  de  nos  officiers,  par 
lesquelles  ils  se  sont  acquis  I'immortaHte  a  juste  titre. 

Depuis  les  revolutions  qui  bouleverserent  premi^re- 
ment  I'empire  d'Occident,  ensuite  celui  d'Orient ;  depuis 
les  succ§s  immenses  de  Charlemagne ;  depuis  I'epoque 
brilliant e  du  regne  de  Charles- Quint ;  apres  les  troubles 
que  la  reforme  causa  en  AUemagne  et  qui  durerent  trente 
annees ;  enfin  apres  la  guerre  qui  s'alluma  a  cause  de  la 
succession  d'Espagne,  il  n'est  aucun  evenement  plus  remarqu- 
able  et  plus  interessant  que  celui  que  produisit  la  mort  de 
Temper eur  Charles  VI,  dernier  male  de  la  maison  de 
Habsbourg. 

La  cour  de  Vienne  se  vit  attaquee  par  un  prince  auquel 
elle  ne  pouvait  supposer  assez  de  force  pour  tenter  une 
entreprise  aussi  difficile.  Bientdt  il  se  forma  une  con- 
juration de  rois  et  de  souverains,  tous  resolus  k  partager 
cette  immense  succession.  La  couronne  imperiale  passa 
dans  la  maison  de  Bavi^re,  et  lorsqu'il  semblait  que  les 
evenement s  concouraient  k  la  ruine  de  la  jeune  reine  de 
Hongrie,  cette  princesse,  par  sa  fermete  et  par  son  habilete, 


HISTOIKE  DE  MON  TEMPS  241 

se  tira  d'un  pas  aussi  dangereux,  et  soutint  sa  monarchie 
en  sacrifiant  la  Silesie  et  une  petite  partie  du  Milanais ; 
c'etait  tout  ce  qu'on  pouvait  attendre  d'une  jeune  princesse 
qui,  a  peine  parvenue  au  tr6ne,  saisit  I'esprit  du  gouveme- 
ment  et  devint  I'ame  de  son  conseil. 

Get  ouvrage-ci  etant  destine  pour  la  posterite  me  delivre 
de  la  gene  de  respecter  les  vivants  et  d'observer  de  certains 
menagements  incompatibles  avec  la  franchise  de  la  verite : 
il  me  sera  permis  de  dire  sans  retenue  et  tout  haut  ce  que 
Ton  pense  tout  bas.  Je  peindrai  les  princes  tels  qu'ils  sont, 
sans  prevention  pour  ceux  qui  ont  ete  mes  allies  et  sans 
haine  pour  ceux  qui  ont  ete  mes  ennemis;  je  ne  parlerai 
de  moi-meme  que  lorsque  la  necessite  m'y  obligera,  et  Ton 
me  permettra,  a  I'exemple  de  Cesar,  de  faire  mention  de 
ce  qui  me  regarde  en  personne  tierce,  pour  eviter  I'odieux 
de  I'egoisme.  C'est  a  la  posterite  a  nous  juger ;  mais  si 
nous  sommes  sages,  nous  devons  la  prevenir  en  nous  jugeant 
rigoureusement  nous-memes.  Le  vrai  merite  d'un  bon 
prince  est  d'avoir  un  attachement  sincere  au  bien  public, 
d'aimer  sa  patrie  et  la  gloire  ;  je  dis  la  gloire,  car  I'heureux 
instinct  qui  anime  les  hommes  du  desir  d'une  bonne  reputa- 
tion est  le  vrai  principe  des  actions  heroiques ;  c'est  le 
nerf  de  I'ame  qui  la  reveille  de  sa  lethargie  pour  la  porter 
aux  entreprises  utiles,  necessaire  et  louables. 

Tout  ce  qu'on  avance  dans  ces  memoires,  soit  a  I'egard  des 
negociations,  des  lettres  de  souverains  ou  de  traites  signes, 
a  ses  preuves  conservees  dans  les  archives.  On  peu  re- 
pondre  des  faits  militaires  comme  temoin  oculaire ;  telle 
relation  de  bataille  a  ete  differee  de  deux  ou  trois  jours 
pour  la  rendre  plus  exacte  et  plus  veridique. 

La  posterite  verra  peut-etre  avec  surprise  dans  ces 
memoires  les  recits  de  traites  faits  et  rompus.  Quoique 
ces  exemples  soient  communs,  cela  ne  justifierait  point 
I'auteur  de  cet  ouvrage,  s'il  n'avait  d'autres  raisons  meilleures 
pour  excuser  sa  conduite. 

L'interet  de  I'Etat  doit  servir  de  regie  aux  souverains. 


242     THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Les  cas  de  rompre  les  alliances  sont  ceux :  (1)  ou  Tallin 
manque  a  remplir  ses  engagements ;  (2)  ou  I'allie  medite 
de  vous  tromper  et  ou  il  ne  vous  reste  de  ressource  que  de 
le  prevenir ;  (3)  une  force  majeure  qui  vous  opprime  et 
vous  force  a  rompre  vos  traites ;  (4)  enfin  I'insuf&sance  des 
moyens  pour  continuer  la  guerre. 

Par  je  ne  sais  quelle  fatalite,  ces  malheureuses  richesses 
influent  sur  tout.  Les  princes  sont  les  esclaves  de  leurs 
moyens ;  I'interet  de  I'Etat  leur  sert  de  loi,  et  cette  loi 
est  inviolable.  Si  le  prince  est  dans  I'obligation  de  sacrifier 
sa  personne  meme  au  salut  de  ses  sujets,  a  plus  forte  raison 
doit-il  leur  sacrifier  des  liaisons  dont  la  continuation  leur 
deviendrait  prejudiciable.  Les  exemples  de  pareils  traites 
rompus  se  recontrent  communement.  Notre  intention 
n'est  pas  de  les  justifier  tous.  J'ose  pourtant  avancer  qu'il 
en  est  de  tels,  que  la  necessite  ou  la  sagesse,  la  prudence 
ou  le  bien  des  peuples  obligeaient  de  transgresser,  ne  restant 
aux  souverains  que  ce  moy en-la  d'eviter  leur  ruine. 

Si  Fran9ois  I  avait  accompli  le  traite  de  Madrid,  il 
aurait,  en  perdant  la  Bourgogne,  etabli  un  ennemi  dans 
le  coeur  de  ses  Etats.  C'etait  reduire  la  France  dans  I'etat 
malheureux  ou  elle  etait  du  temps  de  Louis  XI  et  de  Louis 
XII.  Si,  apres  la  bataille  de  Muhlberg,  gagnee  par  Charles 
Quint,  la  ligue  protestante  d'AUemagne  ne  s' etait/  pas 
fortifi.ee  de  I'appui  de  la  France,  elle  n'aurait  pu  eviter  de 
porter  les  chaines  que  I'Empereur  lui  preparait  de  longue 
main.  Si  les  Anglais  n'avaient  pas  rompu  I'alliance,  si 
contraire  a  leurs  interets,  par  laquelle  Charles  II  s'etait 
uni  avec  Louis  XIV,  leur  puissance  courait  risque  d'etre 
diminuee,  d'autant  plus  que,  dans  la  balance  poHtique  de 
I'Europe,  la  France  I'aurait  emporte  de  beaucoup  sur 
I'Angleterre. 

Les  sages,  qui  prevoient  les  effets  dans  les  causes,  doivent 
a  temps  s'opposer  a  ces  causes  si  diametralement  opposees 
a  leurs  interets.  Qu'on  me  permette  de  m'expliquer 
exactement  sur  cette  matiere  delicate,  que  Ton  n'a  guere 


HISTOIEB  DE  MON  TEMPS  243 

traitee  dogmatiquement.  II  me  parait  clair  et  evident 
qu'un  particulier  doit  etre  attache  scrupuleusement  a  sa 
parole,  Teiit-il  meme  donne  inconsiderement.  Si  on  lui 
manque,  il  pent  recourir  k  la  protection  des  lois,  et  quoi 
qu'il  en  arrive,  ce  n'est  qu'un  individu  qui  souffre ;  mais 
a  quels  tribunaux  un  souverain  prendra-t-il  recours,  si  un 
autre  prince  viole  envers  lui  ses  engagements  ?  La  parole 
d'un  particulier  n'entraine  que  le  malheur  d'un  seul  homme, 
celle  des  souverains  des  calamites  generales  pour  des  nations 
entieres.  Ceci  se  reduit  a  cette  question  :  vaut-il  mieux 
que  le  peuple  perisse  ou  que  le  prince  rompe  son  traite  ? 
Quel  serait  I'imbecile  qui  balancerait  pour  decider  cette 
question  ? 

Vous  voyez  par  les  cas  que  nous  venons  d'exposer 
qu'avant  de  porter  un  jugement  decisif  sur  les  actions  d'un 
prince,  il  faut  commencer  par  examiner  murement  les 
circonstances  ou  il  s'est  trouve,  la  conduite  de  ses  allies, 
les  ressources  qu'il  pouvait  avoir  ou  qui  lui  manquaient 
pour  remplir  ses  engagements.  Car,  comme  nous  I'avons 
deja  dit,  le  bon  ou  le  mauvais  etat  des  finances  sont  comme 
le  pouls  des  Etats,  qui  influent  plus  qu'on  ne  le  croit  ni 
qu'on  ne  le  sait  dans  les  operations  politiques  et  militaires. 
Le  public,  qui  ignore  ces  details,  ne  juge  que  sur  les  appar- 
ences,  et  se  trompe  par  consequent  dans  ses  decisions ; 
la  prudence  empeche  qu'on  ne  le  desabuse,  parce  que  ce 
serait  le  comble  de  la  demence  d'ebruiter  soi-meme  par 
vaine  gloire  la  partie  faible  de  I'Etat :  les  ennemis,  charmes 
d'une  pareille  decouverte,  ne  manqueraient  pas  d'en  profiter. 
La  sagesse  exige  done  qu'on  abandonne  au  public  la  liberte 
de  ses  jugements  temeraires,  et  que  ne  pouvant  se  justifier 
pendant  sa  vie,  sans  compromettre  I'interet  de  I'Etat, 
Ton  se  contente  de  se  legitimer  aux  yeux  desinteresses  de 
la  posterite. 

Peut-etre  ne  sera-t-on  pas  fache  que  j'ajoute  quelques 
reflexions  generales  a  ce  que  je  viens  de  dire  sur  les  evene- 
ments  qui  sont  arrives  de  mon  temps.    J'ai  vu  que  les 


244  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

petits  Etats  peuvent  se  soutenir  centre  les  plus  grandes 
monarchies  lorsque  ces  Etats  ont  de  I'industrie  et  beaucoup 
d'ordre  dans  leurs  affaires.  Je  trouve  que  les  grands 
empires  ne  vont  que  par  des  abus,  qu'ils  sont  remplis  de 
confusion,  et  qu'ils  ne  se  soutiennent  que  par  leurs  vastes 
ressources  et  par  la  force  intrinseque  de  leur  masse.  Les 
intrigues  qui  se  font  dans  ces  cours  perdraient  des  princes 
moins  puissants :  elles  nuisent  toujours,  mais  elles  n'empechent 
pas  que  de  nombreuses  armees  ne  conservent  leur  poids. 

J'observe  que  toutes  les  guerres  portees  loin  des  frontieres 
de  ceux  qui  les  entreprennent  n'ont  pas  les  memes  succes 
que  celles  qui  se  font  a  portee  de  la  patrie.  Ne  serait-ce 
pas  par  un  sentiment  naturel  dans  I'homme  qui  sent  qu'il 
est  plus  juste  de  se  defendre  que  de  depouiller  son  voisin  ? 
Mais  peut-etre  la  raison  physique  Femporte-t-elle  sur  la 
morale  par  la  difficulte  de  pourvoir  aux  vivres  dans  un 
trop  grand  eloignement  de  la  frontiere,  a  fournir  a  temps 
les  recrues,  les  remontes,  les  habillements,  les  munitions 
de  guerre,  etc.  Ajoutons  encore  que,  plus  les  troupes 
sont  aventurees  dans  des  pays  lointains,  plus  elles  craignent 
qu'on  ne  leur  coupe  la  retraite  ou  qu'on  ne  la  rende  difi&cile. 
Je  m'aper9ois  de  la  superiority  marquee  de  la  flotte  anglaise 
sur  celle  des  Frangais  et  des  Espagnols  reunie,  et  je  m'etonne 
comment  la  marine  de  Philippe  II,  ayant  eu  autrefois 
cet  ascendant  sur  celle  des  Anglais  et  des  Hollandais, 
n'a  pas  conserve  d'aussi  grands  avantages. 

Je  remarque  encore  avec  surprise  que  tons  ces  armements 
de  mer  sont  plus  pour  I'ostentation  que  pour  I'effet,  et 
qu'au  lieu  de  proteger  le  commerce,  ils  ne  I'empechent  pas 
de  se  detruire.  D'un  cote  se  presente  le  roi  d'Espagne, 
souverain  du  Potose,  obere  en  Europe,  creancier  a  Madrid 
de  ses  oJB&ciers  et  de  ses  domestiques ;  de  Tautre,  le  roi 
d'Angleterre,  qui  repand  a  pleines  mains  ses  guinees,  que 
trente  ans  d'industrie  avaient  accumulees  dans  la  Grande- 
Bretagne,  pour  soutenir  la  reine  de  Hongrie  et  la  Pragmatique 
Sanction,  independamment  de  quoi  cette  reine  de  Hongrie 


HISTOIKE  DE  MON  TEMPS  245 

est  obligee  de  sacriiier  quelques  provinces  pour  sauver  le 
reste. 

La  capitale  du  monde  Chretien  s'ouvre  au  premier 
venu,  et  le  pape,  n'osant  pas  accabler  d'anathemes  ceux 
qui  le  font  contribuer,  est  oblige  de  les  benir.  L'ltalie  est 
inondee  d'etrangers  qui  se  battent  pour  la  subjuguer. 
L'exemple  des  Anglais  entraine  comme  un  torrent  les 
HoUandais  dans  cette  guerre  qui  leur  est  etrangere,  et  ces 
republicains  qui  du  temps  que  des  heros,  les  Eugene,  les 
Marlborough,  commandaient  leurs  armees,  y  envoyaient 
des  deputes  pour  regler  les  operations  miHtaires,  n'en 
envoient  point  lorsqu'un  due  de  Cumberland  se  trouve  a 
la  tete  de  leurs  troupes.  Le  Nord  s'embrase  et  produit 
une  guerre  funeste  a  la  Suede.  Le  Danemarck  s'anime, 
s'agite  et  se  calme.  La  Saxe  change  deux  fois  de 
parti ;  elle  ne  gagne  rien  ni  avec  les  uns  ni  avec  les 
autres,  sinon  qu'elle  attire  les  Prussiens  dans  ses  Etats  et 
qu'elle  se  ruine.  Un  conflit  d'evenements  change  les 
causes  de  la  guerre  :  cependant  les  effets  continuent,  quoique 
le  motif  ait  cesse.  La  fortune  passe  rapidement  d'un  parti 
dans  Fautre ;  mais  Fambition  et  le  desir  de  la  vengeance 
nourissent  et  entretiennent  le  feu  de  la  guerre.  II  semble 
voir  une  partie  de  joueurs  qui  veulent  avoir  leur  revanche 
et  ne  quittent  le  jeu  qu'apres  s'etre  entierement  ruines. 

Si  Fon  demandait  a  un  ministre  anglais  :  Quelle  rage 
vous  oblige  a  prolonger  la  guerre  ?  C'est  que  la  France 
ne  pourra  plus  fournir  aux  frais  de  la  campagne  prochaine, 
repondrait-il.  Si  Fon  faisait  la  meme  question  a  un  ministre 
fran^ais,  la  reponse  serait  a  peu  pres  semblable.  Ce  qu'il 
y  a  de  deplorable  dans  cette  politique,  c'est  qu'elle  se  joue 
de  la  vie  des  hommes,  et  que  le  sang  humain,  repandu  avec 
profusion,  Fest  inutilement.  Encore  si,  par  la  guerre,  on 
pouvait  parvenir  k  fixer  soHdement  les  frontieres  et  h 
maintenir  cette  balance  des  pouvoirs  si  necessaire  entre  les 
souverains  de  FEurope,  on  pourrait  regarder  ceux  qui 
ont  peri  comme  des  victimes  sacrifices  a  la  tranquillite 


246    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

et  k  la  surete  publique.  Mais  qu'on  s'envie  des  provinces 
en  Amerique,  ne  voila-t-il  pas  toute  I'Europe  entrainee  dans 
des  partis  differents  pour  se  battre  sur  mer  et  sur  terre. 

Les  ambitieux  devraient  considerer  surtout  que  les 
armes  et  la  discipline  militaire  etant  a  peu  pres  les  memes 
en  Europe,  et  les  alliances  mettant  pour  I'ordinaire  I'egalite 
des  forces  entre  les  parties  belligerantes,  tout  ce  que  les 
princes  peuvent  attendre  de  leurs  plus  grands  avantages 
dans  les  temps  ou  nous  vivons,  c'est  d'acquerir  par  des 
succes  accumules  ou  quelque  petite  ville  sur  les  frontieres, 
ou  une  banlieue  qui  ne  rapporte  pas  les  interets  des  depenses 
de  la  guerre,  et  dont  la  population  n'approche  pas  de  nombre 
des  citoyens  peris  dans  les  campagnes. 

Quiconque  a  des  entrailles  et  envisage  ces  objets  de 
sangfroid  doit  etre  emu  des  maux  que  les  hommes  d'Etat 
causent  aux  peuples,  faute  d'y  reflechir  ou  bien  entraines 
par  leur  passions.  La  raison  nous  prescrit  une  regie  sur 
ce  sujet,  dont,  ce  me  semble,  aucun  homme  d'Etat  ne  doit 
s'ecarter ;  c'est  de  saisir  I'occasion  et  d'entreprendre 
lorsqu'elle  est  favourable ;  mais  de  ne  point  la  forcer  en 
abandonnant  tout  au  hasard.  II  y  a  des  moments  qui  de- 
mandent  qu'on  mette  toute  son  activite  en  jeu  pour  en 
profiter,  mais  il  y  en  a  d'autres  ou  la  prudence  veut  qu'on 
reste  dans  I'inaction.  Cette  matiere  exige  la  plus  profonde 
reflexion,  parce  que  non-seulement  il  faut  bien  examiner 
I'etat  des  choses,  mais  qu'il  faut  encore  prevoir  toutes  les 
suites  d'une  entreprise,  et  peser  les  moyens  que  Ton  a  avec 
ceux  de  ses  ennemis  pour  juger  lesquels  I'emportent  dans 
la  balance.  Si  la  raison  n'y  decide  pas  seule,  et  que  la 
passion  s'en  mele,  il  est  impossible  que  d'heureux  succes 
suivent  une  pareille  entreprise.  La  politique  demande 
de  la  patience,  et  le  chef-d'oeuvre  d'un  homme  habile 
est  de  faire  chaque  chose  en  son  temps  et  a  propos. 

L'histoire  ne  nous  foumit  que  trop  d'exemples  de 
guerres  legerement  enterprises  ;  il  n'y  qu'^  se  rappeler  la  vie 
de  Francois  I  et  lire  ce  que  Brant6me  dit  etre  le  sujet  de 


HISTOIKE  DE  MON  TEMPS  247 

sa  malheureuse  expedition  du  Milanais,  ou  ce  roi  fut  fait 
prisonnier  a  Pavie  ;  il  n'y  a  qu'a  voir  combien  peu  Charles- 
Quint  profita  de  I'occasion  qui  se  presentait  a  lui,  apres 
la  bataille  de  Muhlberg,  pour  subjuguer  I'Allemagne ;  il 
n'y  a  qu'a  voir  I'histoire  de  Frederic  V,  electeur  palatin, 
pour  se  convaincre  de  la  precipitation  avec  laquelle  il 
s'engagea  dans  une  entreprise  bien  au-dessus  de  ses  forces. 
Et  dans  nos  derniers  temps,  qu'on  se  rappelle  la  conduite 
de  Maximilien  de  Baviere,  qui  dans  la  guerre  de  Succession, 
lorsque  son  pays  etait,  pour  ainsi  dire,  bloque  par  les  allies, 
se  rangea  du  parti  des  Fran^ais,  pour  se  voir  depouiller 
de  ses  Etats.  Et  plus  recemment  Charles  XII,  roi  de 
Suede,  nous  fournit  un  exemple  plus  frappant  encore  des 
suites  funestes  que  I'entetement  et  la  fausse  conduite  des 
souverains  attire  sur  les  sujects. 

L'histoire  est  I'ecole  des  princes ;  c'est  a  eux  de  s'in- 
struire  des  fautes  des  siecles  passes,  pour  les  eviter,  et 
pour  apprendre  qu'il  faut  se  former  un  systeme  et  le  suivre 
pied  a  pied,  et  que  celui  qui  a  le  mieux  calcule  sa  conduite 
est  le  seul  que  puisse  I'emporter  sur  ceux  qui  agissent  moins 
consequemment  que  lui. 


CHAPTEK  XI 

ESSAI    SUE    LES    FOEMES    DE    GOUVEENEMENT    ET    SUE    LES 
DEVOIES   DES   SOUVEEAINS   (1777) 

Nous  trouvons,  en  remontant  k  I'antiquite  la  plus  reculee, 
que  les  peuples  dont  la  connaissance  nous  est  parvenue 
menaient  une  vie  pastorale,  et  ne  formaient  point  de  corps 
de  societe :  ce  que  la  Genese  rapporte  de  I'histoire  des 
patriarches  en  est  un  temoignage  suffisant.  Avant  le 
petit  peuple  juif,  les  Egyptiens  devaient  etre  de  meme 
eparpilles  par  families  dans  ces  contrees  que  le  Nil  ne  sub- 
mergeait  pas ;  et  sans  doute  il  s'est  ecoule  bien  des  siecles 
avant  que  ce  fleuve,  dompte,  permit  aux  regnicoles  de  se 
rassembler  par  bourgades.  Nous  apprenons  par  I'histoire 
grecque  le  nom  des  fondateurs  des  villes  et  celui  des  legis- 
lateurs  qui  les  premiers  les  rassamblerent  en  corps ;  cette 
nation  fut  longtemps  sauvage,  comme  le  furent  tous  les 
habitants  de  notre  globe.  Si  les  annales  des  Etrusques, 
des  Samnites,  des  Sabins,  &c.,  nous  etaient  parvenues, 
nous  apprendrions  assurement  que  ces  peuples  vivaient 
isoles  par  families  avant  de  s'etre  rassembles  et  reunis.  Les 
Gaulois  formaient  deja  des  associations  du  temps  que  Jules 
Cesar  les  dompta.  Mais  il  parait  que  la  Grande-Bretagne 
n'etait  pas  perfectionnee  k  ce  point  lorsque  ce  conquerant 
y  passa  pour  la  premiere  fois  avec  les  troupes  romaines. 
Du  temps  de  ce  grand  homme,  les  Germains  ne  pouvaient 
se  comparer  qu'aux  Iroquois,  aux  Algonquins  et  pareilles 
nations  sauvages ;   ils  ne  vivaient  que  de  la  chasse,  de  la 

248 


[LES  DEVOIKS  DES  SOUVEEAINS  249 

peche,  et  du  lait  de  leurs  troupeaux.  Un  Germain  croyait 
s'avilir  en  cultivant  la  terre ;  il  employait  k  ces  travaux 
les  esclaves  qu'il  avait  faits  a  la  guerre ;  aussi  la  foret 
d'Hercynie  couvrait-elle  presque  entierement  cette  vaste 
etendue  de  pays  qui  compose  maintenant  I'AUemagne. 
La  nation  ne  pouvait  pas  etre  nombreuse,  faute  de  nour- 
riture  suffisante ;  et  c'est  1^  sans  doute  la  veritable  cause 
de  ces  emigrations  prodigieuses  des  peuples  du  Septentrion, 
qui  se  precipitaient  vers  le  Midi  pour  chercher  des  terres 
toutes  defrichees  et  un  climat  moins  rigoureux. 

On  est  etonne  quand  on  se  represente  le  genre  humain 
vivant  si  longtemps  dans  un  etat  d'abrutissement  et  sans 
former  de  societe,  et  Ton  recherche  avidement  quelle  raison 
a  pu  le  porter  a  se  reunir  en  corps  de  peuple.  Sans  doute 
que  les  violences  et  les  pillages  d'autres  hordes  voisines  ont 
fait  naitre  a  ces  peuplades  isolees  I'idee  de  se  joindre  a 
d'autres  families  pour  assurer  leurs  possessions  par  leur 
mutuelle  defense.  De  la  sont  nees  les  lois  qui  enseignent 
aux  societes  h,  preferer  I'interet  general  au  bien  particulier. 
Des  lors  personne,  sans  craindre  de  chatiment,  n'osa 
s'emparer  du  bien  d'autrui,  personne  n'osa  attenter  sur 
la  vie  de  son  voisin,  il  fallut  respecter  sa  femme  et  ses 
biens  comme  des  objets  sacres,  et  si  la  societe  entiere  se 
trouvait  attaquee,  chacun  devait  accourir  pour  la  sauver. 
Cette  grande  verite,  qu'il  faut  agir  envers  les  autres  comme 
nous  voudrions  qu'ils  se  comportassent  envers  nous,  devient 
le  principe  des  lois  et  du  pacte  social ;  de  la  nait  I'amour 
de  la  patrie,  envisagee  comme  I'asile  de  notre  bonheur. 
Mais  comme  ces  lois  ne  pouvaient  ni  se  maintenir  ni 
s'executer  sans  un  surveillant  qui  s'en  occupat  sans  cesse, 
ce  fut  I'origine  des  magistrats,  que  le  peuple  elut  et  auxquels 
il  se  soumit.  Qu'on  s'imprime  bien  que  la  conservation 
des  lois  fut  I'unique  raison  qui  engagea  les  hommes  ^  se 
donner  des  superieurs,  puisque  c'est  la  vraie  origine  de 
la  souverainete.  Ce  magistrat  etait  le  premier  serviteur 
de  I'Etat.    Quand  ces  societes  naissantes  avaient  k  craindre 


250  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

de  leurs  voisins,  le  magistrat  armait  le  peuple  et  volait  a 
la  defense  des  citoyens. 

Get  instinct  general  des  homines  qui  les  anime  k  se 
procurer  le  plus  grand  bonheur  possible  donna  lieu  a  la 
formation  des  different s  genres  de  gouvemement.  Les 
uns  crurent  qu'en  s'abandonnant  a  la  conduite  de  quelques 
sages  ils  trouveraient  ce  bonheur ;  de  la  le  gouvernement 
aristocratique.  D'autres  prefererent  I'oligarchie.  Athenes 
et  la  plupart  des  republiques  grecques  choisirent  la  demo- 
cratie.  La  Perse  et  I'Orient  ployaient  sous  le  despotisme. 
Les  Komains  eurent  quelque  temps  des  rois ;  mais  lasses 
des  violences  des  Tarquins,  il  tournerent  la  forme  de 
leur  gouvemement  en  aristocratie.  Bient6t,  fatigue  de  la 
durete  des  patriciens,  qui  I'opprimaient  par  des  usures,  le 
peuple  s'en  separa,  et  ne  retouma  a  Eome  qu'apres  que 
le  senat  eut  autorise  les  tribuns  que  ce  peuple  avait  elus 
pour  le  soutenir  contre  le  violence  des  grands ;  depuis, 
il  devint  presque  le  depositaire  de  I'autorite  supreme. 
On  appelait  tyrans  ceux  qui  s'emparaient  avec  violence 
du  gouvemement,  et  qui,  ne  suivant  que  leurs  passions 
et  leurs  caprices  pour  guides,  renversaient  les  lois  et  les 
principes  fondamentaux  que  la  societe  avait  etablis  pour 
sa  conservation. 

Mais  quelque  sages  que  fussent  les  legislateurs  et  les 
premiers  qui  rassemblerent  le  peuple  en  corps,  quelque 
bonnes  que  fussent  leurs  institutions,  il  ne  s'est  trouve 
aucun  de  ces  gouvemements  qui  se  soit  soutenu  dans  toute 
son  integrite.  Pourquoi  ?  Parce  que  les  hommes  sont 
imparfaits,  et  que  leurs  ouvrages  le  sont  par  consequent ; 
parce  que  les  citoyens,  pousses  par  des  passions,  se  laissent 
aveugler  par  I'interet  particulier,  qui  toujours  bouleverse 
I'interet  general ;  enfin  parce  que  rien  n'est  stable  dans 
ce  monde.  Dans  les  aristocraties,  Tabus  que  les  premiers 
membres  de  I'Etat  font  de  leur  autorite  est,  pour  I'ordinaire, 
cause  des  revolutions  qui  s'ensuivent.  La  democratie  des 
Komains  fut  bouleversee  par  le  peuple  meme ;    la  masse 


LES  DEVOIKS  DES  SOUVEKAINS  251 

aveuglee  de  ces  plebeiens  se  laissa  corrompre  par  des  citoyens 
ambitieux  qui  ensuite  les  asservirent  et  les  priverent  de 
leur  liberte.  C'est  le  sort  auquel  I'Angleterre  doit  s'attendre, 
si  la  chambre  basse  ne  prefere  pas  les  veritables  interets 
de  la  nation  a  cette  corruption  infame  qui  I'avilit.  Quant 
au  gouvemement  monarchique,  on  en  a  vu  bien  des  especes 
differentes.  L'ancien  gouvemement  feodal,  qui  etait  presque 
general  en  Europe  il  y  a  quelques  siecles,  s' etait  etabli 
par  les  conquetes  des  barbares.  Le  general  qui  menait 
une  horde  se  rendait  souverain  du  pays  conquis,  et  il  par- 
tageait  les  provinces  entre  ses  principaux  officiers ;  ceux-la 
a  la  verite  etaient  soumis  au  suzerain,  et  lui  foumissaient 
des  troupes,  s'il  les  demandait ;  mais  comme  quelques-uns 
de  ces  vassaux  devinrent  aussi  puissants  que  leur  chef, 
cela  formait  des  Etats  dans  I'Etat.  C'etait  une  pepiniere 
de  guerres  civiles  dont  resultait  le  malheur  de  la  societe 
generale.  En  AUemagne  ces  vassaux  sont  devenus  inde- 
pendants ;  ils  ont  ete  opprimes  en  France,  en  Angleterre 
et  en  Espagne.  Le  seul  modele  qui  nous  reste  de  cet  abomin- 
able gouvemement  subsist e  encore  dans  la  republique 
de  Pologne.  En  Turquie,  le  souverain  est  despotique, 
il  pent  commettre  impunement  les  cruautes  les  plus  re- 
voltantes  ;  mais  aussi  lui  arrive-t-il  souvent,  par  une  vicissi- 
tude commune  chez  les  nations  barbares,  ou  par  une  juste 
retribution,  qu'il  est  etrangle  a  son  tour.  Pour  le  gouveme- 
ment vraiment  monarchique,  il  est  le  pire  ou  le  meilleur 
de  tous,  selon  qu'il  est  administre. 

Nous  avons  remarque  que  les  citoyens  n'ont  accord^ 
la  preeminence  a  un  de  leurs  semblables  qu'en  faveur  des 
services  qu'ils  attendaient  de  lui ;  ces  services  consistent 
a  maintenir  les  lois,  a  faire  exactement  observer  la  justice, 
a  s'opposer  de  toutes  ses  forces  a  la  corruption  des  moeurs, 
a  def endre  I'Etat  contre  ses  ennemis.  Le  magistrat  doit  avoir 
I'oeil  sur  la  culture  des  terres  ;  il  doit  procurer  I'abondance 
des  vivres  a  la  societe,  encourager  I'industrie  et  le  commerce  ; 
il   est   comme  une  sentinelle  permanente  qui  doit  veiller 


252    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

sur  les  voisins  et  sur  la  conduite  des  ennemis  de  I'Etat.  On 
demande  que  sa  prevoyance  et  sa  prudence  forment  h 
temps  les  liaisons,  et  choississent  les  allies  les  plus  con- 
venables  aux  interets  de  son  association.  On  voit  par 
ce  court  expose  quel  detail  de  connaissances  chacun  de  ces 
articles  exige  en  particulier.  II  faut  joindre  k  cela  une 
etude  approfondie  du  local  du  pays  que  le  magistrat  doit 
gouvemer,  et  bien  connaitre  le  genie  de  la  nation,  parce 
qu'en  pechant  par  ignorance,  le  souverain  se  rend  aussi 
coupable  que  par  les  peches  qu'il  aurait  commis  par  malice  : 
les  uns  sont  des  defauts  de  paresse,  les  autres  des  vices 
du  coeur  •  mais  le  mal  qui  en  resulte  est  le  meme  pour  la 
societe. 

Les  princes,  les  souverains,  les  rois  ne  sont  done  pas 
revetus  de  Tautorite  supreme  pour  se  plonger  impunement 
dans  la  debauche  et  dans  le  luxe ;  ils  ne  sont  pas  eleves 
sur  leurs  concitoyens  pour  leur  orgueil,  se  pavanant  dans 
la  representation,  insulte  avec  mepris  a  la  simplicite  des 
moeurs,  a  la  pauvrete,  a  la  misere  ;  ils  ne  sont  point  k  la  tete 
de  rfitat  pour  entretenir  aupres  de  leurs  personnes  un  tas  de 
faineants  dont  I'oisivete  et  I'inutilite  engendrent  tons  les  vices. 
La  mauvaise  administration  du  gouvernement  monarchique 
provient  de  bien  des  causes  differentes,  qui  ont  leur  source 
dans  le  caractere  du  souverain.  Ainsi  un  prince  adonne 
aux  femmes  se  laissera  gouverner  par  ses  maitresses  et 
par  ses  favoris ;  ceux-la,  abusant  du  pouvoir  qu'ils  ont 
sur  Tesprit  du  prince,  se  serviront  de  cet  ascendant  pour 
commettre  des  injustices,  proteger  des  gens  perdus  de 
moBurs,  vendre  des  charges,  et  autres  infamies  pareilles. 
Si  le  prince,  par  faineantise,  abandonne  le  gouvemail  de 
rEtat  en  des  mains  mercenaires,  je  veux  dire  a  ses  ministres, 
alors  I'un  tire  a  droite,  Fautre  a  gauche,  personne  ne  travaille 
sur  un  plan  general,  chaque  ministre  renverse  ce  qu'il 
a  trouve  etabli,  quelque  bonne  que  soit  la  chose,  pour 
devenir  createur  de  nouveautes  et  pour  realiser  ses  fantaisies, 
souvent  au  detriment  du  bien  public ;    d 'autres  ministres 


LES  DEVOIES  DES  SOUVEKAINS  263 

qui  remplacent  ceux-la  se  hatent  de  bouleverser  k  leur 
tour  ces  arrangements  avec  aussi  peu  de  solidite  que  leurs 
predecesseurs,  satisfaits  de  passer  pour  inventeurs.    Ainsi 
cette  suite  de  changements  et  de  variations  ne  donne  pas 
a  ces  pro  jets  le  temps  de  pousser  racine.    De  la  naissent 
la  confusion,  le  desordre  et  tous  les  vices  d'une  mauvaise 
administration.    Les  prevaricateurs  ont  une  excuse  touts 
prete :    ils   couvrent   leur  turpitude   de   ces   changements 
perpetuels  ;  et  comme  ces  sortes  de  ministres  se  contentent 
de  ce  que  personne  ne  recherche  leur  conduite,  ils  se  gardent 
bien  d'en  donner  I'exemple  en  sevissant  contre  leur  sub- 
alternes.    Les  hommes  s'attachent  a  ce  qui  leur  appartient ; 
rEtat  n'appartient  pas  a  ces  ministres ;  ils  n'ont  done  pas 
son  bien  veritablement  a  cceur,  tout  s'execute  avec  non- 
chalance et  avec  une  espece  d'indifference  stoique,  d'ou 
resulte  le  deperissement  de  la  justice,  des  finances  et  du 
militaire.    De   monarchique   qu'il   etait   ce  gouvernement 
degenere  en  une  veritable  aristocratie  ou  les  ministres  et 
les  generaux  dirigent  les  affaires  selon  leur  fantasie ;   alors 
on  ne  connait  plus  de  systeme    general,  chacun  suit  ses 
idees  particulieres,  et  le  point  central,  le  point  d'unite,  est 
perdu.    Comme  tous  les  ressorts  d'une  montre  conspirent 
au  meme  but,  qui  est  celui  de  mesurer  le  temps,  les  ressorts 
du  gouvernement  devraient  etre    montes    de  meme  pour 
que  toutes  les  differentes  parties  de  I'administration  con- 
courussent  egalement  au  plus  grand  bien  de  I'Etat,  objet 
important  qu'on  ne  doit  jamais  perdre  de  vue.    D'ailleurs, 
rinteret  personnel  des  ministres  et  des  generaux  fait  pour 
I'ordinaire  qu'ils  se  contrecarrent  en  tout  et  que  quelquefois 
ils  empechent  1' execution  des  meilleures  choses,  parce  que 
ce  ne  sont  pas  eux  qui  les  ont  proposees.    Mais  le  mal  arrive 
a  son  comble,  si  des  ames  perverses  parviennent  a  persuader 
au  souverain  que  ses  interets  sont  differents  de  ceux  de  ses 
sujets ;    alors  le  souverain  devient  I'ennemi  de  ses  peuples 
sans  savoir  pourquoi ;    il  devient  dur,  severe,  inhumain 
par  mesentendu;   car  le  principe  dont  il  part  etant  faux, 


254    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

les  consequences  le  doivent  etre  necessairement.  Le  souve- 
rain  est  attache  par  des  liens  indissolubles  au  corps  de 
I'Etat ;  par  consequent  il  ressent  par  repercussion  tous 
les  maux  qui  affligent  ses  sujets,  et  la  societe  souffre  egale- 
ment  des  malheurs  qui  touchent  son  souverain.  II  n'y  a 
qu'un  bien,  qui  est  celui  de  I'Etat  en  general.  Si  le  prince 
perd  des  provinces,  il  n'est  plus  en  etat  comme  par  le  passe 
d'assister  ses  sujets ;  si  le  malheur  I'a  force  de  contracter 
des  dettes,  c'est  aux  pauvres  citoyens  a  les  acquitter ;  en 
revanche,  si  le  peuple  est  peu  nombreux,  s'il  croupit  dans  la 
misere,  le  souverain  est  prive  de  toute  ressource.  Ce  sont 
des  verites  si  incontestables,  qu'il  n'est  pas  besoin  d'appuyer 
davantage  la-dessus. 

Je  le  repete  done,  le  souverain  represente  FEtat ;  lui 
et  ses  peuples  ne  forment  qu'un  corps,  qui  ne  peut  etre 
heureux  qu'autant  que  la  concorde  les  unit.  Le  prince 
est  a  la  societe  qu'il  gouveme  ce  que  la  tete  est  au  corps ; 
il  doit  voir,  penser  et  agir  pour  toute  la  communaute,  afin 
de  lui  procurer  tous  les  avantages  dont  elle  est  susceptible. 
Si  Ton  veut  que  le  gouvernement  monarchique  Temporte 
sur  le  republicain,  Tarret  du  souverain  est  prononce :  il 
doit  etre  actif  et  integre,  et  rassembler  toutes  ses  forces 
pour  remphr  la  carriere  qui  lui  est  prescrite.  Voici  Fidee 
que  je  me  fais  de  ses  devoirs. 

II  doit  se  procurer  une  connaissance  exacte  et  detaillee 
de  la  force  et  de  la  faiblesse  de  son  pays,  tant  pour  les 
ressources  pecuniaires  que  pour  la  population,  les  finances, 
le  commerce,  les  lois  et  le  genie  de  la  nation  qu'il  doit 
gouverner.  Les  lois,  si  elles  sont  bonnes,  doivent  etre 
exprimees  clairement,  afin  que  la  chicane  ne  puisse  pas 
les  toumer  a  son  gre  pour  en  eluder  I'esprit  et  decider  de 
la  fortune  des  particuliers  arbitrairement  et  sans  regie ; 
la  procedure  doit  etre  aussi  courte  qu'il  est  possible,  afin 
d'empecher  la  mine  des  plaideurs,  qui  consumeraient  en 
faux  frais  ce  qui  leur  est  du  de  justice  et  de  bon  droit.  Gette 
partie  du  gouvernement  ne  saurait  etre  assez  surveillee, 


LES  DEVOIES  DES  SOUVEEAINS  255 

pour  mettre  toutes  les  barrieres  possibles  a  I'avidite  des 
juges  et  a  Finteret  demesure  des  avocats.  On  retient  tout 
le  monde  dans  son  devoir  par  des  visitations  qui  se  font 
de  temps  a  autre  dans  les  provinces,  ou  quiconque  se  croit 
lese  ose  porter  ses  plaintes  a  la  commission,  et  les  prevari- 
cateurs  doivent  etre  severement  punis.  II  est  peut-etre 
superflu  d'ajouter  que  les  peines  ne  doivent  jamais  passer 
le  delit,  que  la  violence  ne  doit  jamais  etre  employee  au 
lieu  des  lois,  et  qu'il  vaut  mieux  qu'un  souverain  soit  trop 
indulgent  que  trop  severe.  Comme  tout  particulier  qui 
n'agit  pas  par  principes  a  une  conduit e  inconsequent e, 
d'autant  plus  import e-t-il  qu'un  magistrat  qui  veille  au 
bien  des  peuples  agisse  d'apres  un  systeme  arrete  de  politique, 
de  guerre,  de  jS,nance,  de  commerce  et  de  lois.  Par  exemple, 
un  peuple  doux  ne  doit  point  avoir  des  lois  severes,  mais 
des  lois  adaptees  a  son  caractere.  La  base  de  ces  systemes 
doit  toujours  etre  relative  au  plus  grand  bien  de  la  societe ; 
les  principes  doivent  etre  adaptes  a  la  situation  du  pays, 
a  ses  anciens  usages,  s'ils  sont  bons,  au  genie  de  la  nation. 
Par  exemple,  en  politique  c'est  un  fait  connu  que  les 
allies  les  plus  naturels  et  par  consequent  les  meilleurs 
sont  ceux  dont  les  interets,  concourent  avec  les  ndtres, 
et  qui  ne  sont  pas  si  proches  voisins,  qu'on  soit  engage 
en  quel  que  discussion  d'interet  avec  eux.  Quelquefois 
des  evenements  bizarres  donnent  lieu  a  des  combinaisons 
extraordinaires.  Nous  avons  vu,  de  nos  jours,  des 
nations  de  tout  temps  rivales  et  meme  ennemies  marcher 
sous  les  memes  bannieres ;  mais  ce  sont  des  cas  qui 
arrivent  rarement,  et  qui  ne  serviront  jamais  d'exemples. 
Ces  sortes  de  liaisons  ne  peuvent  etre  que  momentanees, 
au  lieu  que  le  genre  des  autres,  contractees  par  un  interet 
commun,  pent  seul  etre  durable.  Dans  la  situation  ou 
I'Europe  est  de  nos  jours,  ou  tous  les  princes  sont  armes, 
parmi  lesquels  il  s'eleve  des  puissances  preponderantes 
capables  d'ecraser  les  faibles,  la  prudence  exige  qu'on 
s'allie  avec   d'autres  puissances,  soit  pour  s'assurer  des 


256    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

secours  en  cas  d'attaque,  soit  pour  reprimer  les  projets 
dangereux  de  ses  ennemis,  soit  pour  soutenir,  a  I'aide  de 
ces  allies,  de  justes  pretentions  contre  ceux  qui  voudraient 
s'y  opposer.  Mais  ceci  ne  suffit  pas ;  il  faut  avoir  chez 
ses  voisins,  surtout  chez  ses  ennemis,  des  yeux  et  des  oreilles 
ouverts,  qui  rapportent  fidelement  ce  qu'ils  ont  vu  et 
entendu.  Les  hommes  sont  mechants ;  il  faut  se  garder 
surtout  d'etre  surpris,  parce  que  tout  ce  qui  surprend  effraye 
et  decontenance,  ce  qui  n'arrive  jamais  quand  on  est 
prepare,  quelque  facheux  que  soit  I'evenement  auquel  on 
doit  s'attendre.  La  politique  europeenne  est  si  fallacieuse, 
que  le  plus  avise  pent  devenir  dupe,  s'il  n'est  pas  toujours 
alert e  et  sur  ses  gardes. 

Le  systeme  militaire  doit  etre  egalement  assis  sur  de 
bons  principes  qui  soient  surs  et  reconnus  par  I'experience. 
On  doit  connaitre  le  genie  de  la  nation,  de  quoi  elle  est 
capable,  et  jusqu'ou  Ton  ose  risquer  ses  enterprises  en  la 
menant  a  I'ennemi.  Dans  nos  temps,  il  nous  est  interdit 
d 'employer  a  la  guerre  les  usages  des  Grecs  et  des  Komains. 
La  decouverte  de  la  poudre  a  canon  a  change  entierement 
la  fagon  de  faire  la  guerre.  Maintenant  c'est  la  superiorite 
du  feu  qui  decide  de  la  victoire  ;  les  exercices,  les  reglements 
et  la  tactique  ont  ete  refondus  pour  les  conformer  a  cet 
usage,  et  recemment,  I'abus  enorme  des  nombreuses  artil- 
leries qui  appesantissent  les  armees  nous  force  egalement 
d'adopter  cette  mode,  tant  pour  nous  soutenir  dans  nos 
postes  que  pour  attaquer  I'ennemi  dans  ceux  qu'il  occupe, 
au  cas  que  d'importantes  raisons  I'exigent.  Tant  de  raffine- 
ments  nouveaux  ont  done  si  fort  change  I'art  de  la  guerre 
que  ce  serait  de  nos  jours  une  temerite  impardonnable  a 
un  general,  en  imitant  les  Turenne,  les  Conde,  les  Luxem- 
bourg, de  risquer  une  bataille  en  suivant  les  dispositions 
que  ces  grands  generaux  ont  faites  de  leur  temps.  Alors 
les  victoires  se  remportaient  par  la  valeur  et  par  la  force ; 
maintenant  I'artillerie  decide  de  tout ;  et  I'habilete  du 
general  consiste  a  faire  approcher  ses  troupes  de  I'ennemi 


LES  DEVOIKS  DES  SOUVEEAINS  257 

sans  qu'elles  soient  detruites  avant  de  commencer  a  I'attaquer. 
Pour  se  procurer  cet  avantage,  il  faut  qu'il  fasse  taire  le 
feu  de  Tennemi  par  la  superiorite  de  celui  qu'il  lui  oppose. 
Mais  ce  qui  restera  etemellement  stable  dans  I'art  militaire, 
c'est  la  castrametrie,  ou  I'art  de  tirer  le  plus  grand  parti 
possible  d'un  terrain  pour  son  avantage.  Si  de  nouvelles 
decouvertes  se  font  encore,  ce  sera  une  necessite  que  les 
generaux  de  ces  temps-la  se  pretent  h  ces  nouveautes,  et 
changent  a  notre  tactique  ce  qui  exige  correction. 

II  est  des  fitats  qui,  par  leur  local  et  par  leur  constitu- 
tion, doivent  etre  des  puissances  maritimes ;  tels  sont 
I'Angleterre,  la  HoUande,  la  France,  I'Espagne,  le  Danemark : 
ils  sont  environnes  de  la  mer,  et  les  colonies  eloignees 
qu'ils  poss^dent  leur  prescrivent  d 'avoir  des  vaisseaux 
pour  entretenir  la  communication  et  le  commerce  entre 
la  mere  patrie  et  ces  membres  detaches.  II  est  d'autres 
Etats,  comme  I'Autriche,  la  Pologne,  la  Prusse  et  meme 
la  Eussie,  dont  les  uns  pourraient  se  passer  de  marine,  et 
les  autres  commettraient  une  faute  impardonnable  en 
politique,  s'ils  divisaient  leurs  forces  en  voulant  employer 
sur  mer  des  troupes  dont  ils  ont  un  besoin  indispensable 
sur  terre.  Le  nombre  des  troupes  qu'un  Etat  entretient 
doit  etre  en  proportion  des  troupes  qu'ont  ses  ennemis ; 
il  faut  qu'il  se  trouve  en  meme  force,  ou  le  plus  faible  risque 
de  succomber.  On  object  era  peut-etre  que  le  prince  doit 
compter  sur  les  secours  de  ses  allies.  Cela  serait  bon,  si 
les  allies  etaient  tels  qu'ils  devaient  etre ;  mais  leur  zele 
n'est  que  tiedeur,  et  Ton  se  trompe  a  coup  sur,  si  Ton  compte 
sur  d'autres  que  sur  soi-meme.  Si  la  situation  des  frontieres 
est  susceptible  d'etre  defendue  par  des  forteresses,  il  ne 
faut  rien  negUger  pour  en  construire,  et  ne  rien  epargner 
pour  les  perfectionner.  La  France  en  a  donne  I'exemple, 
et  elle  en  a  senti  I'a vantage  en  differ entes  occasions. 

Mais  ni  la  politique  ni  le  miHtaire  ne  peuvent  prosperer, 
si  les  finances  ne  sont  pas  entretenues  dans  le  plus  grand 
ordre,  et  si  le  prince  lui-meme  n'est  econome  et  prudent* 

8 


268    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

L'argent  est  comme  la  baguette  des  enchanteurs,  par  le 
moyen  de  laquelle  ils  operaient  des  miracles.  Les  grandes 
vues  politiques,  I'entretien  du  militaire,  les  meilleures 
intentions  pour  le  soulagement  des  peuples,  tout  cela  demeure 
engourdi,  si  I'argent  ne  le  vivifie.  L'economie  du  souverain 
est  d'autant  plus  utile  pour  le  bien  public,  que  s'il  ne 
se  trouve  pas  avoir  des  fonds  sufi&sants  en  reserve  soit 
pour  fournir  aux  frais  de  la  guerre  sans  charger  ses  peuples 
d'imp6ts  extraordinaires,  soit  pour  secourir  les  citoyens 
dans  des  calamites  publiques,  toutes  ces  charges  tombent 
sur  les  sujets,  qui  se  trouvent  sans  ressource  dans  des  temps 
malheureux  ou  ils  ont  si  grand  besoin  d'assistance.  Aucun 
gouvemement  ne  pent  se  passer  d'impdts  ;  soit  republicain 
soit  monarchique  il  en  a  un  egal  besoin.  II  faut  bien  que 
le  magistrat  charge  de  toute  la  besogne  publique  ait  de 
quoi  vivre  que  les  juges  soient  payes,  pour  les  empecher 
de  prevariquer,  que  le  soldat  soit  entretenu,  afin  qu'il  ne 
commette  point  de  violences  faute  d'avoir  de  quoi  sub- 
sister  ;  il  faut  de  meme  que  les  personnes  preposees  au 
maniement  des  finances  soient  assez  bien  payees  pour  que 
le  besoin  ne  les  oblige  pas  d'administrer  infidelement  les 
deniers  publics.  Ces  differentes  depenses  demandent  des 
sommes  considerables ;  ajoutez-y  encore  quelque  argent 
mis  annuellement  de  c6te  pour  les  cas  extraordinaires : 
voila  cependant  ce  qui  doit  etre  necessairement  pris  sur 
le  peuple.  Le  grand  art  consiste  a  lever  ces  fonds  sans 
fouler  les  citoyens.  Pour  que  les  taxes  soient  egales  et  non 
arbitraires,  Ton  fait  des  cadastres,  qui,  s'ils  sont  classifies 
avec  exactitude,  proportionnent  les  charges  selon  les  moyens 
des  individus ;  cela  est  si  necessaire,  qu'une  faute  im- 
pardonnable  en  finance  serait  si  les  imp6ts,  maladroitement 
repartis,  degoutaient  Tagriculteur  de  ses  travaux ;  il 
doit,  ayant  acquitte  ses  droits,  pouvoir  encore  vivre  avee 
une  certaine  aisance,  lui  et  sa  famille.  Bien  loin  d'opprimer 
les  peres  nourriciers  de  I'Etat,  il  faut  les  encourager  a  bien 
Qultiver  leurs  terres ;    c'est  en  quoi  consiste  la  veritable 


LES  DEVOIES  DES  SOUVEEAINS  259 

richesse  du  pays.  La  terre  foumit  les  comestibles  les  plus 
necessaires,  et  ceux  qui  la  travaillent  sont,  comme  nous 
I'avons  deja  dit,  les  vrais  peres  nourriciers  de  la  societe. 

On  m'opposera  peut-etre  que  la  Hollande  subsiste 
sans  que  ses  champs  lui  rapportent  la  centieme  partie 
de  ce  qu'elle  consume.  Je  reponds  a  cette  objection  que 
c'est  un  petit  Etat,  chez  lequel  le  commerce  supplee  k 
I'agriculture ;  mais  plus  un  gouvernement  est  vaste,  plus 
I'economie  rurale  a  besoin  d'etre  encouragee. 

Une  autre  espece  d'impdts  qu'on  leve  sur  les 
villes,  ce  sont  les  accises.  Elles  veulent  etre  maniees  avec 
des  mains  adroites,  pour  ne  point  charger  les  comesti- 
bles les  plus  necessaires  k  la  vie,  comme  le  pain,  la  petite 
biere,  la  viande,  &c.,  ce  qui  retomberait  sur  les  soldats, 
sur  les  ouvriers  et  sur  les  artisans ;  d'ou  il  s'ensuivrait, 
pour  le  malheur  du  peuple,  que  la  main-d'ceuvre  rehausserait 
de  prix ;  par  consequent  les  marchandises  deviendraient 
si  cheres,  qu'on  en  perdrait  le  debit  etranger.  C'est  ce 
qui  arrive  maintenant  en  Hollande  et  en  Angleterre.  Ces 
deux  nations,  ayant  contracte  des  dettes  immenses  dans 
les  dernieres  guerres,  ont  cree  de  nouveaux  impdts  pour 
en  payer  le  dividende,  mais  comme  leur  mala dr esse  en  a 
charge  la  main-d'ceuvre,  ils  ont  presque  ecrase  leurs  manu- 
factures. De  la,  la  cherte  en  Hollande  etant  augmentee, 
ces  republicains  font  fabriquer  leurs  draps  k  Verviers  et  k 
Liege,  et  I'Angleterre  a  perdu  un  debit  considerable  de  ces 
laines  en  Allemagne.  Pour  obvier  a  ces  abus,  le  souverain 
doit  souvent  se  souvenir  de  Tetat  du  pauvre  peuple,  se 
mettre  a  la  place  d'un  paysan  et  d'un  manufacturier,  et 
se  dire  alors  :  Si  j'etais  ne  dans  la  classe  de  ces  citoyens 
dont  les  bras  sont  le  capital,  que  desirerais-je  du  souverain  ? 
Ce  que  le  bon  sens  alors  lui  indiquera,  son  devoir  est  de 
le  mettre  en  pratique.  II  se  trouve  des  provinces,  dans 
la  plupart  des  Etats  de  I'Europe,  ou  les  paysans,  attaches 
S.  la  glebe,  sont  serfs  de  leurs  gentilshommes ;  c'est  de 
toutes  les  conditions  la  plus  malheureuse  et  celle  qui  revolte 


260    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

le  plus  rhumanite.  Assurement  aucun  homme  n'est  n6 
pour  etre  Fesclave  de  son  semblable  ;  on  deteste  avec  raison 
un  pareil  abus,  et  Ton  croit  qu'il  ne  faudrait  que  vouloir 
pour  abolir  cette  coutume  barbare ;  mais  il  n'en  est  pas 
ainsi,  elle  tient  a  d'anciens  contrats  faits  entre  les  possesseurs 
des  terres  et  les  colons.  L 'agriculture  est  arrangee  en  conse- 
quence des  services  des  paysans ;  en  voulant  abolir  tout  d'un 
coup  cette  abominable  gestion,  on  bouleverserait  entiere- 
ment  I'economie  des  terres,  et  il  faudrait  en  partie  indemniser 
la  noblesse  des  pertes  qu'elle  souffrirait  en  ses  revenus. 

Ensuite  s'offre  I'article  des  manufactures  et  du  commerce, 
non  moins  important.  Pour  qu'un  pays  se  conserve  dans 
une  situation  florissante,  il  est  de  toute  necessite  que  la 
balance  du  commerce  lui  soit  avantageuse ;  s'il  paye  plus 
pour  les  importations  qu'il  ne  gagne  par  les  exportations, 
il  faut  necessairement  qu'il  s'appauvrisse  d'annee  en  annee. 
Qu'on  se  figure  un  bourse  ou  il  y  a  cent  ducats  :  tirez-en 
journellement  un,  et  n'y  remettez  rien,  vous  conviendrez 
qu'au  bout  de  cent  jours  la  bourse  sera  vide.  Voici  les 
moyens  d'obvier  k  cette  perte :  faire  manufacturer  toutes 
les  premieres  matieres  qu'on  possede,  faire  travailler  les 
matieres  etrangeres  pour  y  gagner  la  main-d'ceuvre  et  tra- 
vailler a  bon  marche  pour  se  procurer  de  debit  etranger. 
Quant  au  commerce,  il  roule  sur  trois  points  :  sur  le  superflu 
de  vos  denrees,  que  vous  exportez  ;  sur  celles  de  vos  voisins, 
qui  vous  enrichissent  en  les  vendant ;  et  sur  les  marchan- 
dises  etrangeres  que  vos  besoins  exigent  et  que  vous  im- 
portez.  C'est  sur  ces  productions  que  nous  venons 
d'indiquer  que  doit  se  regler  le  commerce  d'un  fitat ;  voila  de 
quoi  il  est  susceptible  par  la  nature  des  choses.  L'Angleterre, 
la  Hollande,  la  France,  I'Espagne,  le  Portugal,  ont  des 
possessions  aux  deux  Indes  et  des  ressources  plus  etendues 
pour  leur  marine  marchande  que  les  autres  royaumes ; 
profiter  des  avantages  qu'on  a,  et  ne  rien  entreprendre 
au  dela  de  ses  forces,  c'est  le  conseil  de  la  sagesse. 

II  nous  reste  h,  parler  des  moyens  les  plus  propres  pour 


i 


LES   DEVOIES  DES   SOUVEEAINS  261 

maintenir  invariablement  I'abondance  des  vivres,  dont  la 
societe  a  un  besoin  indispensable  pour  demeurer  florissante. 
La  premiere  chose  est  d'avoir  soin  de  la  bonne  culture  des 
terres,  de  defricher  tous  les  terrains  qui  sont  capables  de 
rapport,  d'augmenter  les  troupeaux  pour  gagner  d'autant 
plus  de  lait,  de  beurre,  de  fromage  et  d'engrais  ;  d'avoir 
ensuite  un  releve  exact  de  la  quantite  de  boisseaux  des 
differentes  especes  de  grains  gagnes  dans  de  bonnes,  dans 
de  mediocres  et  dans  de  mauvaises  annees  ;  d'en  decompter 
la  consommation,  et,  par  ce  resultat,  de  s'instruire  de  ce 
qu'il  y  a  de  superflu,  dont  Fexportation  doit  etre  permise, 
ou  de  ce  qui  manque  a  la  consommation,  et  que  le  besoin 
demande  qu'on  se  procure.  Tout  souverain  attache  au 
bien  pubhc  est  oblige  de  se  pourvoir  de  magasins  abondam- 
ment  fournis,  pour  suppleer  a  la  mauvaise  recolte  et  pour 
prevenir  la  famine.  Nous  avons  vu  en  AUemagne  dans  les 
mauvaises  annees  de  1771  et  de  1772,  les  malheurs  que 
la  Saxe  et  les  provinces  de  I'Empire  ont  soufferts,  parce 
que  cette  precaution  si  utile  avait  ete  negligee.  Le  peuple 
broyait  I'ecorce  des  chenes,  qui  lui  servait  d'aliment.  Cette 
miserable  nourriture  accelera  sa  mort ;  nombre  de  families 
ont  peri  sans  secours ;  c'etait  une  desolation  universelle. 
D'autres,  pales,  blemes  et  decharnes,  se  sont  expatries  pour 
chercher  des  secours  ailleurs ;  leur  vue  excitait  la  compassion, 
un  coeur  d'airain  y  aurait  ete  sensible.  Quel  reproches 
leurs  magistrats  ne  devaient-ils  pas  se  faire  d'etre  les  specta- 
teurs  de  ces  calamites  sans  y  pouvoir  porter  de  remede  ! 

Nous  passons  maintenant  a  un  autre  article,  aussi 
interessant  peut-etre.  II  est  peu  de  pays  ou  les  citoyens 
aient  des  opinions  pareilles  sur  la  religion ;  elles  different 
souvent  entierement ;  il  en  est  d'autres  qu'on  appelle  des 
sectes.  La  question  s'eleve  alors  :  Faut-il  que  tous  les 
citoyens  pensent  de  meme,  ou  peut-on  permettre  a  chacun 
de  penser  a  sa  guise  ?  Voila  d'abord  de  sombres  politiques 
qui  vous  disent :  Tout  le  monde  doit  etre  de  la  meme  opinion, 
pour  que  rien  ne   divise  les   citoyens.    Le   theologien    y 


262    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMANY 

ajoute :  Quiconque  ne  pense  pas  comme  moi  est  damne, 
et  il  ne  convient  pas  que  mon  souverain  soit  roi  des  damnes ; 
il  faut  done  les  r6tir  dans  ce  monde,  pour  qu'ils  prosperent 
d'autant  mieux  dans  I'autre.  On  repond  a  cela  que  jamais 
une  societe  ne  pensera  de  meme ;  que  chez  les  nations 
chretiennes  la  plupart  sont  anthropomorphites ;  que  chez 
les  catholiques  le  grand  nombre  est  idolatre,  parce  qu'on 
ne  me  persuadera  jamais  qu'un  manant  sache  distinguer 
le  culte  de  la  trie  et  d'hyperdulie ;  il  adore  de  bonne  foi 
rimage  qu'il  invoque.  Voila  done  nombre  d'heretiques 
dans  toutes  les  sectes  chretiennes ;  de  plus,  chacun  croit 
ce  qui  lui  parait  vraisemblable.  On  peu  contraindre  par 
violence  un  pauvre  miserable  a  prononcer  un  certain  formu- 
laire,  auquel  il  denie  son  consentement  interieur ;  ainsi  le 
persecuteur  n'a  rien  gagne.  Mais  si  Ton  remonte  k  I'origine 
de  la  societe,  il  est  de  toute  evidence  que  le  souverain  n'a 
aucun  droit  sur  la  fa^on  de  penser  des  citoyens.  Ne  faudrait- 
il  pas  etre  en  demence  pour  se  figurer  que  des  hommes  ont 
dit  k  un  homme  leur  semblable  :  Nous  vous  elevons  au-dessus 
de  nous,  parce  que  nous  aimons  a  etre  esclaves,  et  nous  vous 
donnons  la  puissance  de  diriger  nos  pensees  a  votre  volonte  ? 
lis  ont  dit  au  contraire  :  Nous  avons  besoin  de  vous  pour 
maintenir  les  lois  auxquelles  nous  voulons  obeir,  pour  nous 
gouverner  sagement,  pour  nous  defendre ;  du  reste,  nous 
exigeons  de  vous  que  vous  respectiez  notre  hberte.  Voila 
la  sentence  prononcee,  elle  est  sans  appel,  et  meme  cette 
tolerance  est  si  avantageuse  aux  societes  ou  elle  est  etablie 
qu'elle  fait  le  bonheur  de  I'Etat.  Des  que  tout  culte  est 
libre,  tout  le  monde  est  tranquille  ;  au  lieu  que  la  persecution 
a  donne  lieu  aux  guerres  civiles  les  plus  sanglantes,  les 
plus  longues  et  les  plus  destructives.  Le  moindre  mal 
qu'attire  la  persecution  est  de  faire  emigrer  les  persecutes ; 
la  France  a  eu  des  provinces  dont  la  population  a  souffert, 
et  qui  se  ressentent  encore  de  la  revocation  de  I'edit  de 
Nantes. 

Ce  sont  la,  en  general,  les  devoirs  qu'un  prince  doit 


LES  DEVOIES  DES  SOUVEEAINS  263 

remplir.  Afin  qu'il  ne  s'en  ecarte  jamais,  il  doit  se  rappeler 
souvent  qu'il  est  homme  comme  le  moindre  de  ses  sujets ; 
s'il  est  le  premier  juge,  le  premier  general,  le  premier  financier, 
le  premier  ministre  de  la  societe,  ce  n'est  pas  pour  qu'il 
represente,  mais  afin  qu'il  en  remplisse  les  devoirs.  II  n'est 
que  le  premier  serviteur  de  I'Etat,  oblige  d'agir  avec  probite, 
avec  sagesse  et  avec  un  entier  desinteressement,  comme 
si  a  chaque  moment  il  devait  rendre  compte  de  son  ad- 
ministration a  ses  citoyens.  Ainsi  il  est  coupable  s'il 
prodigue  I'argent  du  peuple,  le  produit  des  impdts,  en 
luxe,  en  faste,  en  debauches,  lui  qui  doit  veiller  aux  bonnes 
mcBurs  qui  sont  les  gardiennes  des  lois,  qui  doit  perfectionner 
I'education  nationale,  et  non  la  pervertir  par  de  mauvais 
exemples.  C'est  un  objet  des  plus  importants  que  la 
conservation  des  bonnes  moeurs  dans  leur  integrite  ;  le 
souverain  pent  y  contribuer  beaucoup  en  distinguant 
et  recompensant  les  citoyens  qui  ont  fait  des  actions  ver- 
tueuses,  en  temoignant  du  mepris  pour  ceux  dont  la  de- 
pravation ne  rougit  plus  de  ses  dereglements.  Le  prince 
doit  desapprouver  hautement  toute  action  deshonnete, 
et  refuser  des  distinctions  a  ceux  qui  sont  incorrigibles. 
II  est  encore  un  objet  interessant  qu'il  ne  faut  pas  perdre 
de  vue  et  qui,  s'il  etait  neglige,  porter  ait  un  prejudice 
irreparable  aux  bonnes  moeurs ;  c'est  quand  le  prince 
distingue  trop  des  personnes  qui,  sans  merite,  possedent 
de  grandes  richesses.  Ces  honneurs  prodigues  mal  a  propos 
confirment  le  public  dans  le  prejuge  vulgaire  qu'il  suffit 
d'avoir  du  bien  pour  etre  considere.  Des  lors  I'interet  et 
la  cupidite  secouent  le  frein  qui  les  retenait ;  chacun  veut 
accumuler  des  richesses ;  on  emploie  les  voies  les  plus 
iniques  pour  les  acquerir ;  la  corruption  gagne,  elle  s'enracine, 
elle  devient  generale ;  les  hommes  a  talents,  les  hommes 
vertueux  sont  meprises,  et  le  public  n'honore  que  ces  batards 
de  Midas  dont  la  grande  depense  et  le  faste  I'eblouissent. 
Pour  empecher  que  les  mceurs  nationales  ne  se  pervertissent 
jusqu'4  cet  horrible  exc^s,  le  prince  doit  etre  sans  cesse 


264    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

attentif  a  ne  distinguer  que  le  merite  personnel  et  a  ne 
temoigner  que  du  mepris  pour  I'opulence  sans  moeurs  et 
sans  vertus.  Au  reste,  comme  le  souverain  est  proprement 
le  chef  d'une  famille  de  citoyens,  le  pere  de  ses  peuples, 
dans  toutes  les  occasions  il  doit  servir  de  dernier  refuge 
aux  malheureux,  tenir  lieu  de  pere  aux  orphelins,  secourir 
les  veuves,  avoir  des  entrailles  pour  le  dernier  miserable 
comme  pour  le  premier  courtisan,  et  repandre  des  liberalites 
sur  ceux  qui,  prives  de  tout  secours,  ne  peuvent  trouver 
d'assistance  que  par  ses  bienfaits. 

Voila,  selon  les  principes  que  nous  avons  etablis  au 
commencement  de  cet  essai,  I'idee  exacte  qu'on  doit  se 
former  des  devoirs  d'un  souverain  et  de  la  seule  maniere 
qui  peut  rendre  bon  et  avantageux  le  gouvernement  monar- 
chique.  Si  bien  des  princes  ont  une  conduite  differente,  il 
faut  I'attribuer  au  peu  de  reflexion  qu'ils  ont  fait  sur  leur 
institution  et  sur  les  devoirs  qui  en  derivent.  lis  ont  porte 
une  charge  dont  ils  ont  meconnu  le  poids  et  I'importance, 
ils  se  sont  fourvoyes  faute  de  connaissances,  car  dans  nos 
temps  Fignorance  fait  commettre  plus  de  fautes  que  la 
mechancete.  Cette  esquisse  de  souverain  paraitra  peut- 
etre  aux  censeurs  I'archetype  des  stoiciens,  I'idee  de  sage 
qu'ils  avaient  imagine,  qui  n'exista  jamais,  et  dont  le  seul 
Marc-Aur^le  approcha  le  plus  pres.  Nous  souhaitons 
que  ce  faible  essai  soit  capable  de  former  des  Marc-Aureles  ; 
ce  serait  la  plus  belle  recompense  a  la  quelle  nous  puissions 
nous  attendre,  et  qui  ferait  en  meme  temps  le  bien  de 
I'humanite.  Nous  devons  cependant  ajouter  a  ceci  qu'un 
prince  qui  fournirait  la  carriere  laborieuse  que  nous  avons 
tracee  ne  parviendrait  pas  a  une  perfection  entiere,  parce 
qu'avec  toute  la  bonne  volonte  possible,  il  pourrait  se 
tromper  dans  le  choix  de  ceux  qu'il  emploierait  a  I'adminis- 
tration  des  affaires ;  parce  qu'on  pourrait  lui  representer 
les  choses  sous  un  faux  jour ;  que  ses  ordres  ne  seraient 
pas  executes  ponctuellement ;  qu'on  voilerait  des  iniquites 
de  fagon  qu'elles  ne  parviendraient  pas  a  sa  connaissance ; 


LES  DEVOIES  DES  SOUVEEAINS  265 

que  des  employes  durs  et  entiers  mettraient  trop  de  rigueur 
et  de  hauteur  dans  leur  gestion  ;  enfin,  parce  que,  dans  un 
pays  etendu,  le  prince  ne  saurait  etre  partout.  Tel  est 
done  et  sera  le  destin  des  choses  d'ici-bas,  que  jamais 
on  n'atteindra  au  degre  de  perfection  qu'exige  le  bonheur 
des  peuples,  et  qu'en  fait  de  gouvemement,  comme  pour 
toute  autre  chose,  il  faudra  se  contenter  de  ce  qui  est  le 
moins  defectueux. 


CHAPTEK  XII 

INSTRUCTION  AU   MAJOR  BORCKB    (1751) 

Jb  vous  confie  1' education  de  mon  neveu,  I'heritier  pre- 
somptif  de  la  couronne ;  et  comme  il  est  tres-different  de 
bien  elever  un  particulier,  ou  celui  qui  est  destine  a  gouverner 
des  Etats,  je  vous  donne  ici  une  instruction  sur  toutes 
les  choses  que  vous  devez  observer. 

1°.  Touchant  les  maitres : 

II  faut  que  mon  neveu  parcoure  I'histoire  ancienne, 
qu'il  sache  les  diiferentes  monarchies  qui  se  sont  succede, 
de  I'histoire  grecque  surtout  ce  qui  se  passa  dans  la  guerre 
d'Artaxerce,  de  Philippe  et  d'AIexandre,  dans  I'histoire 
romaine,  le  temps  des  guerres  puniques  et  de  Cesar.  II 
ne  faut  point  lui  fatiguer  la  memoire  par  les  noms  des 
princes  qui  se  sont  succede,  pourvu  qu'il  sache  ceux  des 
hommes  illustres  qui  ont  joue  un  grand  r61e  dans  leur 
patrie. 

II  ne  suffit  pas  de  lui  apprendre  I'histoire  comme  k 
un  perroquet ;  le  grand  usage  des  faits  anciens  est  de  les 
comparer  aux  modernes,  de  developper  les  causes  qui  ont 
produit  des  revolutions,  de  montrer  comme  pour  Fordinaire 
le  vice  est  puni  et  la  vertu  recompensee.  II  faut,  de  plus, 
lui  faire  remarquer  que  les  historiens  anciens  ne  sont  pas 
toujours  veridiques,  et  qu'il  faut  examiner  et  juger  avant 
de  croire.  La  partie  de  I'histoire  la  plus  essentielle  et 
la  plus  indispensable,  c'est  celle  qui  prend  a  Charlemagne 
et  qui  finit  k  nos  jours ;    j'entends  par  histoire  celle  de 

266 


INSTRUCTION  AU  MAJOR  BORCKE         267 

TEurope.  II  la  lui  faut  faire  etudier  avec  soin,  ne  s'attacher 
qu'aux  faits  principaux,  et  n'entrer  dans  un  plus  grand 
detail  qu'a  la  guerre  de  trente  ans.  Qu'il  apprenne 
I'histoire  de  sa  maison,  cela  va  sans  dire. 

En  apprenant  la  geographie,  il  est  necessaire  de  lui 
donner  une  idee  des  etats  et  de  leur  gouvemement ;  et 
comme  cette  etude  va  tres  bien  avec  celle  de  I'histoire, 
on  peut,  en  lui  enseignant  Tune,  lui  apprendre  I'autre  en 
meme  temps. 

Dans  quelque  temps  on  pourra  lui  faire  un  petit  cours 
de  logique  depouille  de  toute  pedanterie,  et  autant  qu'il 
en  faut  pour  qu'il  disceme  de  lui-meme  le  point  faux 
d'un  raisonnement  et  en  quoi  ime  proposition  n'est  pas 
juste.  Ensuite  on  pourra  lui  faire  lire  les  orateurs,  Ciceron, 
Demos thene,  quelques  tragedies  de  Racine,  &c. 

Quand  il  aura  quelques  annees  de  plus,  on  pourra  lui 
donner  un  abrege  des  opinions  des  philosophes  et  des 
differentes  religions,  sans  lui  inspirer  de  haine  pour  aucune, 
en  lui  faisant  voir  qu'elles  adorent  toutes  Dieu,  mais  par 
des  moyens  differents.  II  ne  faut  pas  qu'il  ait  trop  de 
consideration  pour  le  pretre  qui  I'instruit,  et  il  faut  qu'il 
ne  croie  les  choses  qu'apres  les  avoir  examinees. 

J'en  reviens  a  la  religion  catholique.  EUe  est  assez 
etendue  en  Silesie,  dans  les  duches  de  Cleves  et  ailleurs. 
Si  cet  enfant  devenait  calviniste  fanatique,  tout  serait 
perdu.  II  est  tres-necessaire  d'empecher  meme  le  pretre 
de  dire  devotement  des  injures  aux  papistes ;  mais  le 
gouverneur  doit  adroitement  faire  sentir  k  son  eleve  que 
rien  n'est  plus  dangereux  que  lorsque  les  catholiques  ont 
le  dessus  dans  im  pays,  par  rapport  aux  persecutions,  a 
I'ambition  des  papes,  et  qu'un  prince  protestant  est  bien 
plus  le  maitre  chez  lui  qu'un  prince  catholique. 

II  s'entend  de  soi-meme  que  mon  neveu  apprenne  ^ 
lire,  k  ecrire,  ^  compter ;  ainsi  je  passe  ces  articles  sous 
silence.  II  est  trop  jeune  pour  apprendre  les  fortifications, 
il  en  sera  temps  quand  il  aura  dix  ou  onze  ans. 


268    THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEEMANY 

Les  exercices  comme  danser,  faire  les  armes  et  monter 
h  cheval  peuvent  s'apprendre  I'apres-midi,  dans  le  temps 
de  la  digestion.  Si  Fenfant  avait  envie  d'apprendre  le 
latin,  le  polonais  ou  I'italien,  il  ne  dependra  que  de  lui ; 
mais  s'il  n'y  marque  pas  d'inclination,  il  ne  faut  pas  le 
presser  la-dessus,  de  meme  que  la  musique. 

Voici  pour  ses  etudes  et  ses  exercices.  Votre  grand  art 
sera  de  lui  faire  le  tout  avec  plaisir,  de  bannir  la  pedanterie 
de  ces  etudes  et  de  lui  en  faire  venir  le  gout ;  c'est  pourquoi, 
au  commencement  surtout,  il  ne  faut  pas  charger  la  dose. 

Nous  en  venons  a  present  a  la  plus  grande  et  essentielle 
partie  de  I'education,  qui  est  celle  des  moeurs.  Ni  vous 
ni  toutes  les  puissances  de  I'univers  ne  sauraient  changer 
le  caractere  d'un  enfant ;  tout  ce  que  peut  I'education, 
c'est  de  moderer  la  violence  des  passions.  Traitez  mon 
neveu  comme  un  particulier  qui  doit  faire  sa  fortune ; 
dites-lui  que  s'il  a  des  defauts,  ou  s'il  n'apprend  rien,  il 
sera  meprise  de  tout  le  monde.  Citez  lui  I'exemple  du 
M.  de  Schwedt  et  de  Henri.  II  ne  faut  point  lui  mettre 
du  vent  en  tete,  et  I'elever  tout  simplement.  Qu'il  soit 
obligeant  en  vers  tout  le  monde,  et  que  s'il  fait  une  grossierete 
a  quelqu'un,  que  celui-la  la  lui  rende  sur-le-champ.  Qu'il 
apprenne  que  tous  les  hommes  sont  egaux,  et  que  la  naissance 
n'est  qu'une  chimere,  si  elle  n'est  pas  soutenue  par  le  merite. 
Laissez-le  parler  tout  seul  avec  tout  le  monde,  pour  qu'il 
devienne  hardi.  Qu'importe  qu'il  parle  de  tort  et  travers  ? 
On  salt  que  c'est  un  enfant,  et,  dans  toute  son  education, 
faites,  autant  qu'il  sera  en  vous,  qu'il  agisse  par  lui-meme, 
et  qu'il  ne  s'accoutume  point  a  se  laisser  mener ;  que  ses 
sottises  soient  a  lui,  de  meme  que  les  bonnes  choses  qu'il 
fera. 

II  est  d'une  tres-grande  importance  de  lui  inspirer  du 
gout  pour  le  militaire  ;  pour  cette  raison  il  faut  dans  toutes 
les  occasions  lui  dire  tant  vous-meme  que  de  lui  faire  dire 
par  d'autres  que  tout  homme  de  naissance  qui  n'est  pas 
soldat  n'est  qu'un  miserable.    H  faut  le  mener  tant  qu'il 


INSTEUCTION  AU  MAJOE  BOKCKE         269 

veut  voir  des  troupes.  On  peut  lui  montrer  les  cadets 
et  en  faire  venir  avec  le  temps  cinq  ou  six  chez  lui  faire 
Texercice ;  que  cela  soit  un  amusement  et  non  pas  un 
devoir,  car  le  grand  art  est  de  lui  donner  du  gout  pour  ce 
metier,  et  ce  sera^'t  tout  perdre  que  de  I'ennuyer  ou  de  le 
rebuter.  Qu'il  parle  a  tout  le  monde,  a  un  cadet,  a  un 
soldat,  h  un  bourgeois,  a  un  officier,  pour  qu'il  devienne 
hardi. 

Qu'on  lui  inspire  surtout  de  Fattachement  pour  ce  pays, 
et  que  personne  ne  lui  tienne  des  discours  que  de  bon  patriote ; 
et  sur  toute  sorte  de  sujets  et  de  discours  on  peut  y  glisser 
quelques  reflexions  de  morale,  qui  tendent  a  lui  precher 
I'humanite,  la  bonte  et  les  sentiments  qu'il  convient  a  un 
homme  d'honneur  et  surtout  a  un  prince  d'avoir. 

Je  veux  que,  quand  il  sera  plus  age,  il  commence  a 
faire  le  service  de  lieutenant,  pour  qu'il  passe  tout  les 
grades ;  ainsi  il  ne  faut  point  lui  mettre  du  vent  dans  la 
tete.  Que  les  officiers  qui  dinent  avec  lui  I'attaquent  et 
I'agacent  pour  le  rendre  hardi  et  gai,  et  qu'il  voie  le  plus 
de  monde  que  se  pourra.  Dans  ses  heures  de  recreation, 
s'il  a  en  vie  de  voir  des  enfant  s  de  son  age,  cela  ne  fera  pas 
de  mal ;  il  est  un  peu  tacitume,  et  il  est  tres-necessaire  de 
I'eveiller  ;  c'est  pourquoi  vous  vous  appliquerez  a  le  rendre 
le  plus  gai  que  possible.  Dans  toutes  les  occasions  vous 
aurez  grande  attention  a  lui  inculquer  le  respect  et  I'amour 
qu'il  doit  a  son  pere,  a  sa  mere,  et  la  deference  envers 
ses  parents.  Quand  vous  le  connaitrez  davantage  il  faudra 
voir  quelle  sera  sa  passion.  Dieu  nous  garde  de  la  detruire  ! 
mais  travaillons  a  la  moderer.  Quand  il  est  dans  son 
particulier,  qu'il  ne  fasse  jamais  des  choses  sans  en  rendre 
raison,  a  moins  que  ce  ne  soit  dans  ses  heures  de  recreation. 
S'il  est  souple,  soyez  doux,  s'il  est  retif,  donnez-vous  toute 
I'autorite  qu'il  vous  convient,  punissez-le  en  lui  dtant 
I'epee,  en  le  mettant  aux  arrets,  et,  tant  qu'il  se  peut,  en 
le  piquant  d'honneur ;  jusqu'^  present  il  parait  fort  doux, 
mais  avec  I'age  il  se  developpera  davantage. 


270  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEKMANY 

Vous  rendrez  toutes  les  semaines  compte  de  sa  conduite 
au  pere,  et  a  moi  tous  les  mois.  S'il  y  a  quelque  cas  ex- 
traordinaire, vous  pourrez  toujours  recourrir  a  moi.  Ne  le 
rendez  pas  timide  par  de  trop  grands  menagements  pour 
sa  sante,  ou  par  crainte  que  malheur  n'arrive.  II  faut 
avoir  un  grand  soin  de  lui,  mais  il  ne  faut  pas  qu'il  s'en 
aper9oive,  cela  le  rendrait  douillet,  timide  et  pusillanime. 
Mon  frere  pourra  regler  ses  heures  comme  il  le  jugera  a 
propos,  et  vous  pourrez  prendre  vos  mesures  la-dessus. 

Cette  instruction  n'est  bonne  que  jusqu'a  I'age  de  dix 
a  douze  ans,  ou  il  vous  en  faudra  une  autre  proportionnee 
aux  progres  de  mon  neveu,  a  son  age  et  aux  circonstances. 

Fait  a  Potsdam,  ce  24  Septembre  1751. 

{Signi)    Fbbdbric. 


CHAPTEE  XIII 

AU    MINISTEE    d'eTAT,    COMTB    DE   FINCKENSTBIN,   A   BERLIN 

Instruction  SecrJ^tb  pour  lb  Comtb  db  Finck 

Berlin,  10  Janvier  1767; 

Dans  la  situation  critique  ou  se  trouvent  nos  affaires,  je 
dois  vous  dormer  mes  ordres,  pour  que,  dans  tous  les  cas 
malheureux  qui  sont  dans  la  possibilite  des  evenements, 
vous  soyez  autorise  aux  partis  qu'il  faut  prendre. 

S'il  arrivait — de  quoi  le  Ciel  preserve ! — qu'une  de  mes 
armees  en  Saxe  fut  totalement  battue,  ou  bien  que  les 
Fran9ais  chassassent  les  Hanoveriens  de  leur  pays  et  s'y 
etablissent  et  nous  inena9assent  d'une  invasion  dans  la 
Vieille-Marche,ou  que  les  Busses  penetrassent  par  laNouveDe- 
Marche,  il  faut  sauver  la  famille  royale,  les  principaux 
dicasteres,  les  ministres  et  le  directoire.  Si  nous  sommes 
battus  en  Saxe  du  c6te  de  Leipzig,  le  lieu  le  plus  propre  pour 
le  transport  de  la  famille  et  du  tresor  est  k  Ciistrin ;  il 
faut,  en  ce  cas,  que  la  famille  royale  et  tous  ci-dessus  nommes 
aillent,  escortes  de  toute  la  gamison,  a  Ciistrin.  Si  les  Busses 
entraient  par  la  Nouvelle-Marche,  ou  qu'il  nous  arrivat 
un  malheur  en  Lusace,  il  faudrait  que  tout  se  transportat 
4  Magdebourg.  Enfin,  le  dernier  refuge  est  a  Stettin  ;  mais 
il  ne  faut  y  aller  qu'^  la  demiere  extremite.  La  gamison, 
la  famille  royale  et  le  tresor  sont  inseparables  et  vont 
toujours  ensemble ;  il  faut  y  ajouter  les  diamants  de  la 
couronne  et  I'argenterie  des  grands  apartements,  qui  en 

271 


272  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GEBMANY 

pareil  cas,  ainsi  que  la  vaisselle  d'or,  doit  etre  incontinent 
monnayee. 

S*il  arrivait  que  je  fusse  tue,  il  faut  que  les  affaires 
continuant  leur  train  sans  la  moindre  alteration  et  sans 
qu'on  s'aper^oive  qu'elles  sont  en  d'autres  mains ;  et  en 
ce  cas  il  faut  hater  serments  et  hommages,  tant  ici  qu'en 
Prusse,  et  surtout  en  Silesie. 

Si  j'avais  la  fatalite  d'etre  pris  prisonnier  par  Tennemi, 
je  defends  qu*on  ait  le  moindre  egard  pour  ma  personne, 
ni  qu'on  fasse  la  moindre  reflexion  sur  ce  que  je  pourrais 
ecrire  de  ma  detention.  Si  pareil  malheur  m'arrivait,  je 
veux  me  sacrifier  pour  I'Etat,  et  il  faut  qu'on  obeisse  4 
mon  frere,  lequel,  ainsi  que  tous  mes  ministres  et  generaux, 
me  repondront  de  leur  tete  qu'on  n'offrira  ni  province  ni 
ran^on  pour  moi,  et  que  Ton  continuera  la  guerre,  en  poussant 
ses  avantages  tout  comme  si  je  n'avais  jamais  existe  dans 
le  monde. 

J'espere  et  je  dois  croire  que  vous,  comte  Finck,  n'aurez 
pas  besoin  de  faire  usage  de  cette  instruction ;  mais,  en 
cas  de  malheur,  je  vous  autorise  ^I'employer,  et,  marque  que 
c'est,  apres  une  mure  et  saine  deliberation,  ma  ferme  et 
constant e  volonte,  je  la  signe  de  ma  main,  et  la  munis  de 
mon  cachet. 

Fr6d6ric,  E. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

Note. — ^The  letter  '  f  '  following  a  page  number  signifies  '  and  following 
page ' ;  '  ff  '  '  and  following  pages.' 


PAGE 

Absolutism,  Monarchical,  condemned  by  Bismarck  .         .         .         .119  fE 

Agriculture,  Promotion  of 18,  21,  45  ff,  63 

Albania 180 

Alliance,  Triple — See  Triple  Alliance. 

Alliances,  Frederick  the  Great's  views  regarding  binding  force  of 

22,  35,  68,  85  £E 

Amateurs,  Danger  of  Government  by 32  ff,  39  fE 

Anglophobia  in  Grermany,  principally  caused  by  William  II  according 

to  Bismarck  ..........     142 

Anti-Machiavel 65  fi 

Aristocracy — See  Nobility. 

Army,  Danger  of  management  of,  by  amateurs       .         .         .         .  32  fE 

„      German,  and  the  General  Staff    .....         .168  ff 

„      Grerman,  Discipline  of  .         .         .         .         .         .         .    33  f 

„     Frederick  the  Great's  principles  relating  to  the     .         .         .  31  ff 
„     Prussian,  Increase  of  .         .         .         .         .         .         .    10  ff.  Ill 

Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia.         .         .         .         .         .         .         .180  ff 

„  „       Bismarck  foretells  likelihood  of  Germany  getting 

entangled  in  the  Balkan  through    .         .         .     134 
„  „       Bismarck's  poUcy  towards 

112,  114,  128  ff,  132  ff,  136  ff 

„  „       Position  of,  in  1740 72  ff 

„  •  „       Possibility  of  her  attacking  Germany  outlined  by 

Bismarck 106  f,  134 

„  „       tried  in  1914  to  avoid  war  at  last  moment    .         .     195 

„  „       Ultimatum  of,  in  1914 184 

„  „       war  with  Prussia  in  1866     .....  Ill  f 

„  „       was  the  tool  of  William  II  in  1914        .         .         .185  ff 

B 

Balance  of  Power,  European,  Frederick  the  Great's  advocacy  of       .    69  f 
Balkan  problems,  Bismarck's  policy  towards  .         .     129  ff,  132  ff,  136  ff 

Balkan  Wars,  First  and  Second 180  f 

Beggars  and  idlers.  Treatment  of,  in  Prussia  .         .         .         .         .164  ff 

Bismarck  and  Napoleon  III  in  Franco-German  War        .         .         .  174  f 

„        Career  and  achievements  of    .         .         .         .         .         .109  ff 

„       Colonial  policy  of 139  ff 

273  T 


274 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


PAGB 

.  115 
.  114 
.124  f 
.119  fiE 
.  145 
.123  ff 
.126  ff 
.  141 
.  119 
.  142 
.     124 


Bismarck  concludes  Re-Insurance  Treaty  with  Russia 

concludes  Triple  Alliance         .  .         .         , 

condemns  *  Machtpolitik '        .         .         .         . 

condemns  monarchical  absolutism   . 
condemns  policy  of  prestige    .... 

condemns  unceasing  interference  of  William  II 
condemns  wars  of  prestige  and  prevention 
considers  conflict  with  England  unthinkable     . 
contrasts  character  of  WiUiam  I  with  that  of  William  II 
describes  William  II  as  the  principal  Anglophobe 
desires  counterpoise  to  Emperor  in  Federal  Council  . 

„  „  „  in  free  Press  and  Parlia- 

ment       .         .         .121  £E 
desires  Grermany  to  follow  a  policy  of  peace  and  modera- 
tion .         .         .         .         .         .         .        117  f,  124fE 

desires  good  relations  with  Great  Britain  .         .         .  139  fi 

desires  responsibility  of  Ministers  in  Grermany  .  .  .  122  f 

foretells  breakdown  of  Triple  Alliance      .         .  133,  138  f,  142  f 
foretells  Italy's  secession  from  Triple  Alliance  138  f,  142  f,  144  f 
foretells  that  Austria  may  turn  against  Germany      .       106,  134 
foretells   that   Germany   wiU   get   into  Austria's  leading- 
strings    .........     134 


foretells  trouble  with  England 

foretells  trouble  with  Japan    .... 

largely  increases  Prussian  Army 

makes  Germany  a  rich  industrial  State    . 

makes  war  upon  Austria         .... 

makes  war  upon  Denmark      .... 

makes  war  upon  France  .... 

on  possibility  of  Austria  attacking  Germany     . 
Policy  of       ......         . 

towards  Austria  .         .        112,  114,  128  ff, 


.145  ff 
.  146  f 
.  Ill 
.  113 
.  li2 
.  Ill 
.  112 
106  f,  134 
.108  ff 
132  ff,  136  ff 


.      129  ff,  132  ff,  136  ff 

.     115 

.      112,  114 

.   114,  138  f 

.     115 

115,  128  ff,  132  ff,  136  ff 

.     115 

.     110 


Balkan  problems 

England 

France   . 

Italy       . 

Roumania 

Russia    . 

Turkey  ....... 

prevents  William  I  abdicating  ..... 

protests  against  non-renewal  of  Re-Insurance  Treaty  with 

Russia 130  ff 

reveals  existence  of  Re-Insurance  Treaty  with  Russia  .         .  134  ff 
states  that  Triple  Alliance  has  a  purely  defensive  character 
and  does  not    cover  Austrian  aggression  in  Balkan 

Peninsula 128  ff,  132  ff,  136  f 

„        warns  Germany  not  to  compete  at  sea  with  England         .  144  f 
„        warns  Germany  not  to  antagonise  Great  Britain       .         .139  ff 
„        warns  Germany  not  to  antagonise  Russia 
Boer  War    . 

Bribery  and  corruption  practised  by  Frederick  the  Great 
Buckingham  Palace,  Conference  of,  1914 
Biilow,  Prince,  Anti-British  policy  of     . 


35, 


143 
176 

90  ff 

184 

176  f 


ANALYTICAL   INDEX 


275 


Cabinet  Government,  Frederick  the  Great  on 

Cabinet,  The,  under  Frederick  William  I 

Causes  of  the  War 

Character,  German,  Foundations  of  the 

Character  of  Prussian  people,  how  formed 

Citizen,  Rights  and  duties  of  the  Prussian 

Civil  Service,  Prussian,  under  Frederick  William  I 

„  „       Secret  of  efficiency  of  Prussian 

Coalitions,  Frederick  the  Great  on  weakness  of 
Code,  Prussian,  Extracts  from 
Colonial  Empire,  The  Grerman 
Colonial  policy  of  Bismarck  and  of  William  II 
Colonies,  German,  Future  and  value  of  the     . 
Colonising  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great 
„  „        of  Frederick  William  I 

Coronation,  Cost  of,  under  Frederick  I  and  Frederick  William 
Corruption  and  bribery  practised  by  Frederick  the  Great 


PAGE 

.  38  ff 
.  12  f 
.174  fE 
.150  ff 
.  17  ff 
.162  ff 
.   12  ff 

43  f,  165 
.101  ff 

44,  161  ff 

.212  ff 

.139  ff 

.212  ff 

46,  50  ff 

.       18 

9 

46,  60  fi 


Democratic  and  Monarchical  Government  compared        .         .         .  28  ff 
Democratic  Government,  Frederick  the  Great  on    .         .         .  28  ff,  39  ff 
Denmark  and  Prussia  .........     Ill 

Diplomacy  and  history.  Study  of,  neglected  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries 

2,  59  ff,  109 

Discipline  is  the  principal  cause  of  Germany's  strength  ...         3 

„         Military,  how  enforced  in  Prussia   .  .  .  .  .    33  f 

Distinctions  and  rewards,  Frederick  the  Great  on  .         .         .         .    42  f 

Dublin  riots  of  1914 186  f 


E 


35  ff,  47  ff,  113,  152  ff 

.150  ff 

.25  ff 

ff,  155  ff, 


Economic  policy  of  Prusso-Germany      .         .    18, 
Education,  German,  Foundations  of 

„         of  princes,  Frederick  the  Great  on 

„  Prussian      .  .  .         .         18  f,  55,  150 

Efficiency  of  German  Civil  Service,  Secret  of  . 
Ems  Telegram      ....... 

England  and  Turkey    ...... 

„        Bismarck  considers  hostility  with,  unthinkable 

„        Bismarck  desires  good  relations  with 

„        Bismarck  values  the  friendship  of     . 

„        Bismarck  warns  against  competing  with  British  Navy 

„        Bismarck  foretold  danger  of  complications  with 

„        Bismarck  policy  towards.  .... 

„        Policy  of,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

„        Traditional  policy  of,  towards  Turkey 


266  ff 
,  266  ff 
.  43 
.  174 
.197  ff 
.  141 
.139ff 
.143  f 
.  144  f 
.145ff 
.  115 
.182  ff 
.  209 
t2 


276  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

F 

PAas 

Fehrbellin,  Battle  of 7 

Finances,  national,  Frederick  the  Great  on     .         .         .         .         .  35  fE 
Fink  von  Finkenstein,  Frederick  the  Great's  letter  to      .         .         .    24  f 

Fiskalat,  The 16  f 

Food  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great 37,  62 

Foreign   Office,  German,  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  William  II's  war 

policy 187  ff 

Foreign  Policy,  Frederick  the  Great  on  .....       37 

France,  Germany's  policy  towards  .....      112,  114 

„       Germany's  war  with  (1870-71) 112 

Franco-German  War  of  1870-71,  Causes  of  the        ....  174  f 
Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  and  William  II         ...         .     181 

„  „         Murder  of 183 

Francis  Joseph,  Address  by,  in  1914      ......     191 

„  „       Timorous  old  man's  policy  of  ...         .  185  f 

„  „       was  the  tool  of  William  II 185  ft 

Frederick  I,  King  of  Prussia,  Character  and  activities  of  .       7  f,  62  f,  151 

Frederick  the  Great,  Agricultural  policy  of 45  £E 

„  „         asserts   that    a    conspiracy   has    been   formed 

against  him 96  f,  100 

„  „         Bribery,  corruption,  and  espionage  practised 

by 90  fE 

„  „         Character  and  activities  of      .         .         .    20  fE,  155 

„  „         claimed  that  the  Seven  Years*  War  had  been 

forced  upon  him      .         .         .         .         .  83  fE 
„  „         Colonising  policy  of         .         .         .         .      46,  50  fE 

„  „         condemns  MachiaveUi's  teachings    .         .         .  66  fE 

„  „         condemns  war  and  praises  peace      .         .      67,  97  fE 

„  „         Economic  policy  of         .     18,  35  fE,  47^fE,  113,  152  fE 

„  „         Educational  policy  of     .         .         .         .65,  166  fE 

„  „         '  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de  Gouvernement,'  text 

of 248fE 

„  „         Food  policy  of       ....         37,  46  fE,  52 

„  „         '  Histoire    de  mon  Temps,'  introduction,  text 

of 238  fE 

„  „         Industrial  policy  of         .         .         .         .         .    48  f 

„  „         '  Instructions  for  Major  Borcke,'  text  of.         .  266  fE 

„  „        instructions  if  captured,  defeated,  or  killed  in 

battle 24f,  271f 


Matrimonial  policy  of     . 

on  alliances 

on  Army  matters  . 

on  Battle  of  Kunersdorf 

on  Cabinet  Government. 

on  causes  of  his  victories 

on  Democratic  Government 


on  distinctions  and  rewards  for  merit      .         .    42  f 


on  duties  of  kings 
on  education  of  princes 
on  Foreign  Policy  . 
on  freedom  of  religion 


.  80  fE 
22,  36,  68,  86  fE 
.  31  fE 
.  102 
.  38  fE 
.101  fE 
.  28  fE 


.  21  fE,  65  fE 
.  25  fE 
.  37 
.     167 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


277 


PAGE 

Frederick  the  Great,  on  glory 71 

on 'Machtpolitik'. 97  fE 

on  military  discipline     .         .         .         .         .    33  f 

on  national  finances  and  financial  policy.         .  35  fE 
on  the  necessity  of  unity  in  Government.         .  38  ff 
on  taxation    .......      37 

on  the  management  of  the  nobility  .        43,  166 

on  the  true  strength  of  the  State    ...       45 
on  weakness  of  coalitions         ....  101  £E 

'  Political  Testament '  of  .         .         .         .229  flE 

Reclamation  policy  of    .         .         .         .         .    60  f 

recommends  acquisition  of  Saxony  ...       81 

Silesian  War  of 70  flE 

Social  policy  of 163  flE 

'  Testament  Politique,'  text  of  .  .  .  229 
tries  to  corrupt  Madame  de  Pompadour  ,  .  92 
Unscrupulousness  and  duplicity  of  .         «  75  fE,  80  fE 

Frederick  William  I,  King  of  Prussia,  Character  and  activities  of 

8  flE,  64,  151  flE 

Frederick  William,  the  Great  Elector,  Character  and  activities  of 

6  fE,  151 

French  refugees  in  Brandenburg-Prussia 6 


G 

General  StafE  and  the  German  Army 168  £E 

Glory,  Frederick  the  Great  on        .         .         .         .         .         .         .71 

Goltz,  Colmar  von  der  ........  178  f 

Government,  Monarchical  and  Democratic  compared        .         .  28  fE,  39  fE 
Great  Britain,  Bismarck  considers  hostilities  with,  unthinkable         .     141 

„       and  Turkey 197  fE 

„  „       Bismarck  desires  good  relations  with         .         .         .  139  fE 

„  „       Bismarck  values  the  friendship  of     .         .         .         .  143  f 

„  „       Bismarck    warns    against    competing    with    British 

Navy       ........  144  f 

„  „       Bismarck's  policy  towards        .         .         .         .         .115 

„  „       Policy  of,  before  outbreak  of  the  war        .         .         .  182  f 

„  „       Traditional  policy  of,  towards  Turkey       .         .         .     209 

Great  Elector,  Character  and  activities  of 5  fE 

H 

Heligoland 137 

History  and  diplomacy.  Study  of,  neglected  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries 

2,  59  fE,  109 


Industrial  policy  of  Bismarck        .         ,         .         .         .  .  .113 

„           „         of  Frederick  the  Great          .         .         .  .  .    48  f 

Insurance,  National,  Foundation  of,  by  Frederick  the  Great  .  .  163  fE 

Ireland,  Influence  of,  upon  outbreak  of  the  war      .         .  .  184,  186  f 


278 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


Italy,  Bismarck  foretold  probable  secession  of,  from  Triple  Alliance 

138  f,  142  f,  144 

„     Bismarck's  policy  towards 114,  138  f 

„     Policy  of,  before  outbreak  of  the  war  .         .         ,         .         .182 


Japan,  Bismarck  foretold  danger  of  complications  with 
Justice,  Frederick  the  Great  on     . 


.  146  f 
55,  159  ff 


King,  The,  is  the  first  citizen  and  the  first  servant  of  the  State  21  S,  65  f 
Kings,  Duties  of,  according  to  Frederick  the  Great  21  ff,  65  ff,  162  S. 
Kriiger  telegram  ..........     176 

Krupp 142 

Kunersdorf,  Battle  of 102 


Law  and  justice,  Frederick  the  Great  on 
Ludewig,  Professor       .... 


55,  159  fE 
.       95 


M 


Machiavelli,  Frederick  the  Great's  condemnation  of 
'  Machtpolitik '  condemned  by  Bismarck 

„  condemned  by  Frederick  the  Great 

Maria  Theresa  and  Frederick  the  Great 

„  „       Frederick  the  Great  on  character  of 

Matrimonial  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great 
Menzel,  the  spy   ....... 

Mesopotamia,  Condition  of    . 
Militdr  Wochenblatt  incites  to  war  in  1914 
Ministers,  Responsibility  of,  urged  by  Bismarck 
Moderation,  Policy  of,  recommended  by  Bismarck  . 

„  „  „  by  Frederick  the  Great 

Moltke,  Field-Marshal  von,  and  German  General  Staff     . 


99, 


117  f. 


56  fE 

124  f 

97  ff 

70  ff 

96 

88  fE 

93  fE 

207  f 

191 

122  f 

124  ff 

.       99 

,169  ff 


N 

Napoleon  III  and  the  Franco-German  War     .....  174  f 
„         „     and  William  II  compared.         .....  179  f 

Navy  BiU,  German,  of  1900 142,  177 

Nobility,  Frederick  the  Great  on  the  management  of  the  .        43,  166 


Opportunities,  Favourable,  should  be  used  for  making  war 
Organisation,  Importance  of,  ignored  by  most  Englishmen  *- 


95,  98 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


279 


PA-QB 

Peace  and  moderation.  Policy  of,  recommended  by  Bismarck 

99,  117  f,  124  £E 

„  „  recommended  by  Frederick  the  Great  .  99 

Poland 137 

Policy,  social,  Foundations  of         ......         .  163  f 

Pompadour,  Frederick  the  Great's  attempt  to  corrupt  Madame  de    .       92 
Population  determines  strength  of  the  State  .  .  .  .  45,  48 

„  Policy  of  Frederick  the  Great  to  increase        .  .  .  60  fE 

„  Prussian,  decrease  of,  during  Seven  Years'  War      .  .       49 

Precaution,  Wars  of,  condemned  by  Bismarck  .  .     95,  98,  117  f,  124  fE 

Press,  German,  Anti-British  activity  of   .  .  .  .  .  177  flE 

Prestige,  Policy  of,  condemned  by  Bismarck     .....    145 

„       Wars  of,  condemned  by  Frederick  the  Great       .         .         95,  98 
Princes — See  Kings. 

R 


Reclamation  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great      .  .  .  .  .    50  f 

„  „     of  Frederick  William  I 18 

Re-Insurance  Treaty  with  Russia  .         .         .         .         .         .115 

„  „  „  Bismarck    protests    against    non- 

renewal of    .         .         .         . 130  fi 

„  „  „  Existence  of,  revealed  by  Bismarck 

134  £E 

„  „  „  not  renewed  by  WUliam  II    .         .     130 

Religion,  Freedom  of    .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .167 

Republics — See  Democratic  Government. 

Responsibility  of  Ministers  urged  by  Bismarck  .  .  .  .122  f 

Revenue  of  Brandenburg-Prussia,  Increase  of  .  .  .         '7,  36,  79 

Rewards  arid  distinctions,  Frederick  the  Great  on    .  .  .  .42 

Roumania,  Bismarck's  policy  towards     .  .  .  .  .  .115 

Rulers — See  Kings. 

Russia,  Bismarck's  policy  towards  .         .       116,  128  fE,  132  £E,  136  ff 

„      Policy  of,  before  outbreak  of  the  war         ....  182  £E 


S 


Saxony,  Acquisition  of,  recommended  by  Frederick  the  Great 

„  Invasion  of,  by  Frederick  the  Great  . 
Serbia  and  Austro -Hungary  .... 
Seven  Years'  War,  How  begun 

„  „  How  havoc  of,  was  overcome 

„  „  Losses  in  men  caused  by  . 

„  „  Terrible  efEect  of 

„  „  Why  Prussia  was  victorious  in 

Silesian  War,  Causes  and  commencement  of    . 
Social  policy,  Foundations  of  .  .  . 

Sovereigns — See  Kings. 
Spying  practised  by  Frederick  the  Great 
StafE,  General,  and  the  German  Army    . 


81 

,  82  ff 
180  ff 
,  82  ff 
.  50  ff 
.  104 
.  49  f 
.101  ff 
.  70  ff 
.163  ff 

.  90  ff 
.168  ff 


280  ANALYTICAL  INDEX 

PAGE 

State,  Conception  and  powers  of,  in  Prussia 162  & 

Statesmanship  ignored  at  British  and  American  Universities    2,  59  &,  109 
Stoffel,  Colonel,  on  Prussian  General  StaflE 168  fE 

T 

Taxation,  Frederick  the  Great  on .         .         .         .         .         .         .37 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von    .........     177 

Treaties,  Frederick  the  Great  on  binding  force  of    .         .      22,  36,  68,  85 

Triple  Alliance 114 

„  „      Breakdown  of,  foretold  by  Bismarck       .  133,  138  f,  142  f 

„  „      Purely  defensive  character  and  limited  scope  of 

115,  128  ff,  132  ff,  136  f 

Turkey,  Asiatic,  Condition  of 207  f 

„       Bismarck's  policy  towards         .         .         .         .         .         .115 

„       Frederick  the  Great's  policy  towards  ....     103 

„       Germany  and  the  war       .......  196  fE 

„       Great  Britain's  traditional  policy  towards  ....     209 

U 

Unity,  Frederick  the  Great  on  necessity  of,  in  Government    .  .    38  fE 

Universities,  Anglo-Saxon,  neglect  history  and  statesmanship .     59  fE,  109 

W 

War,  Causes  of  the 174  fE 

Wars  of  prevention  and  prestige  condemned  by  Bismarck 

95,  98,  117  f,  124  fE 
^;  „  „  „  „        condemned  by  Frederick  the  Great 

95,  98 

Weingarten,  the  spy 93 

William  I,  Abdication  of,  prevented  by  Bismarck  .         .         .         .110 
„  and  William  II  compared  by  Bismarck  .         .         .     119 

William  II  and  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  .  .  .  .  .181 
„  and  William  I  compared  by  Bismarck  .  .  .  .119 
„        Anti-British  policy  of  ...      139  fE,  142  fE,  176  fE 

„  „  „        condemned  by  Bismarck      .         .142  fE 

„        Character  and  policy  of        .         .  60  fE,  108  fE,  175  fE 

„        Far  Eastern  Policy  of,  criticised  by  Bismarck  .         .         .     146 

„        is  called  a  poUron  miserable 180 

„        over-ruled  Bethmann  Hollweg  and  the  German  Foreign 

Ofl&ce 187 

„        refused  to  renew  Re-Insurance  Treaty  with  Russia  .  130  flE 

„  Similarity  of,  with  Napoleon  III  .  .  .  .  .  179  f 
„  Unceasing  interference  of,  condemned  by  Bismarck  .123  fE 
„        was,  according  to  Bismarck,  the  principal  Anglophobe  in 

Germany        .         .  .....     142 

Z 
Zanzibar 137 


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